Cruz v. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JORGE LUIS HERNANDEZ
CRUZ,
Petitioner,
versus
RAYMOND THOMPSON,
Respondent.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:26-cv-03423
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER ON DISMISSAL
The petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus by
Petitioner Jorge Luis Hernandez Cruz, filed on his behalf
by his sister Jeydi De La Caridad Hernandez Cruz, is
dismissed without prejudice. Dkt 1.
1. Background
Petitioner is currently being detained by immigration
officials at the Joe Corley Detention Center in Conroe,
Texas. Dkt 1 at 1. A petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus
was filed on his behalf by his sister as “next friend.” See id
at 8. It admits to his illegal entry on a prior date but asserts
that his detention is illegal as a violation of his rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id at 6–
7. Petitioner’s name is printed on the signature line of the
petition, but it isn’t his actual signature as reflected on any
official document included with the petition. Compare
Dkt 1 at 8 (petition), with id at 10 (passport), 16 (notice to
appear).
Included with the petition is the “next friend
declaration” of Petitioner’s sister. She attests that
Petitioner has limited access to legal resources in detention
and limited ability to prepare legal filings from there. She
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 08, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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also states that she has no interests adverse to Petitioner
and is acting solely to protect his rights. The declaration
contains no other allegations concerning why Petitioner
could not and did not file his own petition. Dkt 1-1 at 2.
2. Legal standard
A petition for writ of habeas corpus may be “signed and
verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by
someone acting in his behalf.” 28 USC §2242 (emphasis
added). A person acting on behalf of another—a next
friend—doesn’t become a party to the action but instead
simply pursues the action on behalf of the person detained,
who remains the real party in interest. Whitmore v
Arkansas, 495 US 149, 163 (1990).
Jurisdiction to entertain a petition filed by a next
friend exists only if the next friend establishes standing.
Standing to proceed as a next friend in habeas proceedings
“is by no means granted automatically to whomever seeks
to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Ibid. The Fifth
Circuit has long observed, “The ‘next friend’ expedient,
which on occasion may be essential to the efficacy of the
‘Great Writ,’ may not be so abused as to unleash on the
courts a quasi-professional group of lay writ writers who
would seek to right all wrongs, both real and imagined.”
Weber v Garza, 570 F2d 511, 514 (5th Cir 1978, per
curiam). Instead, a person seeking to proceed as the next
friend of another must clearly “establish the propriety of
[such] status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the
court.” Whitmore, 495 US at 164.
The person seeking status as a next friend must
(i) provide an adequate explanation as to why the real
party in interest can’t pursue the action on his own behalf,
(ii) establish dedication solely to the best interests of the
real party in interest, and (iii) show a significant
relationship with the real party in interest. See Thorpe v
Eavenson, 2007 WL 4355441, at *2 (ND Tex), citing
Whitmore, 495 US at 163–64.
The first criterion is essential. If the petition “filed by
a would-be ‘next friend’ does not set forth an adequate
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reason or explanation of the necessity for resort to the ‘next
friend’ device,” the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
petition. Weber, 570 F2d at 514; see also Whitmore, 495 US
at 163. In this respect, an adequate explanation requires a
clear showing that the real party in interest “is unable to
seek relief on his own behalf or is mentally incompetent to
do so.” Lovelace v Lynaugh, 809 F2d 1136, 1137–38 (5th Cir
1987, per curiam), citing Gilmore v Utah, 429 US 1012,
1014 (1976).
3. Analysis
It is assumed that Petitioner’s sister satisfies the
second and third requirements to be a next friend. But no
sufficient showing is presented as to the first requirement.
The only explanation she gives for why Petitioner can’t
pursue this action on his own behalf is that he is detained.
But the sole purpose of any petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is to challenge the legality of an ongoing detention.
See Poree v Collins, 866 F3d 235, 243 (5th Cir 2017), citing
Preiser v Rodriguez, 411 US 475, 500 (1973), and Wilkinson
v Dotson, 544 US 74, 78 (2005). If being detained was
sufficient of itself to warrant filings by a next friend, the
next-friend device could be used in all habeas cases. That
is not the rule articulated by the Supreme Court in
Whitmore. See 495 US at 163.
It also bears mention that, to this point, many
hundreds of habeas petitions have been filed in this district
by immigration detainees representing themselves, many
of whom are detained in the same facility as Petitioner. Yet
next-friend status is rarely sought. That it may be easier
for Petitioner’s sister to file the petition isn’t sufficient to
confer standing to pursue relief as a next friend. And to be
clear, nothing is offered to show that Petitioner is mentally
incompetent or otherwise unable to file pleadings on his
own behalf when many others detained at the same facility
have done so.
In short, Petitioner’s sister hasn’t alleged facts showing
that he is unable to seek habeas corpus relief on his own
behalf and is thus in need of a next friend to pursue his
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claims for him. Absent such proof, jurisdiction to consider
the petition she filed on his behalf is lacking.
This action must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
4. Conclusion
The petition filed by Jeydi De La Caridad Hernandez
Cruz on behalf of Petitioner Jorge Luis Hernandez Cruz is
STRICKEN as unauthorized.
This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of
jurisdiction. Dkt 1.
Any pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
A certificate of appealability is unnecessary and is thus
DENIED.
An order of dismissal will enter separately.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on ______________ , at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
May 07, 2026
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