Martinez Campuzano v. Noem et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
MARIO MARTINEZ
CAMPUZANO,
Petitioner,
v.
NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
No. 1:25-CV-1715-DAE
ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Mario Martinez Campuzano’s
(“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (Dkt. # 1), filed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241, and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (the “Motion”), (Dkt. # 2).
Respondents filed a Response to the Motion on December 29, 2025. (Dkt. # 15.)1
Petitioner’s Motion was originally set for a hearing on January 6,
2026. However, given that the parties’ arguments set forth in Petitioner’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (Dkt. # 1), Petitioner’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, (Dkt. # 2), and Respondents’ Response, (Dkt. # 15), appeared to fully
address Petitioner’s statutory challenge to his ongoing detention—whether 8
1 The Court will only address Respondents’ Amended Response, (Dkt. # 15), which
was filed after their initial Response to Petitioner’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, (Dkt. # 14).
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U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) applies in his case—the Court ordered the parties
to advise whether they were willing to rest on their arguments set forth in
Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (Dkt. # 1), Petitioner’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, (Dkt. # 2), and Respondents’ Response, (Dkt. # 15), on this
statutory interpretation issue. Upon conferring, the parties submitted they were
indeed willing to rest on their arguments and requested that the Court rule on the
arguments set forth in the filed documents. (Dkt. # 17.) They advised that the
matter was fully briefed and ready for adjudication. (Id. at 2.)
Accordingly, the Court finds this matter suitable for disposition
without a hearing and determines that the petition is ready for ruling. After careful
consideration of the parties’ briefs and the relevant law, the Court GRANTS
Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. # 1) for the reasons that
follow.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Martinez Campuzano is a Mexican national who entered the
United States in January 1997.2 (Dkt. # 1 at 3.) Since 1997, Petitioner has not left
2 Petitioner originally entered the United States without inspection (“EWI”) prior
to 1997 when he was 14 years old. (Dkt. # 1 at 3.) Petitioner states that after the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) was signed into law in 1986, his
father took him to apply for his permanent residency. (Id.) Petitioner further states
that he believes he applied for permanent residency and obtained an employment
authorization card, a social security number, and a driver’s license, but he does not
know whether he is indeed a lawful permanent resident. (Id. at 3–4.) Petitioner
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the United States and has resided continuously in the country for over 28 years.
(Id. at 4.) He has significant family and community ties to the United States,
including two U.S. citizen children. (Dkt. # 2 at 2.) Petitioner states that he has
applied for 42-B relief3 and qualifies for a T-visa.
In July of 2025, Petitioner was arrested in Bastrop, Texas for driving
without a license and was subsequently detained by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”). (Dkt. # 1 at 4.) He is currently being held at T. Don Hutto
Detention Center in Taylor, Texas pending removal proceedings. (Dkt. # 15 at 3.)
Respondents assert that Petitioner is being detained under the “mandatory
detention” authority for noncitizens who are in the process of entering the United
States, 8 U.S.C. § 1225. (Dkt. # 15 at 3–4, 5–6; see Dkt. # 15-2); see also Matter of
Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)). As such, Petitioner is being held
without the possibility of release or a bond hearing. (See Dkts. ## 11 at 2; 15-2 at
1.)
On October 24, 2025, Petitioner initiated this habeas action. (Dkt.
# 1.) That same day, Petitioner filed Motion for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin
Respondents from continuing Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing
avers that he then left the United States for Mexico for an unspecified amount of
time before returning in 1997 for seasonal agricultural work. (Id.) There is no
record of his admission to the United States for this 1997 entry. (Id. at 4, 13.)
3 The Court presumes Petitioner refers to a request for cancellation of removal
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b using form EOIR-42B.
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pending the resolution of his habeas petition. (Dkt. # 2.)4 Petitioner brings claims
that his ongoing detention without bond is unlawful in violation of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”), his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights, the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the Suspension Clause, and various bond
regulations. (Dkt. # 1 at 13–16.)
LEGAL STANDARD
“A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if a petitioner is in
federal custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.” Buenrostro-
Mendez v. Bondi, No. CV H-25-3726, 2025 WL 2886346, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7,
2025) (internal citation and quotations omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The habeas
4 The Court originally set Petitioner’s Motion for a hearing on November 20, 2025.
(Dkt. # 8.) However, on November 7, 2025, the immigration court made an oral
finding that Petitioner had been lawfully admitted and gave the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) time to amend the notice to appear to reflect the new
charges. (Dkt. # 7 at 1.) Because the immigration judge’s finding would make
Petitioner eligible for a bond hearing and would render the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus moot, the parties requested that the Court hold the motions in
abeyance until after additional immigration court proceedings. (Id. at 1–2.) The
Court granted the parties’ request and canceled the hearing until further update by
the parties. (Dkt. # 10.) On November 21, 2025, the immigration judge rescinded
his decision and found that Petitioner was not lawfully admitted into the country.
(Dkt. # 11 at 2.) The immigration judge further found that the ruling in Matter of
Yajure Hurtado remained in effect and so the immigration court did not have
jurisdiction over Petitioner’s bond proceedings. (Id.) Petitioner then moved this
Court for a new hearing on his previously filed Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
(Id.), which the Court granted. On December 5, 2025, an immigration judge issued
an order denying Petitioner’s request for a custody redetermination, again noting
that immigration judges lack authority to hear bond requests pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and Matter of Yajure Hurtado. (Dkts. ## 15 at 3; 15-2 at 1.)
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petitioner “bears the burden of proving that he is being held contrary to law; and
because the habeas proceeding is civil in nature, the petitioner must satisfy his
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Villanueva v. Tate, No. CV
H-25-3364, 2025 WL 2774610, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2025) (internal citation
and quotations omitted). “A court considering a habeas petition must ‘determine
the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.’” Id. (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2243).
DISCUSSION
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, Respondents argue that the Court lacks
jurisdiction to decide this case because 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), (b)(9), and
§ 1225(b)(4) bar district court review of ICE’s decision to detain Petitioner, the
decision to commence removal proceedings, and any decision regarding the
admission of a noncitizen. (Dkt. # 15 at 8–9.) The Court will address each
provision in turn.
A. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)
Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any [noncitizen] arising from the decision or
action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
execute removal orders against any [noncitizen] under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1252(g). The Supreme Court has emphasized that this section “applies only to
three discrete actions that the Attorney general may take: her ‘decision or action’ to
‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” Reno v.
Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (emphasis in
original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). This language was not intended “to sweep
in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of
the Attorney General.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018). Instead,
the provision is confined to “just those three specific actions themselves.” Id.
(citing Reno, 525 U.S. at 482–83). Therefore, because Petitioner challenges the
lawfulness of his continued detention during the pendency of his removal
proceedings, § 1252(g) does not apply.5 Cardoso v. Reno, 216 F.3d 512, 516–17
(5th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1252(g) does not bar courts from reviewing [a
noncitizen] detention order, because such an order, ‘while intimately related to
efforts to deport, is not itself a decision to “execute removal orders” and thus does
not implicate section 1252(g).’”); Santiago v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-361-KC, 2025
5 Respondents characterize Petitioner’s challenge as one directed at “the decision
to detain [Petitioner] in the first place.” (Dkt. # 15 at 9.) They argue that this
challenge “arises directly from the decision to commence and/or adjudicate
removal proceedings against [Petitioner][,]” which is “exactly the type of challenge
Jennings referenced as unreviewable.” (Id.) The Court finds this argument
unpersuasive. Petitioner is not challenging the decision to detain him but rather his
continued detention without bond. (See Dkt. # 1 at 2.) Contrary to Respondents’
claims, this falls outside the types of challenge § 1252(g) is explicitly limited to.
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294; Cardoso, 216 F.3d at 516–17.
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WL 2792588, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025); Pineda v. Noem, No. SA-25-CA-
01518-XR, 2025 WL 3471418, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2025); YENNIFER
VALERIA DAVILA MERCADO, Petitioner, v. TODD M. LYONS, Acting Dir. of
US ICE, et al., Respondents., No. 5:25-CV-1623-JKP, 2025 WL 3654268, at *3
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2025).
B. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)
Next, § 1252(b)(9) states:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and
application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any
action taken or proceeding brought to remove [a noncitizen] from the United
States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a
final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section,
no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus . . . , or by any other
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such
questions of law or fact.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). According to Respondents, this provision deprives the
Court of jurisdiction because it consolidates all legal and factual challenges arising
from removal proceedings into a single petition for review of a final removal order
before the appropriate federal court of appeals. (Dkt. # 15 at 9.) Section
1252(b)(9), however, does not bar the court’s review where a petitioner is not
“asking for review of an order of removal,” “challenging the decision to detain
them in the first place or seek removal,” or “challenging any part of the process by
which their removability will be determined.” Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 402
(2019). Here, Petitioner is not challenging his removal proceedings but rather his
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continued detention without bond during the pendency of his removal proceedings.
Section 1252(b)(9) thus does not present a jurisdictional bar. Id. at 399–400, 402
(concluding that § 1252(b)(9) did not strip the court of jurisdiction where
individuals challenged their detention without bond); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020) (Ҥ 1252(b)(9) does not present
a jurisdictional bar” where those bringing suit “are not asking for review of an
order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which
removability will be determined.”).
C. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(4)
Finally, Respondents cite 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(4) as a potential bar.
Section 1225(b)(4) relates to an immigration officer’s ability to challenge another
immigration officer’s favorable determination of admissibility.6 The Court sees no
relevance of this provision to cases like Petitioner’s, nor does the Court find this
provision precludes it from exercising jurisdiction. Rojas v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-
443-KC, 2025 WL 3038262, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2025); Estupinan Reyes v.
6 Specifically, § 1225(b)(4) provides: “The decision of the examining
immigration officer, if favorable to the admission of any [noncitizen], shall be
subject to challenge by any other immigration officer and such challenge shall
operate to take the [noncitizen] whose privilege to be admitted is so challenged,
before an immigration judge for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.”
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Warden Bobby Thompson, et al., No. SA-25-CA-01590-XR, 2025 WL 3654265, at
*2 n.1 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2025).7
Accordingly, Respondents’ jurisdictional challenges fail, and the Court has
jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims. Estupinan Reyes, 2025 WL 3654265,
at *1 (“As a general matter, the Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s habeas
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and 2241.”); see also Jennings, 583
U.S. at 293 (“We are required in this case to decide ‘questions of law,’ specifically,
whether . . . certain statutory provisions require detention without a bond
hearing.”).
II. The Merits of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Having concluded that it has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims, the
Court turns to the merits of Petitioner’s habeas petition. In his Petition, Petitioner
claims that Respondents lack statutory authority to detain him without a bond
hearing and are violating his constitutional rights by doing so. (See Dkt. # 1.)
Because the Court agrees with Petitioner’s statutory argument, it does not reach his
constitutional, APA, or other claims.
7 To the extent that Respondents intended to refer to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4), a
provision that discusses the scope and standard of review for orders of removal, the
Court finds nothing in that provision that bars its jurisdiction here. Cardona-
Lozano v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-1784-RP, 2025 WL 3218244, *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov.
14, 2025) (concluding that “[b]ecause Petitioner does not assert a challenge to an
order of removal, nothing in [§ 1252(b)(4)] bars Petitioner from seeking relief from
his continued detention in this case”).
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Petitioner’s statutory challenge to his ongoing detention turns on
whether 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2) or 1226(a) applies in his case. Section 1225(b)(2),
often referred to as the “mandatory detention statute,” provides that a noncitizen
“who is an applicant for admission” “shall be detained for a removal proceeding”
“if the examining immigration officer determines that [the noncitizen] seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). “Individuals detained under § 1225(b)(2) receive no bond
hearing and can only be released on humanitarian parole at the arresting agency’s
discretion.” Cardona-Lozano, 2025 WL 3218244, *3 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at
288). On the other hand, § 1226(a), the “discretionary detention statute,” allows
for release on bond and provides ‘procedural protections that are not afforded
under the mandatory detention statute, such as the right to a bond re-determination
hearing in front of an Immigration Judge and a right to appeal any custody
determination.” Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. CV H-25-3726, 2025 WL
2886346, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025) (quoting Chiliquinga Yumbillo v. Stamper,
No. 2:25-cv-479, 2025 WL 2783642, at *2 (D. Me. Sep. 30, 2025)). Section
1226(a) applies to noncitizens arrested and detained “[o]n a warrant issued by the
Attorney General[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
“The Department of Homeland Security’s ‘longstanding
interpretation’ had been that § 1226, not § 1225, applies to noncitizens like
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[Petitioner] who are already present in the country.” Buenrostro-Mendez, 2025
WL 2886346, at *2 (quoting Savane v. Francis, No. 1:25-CV-6666-GHW, 2025
WL 2774452, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2025)). However, in July 2025, DHS
changed its position. Id. In a memo sent to all ICE employees, DHS announced
that noncitizens already present in the country who had not been admitted were to
be “treated in the same manner that ‘arriving [noncitizens]’ have historically been
treated,” that is, subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Maldonado
Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-CV-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *5 (D.
Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); Cardona-Lozano, 2025 WL 3218244, *6. The Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) adopted this new interpretation in a decision issued
on September 5, 2025. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
Specifically, the BIA held that the immigration judge “did not have authority over
the bond request because [noncitizens] who are present in the United States
without admission are applicants for admission as defined under . . . 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal
proceedings.” Id. at 220. As a result of these changes, “[t]he government now
applies § 1225 to all applicants for admission.” Buenrostro-Mendez, 2025 WL
2886346, at *2 (emphasis in original).
Petitioner asserts that Matter of Yajure Hurtado misinterprets the INA.
(Dkt. # 1 at 14.) He argues that, as is demonstrated by the statutory language,
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congressional intent, and longstanding agency practice, § 1226 “authorizes the
detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an Immigration
Judge,” whereas § 1225(b)(2) applies to “recent arrivals seeking admission.” (Id.
at 6, 8, 14.) Accordingly, because § 1225(b)(2) “does not apply to people like
Petitioner, who entered the U.S. without inspection and have resided here for
decades,” his detention under that provision is unlawful. (Id. at 10, 13–14.)
Respondents counter that Petitioner can be properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)
because he is an “applicant for admission.” (Dkt. # 15 at 3, 5–7.) They argue that
§ 1225(b)(2) applies to anyone who, like Petitioner, is a noncitizen who was found
to be present within the United States without ever having been admitted—
regardless of how long such an individual has been present in the country. (Id. at
5–7.) To make this argument, Respondents rely on § 1225(a)(1)’s definition of an
“applicant for admission,” which defines the term as a noncitizen “present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.”
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Respondents assert that this language unambiguously
covers individuals like Petitioner. (Dkt. # 15 at 5–6.) Therefore, because DHS has
determined that Petitioner is “seeking admission” and is not clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to be admitted to the United States, he can be properly detained
pursuant to § 1225(b)(2). (Id.)
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This case does not present a novel question. Since July 2025, courts
across the country have considered and repeatedly rejected Respondents’ broad
reading of § 1225(b)(2). See, e.g., Mboup v. Field Off. Dir. of New Jersey Immigr.
& Customs Enf’t, No. 2:25-CV-16882 (MEF), 2025 WL 3062791, at *1 & n.3
(D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2025) (collecting cases); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp.
3d 771, 784 & n.5 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (same); Vargas Bondi, No. SA-25-CV-1023-
FB (HJB), 2025 WL 3300446, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Vargas v. Bondi, No. SA-25-CV-1023-FB,
2025 WL 3300141 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025) (same); Buenrostro-Mendez, 2025
WL 2886346, at *2, 3 (explaining that “[t]his case is one of a number of recent
lawsuits filed challenging the federal government’s authority to detain noncitizens
during the pendency of removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)” and noting
that “almost every district court to consider this issue” has rejected the
Government’s new interpretation). This Court reaches the same conclusion for
several reasons.
First, Respondent’s reading of § 1225(b)(2) conflicts with the plain
language of the statute and established rules of statutory interpretation. By its
terms, § 1225(b)(2) applies when three conditions are met: “(1) the person is an
‘applicant for admission’; (2) the person is ‘seeking admission’; and (3) an
‘examining immigration officer determines’ the person ‘is not clearly and beyond a
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doubt entitled to be admitted.’” Estupinan Reyes, 2025 WL 3654265, at *3.
“Multiple courts have read this ‘seeking admission’ requirement to mean a
noncitizen present in the United States without admission who has recently arrived
and is actively seeking admission, not a noncitizen who has been residing in the
country for years.” Cardona-Lozano, 2025 WL 3218244, *4 (emphasis in
original); Rojas Vargas v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV-01699-DAE, 2025 WL 3251728, at
*3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2025). This Court agrees with that interpretation. See 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (A) (defining “admission” and “admitted” as referring to “the
lawful entry of the [noncitizen] into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer”); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 544
(5th Cir. 2008), as amended (June 5, 2008) (“Under th[e] statutory definition,
‘admission’ is the lawful entry of [a noncitizen] after inspection, something quite
different, obviously, from post-entry adjustment of status.” (emphasis in original));
Estupinan Reyes, 2025 WL 3654265, at *4 (explaining that petitioner who had
been in the country for decades was not seeking entry, much less lawful entry, and
so could not be considered to be “seeking admission”).
If, on the other hand, § 1225(b)(2) was intended to encompass all
“applicant[s] for admission,” irrespective of whether they are recent arrivals, as
Respondents effectively contend, “there would be no need to include the phrase
‘seeking admission’ in the statute.” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475,
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488 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). Such an interpretation therefore renders “seeking admission”
meaningless and violates the rule against surplusage. Id.; Cardona-Lozano, 2025
WL 3218244, *4; Rojas Vargas, 2025 WL 3251728, at *3; Martinez v. Hyde, 792
F. Supp. 3d 211 (D. Mass. 2025) (“Respondents’ selective reading of the statute—
which ignores its ‘seeking admission’ language—violates the rule against
surplusage and negates the plain meaning of the text.”).
Respondents assert that Petitioner is “seeking admission” because he
was issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”). (Dkt. # 15 at 6.) They argue that through
the issuance of the NTA, DHS determined that Petitioner is a noncitizen “seeking
admission.” (Id.) The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. A Notice to
Appear is issued when an individual is placed in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(a). Petitioner’s NTA states that he is in removal proceedings because he is
a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.”
(Dkt. # 15-1 at 1.) Nowhere in Petitioner’s NTA is there a determination that he is
“seeking admission.” (Id.) And the Court does not agree with Respondents’
contention that simply because Petitioner is not seeking removal from the United
States, he must be “seeking admission.” (Dkt. # 15 at 6); see Mukasey, 519 F.3d at
541, 544 (equating seeking “admission” with seeking “entry” and noting that
“admission” is “something quite different, obviously, from post-entry adjustment
of status”).
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Moreover, Respondents’ interpretation would narrow § 1226 so
drastically that it would rarely, if ever, apply. Respondents insist that under their
interpretation, § 1226(a) would still apply to noncitizens “within the interior of the
United States who were once lawfully admitted but are now subject to removal
from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).” (Dkt. # 15 at 7.) For example,
it would apply to noncitizens who were initially lawfully admitted but were then
placed in removal proceedings after overstaying a visa. (Id.) This argument is
unconvincing, though, in part because § 1226(a) is broadly worded. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a); Cardona-Lozano, 2025 WL 3218244, *4. Limiting the provision to visa
overstays would be inconsistent with both its text and structure, and the Court
declines to do so. See id. And, as numerous courts have noted, “there is no
indication that Congress intended § 1226 to be limited only to visa overstays.
Indeed, there is nothing in the history or application of § 1226 to even remotely
suggest that it was intended to have such a narrow reach.” Lopez Benitez, 2025
WL 2371588, at *8. “As a result, a more natural way to read the plain language of
these two statutory sections alongside one another is to read § 1226 as governing
detention of noncitizens already residing in the United States and § 1225 as
governing detention of recently arrived noncitizens who are actively seeking
admission to the country.” Cardona-Lozano, 2025 WL 3218244, *4.
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This reading is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Jennings.
Although the Supreme Court ultimately answered a different question than the one
at bar here, they explained in that case that “U.S. immigration law authorizes the
Government to detain certain [noncitizens] seeking admission into the country
under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain
[noncitizens] already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings
under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). This
discussion highlights that people like Petitioner are subject to detention under
§ 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2).
Recent decisions in this District have found additional support for this
interpretation in legislative history, recent amendments, and longstanding agency
practice. See e.g., Cardona-Lozano, 2025 WL 3218244, *5–6. As discussed in
those decisions, §§ 1225(b)(2) and 1226 were enacted as part of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) of 1996. Pub.
L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583,
3009–585. Contrary to Respondents’ assertions, “[t]he IIRIRA left in place an
earlier distinction between noncitizens arrested in the interior of the country (not
subject to mandatory detention) and noncitizens stopped at the border (subject to
mandatory detention).” Cardona-Lozano, 2025 WL 3218244, *5 (citing
Maldonado Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-CV-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082,
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at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025)); see H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996);
H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 210 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also Rodriguez v. Bostock,
No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *23–24 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30,
2025) (explaining why the IIRIRA’s legislative history does not support
Respondents’ arguments).
In addition, earlier this year, § 1226 was amended by the Laken Riley
Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). The Laken Riley Act authorizes
mandatory detention for noncitizens charged with or convicted of certain crimes.
Id. This Court concurs with the opinion in Cardona-Lozano that “[i]f all
noncitizens charged as inadmissible due to entry without inspection were already
subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), it would make no sense for
Congress to have amended the statute to require mandatory detention for specific
subcategories of those individuals.” 2025 WL 3218244, *5. The Court is not
convinced by Respondents’ argument that their interpretation does not render the
Laken Riley Act superfluous simply because “redundancies are common in
statutory drafting.” (Dkt. # 15 at 8.) As the court noted in Cardona-Lozano,
Respondents’ interpretation would not make merely a few words meaningless but
rather the entire amendment. 2025 WL 3218244, *5. The Court declines to adopt
such a reading.
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Finally, Respondents’ interpretation flies in the face of longstanding
agency practice. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024)
(“[T]he longstanding practice of the government—like any other interpretive aid—
can inform a court’s determination of what the law is.”). For decades since the
passage of IIRIRA, “the agencies charged with interpreting and enforcing the INA
applied § 1226(a) to noncitizens like Petitioner, who entered the U.S. without
inspection and were apprehended while residing in the U.S.” Vasquez, 2025 WL
2676082, at *4; see Cardona-Lozano, 2025 WL 3218244, at *6; Lopez-Arevelo v.
Ripa, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22,
2025); Rodriguez, 2025 WL 2782499, at *24–26. Regulations promulgated after
IIRIRA’s enactment by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”)
explained this practice. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg.
10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (“Despite being applicants for admission,
[noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly
referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for
bond and bond redetermination . . . The effect of this change is that inadmissible
[noncitizens], except for arriving [noncitizens], have available to them bond
redetermination hearings before an immigration judge, while arriving [noncitizens]
do not. This procedure maintains the status quo . . . ”).
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As described previously, this approach shifted in July 2025, and in
September 2025, the new interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) was adopted by the BIA.
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). In Loper Bright, the
Supreme Court clarified that the BIA’s interpretation of the INA is not entitled to
any deference by this Court. 603 U.S. at 412–13. Instead, while an agency’s
decision “may help inform the Court’s inquiry, it does so only to the extent of its
‘power to persuade.’” Rodriguez, 2025 WL 2782499, at *25 (quoting Loper
Bright, 603 U.S. at 413, 402) (cleaned up). However, when an agency’s current
position conflicts with its earlier pronouncements, as here, even the agency’s
“power to persuade” is diminished. Cardona-Lozano, 2025 WL 3218244, at *6;
see Rodriguez, 2025 WL 2782499, at *26 (discussing two unpublished decisions
from 2023 where the BIA took the opposite position to that taken in Matter of
Yajure Hurtado); Cardona-Lozano, 2025 WL 3218244, at *6 (discussing a
precedential decision issued one month prior to Matter of Yajure Hurtado applying
§ 1226 to the detention of a noncitizen who had entered without inspection three
years before).
In recent months, courts across the country have repeatedly rejected
the BIA’s novel interpretation of the INA. See Buenrostro-Mendez, 2025 WL
2886346, at *3 (“As almost every district court to consider this issue has
concluded, ‘the statutory text, the statute’s history, Congressional intent, and
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§ 1226(a)’s application for the past three decades’ support finding that § 1226
applies to these circumstances.”); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3682, 2025 WL
2802947, at *6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (calling the decisions a “chorus” of courts
rejecting respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)). Those courts have time and
again found that petitioners who entered without inspection and have long resided
in the United States cannot be detained under § 1225(b)(2). See id.; Cardona-
Lozano, 2025 WL 3218244, at *6. This Court agrees with those well-reasoned
opinions.
Here, Petitioner entered without inspection and has been present in the
United States continuously for almost thirty years. For all of the reasons described
above and cited by other district courts, he cannot be said to be “seeking
admission” into the United States. Accordingly, his detention without bond under
§ 1225(b)(2) violates the INA, and he is entitled to relief.8
8 “Absent an assertion by Respondents that they are detaining Petitioner
under § 1226, the Court has no need to consider whether § 1226 is a valid basis for
Petitioner’s current detention.” Davila Mercado, 2025 WL 3654268, at *6; see
also Estupinan Reyes, 2025 WL 3654265, at *4. Although Respondents state that
Petitioner can be detained discretionarily under either §§ 1226(a) or 1225(b),
according to the Immigration Judge’s order, Petitioner is currently being held
pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) and is being denied a custody redetermination on that
basis. (Dkt. # 15-2 at 1.) Accordingly, the Court will not consider § 1226 as a
basis for Petitioner’s detention. Estupinan Reyes, 2025 WL 3654265, at *4.
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III. Appropriate Relief
Respondents contend that although the only relief available to
Petitioner through habeas is release from custody, he “has no claim to any lawful
status in the United States that would permit him to reside lawfully in the United
States upon release.” (Dkt. # 15 at 2, 4, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241; DHS v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 118–19 (2020).) To the extent that Respondents
intend to argue that release is not proper solely because Petitioner lacks lawful
status, that argument is without merit. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701,
692–93 (2001) (providing for the release via a habeas corpus proceeding for
deportable noncitizens who establish the unreasonableness of their continued
detention and noting the protections that exist for noncitizens already in the
country even when their presence is unlawful); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594
U.S. 523, 529 (2021) (citing Zadvydas); see also Osorio-Martinez v. Att’y Gen.
United States of Am., 893 F.3d 153, 175 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Nothing in our precedent
suggests that the lack of lawful permanent resident status, potential inadmissibility,
or the happenstance that visas are not currently available is dispositive in assessing
an [noncitizen’s] entitlement to habeas review.”). Under the circumstances of this
case, Petitioner’s detention is unlawful and habeas relief is proper. Estupinan
Reyes, 2025 WL 3654265, at *4; Davila Mercado, 2025 WL 3654268, at *7; see
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Vargas Bondi, 2025 WL 3300446, at *5 (discussing why the appropriate habeas
relief is release rather than a bond redetermination hearing).
As a final matter, “[a]lthough Petitioner invokes jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2241 and seeks attorney fees, the Court treats the instant action
solely as a habeas action under § 2241.” Davila Mercado, 2025 WL 3654268, at
*7. Here, as in Davila Mercado, Petitioner has not specifically brought any non-
habeas claim and has paid only the minimal habeas filing fee. Accordingly, the
Court denies any request for attorney’s fees in this case. Id.; Aldana Perez v.
Noem, et. al., No. SA-25-CA-01534-XR, 2025 WL 3654262, at *7 (W.D. Tex.
Dec. 5, 2025).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Petition for
Habeas Corpus. (Dkt. # 1.) Given this ruling, Petitioner’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction is MOOT. (Dkt. # 2.) It is ORDERED that:
1. Respondents are DIRECTED to RELEASE Petitioner Mario Martinez
Campuzano from custody, under conditions of release no more restrictive
than those in place prior to the detention at issue in this case, to a public
place by no later than 12:00 p.m. on January 8, 2026.
2. Respondents must NOTIFY Petitioner’s counsel by email
(patricio@garzanarvaez.com) of the exact location and exact time of
Petitioner’s release as soon as practicable and no less than two hours
before his release.
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3. Any possible or anticipated removal or transfer of Petitioner under this
present detention is PROHIBITED.
4. Respondents are enjoined from further detaining Petitioner under the
asserted detention authority, 8 U.S.C. § 1225. If Petitioner is re-detained
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, all applicable procedures must be followed,
including that he be afforded a bond hearing.
5. The parties shall FILE individual status reports no later than 6:00 p.m.
January 9, 2026, detailing their compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Austin, Texas, January 6, 2026.
_____________________________
David Alan Ezra
Senior United States District Judge
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