Bagherzadeh Rezaei v. Martinez et al

UNITED S TATES DISTRICT C OURT
S OUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MOHAMMAD ALI
BAGHERZADEH REZAEI ,
Petitioner,
versus
G ABRIEL MARTINEZ, et al,
Respondents.
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CIVIL ACTION N UMBER
4:26-cv-00800
J UDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
ORDER ON DISMISSAL
Pending is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by
Petitioner Mohammad Ali Bagherzadeh Rezaei. Dkt 1. He
is an Iranian national who entered the United States as a
refugee in 1985 and obtained lawful permanent status in
1986. Id at ¶¶19–20. But Petitioner was later placed in
removal 	proceedings 	following 	convictions 	for 	robbery,
aggravated 	robbery, 	aggravated 	perjury, 	and 	drug
possession. Id at ¶21.
An immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed to
Iran on April 20, 1992. Ibid. And, after being released from
criminal custody on March 3, 2003, he was transferred to
the custody of the Department of Homeland Security. Id at
¶22. He remained in immigration custody until November
24, 2003, when he was released on an Order of Supervision
“after DHS determined that his removal to Iran was not
practicable.” Id at ¶23.
Petitioner 	acknowledges 	that 	he 	isn’t 	presently
detained, but is instead at liberty pursuant an Order of
Supervision. Id at ¶1. Even so, he alleges that he “faces a
credible 	and 	imminent 	risk 	of 	arbitrary 	re-detention”
because he is scheduled to appear for a routine check-in
before ICE. Id at ¶¶2–3. Though Petitioner hasn’t received
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 09, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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any notice indicating he will be detained, he anticipates he
may be detained based on ICE’s alleged new practice of
detaining individuals subject to Orders of Supervision
without advance notice. Id at ¶3.
A district court entertaining an application for a writ
of habeas corpus “shall forthwith award the writ” or issue
a show cause order “unless it appears from the application
that 	the 	applicant 	or 	person 	detained 	is 	not 	entitled
thereto.” 28 USC §2243. A petition brought under 28 USC
§2241 is thus “subject to summary dismissal if it appears
from the face of the pleading that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief.” Montgomery v United States, 2016 WL
592846, *5 (WD Tex).
Because 	the 	challenged 	detention 	was 	purely
prospective, Petitioner was ordered to submit a filing to
establish (i) whether Petitioner is “in custody” for purposes
of inquiry on habeas jurisdiction, and (ii) whether this
action 	is 	ripe. 	Dkt 	4. 	His 	response 	establishes 	that
jurisdiction is lacking. Dkt 5.
As to whether Petitioner is in custody, the “federal
habeas statute gives the United States district courts
jurisdiction to entertain petitions for habeas relief only
from 	persons 	who 	are 	“in 	custody 	in 	violation 	of 	the
Constitution 	or 	laws 	or 	treaties 	of 	the 	United
States.” Maleng v Cook, 490 US 488, 490 (1989), citing
28 USC §2241(c)(3) (emphasis in original). The Supreme
Court has “interpreted the statutory language as requiring
that 	the 	habeas 	petitioner 	be 	‘in 	custody’ 	under 	the
conviction 	or 	sentence 	under 	attack 	at 	the 	time 	his
petition is filed.” Ibid, citing Carafas v LaVallee, 391 US
234, 238 (1968) (emphasis added).
Petitioner 	contends 	that 	he’s 	presently 	in 	custody
because he is “subject to an active Order of Supervision
requiring 	regular 	reporting 	to 	ICE, 	compliance 	with
enumerated 	conditions, 	restrictions 	on 	his 	freedom 	of
movement, and submission to ICE authority at designated
times and places.” Dkt 5 at 1–2. But Petitioner isn’t by this
action challenging his Order of Supervision. He instead
seeks to challenge his (possible) future physical detention.
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Given that he isn’t presently subject to the detention he
seeks 	to 	contest, 	he 	fails 	to 	satisfy 	the 	in-custody
requirement.
As to ripeness, a habeas petition “cannot be used to
seek relief for claims that are speculative or otherwise
not ripe for review.” Sambuev v Andrews, 2026 WL 42385,
*2 (ED Cal). And a “claim is not ripe for adjudication if it
rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” Texas v US,
523 US 296, 300 (1998), quoting Thomas v Union Carbide
Agricultural Products Co, 473 US 568, 580–81 (1985).
Petitioner maintains that this action is ripe because
he faces a “real and immediate threat of re-detention.”
Dkt 5 at 3. He contends that this is so because (i) he has
“been directed to appear for an ICE check-in on a date
certain,” and (ii) “ICE possesses—and has increasingly
exercised—the authority to revoke orders of supervision
and 	take 	similarly 	situated 	individuals 	into 	custody
without advance notice.” Ibid.
Petitioner acknowledges that he “has not received any
written notice, charging document, or formal administra-
tive determination indicating that his Order of Supervision
has been or will be revoked.” Dkt 1 at ¶30. While Petitioner
points to other habeas cases arising from revocation of
supervision at ICE check-ins, whether Petitioner himself
will be detained at his check-in appointment remains
speculative. Dkt 5 at 3. Any future detention instead
depends 	on 	contingent 	future 	events 	within 	the
discretionary 	enforcement 	authority 	of 	the 	federal
government. Such events may—or may not—occur. That is
the very definition of circumstances that lack ripeness for
purposes of adjudication in federal court.
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus by Mohammad
Ali Bagherzadeh Rezaei is DENIED. Dkt 1.
This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE . For the
avoidance of doubt, Petitioner may bring further petition if
and when any detention actually occurs.
This is a FINAL JUDGMENT .
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SO ORDERED.
Signed on February 9, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
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