Sanchez Benitez v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
IVERSON JORVIANNE SANCHEZ
BENITEZ,
Petitioner,
VS.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-CV-00727
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Iverson Jorvianne Sanchez Benitez is detained in the custody of officials
with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Proceeding pro se, the petitioner filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. 1).
The petition and supporting documents state that the petitioner is a citizen of
Venezuela; that he entered the United States in July 2021 and officials released him from
detention; that he applied for political asylum and withholding of removal in March 2022;
that he applied for temporary protected status in 2025; that his spouse is a United States
citizen and has filed a petition for adjustment of status on his behalf; that officials granted
him work authorization in 2022; that he complied with ICE supervision requirements in
the period from 2022-25; and that ICE officials detained him on November 25, 2025, when
he appeared for a supervision appointment. He attaches multiple letters of support from
family and friends attesting to his good character. He raises a claim under the Due Process
Clause, among others, and seeks release from custody.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 23, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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The federal respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment (Dkt. 9), arguing that the petitioner is subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and that his claims, including his due-process claim,
fail. The petitioner responded (Dkt. 11).
On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit held in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166
F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), that two petitioners who has been present in the United States
for many years, and who had not been apprehended by immigration officials before the
detention at issue in the case, were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). The Court does not base this opinion on the statutory text but instead turns
to the petitioner’s claim that his current detention violates his rights under the Due Process
Clause. The Court has previously addressed due-process claims in the context of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. See, e.g., Gallegos Perez v. Noem, Civil Action No. 4:26-351 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2,
2026); Cruz Osorio v. Noem, Civil Action No. 25-6390 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026); Rozo-
Teran v. Bondi, Civil Action No. 4:26-243 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2026); Navarette-Garcia v.
Bradford, Civil Action No. 4:26-1503 (S.D. Tex. Mar, 16, 2026); Delgado-Rodriguez v.
Tate, Civil Action No. 26-650, 2026 WL 517983 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026).
The Constitution guarantees due process of law to every person in the United States,
regardless of the person’s immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)
(the Due Process Clause “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”); see A.A.R.P. v
Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025) (procedural due process protections apply to removal
proceedings for persons detained under the Alien Enemies Act).
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The Court notes at the outset that the petitioner in this case challenges only his
detention, and not his right to relief from deportation or removal. District courts across the
country have recognized that “as-applied due process challenges to detention without a
bond hearing are not foreclosed” by Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
103 (2020), or other Supreme Court precedent.1 Destino v. FCI Berlin, Warden, No. 1:25-
CV-374-SE-AJ, 2025 WL 4010424, at *4 n.6 (D.N.H. Dec. 24, 2025) (noting a “growing
consensus” among district courts and collecting cases); see Vieira v. De Anda-Ybarra, 806
F. Supp. 3d 690, 697-700 (W.D. Tex. 2025); Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, 801 F. Supp. 3d 668,
681-85 (W.D. Tex. 2025); Bonilla Chicas v. Warden, No. 5:26-CV-00131, 2026 WL
539475, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2026); Castro Coneo v. Almodovar, No. 25-CV-09850
(NSR), 2025 WL 3754079, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2025); Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at
*5-*7. Many cases cited above also distinguish Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281
(2018), and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), from the detention challenge at issue in
this case. See, e.g., Bonillas Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at *7-*9; Destino, 2025 WL
1 In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court held that a noncitizen seeking “initial entry” to the
United States enjoys only the rights provided by statute because the “power to admit or exclude
aliens is a sovereign prerogative” over which the political branches have plenary authority.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139-40 (cleaned up) (considering case regarding noncitizen detained
25 yards from the border and for whom immigration officials rejected his “credible fear” claim for
purposes of political asylum). However, a challenge to detention, rather than to immigration
proceedings, does not implicate the “sovereign prerogative” on which Thuraissigiam relies. See
Rincon v. Hyde, No. CV 25-12633-BEM, 2025 WL 3122784, at *5-*6 (D. Mass. Nov. 7, 2025)
(discussing “entry fiction” doctrine and its purposes).
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4010424, at *3-*8; Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *4-*8.2 The Court agrees with this
consensus and thus proceeds to review the petitioner’s constitutional claim.3
When adjudicating a procedural due-process claim from a civil detainee, courts
apply the three-part test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing and balancing the following
factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, (3) the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).
Regarding the first Mathews factor, the petitioner has a liberty interest that the Due
Process Clause protects. Freedom from physical detention is “the most elemental of liberty
2 In Demore, the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), a
statutory provision that provides for mandatory detention of non-citizens who have been convicted
of certain crimes, and held that the facial challenge failed. In so holding, the Court discussed
extensively the fact that Congress enacted § 1226(c) based on evidence of increasing criminal
activity by criminal aliens, as well as high rates of recidivism and flight. Demore, 538 U.S. at 518-
19. The Court also relied on the fact that a detainee under § 1226(c) was a “criminal alien” who
was detained for “the limited period of his removal proceedings.” Id. at 531; see id. at 529-31
(citing facts in the record showing that detention under § 1226(c) lasted for an average of 47 days,
and that 100% of the detentions lasted five months or less). Finally, the Court noted that the
detainee in Demore had been afforded procedural protections, including “the full procedural
protections our criminal justice system offers” for his prior convictions and the opportunity for a
“Joseph hearing” at which he would have been entitled to raise any non-frivolous argument to
demonstrate that he was not properly included in the mandatory detention category. Id. at 513-14
& n.3.
3 See also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304–05 (2001) (“a serious Suspension Clause issue
would be presented” if a statute deprived federal courts of habeas jurisdiction to review “pure
questions of law”).
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interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
A noncitizen who has lived for years in the interior of the United States and established
connections in the country acquires a protectible liberty interest. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
at 107 (“aliens who have established connections in this country have due process rights in
deportation proceedings”); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)
(“aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the
United States and developed substantial connections with this country”); Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (noncitizen has a “weighty” interest in his or her right
“to stay and live and work in this land of freedom” and to “rejoin . . . immediate family”).
As stated above, the petitioner has lived in the United States since 2021. His
application for political asylum and withholding of removal provides a potential path to
immigration relief, and his wife also has filed a petition to adjust his status. He presents
evidence of strong family and community ties. Moreover, the respondents previously
released him from detention and do not point to any condition of release he violated or
other changed circumstance justifying his re-detention. Therefore, the petitioner acquired
a protected liberty interest before the detention challenged in this case. See Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. at 107; Vieira, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 700; Gunaydin v. Trump, 784 F.Supp.3d 1175,
1187 (D. Minn. 2025); Lopez-Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d. at 685-86; Destino, 2025 WL
4010424, at *12; Barros v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-488-KC, 2025 WL 3154059, at *4 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 10, 2025). The first factor weighs heavily in the petitioner’s favor.
The second Mathews factor is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the petitioner’s
liberty interest by the procedures used for his current detention, as well as the probable
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value of additional safeguards. “Once it is determined that due process applies, the
question remains what process is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
Due process requires adequate procedural protections to weigh the governmental interest
against that of the individual. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“[G]overnment detention
violates [the Due Process] Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding
with adequate procedural protections or, in certain special and narrow[,] nonpunitive
circumstances where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness,
outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint”) (cleaned up). “Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (cleaned up). Immigrant
detainees “are entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the
case.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (cleaned up).
The respondents argue that the petitioner’s claim should be denied based on
Demore, 538 U.S. 510, which rejected a facial due-process challenge to a different statute,
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). However, the Court does not consider in this case whether
§ 1225(b)(2) is facially unconstitutional, that is, “unconstitutional in all of its applications.”
See United States v. Morgan, 147 F.4th 522, 526 (5th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-6677,
2026 WL 568341 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026) (cleaned up); Bonillas Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at
*6. Instead, the Court considers whether § 1225(b)(2), “though constitutional in some
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circumstances,” has been unconstitutionally applied to the petitioner. See Morgan, 147
F.4th at 526.4
Civil detention can be permissible based on the government’s showing that the
person is a danger to the community. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
746, 748-49 (1987) (the government’s regulatory interest in community safety can
outweigh an individual’s liberty interest in avoiding pre-trial detention if the person poses
a danger) (collecting cases). In such cases, the civil detention must be “limited” and
“subject to strong procedural protections.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357(1997) (“We have consistently upheld [forcible civil
detainment of persons who pose a danger to public health and safety] provided the
confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards”);
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (upholding bail reform statute which required the government,
“[i]n a full-blown adversary hearing,” to “convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and
4 Apart from the fact that it decided a facial challenge, Demore is distinguishable for
additional reasons. First, the statute at issue in Demore applied to a specific subset of non-citizens
convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). In contrast, § 1225(b)(2) is a broad, “catch-
all” provision. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 499 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287); see id. at
505 (holding that, although “[i]t is true that § 1226 applies to aliens in the United States,” the
application of § 1226 “does not preclude § 1225 from also applying to such aliens” because “the
two provisions overlap”). Moreover, as stated above, the Demore petitioners had received criminal
procedural protections, as well as the opportunity for a Joseph hearing, and were detained for an
average of 47 days. In the case at bar, however, the respondents identify no procedures to protect
the liberty interest impacted by his current detention, and nothing in the record suggests that the
length of detention will be limited. Finally, unlike in Demore, nothing in the record in this case
suggests that the petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(2) is justified by evidence of danger to the
community. For all of these reasons, Demore does not foreclose the petitioner’s as-applied
challenge. See Bonilla Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at *7-*9 (distinguishing Demore); Destino, 2025
WL 4010424, at *8-*9 (distinguishing Demore); Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *7-*8
(distinguishing Demore).
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convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person”).
Here, the petitioner has been detained for approximately five months, and the
respondents provide no information about when the detention will end. Moreover, the
respondents have made no showing that the petitioner’s current civil detention is justified
by his danger to the community, flight risk, or any other weighty government interest.5
5 In other recent cases in this district, the respondents have argued that danger and flight risk
are irrelevant under the plain language of § 1225(b)(2), citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe,
538 U.S. 1 (2003), thus ending the Court’s constitutional inquiry. However, the question of
whether procedural safeguards for the petitioner’s liberty interest are adequate is a constitutional
question, not a statutory one, and a statute may not deprive a person of rights that are
constitutionally guaranteed. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985);
Palm Valley Health Care, Inc. v. Azar, 947 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2020) (“the Constitution, not
statutes, determine the minimum procedures that due process requires”). Moreover, Doe is
distinguishable on several grounds. The plaintiff in Doe challenged a Connecticut statute that
mandated registry of sex offenders based only on the person’s past conviction for a sex offense,
arguing that the registry requirement without a hearing to show he was currently dangerous
violated his procedural due process rights. The Supreme Court held that, because current
dangerousness was irrelevant under the statute, the plaintiff had no procedural due process right to
a hearing. The Court joins other courts in holding that Doe is distinguishable from the facts and
issues in this case. See, e.g., Aliaga Zamora v. Bondi, No. SA-26-CA-00447-XR, 2026 WL
693054, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2026); Betancourth v. Tate, No. 4:26-CV-01169, 2026 WL
638482, at *2 & n.4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2026); Noyola v. Bondi, No. 1:26-CV-405-RP, 2026 WL
607266, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2026); Diaz Yanez v. Bondi, No. EP-26-CV-00486-DB, 2026
WL 690005, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2026); Villegas Angel v. Noem, No. 1:26-CV-00384-DAE,
2026 WL 594368, at *3-4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2026). First, the petitioner in this case does not
challenge a registry requirement, which the Doe Court assumed arguendo implicated a liberty
interest, but rather freedom from physical detention, “the most elemental of liberty
interests.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. Second, civil immigration detention is constitutional only
when it is justified by a sufficient, non-punitive purpose. Foucha v. La., 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992);
Betancourth, 2026 WL 638482, at *2 n.4; Diaz Yanez, 2026 WL 690005, at *2. Once a protected
interest is implicated, “the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.” Aliaga Zamora, 2026
WL 693054, at *5 (citing, inter alia, Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972)); Villegas
Angel, 2026 WL 594368, at *3. Third, statutory language indicates that flight risk and danger are
not irrelevant to detention under § 1225(b), given that “noncitizens who are detained under
§ 1225(b) may be released on parole for humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit, so long
as they present neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding.” Noyola, 2026 WL 607266, at *3
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They also identify no procedures afforded to the petitioner to provide notice, an opportunity
to be heard, or any individualized determination regarding his current detention. To the
extent the respondents rely on the Notice to Appear dated November 26, 2025, the
document states only that the petitioner is not a citizen or national of the United States; is
a citizen of Venezuela; entered the United States on an unknown date; was not “then
admitted or paroled after inspection” by an immigration officer; and is not in possession of
a valid entry document (Dkt. 9-1). This document does not adequately address the
petitioner’s presence in the United States for over four years and the liberty interest he
acquired during that time based on established connections in the country. See
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271; Landon, 459 U.S. at
34. It also does not show that the petitioner was afforded notice and an opportunity to be
heard as to the justification for his current detention. See J.G.G., 604 U.S. at 673
(immigrant detainees “are entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the
nature of the case”) (cleaned up).
In the absence of any available procedure to require the respondents to demonstrate
danger or another adequate justification for detention, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of the petitioner’s liberty interest is high. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–70 & n.7 (“When
protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount”)
(citing, inter alia, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402
(cleaned up) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)); Aguilar v. Bondi, No. 5:25-
CV-01453-JKP, 2025 WL 3471417, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025).
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U.S. 535, 542 (1971)). When “the only mechanism Petitioner has to test the propriety of
his detention is DHS’s discretionary authority,” that is “no real test at all.” Tenemasa-
Lema v. Hyde, No. CV 25-13029-BEM, 2025 WL 3280555, at *9 (D. Mass. Nov. 25,
2025); see Destino, 2025 WL 4010424, at *13 (noting that the risk is heightened by the
likelihood of lengthy delays in removal proceedings). This risk of deprivation could be
addressed through an individualized assessment such as the bond hearings that
respondents, until late 2025, routinely provided to assess a petitioner’s danger to
community and flight risk. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (courts should assess whether
“additional or substitute procedural safeguards” would have “probable value”); Lopez-
Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 686 (an individualized hearing would provide an opportunity
to be heard and a meaningful assessment of the petitioner’s dangerousness and flight risk,
and thus would “greatly reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of his liberty”); Barros,
2025 WL 3154059, at *4 (risk of erroneous deprivation “can be easily ameliorated through
a bond hearing”). The Court concludes that the second Mathews factor weighs in the
petitioner’s favor.
The third Mathews factor is the respondents’ interest in the petitioner’s mandatory,
unreviewable detention at issue here. The respondents have not addressed this factor and
do not argue their interest in detaining the petitioner under § 1225(b). To the extent the
respondents rely on their general interest in enforcing the statute, their interest is
insufficient to extinguish the petitioner’s right to due process. See Loudermill, 470 U.S.
at 541; Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *6 (“legislation cannot detract from the privilege
afforded by the constitution”) (cleaned up) (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
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547, 565 (1892), overruled on other grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972)). Although courts have recognized a legitimate governmental interest in preventing
a detainee’s flight and in protecting the community from any danger posed by the detainee,
see, e.g., Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1189, these interests could be addressed by
providing individualized hearings, as discussed above.6 Moreover, to the extent the purpose
of the detention is punitive, the purpose is impermissible in the context of civil immigration
proceedings. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80. The respondents have not contested the
petitioner’s relevant representations, including that he has strong community and family
ties and several potential paths to immigration relief The third factor therefore weighs in
the petitioner’s favor.
Because all three Mathews factors weigh in the petitioner’s favor, he is detained
without due process of law. The Court concludes, in accordance with numerous other
courts considering the question, that detention under § 1225(b)(2) as applied to this
petitioner, without an individualized assessment or any notice or opportunity to be heard,
violates the petitioner’s right to procedural due process. The petition for a writ of habeas
corpus will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see Brown v. Davenport, 596
6 Courts “generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively
minimal.” Hilario M.R. v. Warden, Mesa Verde Det. Ctr., 2025 WL 1158841, at *9 (E.D. Cal.
Apr. 21, 2025); see Tenemasa-Lema, 2025 WL 3280555, at *10. Additionally, courts have
recognized that detention itself imposes significant costs and burdens. See Hernandez-Lara v.
Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 33 (1st Cir. 2021) (noting the “substantial social costs” of detention that
separates families and removes breadwinners, caregivers, parents, siblings, and employees from
the community) (citing Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 855 (2d Cir. 2020)); Sampiao v.
Hyde, 799 F. Supp. 3d 14, 34 (D. Mass. 2025) (noting that detention of those who have been denied
release on bond or the opportunity to seek release “requires the government to continue funding
and overseeing [the petitioner’s] detention”).
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U.S. 118, 128 (2022) (“federal courts may grant habeas relief as law and justice require”)
(cleaned up).
“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The remedy for unlawful detention “is, of course, release.” Id.;
see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (based on statutory language of 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and the common-law history of the writ, “the essence of habeas corpus
is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody”). Because the respondents do
not acknowledge any process available to the petitioner, “there is no process to await.” See
Aroca v. Mason, No. 2:26-CV-00057, 2026 WL 357872, at *19 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 9, 2026)
(cleaned up) (collecting cases).7 After reviewing the authorities and all matters of record,
the Court determines that release is the appropriate habeas relief for the unlawful detention
in this case.
The Court therefore ORDERS as follows:
1. The respondents’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 9) is DENIED.
2. The petitioner’s petition for habeas relief (Dkt. 1) is GRANTED in part.
3. The respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE the petitioner from custody to a
public location, under conditions of release no more restrictive than those in
place prior to the detention at issue in this case, within 48 hours of this order.
7 In light of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Buenrostro-Mendez, and because the respondents
do not argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies, the Court does not order a bond hearing under
§ 1226(a). See Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-4711 (ECT/SGE), 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D.
Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (collecting cases).
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4. The respondents are further ORDERED to inform the petitioner of the time and
location of release at least three hours before the release.
5. Because the petitioner proceeds pro se, the respondents are ORDERED to also
notify any and all persons in their records as contacts for the petitioner, including
immigration counsel and/or family members and friends of the petitioner, of the
time and location of release at least three hours before the release.
6. The respondents are further ORDERED to return to the petitioner, at the time
of his release from custody, any and all identification documents taken from him
at the time of or during his detention.
7. Any possible or anticipated removal or transfer of the petitioner under this
present detention is PROHIBITED and ENJOINED.
8. The respondents are further ORDERED to file a status report updating the Court
within 72 hours of this order.
9. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on , 2026.
__________________________________
GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
April 23
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