St. Amand v. EKRE of TX, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Clemmie Elnora St. Amand, Heir
and Successor in Interest to Frances
St. Amand, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
EKRE of TX, LLC,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 4:26-cv-00802
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a 	title dispute case. 	Plaintiff Clemmie Elnora 	St. Amand
(“Clemmie”) filed a motion to remand, Dkt. 5, and Defendant EKRE of TX, LLC
(“EKRE”) filed a motion to dismiss Clemmie’s claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), Dkt. 7. 	After carefully considering the motions, the responses,
Dkts. 6, 11, the record, and the applicable law, it is recommended that
Clemmie’s motion to remand (Dkt. 5) be denied and EKRE’s motion to dismiss
(Dkt. 7) be granted.
Background
The pertinent facts are taken from the pleadings and records of which
this Court takes judicial notice. 	See Canada v. United States, 950 F.3d 299,
313 n.16 (5th Cir. 2020) (judicial notice of records in prior related proceedings);
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 27, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2), (d) (authorizing judicial notice “at any stage of the
proceeding” of facts “not subject to reasonable dispute” that are “readily
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”).
Clemmie brings this suit as heir and successor-in-interest to her mother,
Frances St. Amand (“Frances”), who passed away on March 27, 2025. 	Dkt. 1-
3 at 3. 	Frances had owned property at 3401 Le Badie Street, Houston, Texas
(the “Property”). Id. In 2019, Frances executed a revocable transfer on death
deed naming Clemmie as primary beneficiary. 	Id. 	But in 2022, according to
Clemmie, EKRE fraudulently induced Clemmie to convey the Property to it
under “false pretenses … representing the arrangement as a debt-relief or loan
program” while assuring Clemmie that Frances would retain ownership of the
Property. 	Id. 	Clemmie 	also 	accuses 	EKRE 	of 	creating 	and 	recording
documents with forged signatures and false notary acknowledgments. 	Id.
Since 	then, 	EKRE 	has 	repeatedly 	attempted 	to 	evict 	Clemmie 	from 	the
Property and recently issued a notice to vacate. Id.
But in 2024, Frances’s granddaughter, Bria Ratcliff, purporting to act as
Frances’s attorney-in-fact, brought a lawsuit challenging the same conveyance
to EKRE. See Ratcliff v. EKRE of TX, LLC, 2025 WL 3657315, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 25, 2025), adopted by 2025 WL 3655196 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2025) (the
“First Suit”). 	The First Suit alleged that EKRE “stole away [Frances’s] real
property 	with 	consideration 	that 	falls 	egregiously 	short 	of 	just 	and 	fair
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compensation,” and sought recission of the conveyance, return of the Property
in fee simple absolute, and a declaration that the documents signed by Frances
or “anyone allegedly acting on her behalf ... [are] null and void.” Id.
Because Ratcliff was not a licensed attorney and lacked the authority to
represent Frances in the First Suit, this Court issued an order directing
Frances—whom it noted was the “sole plaintiff in this lawsuit”—to either file
a notice that she intended to represent herself pro se or to hire an attorney who
would enter an appearance on Frances’s behalf. 	Id. 	After Frances failed to
comply with that order, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice on
December 17, 2025, for failure to prosecute. Ratcliff, 2025 WL 3655196, at *1.
A few weeks later, Clemmie filed this new suit in state court challenging
the same conveyance to EKRE. 	See Dkt. 1-3 at 2-4 (filed January 6, 2026).
Clemmie asserts claims for quiet title, fraud and fraud in the inducement, and
a declaratory judgment that cancels or voids EKRE’s instruments, and an
injunction that precludes EKRE from interfering with Clemmie’s possession of
the Property. See id. at 3-4.
EKRE promptly removed the action to this Court. 	Dkt. 1. 	Clemmie
moved to remand, Dkt. 5, and EKRE responded, Dkt. 6. 	EKRE then filed a
motion to dismiss Clemmie’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6), Dkt. 7, to which
Clemmie responded, Dkt. 11. The motions are ripe for resolution.
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Analysis
Based 	on 	uncontroverted 	and 	judicially-noticeable 	facts, 	diversity
jurisdiction is proper, and this suit is barred on the merits. 	Contrary to
Clemmie’s contention, EKRE has established that this suit well exceeds the
amount in controversy necessary to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 	And EKRE is
correct that Clemmie, a successor-in-interest to the Property, cannot relitigate
the same claims that were raised or could have been raised in the First Suit.
Accordingly, this Court should deny Clemmie’s motion to remand and grant
EKRE’s motion to dismiss all claims.
I. 	Removal was proper based on diversity jurisdiction.
Clemmie argues that remand is warranted because EKRE failed to show
that this dispute meets the jurisdictional minimum for diversity jurisdiction.
Dkt. 5 at 1-2. 	EKRE responds that public records confirm its allegation that
the amount-in-controversy exceeds $75,000. 	Dkt. 6 at 3. 	For the reasons
below, EKRE is correct.
A. 	Legal standard for removal
A state court action can be removed to federal court if the action could
originally have been filed in federal court. 	28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 	The sole
asserted basis for removal here is 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1), which authorizes
federal courts to hear cases “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
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or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between … citizens
of different States.” See Dkt. 1 at 2-4 (notice of removal).
The removal statute must “be strictly construed and any doubt as to the
propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand.” 	In re Hot-Hed
Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 	“The jurisdictional facts
that support removal must be judged at the time of the removal.” 	Gebbia v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2000). 	The party invoking
federal jurisdiction “bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction
exists and that removal was proper.” Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). 	Jurisdiction must be established “by
competent proof,” see Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96-97 (2010), based
on “summary judgment type evidence,” St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg,
134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted).
B. 	Diversity jurisdiction exists.
Clemmie does not dispute that the parties are citizens of different states.
Indeed, the record confirms that the parties’ citizenships are diverse because
Clemmie is a natural person domiciled in Texas, see Dkt. 1 at 3, and the owners
of the LLC that owns EKRE are natural persons domiciled in New York, see
id. See SXSW, LLC v. Fed. Ins. Co., 83 F.4th 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2023) (natural
person’s citizenship is determined by state of domicile); Harvey v. Grey Wolf
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Drilling 	Co., 	542 	F.3d 	1077, 	1080 	(5th 	Cir. 	2008) 	(LLC’s 	citizenship 	is
determined by citizenship of “all of its members”).
Rather, 	the 	only 	dispute 	is 	whether 	Clemmie’s 	claims 	exceed 	the
jurisdictional minimum. 	Because she seeks a declaration and injunction to
void EKRE’s interests in the Property, see Dkt. 1-3 at 3-4, the answer is yes.
“In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well established
that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the
litigation.” 	Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347
(1977). 	“[W]hen the validity of a contract or a right to property is called into
question in its entirety, the value of the property controls the amount in
controversy.” 	Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Knox, 351 F. App’x 844, 849 (5th Cir.
2009) (quoting Waller v. Prof’l Ins. Corp., 296 F.2d 545, 547-48 (5th Cir. 1961)).
“In such cases, courts generally use the county appraisal district’s market
valuation to determine the amount in controversy.” 	Mosley v. NewRez Mortg.
LLC, 2022 WL 1750635, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2022), adopted by 2022 WL
1747023 (May 31, 2022).
Here, the original petition asserts that EKRE’s instruments are “forged
and fraudulent” and asks that they be declared void and “cancelled.” Dkt. 1-3
at 3. 	By questioning ERKE’s interests in the Property, Clemmie’s claims put
into controversy the Property’s value. Public records supplied by EKRE reflect
that the Property’s appraised value even before removal was $231,948. 	Dkt.
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6-1 at 2 (Harris County Appraisal District report as of April 21, 2025). 	That
satisfies EKRE’s burden to show that the amount in controversy exceeds the
$75,000 jurisdictional minimum under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 	Clemmie’s
motion to remand should be denied.
II. 	Res judicata bars this suit.
Moving to dismiss, EKRE argues that this suit is barred by res judicata.
Dkt. 7 at 7-9. Clemmie responds that res judicata does not apply because she
was not a party to and asserts claims that differ from those in the First Suit.
Dkt. 11 at 3. Neither of those contentions is sufficient to avoid the First Suit’s
preclusive effect.
A. 	Legal standard for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a party must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
An 	affirmative 	defense—like 	res 	judicata—can 	provide 	grounds 	for
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if the defense is established on the face of the
pleadings. 	See Kansa Reinsurance Co. v. Cong. Mortg. Corp. of Tex., 20 F.3d
1362, 1366 (5th Cir. 1994); see also, e.g., Pie Dev., LLC v. Pie Carrier Holdings,
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Inc., 128 F.4th 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2025) (recognizing that “courts may sua
sponte address res judicata at the motion to dismiss stage”). When conducting
this inquiry, the Court can consider documents referenced and incorporated in
the complaint and any facts for which judicial notice is appropriate. See Funk
v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 782-83 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming judicial notice
of publicly available documents containing matters of public record when
resolving Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
B. 	As a successor-in-interest to the Property, Clemmie cannot
challenge the same conveyance addressed in the First Suit.
EKRE argues the First Suit is preclusive. 	Dkt. 7 at 7-9. 	“Claim
preclusion, or res judicata, bars the litigation of claims that either have been
litigated or should have been raised in an earlier suit.” 	Test Masters Educ.
Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005). 	Texas’s preclusive
principles govern this case because jurisdiction is premised on diversity of
citizenship. 	See Anderson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 953 F.3d 311, 314 (5th
Cir. 2020) (“[F]ederal courts sitting in diversity apply the preclusion law of the
forum state unless it is incompatible with federal interests.”) (citing Semtek
Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001)).
Under Texas law, res judicata requires “(1) a prior final judgment on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of the parties or those
in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims as were
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raised or could have been raised in the first action.” 	Cox v. Nueces Cnty.,
839 F.3d 418, 421 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp.,
919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996)). 	These elements, although “articulated in a
slightly different way,” are substantively identical to the federal standard.
See Matter of 3 Star Props., LLC, 6 F.4th 595, 604-05 (5th Cir. 2021).
Clemmie does not dispute the first element of res judicata, namely that
this Court had jurisdiction when entering a final judgment in the First Suit.
In its order dismissing Frances’s claims, this Court found that diversity
jurisdiction was proper. See Ratcliff, 2025 WL 3657315, at *1 (noting diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). And that decision was a final judgment
on the merits. 	See id. (dismissing Frances’s claims with prejudice for failure
to prosecute); see also Bouler v. Trans Union, LLC, 2019 WL 6255572, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2019) (“Generally, a Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to
prosecute a claim is with prejudice and constitutes an adjudication on the
merits.”), adopted by 2019 WL 6255332 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2019).
Regarding the second res judicata element, Clemmie contends that she
was neither a party to nor in privity with Frances in the First Suit. Dkt. 11 at
3. Under Texas law, “privity exists if the parties share an identity of interests
in the basic legal right that is the subject of litigation.” 	Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d
at 653. 	“Those in privity with a party may include persons who … are
successors in interest to the party.” 	Getty Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
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845 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1992). “[A]ll persons are privy to a judgment whose
succession to the rights of property therein adjudicated are derived through or
under one or the 	other of the parties to the action, and which accrued
subsequent to the commencement of the action.” 	Kirby Lumber Corp. v. S.
Lumber Co., 196 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Tex. 1946) (quotations omitted).
Clemmie brings this suit as “heir and successor in interest” to Frances,
who was the sole plaintiff in the First Suit. 	Dkt. 1-3 at 2. 	Having succeeded
to Frances’s interest in the Property underlying the First Suit, Clemmie stands
in privity with Frances. See Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at 653.
The last res judicata element is also met because Clemmie asserts claims
that were or could have been raised in the First Suit. 	Texas has adopted the
“transactional approach” under which a later suit “will be barred if it arises
out of the same subject matter of a previous suit and which through the
exercise of diligence, could have been litigated in a prior suit.” 	Barr v.
Resolution Tr. Corp. ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1992).
Clemmie argues that her claims arise from “a distinct legal interest
under a Transfer on Death Deed that was not adjudicated in the prior case.”
Dkt. 11 at 3. But res judicata compares the subject matter of the two suits, not
the means through which Clemmie acquired the interest that she attempts to
assert. 	And the subject matter of both suits is identical: both suits challenge
the Property’s conveyance to EKRE, asserting that EKRE’s interest is invalid.
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That satisfies the transactional test. 	Because the res judicata defense is
established as a matter of law, this Court should grant EKRE’s motion and
dismiss Clemmie’s claims.
Recommendation and Order
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	it 	is 	RECOMMENDED 	that 	Plaintiff
Clemmie Elnora St. Amand’s motion to remand (Dkt. 5) be DENIED.
It is further 	RECOMMENDED 	that Defendant EKRE’s motion to
dismiss (Dkt. 7) be GRANTED, and that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), a
separate final judgment be entered stating that Plaintiff Clemmie Elnora St.
Amand’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
It is further ORDERED that the initial conference previously scheduled
for May 1, 2026 (Dkt. 4) is hereby CANCELED.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on April 27, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
Texas.
_________________________________________
Yvoon	n	nn	n	nee Y. Ho
Uniitted States M	Magistrate Judge
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