Redpoint County Mutual Insurance Company v. Admiral Insurance Company et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
Redpoint County Mutual
Insurance Company,
Plaintiff
v.
Admiral Insurance Company and
Go Maps, Inc.,
Defendants
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Case No. 1:24-cv-00084-DAE
ORDER
Now before the Court are:
1. Plaintiff Redpoint County Mutual Insurance Company’s Opposed Motion to Compel
Discovery from Defendant Admiral Mutual Insurance Company, filed July 25, 2025
(Dkt. 44);
2. Joint Advisory Report Pursuant to the Court’s August 11, 2025 Order, filed August 27,
2025 (Dkt. 48);
3. Redpoint County Mutual Insurance Company’s Opposed Motion to Compel the
Noticed Deposition of Admiral Insurance Company Witness Lynn Trang, Esq., filed
October 7, 2025 (Dkt. 62);
4. Second Joint Advisory Report Pursuant to the Court’s September 25, 2025 Order, filed
October 23, 2025 (Dkt. 70);
5. Defendant Admiral Insurance Company’s Opposed Motion to Reopen Discovery,
filed November 26, 2025 (Dkt. 74);
6. Plaintiff Redpoint County Mutual Insurance Company’s Request for a Status
Conference and for Fees, filed December 3, 2025 (Dkt. 76);
and the associated response and reply briefs.1
This is an insurance dispute in which Redpoint seeks recovery from Admiral of a judgment
against Admiral’s policyholder, Go Maps, Inc., for approximately $18 million. Dkt. 49 at 5.
Discovery closed August 1, 2025. Dkt. 35 ¶ 7.
1 By Text Orders entered July 28, October 8, December 1, and December 11, 2025, the Honorable David
A. Ezra referred the motions to this Magistrate Judge for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and Rule 1(c) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas (“Local Rules”).
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Redpoint asks the Court to sanction Admiral for its alleged discovery failures. Admiral
contends that it responded to Redpoint’s requests and presented witnesses for deposition but failed
to take any discovery of its own. So Admiral asks the Court to reopen discovery for ninety days,
making the novel argument that its own lack of discovery efforts “is so complete that it constitutes
an exceptional circumstance.” Dkt. 74 ¶ 8. Attorney Greg Wilkins, now of Mehaffy Weber, P.C.,
represented Admiral from the inception of this lawsuit and, Admiral submits, “functionally worked
as a solo practitioner” due to two firm restructurings. Id. ¶ 9; see also Dkt. 77 ¶¶ 1, 17 (citing “the
collapse of its counsel’s firm” and the firm’s “crises”). Admiral recently retained two more
attorneys with Litchfield Cavo LLP: E. R. Hamilton entered an appearance on September 24, 2025,
and Daniel Litchfield attorney was admitted pro hac vice one week later. Dkts. 53, 58.
On September 2, 2025, Redpoint filed a motion for partial summary judgment on two of its six
asserted claims. Dkt. 49. After Admiral failed to timely respond, the District Court granted its
opposed motion for an extension of time to file a response and denied Redpoint’s motion to
reconsider that order. Dkts. 59, 61. Admiral filed its brief on October 9, 2025, and sought leave
the next day to supplement its response with a declaration. Dkts. 63, 64. Admiral never requested
discovery under Rule 56(d). It was not until November 26, 2025 – nearly two months after filing
its brief in response to Redpoint’s motion – that Admiral moved to reopen the discovery deadline.
I. Admiral’s Motion to Reopen
Admiral asks the Court to reopen discovery nearly four months after it closed and more than
six weeks after responding to Redpoint’s motion for partial summary judgment. At the outset,
Admiral’s request to reopen discovery does not preclude the Court from ruling on Redpoint’s fully
briefed summary judgment motion. Rahdar v. City of Friendswood, No. 3:22-cv-00280, 2025 WL
918539, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2025), R. & R. adopted, 2025 WL 1158552 (April 21, 2025).
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A. Analysis
Had Admiral filed a motion for discovery under Rule 56(d), it would be required to show “by
affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its
opposition” to Redpoint’s motion for partial summary judgment. Id. Admiral submits two
declarations briefly addressing its discovery failures but does not specify any reason it cannot
present facts essential to justify its opposition to Redpoint’s motion. Nor could it: Admiral long
since filed an (overlength) 21-page response to that motion – a full month after new counsel was
retained on September 9, 2025. Dkt. 75-5 at 3; Dkt. 77 ¶ 16.
Instead, Admiral cites Rule 16(b)(4), under which a scheduling order may be modified after a
deadline has passed “for good cause and with the court’s consent.” Gibson v. United States,
No. 1:18-cv-626-RP, 2021 WL 6617723, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2021). Under Rule 16(b)(4),
the Court considers: (1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for a modification of the
scheduling order; (2) the importance of the modification; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the
modification; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice. Id.
1. Explanation
To satisfy the Rule 16(b) good cause standard, the movant must show that the deadlines could
not have reasonably been met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension. S & W
Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003). Diligence is the
most important factor. BigCommerce, Inc. v. S&O Inc., No. 1:24-cv-00121-SH, 2025 WL 882701,
at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2025) (“The most important factor bearing on the ‘good cause’ inquiry
under Rule 16(b)(4) is whether the party seeking to modify the scheduling order can show that it
has been diligent in pressing its claims but despite its diligence could not reasonably have met the
scheduling deadline.”) (citation omitted).
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The Court finds that Admiral’s explanation for its failure to timely move to extend the
discovery deadline weighs heavily against a showing of good cause. The Court entered an agreed
scheduling order on October 4, 2024 setting the discovery deadline on March 17, 2025, and issued
an amended agreed scheduling order on April 21, 2025 extending the deadline to August 1, 2025.
Discovery thus was open for ten months, but Admiral waited seven months after the parties’ agreed
discovery extension to seek more time. Nor did Admiral request discovery in the five weeks
between Redpoint’s filing of its partial summary judgment motion and Admiral’s response. And
at least ten weeks lapsed after Admiral retained additional counsel before it filed this motion to
reopen. On this timeline, the Court cannot find that Admiral has been diligent in pressing its claims.
2. Importance
Admiral argues that discovery is essential, but contends that it refuted many key points in
Redpoint’s motion for partial summary judgment in its response to that motion. See Dkt. 77 ¶¶ 10-
14. Admiral focuses its (overlength) reply brief on its need to depose Redpoint declarant Allen
Halbrook, contending that Halbrook’s deposition “is necessary to address his declaration that Go
Maps acted solely as a ‘retail agent.’” Id. ¶ 11. Admiral already addressed the declaration in its
response. Dkt. 63 ¶¶ 9, 14. Nevertheless, because Halbrook’s deposition could bear on the weight
of his declaration in support of Redpoint’s motion for partial summary judgment, the importance
of this discovery slightly favors reopening.
3. Prejudice and Availability of a Continuance
The final two factors heavily favor denying Admiral’s motion to reopen. The Court finds that
Redpoint would be prejudiced by reopening discovery now because it already moved for partial
summary judgment on the existing record, and that a continuance would not cure this prejudice.
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Le-Vel Brands, LLC v. DMS Natural Health, LLC, No. 4:20-CV-398-SDJ, 2022 WL 949952, at
*4-5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2022) (denying motion to reopen).
B. Conclusion
Three of the four good cause factors weigh heavily in favor of denying Admiral’s motion,
while only the second factor slightly favors granting it. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant
Admiral Insurance Company’s Opposed Motion to Reopen Discovery (Dkt. 74) without prejudice.
II. Redpoint’s Motions
The District Court’s ruling on Redpoint’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 49) will
be highly relevant to the Court’s determination whether either party may require any additional
discovery before proceeding to trial on Redpoint’s remaining claims, as well as the amount of
Redpoint’s reasonable expenses Admiral may be required to pay. Therefore, the Court:
• DENIES Redpoint’s Opposed Motion to Compel Discovery from Defendant Admiral
Mutual Insurance Company (Dkt. 44);
• STRIKES Redpoint’s Opposed Motion to Compel the Noticed Deposition of Admiral
Insurance Company Witness Lynn Trang, Esq. (Dkt. 62), which was filed more than
two months after discovery closed, in violation of Local Rule CV-16(e); and
• DENIES Redpoint’s Request for a Status Conference and for Fees (Dkt. 76),
all without prejudice to refiling after disposition of Redpoint’s partial summary judgment motion.
The Court ORDERS the parties to file any discovery motions within 30 days after that decision.
The Court FURTHER ORDERS the parties to fully comply with Local Rule CV-7(g) before
filing any discovery or other nondispositive motion. Counsel must confer in person or by telephone
or videoconference “in a good-faith attempt to resolve the matter by agreement,” id., describe their
conference(s) in the motion, and certify the specific reason they failed to reach agreement.
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The Court finally cautions Redpoint that only its reasonable expenses incurred for discovery
motions may be recoverable under Rule 37(a)(5). Redpoint’s pursuit of discovery and its briefing
appear overly aggressive; it has filed at least one untimely motion and others that are duplicative
(e.g., Dkts. 68, 69) or attempt to evade page limits by using excessive single-spaced material and
footnotes and submitted several hundreds of pages of exhibits. This Magistrate Judge will not
recommend that the District Court award excessive attorney fees or other expenses.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that this case be removed from this Magistrate Judge’s docket
and returned to the docket of the Honorable David A. Ezra.
SIGNED on January 5, 2026.
SUSAN HIGHTOWER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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