Gilley v. Victoria County Jail

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION
STEVE GILLEY,
Plaintiff,
VS.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:26-CV-00021
VICTORIA COUNTY JAIL, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
TO RETAIN CASE AND DISMISS CERTAIN CLAIMS
Plaintiff Steve Gilley, appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed this
prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiff’s case is subject to
screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Act. See 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c); 28 U.S.C.
§§1915(e)(2), 1915A.
For purposes of screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1)
and the reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that certain of
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims be retained and will order service of process on those
claims. The undersigned further recommends that the district court:
● DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants
Victoria County Jail and Victoria County Medical Department as frivolous
and/or for failure to state a claim for relief; and
● DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against
each named individual defendant sued in his or her official capacity.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 18, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. JURISDICTION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case
has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making
recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Criminal
Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID). On March 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed his original
complaint. (D.E. 1). Plaintiff named as defendants: (1) Victoria County Jail; and (2)
Victoria County Medical Department. (D.E. 1). At the Court’s direction, Plaintiff has filed
an Amended Complaint and two More Definite Statements to further explain his claims.
(D.E.s 12, 16, & 21). After these filings, Plaintiff has added these named defendants: (1)
Victoria County Deputy Thompson; (2) Victoria County Deputy West; (3) Victoria County
Jail Doctor Robertson; (4) Victoria County Jail Doctor McNell; (5) Victoria County Jail
Nurse Tammy Dodds; (6) Victoria County Jail Nurse Gayle; (7) Victoria County Jail Nurse
Maddison; (8) Victoria County Deputy Penny; and (9) Victoria County Deputy Lackey.
Plaintiff alleges the following in his Complaint, Amended Complaint, and More
Definite Statements. Plaintiff states that he is in custody of TDCJ-CID. He was previously
held in custody on a probation violation at the Victoria County Jail from September 5, 2024
to October 15, 2024. (D.E. 16 at 1).
Plaintiff alleges that, on or around September 7, 2025, he began experiencing small
amounts of blood from his rectum. (D.E. 16 at 2). The bleeding then began to happen each
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time he needed to use the toilet (several times a day) and progressed to the point of bleeding
that he would almost pass out. Id. At one point he did pass out. Id. Although other
inmates attempted to help Plaintiff in getting the attention of jail officers, no one came to
help. Id. Deputies Thompson, West, Penny and Lackey were among the jail staff who
ignored Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment for four days. (D.E. 21 at 1-4, 15-17).
Also, another inmate attempted to get the attention of jail personnel because they did not
like the fact that Plaintiff was bleeding in the shower. Id. at 2. Plaintiff alleges that he
waited for hours for an officer to respond, and when they did, they told Plaintiff he had to
wait on medical to arrive. (D.E. 16 at 2). According to Plaintiff, medical never arrived.
Id. After four days of bleeding, Plaintiff was taken to see medical staff, either Nurse
Tammy Dodds, Nurse Gayle, or Nurse Maddison. Id at 3; (D.E. 21 at 2). Plaintiff also got
a “three-minute examination” from either Doctor Robertson or Doctor McNell. (D.E. 21
at 5). Plaintiff was given a sample cup for his bleeding and blood pressure medicine. (D.E.
16 at 2). Also, on September 9, 2025, Plaintiff passed out on the toilet while trying to
provide a sample as requested by medical staff. Id. At this time, medical staff sent Plaintiff
to the Emergency Room where he was examined by a doctor. Id. That evening, Plaintiff
had surgery to remove several polyps that were causing bleeding from his rectum. Id.
After Plaintiff’s surgery, he was prescribed medicine by the hospital doctor. Id. at
5. After returning to the jail, jail officials did not provide Plaintiff with the medicine. Id.
Jail officials told Plaintiff that they had misplaced Plaintiff’s prescriptions. Id. Plaintiff,
days later, passed out again on the toilet from blood loss and was taken to the hospital. Id.
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At the hospital, it was determined that Plaintiff’s stitches ruptured, and he was sent back to
surgery. Id.
Plaintiff sues Deputy Thompson, Deputy West, Doctor Robertson, Doctor NcNell,
Nurse Dodds, Nurse Gayle, Nurse Maddison, Deputy Penny, and Deputy Lackey in their
official capacities for failing to honor their oath to protect and for ignoring Plaintiff for
four days during his bleeding episodes. Id. at 6-7. Although Plaintiff does not state he is
suing the individual deputies and medical staff in their individual capacities, the Court
construes his claims as such. Plaintiff seeks money damages for medical bills (now and in
the future) and pain and suffering. Id. at 7-8.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Screening of Plaintiff’s Action
When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis the Court shall evaluate the
complaint and dismiss it without service of process if the Court finds the complaint
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (providing that a court shall review an in forma pauperis
complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune
defendant). A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal
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interest which clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998).
A claim has no arguable basis in fact if “after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to
present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Talib v.
Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
“In analyzing the complaint, [the Court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d
322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999). “The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but
whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. Thus, the Court should not
dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts
or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
Id. (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give
rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. Id.; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief
above the level of mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As long as the complaint,
taken as a whole, gives rise to a plausible inference of actionable conduct, Plaintiff’s claim
should not be dismissed. Id.
Pleadings filed by pro se litigants like Plaintiff are construed using a less stringent
standard of review. Documents filed by pro se litigants are to be liberally construed, and
pro se complaints, however inartfully drafted they might be, are held to less stringent
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standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 740
(5th Cir. 2002) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)); see also Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint are to be taken as true for purposes of screening, but such deference does not
extend to conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.
DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2019).
B. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Claims
1. Claims against Victoria County Jail and the Victoria County Medical
Department
Plaintiff lists the Victoria County Jail and the Victoria County Medical Department
as defendants in this case. These entities, however, are not capable of being sued. Rogers
v. Nueces County Jail, No. C-07-410, 2007 WL 4367814, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2007)
(citing Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep’t, 939 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1991)); Prenosil v. Dallas
County Jail, No. 3–93–CV–1130–D, op. at 2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 1995) (Fitzwater, J.)
(Dallas County Health Department not a proper defendant with jural existence); Walker v.
Dallas Cnty. Sheriff's Med. Dep't, No. 3-02-CV-1546-P, 2002 WL 31553930, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 13, 2002). Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that
Plaintiff’s claims against the Victoria County Jail and the Victoria County Medical
Department be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim for
relief.
2. Official Capacity Claims
Suits against individuals in their official capacities “generally represent only another
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way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Goodman v.
Harris County, 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue Deputy Thompson, Deputy West, Deputy Penny,
Deputy Lackey, Doctor Robertson, Doctor McNell, Nurse Tammy Dodds, Nurse Gayle,
and Nurse Maddison in their official capacities, it is effectively a suit against the officials’
office, Victoria County. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
A municipality such as Victoria County is liable for the constitutional violations of
its employees only if the alleged constitutional deprivations resulted from municipal
policy. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). See also Zarnow v.
City of Wichita Falls, Texas, 614 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that a municipality
may not be subject to liability merely for employing a tortfeasor; liability requires
deliberate action attributable to the municipality that is the direct cause of the alleged
constitutional violation). Liability of a municipality under § 1983 requires proof of three
elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose
“moving force” is the policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Piotrowski v. City of
Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that any of the named defendants are policymakers in
Victoria County or that an official county policy or practice was the “moving force” behind
the violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that Plaintiff’s claims against Deputy Thompson, Deputy West, Deputy
Penny, Deputy Lackey, Doctor Robertson, Doctor McNell, Nurse Tammy Dodds, Nurse
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Gayle, and Nurse Maddison in their official capacities be dismissed without prejudice.
3. Deliberate Indifference Claims against Individual Deputies and Medical
Staff
Liberally construed, Plaintiff claims that Deputy Thompson, Deputy West, Deputy
Penny, Deputy Lackey, Doctor Robertson, Doctor McNell, Nurse Tammy Dodds, Nurse
Gayle, and Nurse Maddison acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs by delaying his access to care for bleeding from his rectum for four days and denying
his prescribed medication following surgery.. Plaintiff contends that the delays caused by
these individual defendants exacerbated his medical conditions by not attending to his
medical needs immediately and by not providing him hospital-prescribed medications after
his surgery to remove several polyps.
The Fifth Circuit has held that “the State owes the same duty under the Due Process
Clause and the Eighth Amendment to provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates
with basic human needs, including medical care and protection from harm, during their
confinement.” Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996). “A pretrial
detainee alleging acts or omissions condition of confinement claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment must satisfy tests for both objective and subjective components of the claim;
the same tests as a convicted inmate alleging an Eighth Amendment violation.” Matthews
v. Lo, Civ. No. 21-1862, 2022 WL 4545613, at *11 (E.D. La. Aug. 23, 2022), adopted,
2022 WL 4534723 (E.D. La. Sept. 27, 2022) (citing Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 664
(5th Cir. 2001) (for an inmate to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison
conditions, the inmate must show a sufficiently serious deprivation, and must show that
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the relevant official or officials acted with deliberate indifference to inmate health or
safety) and Hare, 74 F.3d at 643 (“Finding no constitutionally significant distinction
between the rights of pretrial detainees and convicted inmates to basic human needs, ...we
conclude that a state jail official’s constitutional liability to pretrial detainees for episodic
acts or omissions should be measured by a standard of deliberate indifference enunciated
by the Supreme Court in [Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)]”)).
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims, however, technically arise under the
Eighth Amendment and not the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the Eighth Amendment
only applies to convicted prisoners and not to pretrial detainees. Jacobs v. West Feliciana
Sheriff's Dept., 228 F. 3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Unlike convicted prisoners, whose
rights to constitutional essentials like medical care and safety are guaranteed by the Eighth
Amendment, pretrial detainees look to the procedural and substantive due process
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure provision of these same basis needs.”);
See also Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996). The undersigned
finds that Plaintiff should be deemed a convicted prisoner for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment since he was incarcerated for a probation violation, and therefore was in jail
for an “old conviction.” See McColister v. NFN Casto, No. 2:99-CV-0171, 2001 WL
34124760 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 6, 2001), adopted, 2001 WL 34124759 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 25,
2001) (“At the time of the incident, plaintiff had been convicted of a crime and was back
in jail on probation violation ... Consequently, it is clear plaintiff was not in jail on a new
offense but on his old conviction and, for purposes of this analysis, was a convicted
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prisoner at the time of the incident.”); Kirschstein v. Bowie Cnty., Tex., No. 5:07-CV-59-
DF, 2008 WL 11449195, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2008).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const.
amend. VIII. “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . but neither does
it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that the treatment a prisoner receives in
prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment.” Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (internal quotations
omitted)). An Eighth Amendment violation occurs when a prison official acts with
deliberate indifference to an inmate’s health and safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994).
“Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.” Domino v. Tex.
Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2001). The test for deliberate
indifference has both an objective and subjective prong. Id. at 839. Under the objective
prong, the inmate must first prove “an objective exposure to a substantial risk of harm.”
Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 281 (5th Cir. 2021). “[I]nmates need not show that death
or serious injury has already occurred to prove that unconstitutional conditions exist under
the objective element[,] . . . [r]ather, they need only show that there is a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Garrett v. Lumpkin, 96 F.4th 896, 900-01 (5th Cir. 2024) (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
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To prove the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test, the inmate must
establish that the prison official “had subjective knowledge that the inmate faced a
substantial risk of harm [to the inmate’s health and safety] and … [consciously] disregarded
the risk.” Valentine, 993 F.3d at 281; see also Lawson v. Dall. Cnty., 286 F.3d 257, 262
(5th Cir. 2002). In other words, a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if he
knows that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by
failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 at 847.
Deliberate indifference may be exhibited by prison doctors in their response to
prisoners’ needs, but it may also be shown when prison officials have denied an inmate
prescribed treatment or have denied him access to medical personnel capable of evaluating
the need for treatment. Estelle, 429 U.S at 104-05. In the context of medical treatment,
the prisoner must show “that prison officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly
evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d
339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A prison official’s knowledge of substantial risk may be inferred if the risk was
obvious. Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006). The Fifth Circuit
nevertheless has “consistently recognized . . . that ‘deliberate indifference cannot be
inferred merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk
of serious harm.’” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Thompson
v. Upshur Cnty., Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 458-59 (5th Cir. 2001)); see also Aguirre v. City of
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San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 420 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Negligence or even gross negligence is
not enough, the officials must have actual knowledge of the substantial risk”). The
Supreme Court further explains that “an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that
he should have perceived but did not” falls short of constituting deliberate indifference.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. Deliberate indifference encompasses only unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the conscience of humankind. McCormick v.
Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
a. Deliberate Indifference Claims to Retain
The Court will first consider whether Plaintiff can establish the objective component
of his deliberate indifference claims. The Supreme Court has stated that only extreme
deprivations can be characterized as punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). The length of time spent in offensive
conditions also should be considered, because for example a “filthy, overcrowded cell ...
might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.” Alexander
v. Tippah Cnty., Miss., 351 F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 2003). As noted in Hernandez,
“conditions may not be ‘grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting
imprisonment.’” Hernandez, 2020 WL 5539093, at *14 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). “[A] ‘sufficiently serious’ deprivation under the Eighth
Amendment” is defined “as the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
Here, Plaintiff’s alleges that: (1) he spent four days excessively bleeding without medical
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treatment; (2) he passed out from loss of blood without medical treatment; (3) he
experienced significant distress while bleeding; (4) he was not given his prescribed
medications for multiple days after undergoing a surgery to remove several polyps, which
he described as “painful”; and (6) he continues to experience medical issues because of
what he experienced. (See D.E. 16, pp. 2-5; D.E. 21). Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as
true, reflect that he has suffered serious physical injuries and unnecessary distress as a
result of experiencing delays in receiving medical care and being denied prescribed
medications. These allegations suggest that Plaintiff was exposed to a substantial risk of
serious harm in connection with the lack of adequate medical attention and care received
by him for his serious medical issues at the Victoria County Jail. See Garrett, 96 F.4th at
900-01.
In turning to the subjective component of his claims, Plaintiff alleges that the
individual defendants acted with deliberate indifference toward him by intentionally
delaying or denying Plaintiff adequate care for his serious medical issues. These
allegations are summarized as follows:
● Deputy Thompson (1) ignored Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment for
multiple days; (2) laughed at Plaintiff’s request for medical assistance; (3)
ignored other inmates trying to seek medical help for Plaintiff; and (4)
ignored phone calls and computer requests for medical help for Plaintiff.
(D.E. 16 at 6; D.E. 21 at 1-2).
● Deputy West(1) ignored Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment for
multiple days; (2) laughed at Plaintiff’s request for medical assistance; (3)
ignored other inmates trying to seek medical help for Plaintiff; and (4)
ignored phone calls and computer requests for medical help for Plaintiff.
(D.E. 16 at 7; D.E. 21 at 3).
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● Deputy Penny (1) ignored Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment for
multiple days; (2) laughed at Plaintiff’s request for medical assistance; (3)
told Plaintiff to remain in his bunk because the inmates were upset Plaintiff
was bleeding in the shower and toilet; and (4) allowed inmates to steal
Plaintiff’s food from his food tray because Plaintiff was unable to retrieve
the tray due to bleeding. (D.E. 16 at 7; D.E. 21 at 14-15).
● Deputy Lackey (1) ignored Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment for
multiple days; (2) laughed at Plaintiff’s request for medical assistance; and
(3) told Plaintiff he would not receive medical case unless he was “bleeding
to death or dying.” (D.E. 16 at 7; D.E. 21 at 16-17).
● Doctor Robertson – (1) ignored Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment for
multiple days; (2) laughed at Plaintiff’s request for medical assistance; (3)
ignored other inmates seeking medical assistance for Plaintiff; (4) ignored
phone calls and computer requests for medical help; (5) returned Plaintiff to
inmate cell instead of placing him in a medical tank; (6) did not provide
Plaintiff with his prescribed medications after surgery; and (7) did not
provide cleaning supplies for Plaintiff to clean himself from bleeding. (D.E.
16 at 7; D.E. 21 at 5-7).
● Doctor McNell (1) ignored Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment for
multiple days; (2) laughed at Plaintiff’s request for medical assistance; (3)
ignored other inmates seeking medical assistance for Plaintiff; (4) ignored
phone calls and computer requests for medical help; (5) returned Plaintiff to
inmate cell instead of placing him in a medical tank; (6) did not provide
Plaintiff with his prescribed medications after surgery; and (7) did not
provide cleaning supplies for Plaintiff to clean himself from bleeding. (D.E.
16 at 7; D.E. 21 at 7-9).
● Nurse Dodds (1) ignored Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment for
multiple days; (2) laughed at Plaintiff’s request for medical assistance; and
(3) did not provide Plaintiff with his prescribed medications after surgery.
(D.E. 16 at 7; D.E. 21 at 11).
● Nurse Gayle – (1) ignored Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment for
multiple days; (2) laughed at Plaintiff’s request for medical assistance; (3)
and did not provide Plaintiff with his prescribed medications after surgery.
(D.E. 16 at 7; D.E. 21 at 11-12).
● Nurse Maddison – (1) ignored Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment for
multiple days; (2) laughed at Plaintiff’s request for medical assistance; and
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(3) did not provide Plaintiff with his prescribed medications after surgery.
(D.E. 16 at 7; D.E. 21 at 12-13).
Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, indicate that each of the individual
defendants were aware that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm—in connection
either with his daily bleeding issue or need for his prescribed medication following his
surgery—and disregarded that risk by failing to take timely and reasonable measures to
abate that risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Valentine, 993 F.3d at 281. These allegations,
when reviewed in their totality, suggest that the conduct taken by these defendants may
have “evince[d] a wanton disregard for” Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.” Gobert, 463
F.3d at 346. Plaintiff, therefore, has alleged plausible Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claims against the defendants identified above in connection with his bleeding
medical issues and denial of prescribed medications while confined at the Victoria County
Jail. Cf. Stewart v. Medical Director, No. 24-20569, 2026 WL 637729, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar.
6, 2026) (per curiam) (recognizing that the intentional denial of delay of access to medical
care as well as intentional interference with prescribed treatment constitutes deliberate
indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Wesley v. Flores, No. 6:25cv412,
2026 WL 1690081, at * 4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2026), adopted, 2026 WL 1688320 (E.D.
Tex. Jun. 10, 2026) (concluding that inmate stated a deliberate indifference claim against
prison officials claim based on allegations that they denied or delayed medical treatment
for over twelve hours after the inmate suffered from an incident of rectal bleeding). Further
factual and legal development of these claims is necessary to determine whether Plaintiff
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can maintain these claims against each particular defendant in his or her individual
capacity.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, based on the allegations set forth above in this section, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that the Court RETAIN Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claims against Deputy Thompson, Deputy West, Deputy Penny, Deputy
Lackey, Doctor Robertson, Doctor McNell, Nurse Tammy Dodds, Nurse Gayle, and Nurse
Maddison in their individual capacities. The undersigned will order service separately on
these defendants with respect to the claims retained in this case.
The undersigned respectfully recommends further that the district court:
● DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Victoria
County Jail and Victoria County Medical Department as frivolous or for
failure to state a claim for relief; and
● DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against
each named individual defendant sued in his or her official capacity.
Respectfully submitted on June 18, 2026.
____________________________
Julie K. Hampton
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs.
Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc).
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