Bounds v. U.S. Bank Trust National Association et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CARLOS LESLIE TENNESSEE
BOUNDS,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-cv-2016
U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Carlos Bounds’s (“Plaintiff”)
Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. 	(ECF No. 7).1 	Based
on 	a 	review 	of 	the 	motion, 	arguments, 	and 	relevant 	law, 	the 	Court
RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s motion (id.) be DENIED.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff is in the process of being evicted from her property located at
8607 Thornberry Hollow Court, Missouri City, Texas 77459 (the “Property”).
(ECF No. 7 at 1). On June 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant motion, seeking
a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 65(b), seeking to enjoin Defendant GFF Texas Holdings,
1 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all pretrial matters pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). (ECF No. 3).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 26, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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LLC (“GFF”) from executing a writ of possession and evicting Plaintiff from the
Property. 	(Id.). 	According to Plaintiff, the writ of possession “was issued on
April 	8, 	2026, 	and 	expires 	approximately 	June 	21, 	2026. 	Execution 	is
imminent.” 	(Id. 	at 2). 	Plaintiff contends that absent immediate relief,
“Plaintiff will be locked out of her homestead before this Court has an
opportunity 	to 	adjudicate 	the 	validity 	of 	the 	underlying 	foreclosure
transaction.” (Id.).
Plaintiff goes on to explain that this case arises from an alleged wrongful
foreclosure 	and 	attempt 	to 	dispossess 	Plaintiff 	of 	her 	homestead. 	(Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that the foreclosure and transfer of title to GFF is “void due to
false affidavits, defects in the chain of authority, chain-of-title defects, and
constitutional title deficiencies.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges the “state-court forcible
detainer 	proceeding 	addressed 	only 	the 	narrow 	question 	of 	immediate
possession; it did not and could not adjudicate the validity of the foreclosure or
the title defects alleged here.” (Id.). Plaintiff states she pursued “relief in state
court,” and the “Texas First Court of Appeals denied an emergency stay on
April 23, 2026, holding that the eviction judgment could not be stayed absent
a $60,000 supersedeas bond.” 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff therefore requests a TRO
enjoining GFF from executing the writ of possession, dispossessing Plaintiff of
the Property, and transferring the Property during the lawsuit. (ECF No. 7).
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II. 	Legal Standard
In the Fifth Circuit, there are four prerequisites for obtaining the
extraordinary relief of a TRO. To prevail, the applicant must demonstrate (1)
a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that
the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) that
the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction might cause
the Defendant; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.
See Palmer v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 579 F.3d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 2009);
Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 372 (5th Cir. 2008); Mississippi
Power & Light Co., v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir.
1985). Plaintiff bears the burden to prove all four requirements in order to be
entitled to injunctive relief. Palmer, 579 F.3d at 506.
Additionally, the Court may issue a TRO without written or oral notice
to the adverse party or its attorney only if (1) specific facts in an affidavit or a
verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in
opposition; and (2) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made
to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. 	FED. R. C IV. P.
65(b)(1).
The denial of a TRO will be upheld where the movant has failed to
sufficiently establish any one of the four criteria. 	Black Fire Fighters Ass’n v.
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City of Dallas, Tex., 905 F.2d 63, 65 (5th Cir. 1990). 	Injunctive relief is an
extraordinary remedy that requires the applicant to unequivocally show the
need for its issuance. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 118 F.3d 1047,
1050 (5th Cir. 1997). 	Indeed, courts in this Circuit have made clear that
temporary 	restraining 	orders 	constitute 	“extraordinary 	and 	drastic
remed[ies],” which are “not to be granted routinely, but only when the movant,
by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” 	White v. Carlucci, 862
F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Albright v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.
Supp. 	2d 	523, 	532 	(E.D. 	La. 	1999) 	(“Temporary 	restraining 	orders 	and
preliminary 	injunctions 	are 	extraordinary 	relief 	and 	rarely 	issued.”).
Accordingly, the movant has the burden of introducing sufficient evidence to
justify the grant of a TRO, PCI Transp. Inc. v. Fort Worth & Western R.R. Co.,
418 F.3d 535, 546 (5th Cir. 2005), and movant must also satisfy a cumulative
burden of proving each of the four elements enumerated before a TRO can be
granted, Mississippi Power and Light., 760 F.2d at 621.
III. 	Discussion
In this case, foreclosure of the Property has already taken place through
state court proceedings and the writ of possession issued on April 8, 2026. In
fact, Plaintiff has attached the March 11 state court order from Fort Bend
County, ordering that GFF is entitled to possession of the Property. (ECF No.
7-1). 	As such, the foreclosure has already transpired, the Property was
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conveyed to GFF, eviction proceedings have been completed, and the eviction
is forthcoming.
Plaintiff files this motion to stop the eviction. Now that foreclosure has
taken place, the Property has been transferred, and eviction proceedings are
complete, the Court will not intervene in the state court proceedings on the
issue of possession. 	Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the burden for granting an
injunction based upon the current facts of this case. 	Moreover, Plaintiff has
failed to offer evidence that would allow this Court to grant relief. Plaintiff is
no longer the owner of the property, and she has no basis for an injunction.
Federal district courts have found, following Knoles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
513 F. App’x 414 (5th Cir. 2013), that they generally lack jurisdiction to grant
relief where a plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order or injunction to
prevent the pursuit of eviction proceedings, or the execution of a writ of
possession. 	This Court therefore cannot issue an injunction to stop the
eviction. 	See Slocum v. Sebring Capital Partners, LP, et al., No. 4:18-cv-029,
2018 WL 3470300, at *11 (E.D. Tex. June 27, 2018) (denying Plaintiff’s request
for injunctive relief to undo a foreclosure sale as “federal courts are statutorily
prohibited from enjoining state court proceedings under the Anti-Injunction
Act”); Brooks v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:17-cv-3443, 2018 WL 3422138,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2018) (denying plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief
related 	to 	pending 	eviction 	proceedings 	and 	the 	execution 	of 	a 	writ 	of
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possession pursuant to the Anti-Injunction Act); Omoloh v. Bank of America,
N.A., No. 4:17-cv-160, 2017 WL 2616006, *5 (N.D. Tex. May 16, 2017) (“Where,
as here, the requested injunctive relief would restrain a party from executing
a writ of possession lawfully obtained by a Texas court, a federal district court
lacks jurisdiction to grant such relief”); Green v. Bank of America N.A., No. 13-
cv-1092, 2013 WL 2417916, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2013) (determining that
“[t]o the extent there was a forcible detainer proceeding and eviction order,”
the 	court 	lacked 	the 	ability 	to 	provide 	the 	plaintiff 	with 	the 	requested
temporary restraining order to enjoin the state-court proceeding).
“Proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed to continue
unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error,
if any, through the state appellate courts and ultimately this Court.” 	Health
Net, Inc. v. Wooley, 534 F.3d 487, 494 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Atl. Coast Line
R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286–87 (1970)). 	“[T]he Anti-
Injunction 	Act 	‘is 	an 	absolute 	prohibition 	against 	enjoining 	state 	court
proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically defined
exceptions.’” Id. (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 286). The exceptions
include situations “as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”
Id. at 493. 	As such, the Court lacks authority to grant Plaintiff’s request for
injunctive relief because her request to enjoin the eviction proceedings is
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barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. See Williams v. Cap. Fund I, LLC, No. 4:23-
cv-1694, 2023 WL 6797529, at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2023); Knoles, 513 F.
App’x at 415–16.
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to show that any of the exceptions apply
here. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers
Loc. No. 70 of Alameda Cnty., 415 U.S. 423, 443 (1974) (“The burden was on
the [movant] to show that they were entitled to a preliminary injunction, not
on the [respondent] to show that they were not.”). 	To the extent Plaintiff
argues the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception applies, such exception is not
applicable as this lawsuit is an in personam action. 	See Phillips v. Charles
Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127, 132 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Phillips’s complaint seeks
monetary damages for wrongs allegedly committed by Schreiner Bank. 	This
lawsuit is thus an ordinary in personam action, and the mere fact that debts
secured by real property are at issue in the dispute does not transform it into
an in rem proceeding.”). 	Here, Plaintiff seeks to determine her right to the
Property, 	requesting 	injunctive 	relief 	based 	on 	the 	allegedly 	wrongful
foreclosure. (ECF No. 23 at 3–4, 17); see Navis v. PHH Mortg. Servs., No. 4:26-
cv-444, 2026 WL 1701005, at *5 (E.D. Tex. June 10, 2026). Further, “[a] simple
overview of Texas foreclosure and forcible detainer law reveals that the state
court eviction proceedings will neither dispose of the res nor threaten this
Court’s continuing supervision.” 	Hart v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:14-cv-
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1111, 2014 WL 12531171, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2014) (emphasis in
original). 	“Specifically, the federal and state court actions can both proceed
uninhibited because, in Texas, actions to determine possession and actions to
decide 	title 	address 	distinct 	issues 	and 	can 	be, 	and 	often 	are, 	tried
concurrently.” 	Id. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief to
prevent eviction in the state court proceedings seeks relief that falls outside of
this Court’s jurisdiction. 	Further, Plaintiff has failed to show a substantial
likelihood of success. Therefore, her requested relief should be denied.
IV. 	Conclusion
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing, 	the 	Court 	RECOMMENDS 	Plaintiff’s
Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 7) be DENIED.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on June 26, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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