Llanes Carnesolta v. Tate et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MAYKETIA LLANES
CARNESOLTA,
Petitioner,
versus
RANDY TATE, et al,
Respondents.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:26-cv-01006
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER ON DISMISSAL
Petitioner Mayketia Llanes Carnesolta filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC §2241 on February
6, 2026. Dkt 1. She acknowledges illegal entry into the
United States at a prior date but nonetheless asserts that
her present detention under 8 USC §1225(b) is unlawful.
She contends that any detention should instead proceed, if
at all, under 8 USC §1226(a), which may entitle her to a
bond hearing. Id at ¶2.
Prior order indicated that the arguments in the
petition appeared to raise only issues previously resolved
in decisions cited there. Dkt 4. Petitioner was given an
opportunity to make a further filing with additional
authorities or distinguishing facts not considered in the
rulings cited on prior dismissals.
Petitioner then filed an amended petition. Dkt 6. In it,
she asserts claims under (i) the Immigration and
Nationality Act, (ii) the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, (iii) equal protection, (iv) the Suspension
Clause, and (v) the Accardi doctrine. Id at ¶¶74–148. The
claims with respect to equal protection and the Accardi
doctrine weren’t resolved by the prior-cited decisions. The
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 08, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Government was thus ordered to show cause as to those
claims only. Dkt 7. It then filed a response. Dkt 10.
The Fifth Circuit has now issued a controlling decision
in Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 166 F4th 494 (5th Cir
2026). In sum, it holds that anyone present in the United
States without legal admission is both an “applicant for
admission” and deemed to be “seeking admission,” and that
all such persons are thus subject to mandatory detention
under 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A). Such determination forecloses
Petitioner’s statutory arguments under the INA. See also
Herrera Avila v Bondi, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir) (holding
to same effect).
The undersigned previously resolved that and an array
of closely related issues upon determination that the
Government may properly apply 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A) in
circumstances similar to those of Petitioner. For example,
see:
o Montoya Cabanas v Bondi, 2025 WL 3171331
(SD Tex): Finding that (i) the term “applicant
for admission” is determinative, as it is broadly
defined to include anyone “present in the
United States who has not been admitted,”
(ii) application of §1225(b)(2)(A) doesn’t render
superfluous the amendment to §1226 by the
Laken Riley Act, and (iii) no due process
violation occurs where constitutional argument
depends on rejected statutory interpretation of
§§1225 and 1226.
o Herrera Naranjo v Uhls, 2025 WL 3771447
(SD Tex): Rejecting contention that (i) the text
of §1225(b)(2)(A) is ambiguous, with resort to
other canons of statutory construction thus
being unnecessary, (ii) the location of
petitioner’s arrest may itself violate due
process or otherwise make detention unlawful,
and (iii) prior work authorizations confer
lawful status.
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o Rodriguez-Hidalgo v Noem, 4:25-cv-05730
(SD Tex, Jan 9, 2026): Rejecting arguments
based on (i) bond regulations, because
statutory language prevails over putative
conflicting regulations, (ii) due process,
because the Government may constitutionally
detain deportable aliens during the limited
period necessary for their removal proceedings,
and (iii) eligibility for adjustment of status
under the Cuban Adjustment Act, because such
is outside the scope of habeas jurisdiction.
o Garcia Tabon v Dickey, 4:25-cv-06145 (SD Tex,
Jan 22, 2026): Rejecting argument under
Administrative Procedure Act where it
depends on rejected statutory interpretation of
§§1225 and 1226.
o Ordonez v Frink, 2026 WL 143153 (SD Tex):
Rejecting argument under Fourth Amendment
where it depends on rejected statutory
interpretation of §§1225 and 1226.
As noted within those citations, a claim under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment necessarily fails to
the extent that it proceeds upon reliance of rejected
statutory interpretation as to the applicability of §1226.
For example, see Montoya Cabanas, 2025 WL 3171331
at *6–7; Herrera Naranjo, 2025 WL 3771447 at *2.
Further, the Supreme Court has recognized that “the
Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens
during the limited period necessary for their removal
proceedings.” Maceda Jimenez v Thompson, 2025 WL
3265493, *1 (SD Tex), quoting Demore v Kim, 538 US 510,
523 (2003).
As also noted above, a claim under the Administrative
Procedure Act likewise fails to the extent that it proceeds
upon reliance of the same rejected statutory interpretation.
Such claims are also foreclosed by 5 USC §704, given that
adequate remedy exists through habeas relief. For
example, see Garcia Tabon, 4:25-cv-06145, Dkt 14 at 3;
Sanchez-Sanchez v Bondi, 4:26-cv-00144, Dkt 7 at 2–3.
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The undersigned has also determined a number of
other issues since the Fifth Circuit decided Buenrostro-
Mendez. Most pertinent is Penafiel Clavijo v Thompson,
2026 WL 923310 (SD Tex), holding that (i) procedural due
process doesn’t require an individualized custody deter-
mination beyond the mandate of 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A), and
(ii) pre-removal-order detention without a bond hearing
pending removal proceedings didn’t violate substantive
due process, where not exceeding the presumptively
reasonable six-month period enunciated in Zadvydas v
Davis, 533 US 678, 701 (2001), as to post-removal-order
detention.
To the extent that Petitioner otherwise relies on
arguments not already raised and resolved to the contrary
in the decisions above, they lack merit.
As to equal protection, Petitioner suggests that
mandatory detention by classification under §1225(b)(2)(A)
“fails rational-basis review as applied to Petitioner”
because “a categorical rule that treats similarly situated
individuals differently based solely on entry-related labels
[ ] bear[s] no rational relationship to present-day custody
concerns.” Dkt 6 at ¶¶121–22.
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne
v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 439 (1985), quoting
Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 216 (1982). The Supreme Court
holds that this guarantee of equal protection applies to the
federal government through the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 499–500
(1954).
To establish an equal protection claim requires proof at
the outset that similarly situated persons have been
treated differently. Faculty Rights Coalition v Shahrokhi,
204 F Appx 416, 420 (5th Cir 2006), citing Muhammad v
Lynaugh, 966 F2d 901, 903 (5th Cir 1992). The Fifth
Circuit holds that the inquiry is “whether they ‘are in all
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relevant respects alike.’” Texas Entertainment Association
v Hegar, 10 F4th 495, 513 (5th Cir 2021).
The subject classifications here are (i) those aliens, like
Petitioner, who are subject to mandatory detention under
§1225(b)(2)(A), and (ii) those aliens in removal proceedings
who are entitled to a bond hearing when detained under
§1226(a). For example, see Dkt 6 at ¶¶113–26. Notably, the
immigration charges giving rise to detention pending
removal within each of those groups are quite distinct. An
alien detained under §1225(b)(2)(A) entered entirely
without inspection in disregard of law, which is a criminal
offense. An alien detained under §1226(a) instead was
lawfully admitted but then took other action (such as
overstaying a visa), which is a civil offense. Compare 8 USC
§§1325, 1326 (illegal entry and re-entry), with 8 USC
§1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (visa overstay).
The Fifth Circuit holds differences such as these to
defeat the “similarly situated” requirement. For example,
see Faculty Rights Coalition, 204 F Appx at 420 (adjunct
professors not similarly situated to full-time faculty for
purposes of salary and benefits); Golden Glow Tanning
Salon, Inc v City of Columbus, 52 F4th 974, 978–79 (5th
Cir 2022) (Wal-Marts and tanning salons not similarly
situated for purposes of COVID-era restrictions).
It having been determined that aliens in each of these
two groups are not similarly situated in all relevant
respects, the equal-protection inquiry needn’t proceed
further. But even if those detained under §1225(b)(2)(A)
were similarly situated to those detained under §1226(a),
such classification doesn’t offend equal protection.
Petitioner acknowledges, as she must, that deferential
rational-basis review applies to disparate treatment of
different groups of aliens. See Dkt 6 at ¶121. Legislation
survives rational-basis review so long as there is “any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.” Cabral v Holder,
632 F3d 886, 894 (5th Cir 2011). This means that, where
there are “plausible reasons” for congressional action,
judicial inquiry “is at an end.” FCC v Beach
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Communications, Inc, 508 US 307, 313–14 (1993), quoting
United States Railroad Retirement Board v Fritz, 449 US
166, 179 (1980). And as pertinent here, the Supreme Court
stresses “the limited scope of judicial inquiry into
immigration legislation.” Fiallo v Bell, 430 US 787, 792
(1977); see also Mathews v Diaz, 426 US 67, 78–84 (1976)
(holding that “statutory discrimination” between classes of
aliens “allowing benefits to some aliens but not to others”
is permissible).
For reasons explained above as to why the subject
classes aren’t similarly situated in the first place, Congress
could quite rationally treat the worse infraction
(encompassing aliens who entered without inspection in
contravention of law) more harshly than the lesser
infraction (encompassing aliens who were once lawfully
admitted but later became removable). Such explanation
suffices under the pertinent, deferential standard. See
Dkt 10 at 5 n 3.
The claim for equal protection will be dismissed.
As to the Accardi doctrine, Petitioner’s claims amount
to a challenge to the legality of her arrest without a
warrant under 8 CFR §§287.8(c)(2)(i) and (ii). See Dkt 6
at ¶¶138–48.
The claim fails at the threshold because 8 CFR §287.12
specifically disclaims creation of any enforceable rights
with respect to 8 CFR Part 287 – Field Officers; Powers and
Duties. See also Rios-Arias v Sessions, 684 F Appx 441, 442
(5th Cir 2017) (holding that 8 CFR §287.12 “do[es] not
create any enforceable rights or remedies”). Petitioner thus
has no enforceable right to assert in this regard.
Beyond this, it’s unclear from the record whether
Petitioner’s arrest at an ICE facility failed to comport with
the cited regulations. See Dkt 10 at 9. But even assuming
her characterization is factually correct, remedy pursuant
to habeas corpus isn’t available. The Supreme Court holds
that “the mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a
subsequent deportation proceeding.” INS v Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 US 1032, 1040 (1984). This is so because the
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“body or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal
or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of
an unlawful arrest.” Id at 1039 (cleaned up).
Said differently, an illegal arrest has no bearing on the
legality of detention following that arrest. A number of
district courts have thus rejected habeas corpus claims
based on allegedly unlawful arrests. For example, see
Rezaee v President of the United States, 2025 WL 4051609,
*5 (MD Fla); HN v Warden, Stewart Detention Center, 2021
WL 4203232, *5 (MD Ga). Even courts sustaining other
arguments in similar petitions have rejected unlawful-
arrest claims. For example, see Rodrigues De Oliveira v
Joyce, 2025 WL 1826118, *5 (D Me) (rejecting illegal-arrest
argument but granting relief on grounds of procedural due
process); Valenzuela v Semaia, 2025 WL 3635578, *4–5
(CD Cal) (rejecting illegal-arrest argument but finding
petitioner likely to succeed on merits of INA claim).
Petitioner may be able to pursue “alternative remedies for
institutional practices . . . that might violate Fourth
Amendment rights.” Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US at 1045. But
relief on habeas corpus is “at its core a remedy for unlawful
executive detention.” DHS v Thuraissigiam, 591 US 103,
119 (2020).
The claim as to the Accardi doctrine will be dismissed.
As to the Suspension Clause, the claim will also be
dismissed. Dkt 6 at ¶¶127–37. The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus hasn’t been suspended. To the contrary,
petitions here and across the country are being addressed
and resolved on the merits.
The amended petition for writ of habeas corpus by
Petitioner Mayketia Llanes Carnesolta is thus DENIED.
Dkt 6.
This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A final judgment will enter separately.
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SO ORDERED.
Signed on April 8, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
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