5:25-cv-01491•Duran v. Honorable Christine Del Prado, Individual et al
Duran v. Honorable Christine Del Prado, Individual et al
5:25-cv-01491Txwd15 déc. 2025
Texte intégral
1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION ARTURO OSVALDO DURAN, Plaintiff, vs. JUDICIAL OFFICER HONORABLE CHRISTINE DEL PRADO, INDIVIDUAL, POLICE OFFICER SAPD; ADAM H. LEE, INDIVIDUAL, SAN ANTONIO; ATTORNEY AT LAW JOE STENBERG, INDIVIDUAL, MAGISTRATE CELESTE MARIE RAMIREZ, INDIVIDUAL, BEXAR COUNTY; AND WILLIAM MCMANUS, INDIVIDUAL, Defendants. § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § SA-25-CV-01491-JKP ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE To the Honorable United States District Judge Jason K. Pulliam: Before the Court in the above-styled cause of action are Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs [#1], Proposed Complaint [#1-1], and Motion to Appoint Counsel [#2]. This case was automatically referred to the undersigned upon filing for an order on Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and motion to appoint counsel and a review of the pleadings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The undersigned therefore has authority to enter this order and report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). By his motions, Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP based on his inability to afford court fees and costs and requests appointment of counsel. Having considered the motions and documentation provided by Plaintiff, the undersigned will grant Plaintiff’s IFP motion [#1], deny Case 5:25-cv-01491-JKP Document 4 Filed 12/15/25 Page 1 of 11
2 the motion to appoint counsel [#2], recommend the District Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and claims for damages against Plaintiff’s appointed attorney and the two state judge Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and recommend the District Court stay Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Defendants pending the resolution of his state criminal proceedings. I. Motion to Proceed IFP All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350, as well as an administrative fee.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP includes his income and asset information, which indicates that he does not have sufficient monthly resources available to pay the filing fee. The Court will therefore grant the motion to proceed IFP. II. Review Under Section 1915(e) Pursuant to the Court’s October 8, 2019 Standing Order, the undersigned has also reviewed Plaintiff’s Proposed Complaint [#1-1] under the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), this Court may screen any civil complaint filed by a party proceeding IFP to determine whether the claims presented are (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This Court also has an ongoing obligation to evaluate its subject matter jurisdiction. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). 1 The administrative fee, which is currently $55, is waived for plaintiffs who are granted IFP status. See District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule. Case 5:25-cv-01491-JKP Document 4 Filed 12/15/25 Page 2 of 11
3 This case arises out of Plaintiff’s alleged wrongful arrest on August 20, 2024, and an ensuing criminal prosecution. Plaintiff alleges that he was not afforded due process at many intervals of his encounter with the San Antonio Police Department (SAPD), from the traffic stop that led to his arrest to his detention and current criminal proceedings in Bexar County District Court. Plaintiff names as Defendants the City of San Antonio, SAPD Chief William McManus, SAPD Officer Adam Lee (the arresting officer), Judge Celeste Ramirez (Bexar County Magistrate), Judge Christine Del Prado (the Bexar County District Judge presiding over his criminal proceedings), and Joe Stenberg (his appointed attorney). Plaintiff states in his proposed Complaint that there are ongoing criminal proceedings against him related to these events and provides the Court with a cause number, 2024CR010945. A public records search confirms that there is a pending criminal case in the 227th District Court of Bexar County before Judge Christine Del Prado against Plaintiff, in which Plaintiff is awaiting trial on felony charges. Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint alleges constitutional violations by SAPD, Bexar County Judges, and the attorney appointed to represent him in his criminal case. By his lawsuit, Plaintiff asks this Court to dismiss his state criminal case, bar Judges Ramirez and Del Prado and Defendant Stenberg from the practice of law, permanently enjoin Defendants from retaliating against Defendant with further convictions, and award him $999,999.99 in compensatory damages from each Defendant. For the reasons that follow, the District Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under the Younger abstention doctrine; dismiss his damages claims against his appointed attorney and Judges Ramirez and Del Prado; but stay his damages claims against the remaining SAPD Defendants pending the resolution of his state criminal proceedings. Case 5:25-cv-01491-JKP Document 4 Filed 12/15/25 Page 3 of 11
4 A. Younger Abstention and Plaintiff’s Claims for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief First, under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts must “refrain from considering requests for injunctive relief based upon constitutional challenges to state criminal proceedings pending at the time the federal action is instituted.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing cases). Three conditions must be met for the doctrine to apply: (1) the dispute must involve an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) an important state interest in the subject matter of the proceeding must be implicated; and (3) the state proceeding must afford an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. Wightman v. Tex. Sup. Ct., 84 F.3d 188, 189 (5th Cir. 1996). First, Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint and court records over which the Court may take judicial notice establish that Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief in ongoing criminal proceedings. Second, these proceedings concern the enforcement of state criminal law, something in which the state has as strong interest. Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 880 (5th Cir. 2018). As to the third requirement, federal courts “should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). To overcome this assumption, plaintiff must show that he “had no opportunity to litigate the federal issue in state court.” DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff has attached to his proposed Complaint a copy of a motion to disqualify Judge Del Prado filed in his state criminal case. Plaintiff’s own filings demonstrate that he is actively availing himself of the opportunity to litigate issues raised in his proposed federal Complaint in state court. Plaintiff has not overcome the assumption that there is an adequate remedy in state court to raise his constitutional challenges. To the extent Plaintiff believes he will not receive a fair trial in state court, he still Case 5:25-cv-01491-JKP Document 4 Filed 12/15/25 Page 4 of 11
5 has an adequate remedy at law because he may raise his constitutional concerns on direct appeal. See Thomas v. State, 294 F. Supp. 3d 576, 594–95 (N.D. Tex. 2018). Accordingly, all three conditions of Younger abstention are satisfied here. Even where the prerequisites for Younger abstention are satisfied, there are narrow exceptions to the doctrine, such as where “extraordinary circumstances” justify intervention and irreparable injury is imminent or a state proceeding is clearly being brough in bad faith or with the purpose of harassment. DeSpain, 731 F.2d at 1180. A prosecution is taken in bad faith if state officials proceed “without hope of obtaining a valid conviction.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971); accord Ballard v. Wilson, 856 F.2d 1568, 1571 (5th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit has made clear that “the ‘bad faith’ exception is narrow and should be granted parsimoniously.” Hefner v. Alexander, 779 F.2d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1985). Although Plaintiff alleges he was denied due process repeatedly throughout his proposed Complaint, he does not sufficiently plead that his prosecution was taken in bad faith, only that he does not believe “driving while drunken” is a recognizable offense in the Texas. As to the “extraordinary circumstances” exception, Plaintiff has not identified any imminent irreparable injury other than a possible conviction. The narrow exceptions to Younger abstention do not apply here, and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s request for injunctive and declaratory relief. B. Plaintiff’s Claims for Damages Against the Judge Defendants Plaintiff also seeks compensatory damages from each Defendant in their individual and official capacities for constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Notably, “requests for monetary damages do not fall within the purview of the Younger abstention doctrine.” Allen v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry, 835 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff, however, cannot Case 5:25-cv-01491-JKP Document 4 Filed 12/15/25 Page 5 of 11
6 pursue compensatory damages against the two judge Defendants named in his proposed Complaint. Judges are immune from suit for acts taken in a judicial capacity under the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). This immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice. Id. Insofar as Plaintiff is seeking damages from Judges Ramirez and Del Prado in their official capacities, these claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as they are in essence claims for damages against the State of Texas itself. See Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding judges are “entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims asserted against them in their official capacities as state actors”). The District Court should therefore dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Judges Ramirez and Del Prado under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). C. Plaintiff’s Claims against his Appointed Attorney Plaintiff’s claims against his appointed attorney should also be dismissed. “Section 1983 claims require that the conduct complained of be done under color of law, and private attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors, and generally are not subject to suit under section 1983.” Mills v. Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1988). Private attorneys who have conspired with state actors may, however, be held liable under Section 1983, even if the state officials with whom they are alleged to have conspired are themselves immune from suit. Id. However, nowhere in Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint has he pleaded that Defendant Stenberg conspired with others to deprive him of due process. The only allegations in Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint about Stenberg is that he allegedly engaged in ex parte communications with Magistrate Judge Ramirez to “get Stenberg on board with violating” his constitutional rights by ensuring that “all exculpatory evidence” was concealed from Plaintiff in his criminal case. Plaintiff does not articulate a theory of conspiracy or any due process Case 5:25-cv-01491-JKP Document 4 Filed 12/15/25 Page 6 of 11
7 violation by Stenberg actionable under Section 1983. If Plaintiff believes he is not receiving effective assistance of counsel in his criminal case, he may raise these concerns in his criminal case. D. Plaintiff’s Claims against the SAPD Defendants This leaves Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the City of San Antonio, SAPD Officer Adam Lee, and SAPD Chief William McManus. These claims should be stayed pending the resolution of Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings. In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that a Section 1983 claim for damages that “necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of [the plaintiff’s] conviction or imprisonment” does not accrue until that conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). However, in Wallace v. Kato, the Supreme Court held that the Heck bar does not apply to a civil rights claim that would impugn pending criminal proceedings, and common practice supports the stay of such a civil rights claim pending resolution of the criminal case. 549 U.S. 384, 393–94 (2007). The Court explained: If a plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended. . . . If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit. Id. (citations omitted). See also Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The court may—indeed should—stay proceedings in the section 1983 case until the pending criminal case has run its course, as until that time it may be difficult to determine the relation, if any, between the two.”). Case 5:25-cv-01491-JKP Document 4 Filed 12/15/25 Page 7 of 11
8 Accordingly, the Court should stay Plaintiff’s claim for damages under Section 1983 against the SAPD Defendants until his underlying state criminal case concludes. The District Court should also administratively close this case; order that Plaintiff file a motion to reopen this case within sixty (60) days after entry of judgment in the underlying state criminal case; and warn Plaintiff that his failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute and for failure to comply with court orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). III. Motion to Appoint Counsel Finally, Plaintiff also seeks the appointment of counsel. There is no right to the automatic appointment of counsel in a civil case. Akasike v. Fitzpatrick, 26 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1994); Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). However, courts have the discretion to appoint counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) in in forma pauperis proceedings where exceptional circumstances are present. Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted); see Cupit, 835 F.2d at 86. In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist and whether the court in its discretion should appoint counsel, the following factors are relevant: (1) the type and complexity of the case; (2) whether the plaintiff is capable of adequately representing herself; (3) the plaintiff’s ability to adequately investigate and present her case; (4) the presence of evidence which consists largely of conflicting testimony so as to require skill in the presentation of evidence and in cross-examination; and (5) the likelihood that appointment will benefit the plaintiff, the court, and the defendant by shortening the trial and assisting in a just determination. Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cnty., Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991); Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982). Case 5:25-cv-01491-JKP Document 4 Filed 12/15/25 Page 8 of 11
9 Plaintiff has not demonstrated that exceptional circumstances are present in his case or that, based on the record, appointment of counsel is appropriate under the applicable legal standards of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The undersigned has already reviewed the pleadings and determined that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief should be dismissed; that Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Judges Del Prado and Martinez and Attorney Stenberg should be dismissed; and that his remaining damages claims against the SAPD Defendants should be stayed during the pendency of his state criminal proceedings. The appointment of counsel would not save any of the claims for which the undersigned has recommended dismissal. The Court will therefore deny Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel. IV. Orders and Recommendation For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs [#1] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel [#2] is DENIED. Additionally, having considered Plaintiff’s Proposed Complaint [#1-1] under the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. §1915(e), the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and his claims for damages against Defendants Celeste Ramriez, Christine Del Prado, and Joe Stenberg pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). It is also RECOMMENDED that the District Court STAY Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants SAPD, Chief McManus, and Officer Adams pending the resolution of his state criminal proceedings The District Court should also administratively close this case; order that Plaintiff file a motion to reopen this case within sixty (60) days after entry of judgment in the Case 5:25-cv-01491-JKP Document 4 Filed 12/15/25 Page 9 of 11
10 underlying state criminal case; and warn Plaintiff that his failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute and for failure to comply with court orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). V. Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object/Appeal The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this report and recommendation on all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as a “filing user” with the clerk of court, or (2) by mailing a copy to those not registered by certified mail, return receipt requested. Written objections to this report and recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, unless this time period is modified by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The party shall file the objections with the Clerk of Court and serve the objections on all other parties. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the district court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149–52 (1985); Acuña v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to file timely written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report and recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the un-objected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, Case 5:25-cv-01491-JKP Document 4 Filed 12/15/25 Page 10 of 11
11
1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
SIGNED this 15th day of December, 2025.
ELIZABETH S. ("BETSY") CHESTNEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 5:25-cv-01491-JKP Document 4 Filed 12/15/25 Page 11 of 11Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.