Ley Villa v. United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MCALLEN DIVISION
MANUEL IGNACIO LEY VILLA
Petitioner,
VS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent.
§
§
§ 	CIV. NO. 7:25-00079
§
§ 	CRIM. NO. 7:23-00750-1
§
§
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, Manuel Ignacio Ley Villa, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this
action by filing a hand-written Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 contesting the validity of his
conviction and sentence. 	(Civ. Dkt. No. 1). 1 	This case was subsequently referred to the
undersigned magistrate judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). On
June 23 , 2025 , Respondent, United States, filed United States Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Civ. Dkt. No. 7).
Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. (Civ. Dkt. No. 1 at 14). For the reasons discussed further in this Report and
Recommendation, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner's claims should be denied because his
guilty plea was constitutionally valid.
After careful review of the record and relevant law, the undersigned recommends that
United States Motion for Summary Judgment (Civ. Dkt. No. 7) be GRANTED and Petitioner's
habeas petition under § 2255 (Civ. Dkt. No. 1) be DENIED. 	It is further recommended that
1 Citations to Criminal Docket Entries pertain to United States v. Ley Villa , 7:23-cr-00750-1 ; Citations to
Civil Docket Entries pertain to filings within this habeas proceeding.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 06, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Petitioner's § 2255 petition (Civ. Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED with prejudice, and the case be
closed.
Finally, it is recommended that the District Court DECLINE to issue a certificate of
appealability.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. 	Facts and Circumstances of Arrest
On April 30, 2023 , Petitioner arrived at the Hidalgo, Texas, Port of Entry, attempting to
enter the United States as the sole occupant of a maroon 2006 Chrysler Pacifica with Mexican
license plates. 	(Crim. Dkt. No. 34 at 4). 	At the initial inspection area, Petitioner provided a
negative declaration for fruits, plants, or meats, claiming he had been visiting family in Mexico,
and was returning to the United States to purchase groceries. (Id.). Petitioner claimed the vehicle
belonged to his mother. 	(Id.). Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) conducted a primary query on
Petitioner, which returned a system alert for attempting to import excessive amounts of alcohol
into the United States. (Id.). This prompted officers to refer Petitioner to the secondary inspection
area. (Id.).
At the secondary inspection site, Petitioner again provided a negative declaration. 	(Crim.
Dkt. No. 24 at 4). 	This time, the declaration was for plants, fruits, vegetables, drugs, tobacco,
firearms, and currency exceeding $10,000. (Id.). 	There, Petitioner claimed the vehicle belonged
to an acquaintance instead of his mother. (Id.). After noticing tampering near the fuel tank, CBP
performed a non-intrusive x-ray scan on the vehicle, which revealed anomalies in the fuel tank
area. (Id.). This prompted CBP officers to move the vehicle to the lift-area for further inspection.
(Id.).
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At the lift-area, CBP officers noted tampering on the bolts that hold the fuel tank. 	(Crim.
Dkt. No. 24 at 4). 	Officers further observed the fuel sending unit was disconnected on the
passenger's side of the fuel tank. (Id.). 	When CBP officers lowered the fuel tank and opened the
fuel sending unit, a clear liquid spilled out and officers noticed the clear liquid solution crystalized.
(Id.). CBP officers conducted a field test of the crystal-like substance which tested positive for
methamphetamine. 	(Id.). 	Further laboratory analysis revealed the samples of methamphetamine
hydrochloride had an 85% purity level. (Id. at 5). The methamphetamine was extracted from the
fuel tank of the vehicle. 	(Crim. Dkt. No. 34 at 4). 	The extraction revealed 41.14 kilograms of
methamphetamine. (Id. ).
After being read his Miranda rights, Petitioner admitted he was recruited by an unknown
individual in Reynosa, Tamaulipas, Mexico, to smuggle the narcotics into the United States.
(Crim. Dkt. No. 34 at 4). 	Petitioner had previously been incarcerated for an attempt to smuggle
methamphetamine into the United States where he was recruited by the same organization. (Id. at
4-5). As a result of alleged pressure, said organization arranged for Petitioner to travel to Reynosa,
Tamaulipas, Mexico, to pick up the narcotics vehicle. (Id. at 5). Petitioner was then to smuggle
the drugs into the United States, at which point the unknown individuals would provide further
instructions for delivery. 	(Id.). 	Law enforcement subsequently arrested Petitioner at the port of
entry. (Id .).
B. 	District Court Proceedings
On May 16, 2023 , Petitioner was indicted in the Southern District of Texas, McAllen
Division, charging Petitioner of four counts:
(1) 	Conspiracy to import into the United States of America from the United
Mexican States 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963 , 952(a), 960(a)(l),
and 960(b)(l).
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(2) 	Import into the United Stats of America from the United Mexican States
500 grams or more, that is , approximately 41 . 14 kilograms of a mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(l), 960(b)(l), and 18 U.S .C. § 2.
(3) 	Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more a mixture
or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(l), and 841(b)(l)(A).
(4) 	Possession 	with 	intent 	to 	distribute 	500 	grams 	or 	more, 	that 	is ,
approximately 41.14 kilograms of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount ofmethamphetamine, in violation of21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(l), 841(b)(l)(A),
and 18 U.S .C. § 2.
(Crim. Dkt. No. 10 at 3) .
On November 28 , 2023 , Petitioner, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty to count 2 of
the indictment before the Honorable Magistrate Judge J. Scott Hacker. 	(Crim. Dkt. No. 28). 	In
exchange for the guilty plea, the Government recommended a two-level decrease pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a) for acceptance of responsibility and agreed that the remaining counts of the
indictment be dismissed at the time of sentencing. (Id. at 1).
At the re-arraignment hearing, the court communicated with Petitioner through a Spanish-
speaking interpreter. (Crim. Dkt. No. 46 at 5). Specifically, the court discussed the various rights
and consequences implicated in the context of a guilty plea. (Id.).
Judge Hacker explained the charge as follows:
On or about April 	30 , 2023 , in the 	Southern District of Texas 	and
jurisdiction of the Court, that you did knowingly and intentionally import into the
United States of America from the United Mexican States a controlled substance.
It says that the controlled substance involved 	500 grams or more, that is,
specifically, 41.14 kilograms of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. In violation of
Title 21 , United States Code, Section 952(a), 960(a)(l) and (b)(l), and also 18
U.S.C ., Section 2.
(Crim. Dkt. No. 46 at 8) .
The court questioned Petitioner's understanding of the charge as follows:
THE COURT: Sir, do you understand this charge against you?
DEFENDANT LEY VILLA: Yes, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: Do you have any questions about this charge?
DEFENDANT LEY VILLA: No.
(Id.) . The court continued to explain the rights Petitioner would not have if he pleaded
guilty, including the right to have an attorney represent him throughout the entire case, the right to
a jury trial, the right to have 30 days to prepare for the trial, the right to have the Government
present the witnesses that would testify against Petitioner, the right to ask questions of those
witnesses, the right to present evidence and to present witnesses, the right to testify at trial, and the
right to remain silent (Id. at 10-12). Petitioner testified that he understood. (Id. at 12). Next, the
court noted the minimum mandatory sentence of ten (10) years of prison, with a maximum
sentence of life in prison. 	(Id. at 13). The court further questioned whether Petitioner discussed
the plea agreement in detail with counsel, to which he confirmed that he did and that he understood
everything. (Id. at 16 -17). Specifically, the court questioned:
THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything outside of this written Plea
Agreement to get you to plead guilty today?
DEFENDANT LEY VILLA: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Has anyone forced you, coerced you, or threatened you to get you
to plead guilty?
DEFENDANT LEY VILLA: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty today freely and voluntarily?
DEFENDANT LEY VILLA: Yes , Your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty today because you did what the Government
is accusing you of in this offense?
DEFENDANT LEY VILLA: Yes , Your Honor.
(Crim. Dkt. No. 46 at 18).
Further, before accepting the plea agreement, the court cautioned Petitioner:
And, the point is, nothing that I 'v e covered with you today should have been a
surprise to you. 	You should have discussed all of these areas with your attorney
before seeing me. That's important in making a knowing and voluntary plea. If for
some reason, you don't remember discussing something that I've spoken about
today with the attorney, and you don't remember covering it with your attorney,
that's okay. Answer the next question "No" and I'll give you more time with [your
trial counsel], you can go over the areas you don 't remember discussing, you can
ask questions, and I'll just bring you back a little later to see if you still want to
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enter a guilty plea. 	So my question is : Have you discussed everything that I've
covered with you today with the attorney before seeing me ?
(Crim. Dkt. No. 46 at 19-20) (emphasis added).
Petitioner answered " Yes , Your Honor." (Id. at 21).
The court then read the Government's factual allegations to determine whether there were
any inaccuracies, to which Petitioner testified that he did not disagree with any of the facts. 	(Id.
at 22).
Prior to the sentencing hearing, the U.S. Probation Department completed a Presentence
Investigation Report (PSR). (Crim. Dkt. No. 34). The PSR found a base offense level for count 2
to be 38 , as a result of a net quantity of 33.22 kilograms of methamphetamine. (Id. at 6-7). The
PSR further set out, under the guidelines, a two-level increase due to the importation of
amphetamine or methamphetamine. 	(Id. at 7). 	After the recommended downward two-level
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, Petitioner was left with a total offense level of 38.
(Id.). The Probation Officer found Petitioner had a criminal history score of three and established
a criminal history category ofll. (Id. at 8). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Petitioner fell within
Zone D of the Sentencing Table, which provided a guideline range of 262 to 327 months. (Id. at
12). The PSR further set out that the guideline range for a term of supervised release should be
five years. (Id.).
Petitioner appeared before the Honorable Judge Micaela Alvarez for sentencing on
February 14 , 2024. Judge Alvarez adopted the PSR with the addition of reducing the offense le vel
by one after granting the Government's motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b). (Crim. Dkt. No.
42 at 1) . Judge Alvarez subsequently found the guideline range to be 235 to 293 months. 	(Id.).
As such, Judge Alvarez sentenced Petitioner to 255 months of imprisonment and five-year term of
supervised release. (Id.) . As mandated by statute, Petitioner was ordered to pay $100. (Id. at 5) .
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C. 	Appeal
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on February 15 , 2024. (Crim. Dk:t. No. 39). Petitioner
filed Brief for Appellant in Accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) on May 7,
2024. See Appellants Brief, United States v Ley Villa, No. 24-40104, 2024 WL 2132833 (5th Cir.
May 7, 2024). 	There, Appellate Counsel 2 identified two issues to be discussed: (1) whether this
Court may pretermit evaluation of Petitioner's guilty plea proceeding and conviction because
Petitioner has evinced his desire to appeal only his sentence, and (2) whether there is any
nonfrivolous argument for reversal of Petitioner's sentence. Id. at *2. Appellate Counsel argued
that the court could pretermit evaluation of Petitioner's guilty plea proceeding and conviction
because he has expressed a desire to appeal only his sentence. Id. at *5. Further, Appellate Counsel
argued that there was no nonfrivolous argument for reversal of Petitioner's sentence. Id. As such,
Appellate Counsel moved to withdraw. Id.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a written opinion on September 4, 2023. 	See
United States v. Ley Villa, No. 24-40104, 2024 WL 4035907 (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2024). There, the
court found that the appeal presented no nonfrivolous issues to warrant appellate review and
dismissed the case. Id. at * 1.
Petitioner then filed the present§ 2255 motion on February 26, 2025. (Civ. Dkt. No. 1) .
II. 	SUMMARY OF THE PLEADINGS
A. 	Petitioner's § 2255 Petition
Pending before the Court is Petitioner's § 2255 Motion (Civ. Dkt. No. 1) , wherein
Petitioner appears to set out two claims: 3
2 Appellate Couns el was AFPD Scott Andrew Martin ; Trial Counsel was AFPD Juan Jose Becerra.
3 Petitioners pro se petition is entitled to a more liberal construction than those drafted by practicing
attorneys. S ee Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519, 520 ( I 972); see also Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420,
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(1) 	Trial Counsel was ineffective because Counsel did not effectively explain
the consequences of a guilty plea to Petitioner; and
(2) 	Trial Counsel was ineffective because Petitioner was intimidated into
signing the plea deal or risk getting up to life in prison.
(Civ. Dkt. No. 1 at 15) .
B. 	Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment
In response, Respondent filed United States Motion for Summary Judgment. 	(Civ. Dkt.
No . 7) . Respondent contends the record conclusively establishes Petitioner's claims are false. (Id.
at 2). In the Motion, Respondent emphasizes that Petitioner admitted in court that he was caught
smuggling metharnphetarnine into the United States from Mexico. 	(Id.). 	Respondent points to
Petitioner's statements to Magistrate Judge Hacker at the re-arraignment stage. (Id.) . Specifically,
Respondent argues, the court confirmed that Petitioner had time to discuss the case with his
counsel, explained that the burden is on the Government to prove their case, that the minimum
mandatory sentence for the charge was 10 years, and then discussed the plea agreement. (Id. at 2-
6) . 	The court then questioned whether Petitioner discussed the sentencing guidelines with his
counsel. (Id. at 5). The court asked whether Petitioner was promised anything outside of the plea
agreement, whether he was forced or coerced to get him to plead guilty, whether Petitioner was
pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, and whether Petitioner was pleading guilty because he did
what the Government accused him of within the indictment. 	(Id. at 6). 	Finally, the court
summarized the proceeding up to that point, and asked Petitioner whether everything covered had
been discussed with his counsel. (Id. at 7). Accordingly, the court accepted the plea. (Id.). Then,
Respondent highlights that Petitioner "instructed his attorney to appeal his sentence alone, and not
426-27 (5th Cir. 2011) (" It is the substance of the relief sought by a pro se pleading, not the label that the
petitioner has attached to it, that determines the true nature and operative effect of a habeas filing." ).
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challenge his guilty plea." (Civ. Dkt. No. 7 at 8). As such, neither the appellate brief nor the Fifth
Circuit opinion discussed the guilty plea. (Id. at 8-9).
Respondent argues that the court's compliance with the Rule 11 admonishments support
the finding that Petitioner was not coerced into pleading guilty. (Civ. Dkt. No. 7 at 15-16). Next,
Respondent argues that the court clearly articulated the charge to Petitioner, and he "understood
the nature of the charge against him." (Id. at 17). Finall y, because the court apprised Petitioner of
the 	mandatory 	minimum 	sentence 	attached 	to 	his 	guilty 	plea, 	Petitioner 	understood 	the
consequences of pleading guilty. 	(Id. ). Thus, Respondent concludes, Petitioner's motion should
be denied. (Id. at 19) .
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Jurisdiction
Generally, a § 2255 motion must be filed within one year of the latest of four events, one
of which is the date the judgment becomes final. 	See 28 U .S .C. § 2255(f)(l). Here, Petitioner's
conviction became final on December 25 , 2024, ninety (90) days after the Fifth Circuit dismissed
Petitioner's appeal because Petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari for Supreme Court review.
S ee Clay v. United Stat es , 537 U.S. 522, 525 (2003) ("For the purpose of starting the clock on §
2255 's one-year limitation period, ... a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time
expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the
conviction."); s ee also United States v. Wheaten , 826 F.3d 843 , 846 (5th Cir. 2016). 	As such,
Petitioner had until December 25 , 2025, to file his § 2255 motion. Petitioner's motion is timel y, as
Petitioner filed the § 2255 motion on February 26, 2025 , well before the one-year limitation.
Accordingl y, this Court has jurisdiction to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 , 2255 .
B. 	Applicable Law
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1. 	Summary Judgment Review
The Federal Rules of Civ il Procedure apply if there is no conflict with the federal rules
governing habeas proceedings. See Burgess v. United States, 874 F.3d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 2017)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(4)(A) and R. Gov. § 2255 Proceedings 12). 	Unless there is a noted
conflict with the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, these claims are reviewed under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
Summary Judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and evidence show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Once the moving party presents a "properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show with ' significant probative evidence'
that there exists a genuine issue of material fact. " Hamilton v. Segue Softwar e, In c., 232 F.3d 473 ,
477 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment,
a district court must generally construe disputed facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
2. 	28 U.S.C. § 2255
It is well settled that " [f]ollowing a conviction and exhaustion or waiver of the right to
direct appeal, [courts] presume a defendant stands fairly and finally convicted." 	United States v.
Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231-
32 (5th Cir. 1991)). Therefore, there are only four limited grounds upon which a federal prisoner
may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence upon collateral review:
(1 ) constitutional issue s;
(2) challenges to the District Court's jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
(3) challenges to the length of a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum; and
(4) claims that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); United States v. Pia ce nte, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996).
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A petitioner, however, "may not raise an issue for the first time on collateral review without
showing both ' cause' for his procedural default, and 'actual prejudice' resulting from the error."
Shaid, 937 F.2d at 232 (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S . 152 , 168 (1982)). "This cause and
actual prejudice standard presents ' a significantly higher hurdle' than the 'plain error' standard
[applied] on direct appeal." Id. (citing Frady, 456 U.S. at 166). Thus, a petitioner must explain
why the constitutional or jurisdictional claim was not brought up on direct appeal (the cause for
the procedural default to not appealing the issue) and the harm caused by said claim (the prejudice
resulting from such claim). 	This "rigorous standard" is applied " to ensure that final judgments
command respect and that their binding effect does not last only until the 'next in a series of endless
postconviction collateral attacks. '" Id. (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 165-66). "A defendant must
meet this cause and actual prejudice test even when he alleges a fundamental constitutional error."
Id. (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 493 (1986)). The Supreme Court allows an exception
to this high bar of cause and prejudice for "extraordinary case[ s]" where "a constitutional violation
has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent[.]" Shaid, 937 F.2d at 232.
Further, "[o]ther types of error may not be raised under section 2255 unless the defendant
demonstrates that the error could not have been raised on direct appeal, and, if condoned, would
result in a complete miscarriage of justice." Cervantes, 132 F.3d at 1109 (citing United States v.
Pierce , 959 F.2d 1297, 1301 (5th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis in original); see also Shaid, 937 F.2d at
232 n.7.
3. 	Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the two-prong test set forth
in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 	To satisfy the Strickland test, Petitioner is
required to show that (1) his attorney's performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient
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performance prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687. "Failure to prove either deficient performance or
actual prejudice is fatal to an ineffective assistance claim." Carter v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 452, 463
(5th Cir. 1997). Thus, " [a] court need not address both components of the inquiry if the [petitioner]
makes an insufficient showing on one." Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 210 (5th Cir. 1994).
The first prong requires a petitioner to show that the alleged errors of counsel were so
serious that the assistance received was "below the constitutional minimum guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment." United Stales v. Faubion, 19 F.3d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Strickland,
466 U.S . at 686). 	The "constitutional minimum is measured against an objective standard of
reasonableness." 	Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 	An ineffective assistance of counsel
claim focuses on "counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of
the time of counsel's conduct[,]" because "[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess
counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence[.]" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.
The second prong requires that a petitioner "demonstrate that her counsel's performance
so prejudiced her defense that the proceeding was fundamentally unfair." Faubion, 19 F.3d at 228
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)). To show such prejudice, a petitioner must show that "there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. To establish such prejudice in connection
with a guilty plea, a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating "a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52 , 59 (1985). To establish such prejudice within the punishment
phase of a non-capital case, a defendant must demonstrate that he was subjected to increased jail
time due to counsel's deficient representation. 	United States v. Grammas, 376 F.3d 433 , 438-39
(5th Cir. 2004) (citing Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 , 203 (2001)).
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C. 	Petitioner's Claims
1. 	Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
In the present motion, Petitioner appears to set out two claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. First, Petitioner argues that his counsel did not effectively explain the consequences of a
guilty plea. 	(Civ. Dkt. No. 1 at 15). 	Second, Petitioner argues that there was constant coercion
and pressure, like " if you don't sign, you will get up to life in prison." 	(Id.). 	In other words,
Petitioner contends, for the first time on collateral review, that his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary and the product of ineffective assistance of counsel. 	For the reasons set forth below,
each of these claims fails under the Strickland test.
a. 	Petitioner was Aware of the Consequences of a Guilty Plea
Petitioner claims his Trial Counsel did not explain the consequences of a guilty plea. (Civ.
Dkt. No. 1 at 15). Petitioner's statements at the re-arraignment, along with evidence in the record
preclude such a finding.
"Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to 'the effective assistance
of competent counsel. "' Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356, 364-65 (2010) (quoting McMann v.
Richards on , 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). During the plea stage, the Supreme Court emphasizes that
counsel has "the critical obligation ... to advise the client of 'the advantages and disadvantages of
a plea agreement. "' Padilla, 559 U.S. at 370 (citing Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50-51
(1995)). Counsel is responsible for providing the accus ed an understanding of the law relative to
the facts, and it need not be perfect, "but it must be reasonably competent." United States v. Cavitt,
550 F.3d 430, 440 (5th Cir. 2008).
The test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is "whether the plea represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant."
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Hill, 474 U. S. at 56 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). When a defendant
is represented by counsel "during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel,
the vo luntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice ' was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. "' 	Id. (citing McCann, 397 U.S . at 771 ).
Further, a defendant who pleads guilty upon advice of counsel "may only attack the voluntary and
intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was
not within the standards set forth in McCann." 	Toll ett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
"When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the
offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea." Id.
To establish prejudice in connection with a guilty plea, a defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel 's errors, he would not have pled
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 	Hill, 474 U.S . at 59 . For a guilty plea to be
"intelligently" and "knowingly" entered, the defendant must have "a. full understanding of what
the plea connotes and of its consequence." 	United States v. Lincks, 82 F.4th 325, 331 (5th Cir.
2023) (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 244 (1969)). 	"The defendant need only
understand the direct consequences of the plea; he need not be made aware of every consequence
that, absent a plea of guilty, would not otherwise occur." 	United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d
252, 255 (5th Cir. 2000).
Petitioner unequivocally and unambiguously stated in open court, and under oath, that he
knew and understood the consequences of his guilty plea. 	The magistrate judge questioned
Petitioner on 	countless 	occasions to 	ensure 	he 	understood the 	nature 	of the 	charge, the
consequences of the plea, and the ramifications of the sentencing guidelines. The court listed the
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charge, explained the elements and the Government's burden of proof, and emphasized the
importance of making the plea freely and voluntarily. 	Specifically, the court communicated the
right to counsel, the right to a jury trial, the right to cross examine the Government's witnesses,
the right to present Petitioner's own witnesses and evidence, and the right to testify or remain
silent. (Crim. Dkt. No. 46 at 10-12). The court queried whether Petitioner understood those rights
and the implication of a guilty plea, to which he responded in the affirmative. (Id. at 12). 	The
court further explained the minimum and maximum sentences applicable to his guilty plea, to
which Petitioner claimed he understood. 	(Id. at 13) . 	Similarly, the court discussed supervised
release and the potential financial penalties that could be imposed. (Id. at 14) . Petitioner testified,
again, that he understood. 	(Id. at 16). 	Additionally, Petitioner testified to having discussed
everything with his attorney before the re-arraignment hearing. (Id. at 21 ). In fact, at no point did
Petitioner testify that he did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea, nor that his
attorney failed to discuss those with him, until this Motion for collateral review.
Thus, Petitioner's claims are contradicted by the record. 	See Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63 , 74 (1977) (emphasizing a defendant's formal declarations in open court are solemn and
"carry a strong presumption of verity," which "constitutes a formidable barrier in any subsequent
collateral proceedings."). Similarly, a signed and unambiguous plea agreement is accorded great
evidentiary weight, and Petitioner has failed to motivate this Court to question its legitimacy. S ee
Bonvillain v. Blackburn, 780 F.2d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir. 1986).
Moreover, even assuming Petitioner showed that his Trial Counsel failed to explain the
consequences of the guilty plea with reasonable competence, Petitioner would be unable to satisfy
the prejudice element of the Strickland test because the court executed a meticulous enunciation
of the consequences of a guilty plea, and Petitioner testified that he understood full y. See Cavitt,
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550 F.3d at 440. Petitioner was on notice of the consequences of a guilty plea. As such, Petitioner
similarly fails to establish that "but for counsel 's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial." Hill , 474 U. S. at 59.
In sum, Petitioner's signed plea agreement, the factual stipulation, and his testimony under
oath at the re-arraignment hearing undercut the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted.
b. 	Petitioner was not Coerced into Pleading Guilty.
Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was a product of coercion and pressure, like " if you
don't sign, you will get up to life in prison." (Civ. Dkt. No. 1 at 15). This allegation is conclusory
and contradicted by the record.
At the re-arraignment hearing, the court probed Petitioner at multiple points to determine
whether the guilty plea was made freely and voluntarily. 	Petitioner testified that he was not
promised anything outside of the written plea agreement in exchange for his guilty plea. (Crim.
Dkt. No. 46 at 18). 	Petitioner testified that he was not forced, coerced, or threatened to plead
guilty. 	(Id.) . 	He testified that his guilty plea was made freely and voluntarily. 	(Id.). 	Finally,
Petitioner testified he pleaded guilty because he did what the Government accused him of within
the indictment. 	(Id.). 	As mentioned, sworn statements in open court are entitled to a strong
presumption of verity, and Petitioner has failed to establish any reason to rebut that presumption.
See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74.
Petitioner 's contention that he was coerced is further contradicted by the evidence in the
record that he committed the offense alleged. After the court read the factual stipulation offered
by the Government, Petitioner testified that he did not disagree with any of the facts. (Crim. Dkt.
No. 46 at 22). 	Petitioner answered questions by the court relating to the offense alleged, and
detailed how the crime was committed. 	(Id. at 23). 	This is further evidenced by Petitioner's
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Acceptance of Responsibility Statement, where he admitted to the offense alleged and signed to
affirm the veracity of the document. 	(Crim. Dkt. No. 35 ). 	Moreover, Petitioner echoed this
sentiment in the present Motion by stating that he knows what he did was wrong. ( Civ. Dkt. No.
1).
Despite significant evidence to the contrary, Petitioner claims his guilty plea came after
coercion. See e.g., United Stat es v. Hurtado-Paco , No. C-06-567, 2007 WL 1731114, at *3 (S.D.
Tex . June 13 , 2007) (denying ineffective assistance of counsel challenge where petitions alleged
that "counsel pressured him to plead guil ty, by telling him he could get 15 years or more if he did
not plead guilty."). Such a "conclusory allegation[] on a critical issue [is] insufficient to raise a
constitutional issue." 	United States v Pineda, 988 F.2d 22 , 23 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting United
States v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 2 88 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989)); see also Ross v. Estell e, 694 F.2d 1008,
1012 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasizing that "mere conclusory allegations do not raise a constitutional
issue in a habeas proceeding") (internal citation omitted). Similarly, Petitioner is unable to show
"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel 's error s, he would not have pled guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; see also Hurtado-Paco , 2007 WL 1731114
at *5
In sum, the factual stipulation at the re-arraignment, Petitioner's sworn testimony, and other
evidence in the record combine to undercut Petitioner's allegation of coercion. This claim fails .
D. 	Hear in g
"A motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 can be denied without a hearing only if the
motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief."
United States v. Bartholomew, 974 F.2d 39, 41 (5th Cir. 1992 ); see also R. Gov. Sec. 2255
Proceedings 4(b ). A court does not abuse its discretion when denying a habeas petition without
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hearing when Movant's assertions are merely conclusory allegations or are otherwise "inconsistent
with the bulk of[his] conduct." See United States v. McDaniels, 907 F.3d 366, 370 (5th Cir. 2018)
(internal citation omitted) (affirming the district court's judgment to dismiss§ 2255 motion without
a hearing because evidentiary hearing was not warranted when movant's arguments were
"unavailing" ); see also Bartholomew, 974 F.2d at 41 (holding there was no abuse of discretion in
denying a habeas motion without hearing where the movant's assertions of ineffective assistance
were wholly conclusory in nature and refuted by reference to the record itself).
Based on the pleadings and record as outlined, Respondent has established that the claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel within the habeas petition do not raise any genuine issues of
material fact and summary judgment is warranted. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	Because the record is
adequate to dispose fully and fairly of Petitioner's claims, no evidentiary hearing is necessary.
Each claim is either refuted by the record or solely based on conclusory allegations. 	In other
words, summary dismissal in favor of Respondent is appropriate without hearing as the record
established that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts as claimed by Petitioner.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Recommended Disposition
After careful review of the record and relevant law, the undersigned recommends that
United States Motion for Summary Judgment (Civ. Dkt. No. 7) be GRANTED and Petitioner's
habeas petition under § 2255 (Civ. Dkt. No . 1) be DENIED. 	It is further recommended that
Petitioner's § 2255 petition (Civ. Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED with prejudice, and the case be
closed.
Certificate ofAppealability
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It is recommended that the District Court deny a certificate of appealability. An appeal
may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding "unless
a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability." 	28 U.S .C. § 2253(c)(l)(A). The
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings instruct that the District Court "must issue or deny a
certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant." R. Gov. Sec. 2255
Proceedings 11. Because the undersigned recommends the dismissal of Petitioner' s§ 2255 action,
the Court must address whether Petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability (COA).
Petitioner is entitled to a COA "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "T he COA determination under§ 2253(c)
requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits."
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). For claims denied on their merits, " [t]he petitioner
must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S . 473 , 484 (2000); see also
Un ited States v. Jones, 287 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying the Slack standard to a COA
determination in the context of a § 2255 proceeding). Petitioner may also satisfy this standard by
showing that "jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; see also Jones, 287 F.3d at 329. For claims that a
district court rejects solely on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show both that "jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling." Slack, 529 U.S . at 484.
Based on the record and for reasons explained, Petitioner would not be able to demonstrate
that reasonable jurists would find the "district court's assessment of the constitutional claims
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debatable or wrong[,]" nor would he be able to show that the issues "deserve encouragement to
proceed further." Slack, 529 U.S. at 484; Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327.
Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to a COA.
Notice to the Parties
The Clerk shall send copies of this Report and Recommendation to Petitioner, who has
fourteen (14) days after receipt thereof to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 	§
636(b)(l)(C) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to file timely written
objections shall bar an aggrieved party from receiving a de novo review by the District Court on
an issue covered in this Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal
the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court.
The Clerk shall provide copies of this order to Petitioner and counsel for Respondent.
/..-,t.1.
DONE at McAllen, Texas, on _v__ 	ay of November 2025
Juan 	. Alanis
United States Magistrate Judge
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