Calderon v. Candice et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
AGUSTIN CALDERON,
(TDCJ # 02200225),
Plaintiff,
vs.
CANDICE FLANNEL, et al.,
, Defendants.
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§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. H-25-6359
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Agustin Calderon, is an inmate at the Clemens Unit of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division. Proceeding pro
se and informa pauperis, he filed a prisoner's civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, concerning the denial of a second storage box for his legal materials, which
he contends violates his right of access to the courts. 	(Dkt. 1). 	At the Court's
request, Calderon also filed a More Definite Statement of his claims. (Dkt. 11 ).
Because Calderon is a prisoner seeking relief under § 1983, the Court must
examine his claims and dismiss his complaint, in whole or in part, if it determines
that the action is "frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted," or "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief." 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 	After considering Calderon's complaint
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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and More Definite Statement, the Court concludes that this case must be dismissed
for the reasons explained below.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In December 2025, Calderon filed a civil-rights complaint against Candice
Flannel, as Assistant Warden of the Clemens Unit; Eric Nichols, as Chairman of the
Texas Board of Criminal Justice; Monica Griffin, as Clemens Unit Law Librarian;
Jancie Demiter, as Access to Courts Supervisor; and Ms. Garza, as a Law Library
Supervisor Substitute. 	(Dkt. 1, pp. 3, 6-7). He alleges that each of them failed or
refused to consider his request for a second storage box to protect his legal
materials, thus denying his right of access to the courts. (Id. at 3).
More specifically, Calderon alleges that he has been a ''pro se criminal
appellant" since 2019 and that he has worked "super hard" to collect and protect his
legal materials. 	(Id. at 7). He alleges that he currently has a federal habeas corpus
action pending, and he has a significant quantity of legal materials and legal books
that he needs to pursue that action. 1 (Id.). 	Because he has such a large quantity of
legal materials, the single storage box provided by TDCJ is not sufficient to hold it,
along with his personal and religious belongings. 	(Id.). 	He therefore requested a
second storage box to hold his legal materials. (Id.).
1
See Calderon v. Lumpkin, No. 3:23-cv-324 (S.D. Tex.).
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In response to his request, Law Librarian Griffin told him that TDCJ would
determine whether he was entitled to a second storage box based on the legal
materials needed only for active litigation. (Id.). Therefore, legal materials relating
to his state criminal appeal and other documents such as grievances and prison
complaints 	from 	more than six months 	ago 	would not be 	considered when
determining whether he needed a second storage box. 	(Id. 	at 7-8). 	Calderon
appealed that decision to Warden Flannel, but she also refused to authorize a second
storage box. 	(Id. at 7). 	Calderon then wrote to Chairman Nichols to explain his
circumstances and request accommodation for his legal materials. (Id.). He has not
been provided with relief, and he therefore does not have sufficient storage to
protect his legal materials from damage or theft. 	(Id. at 7-8).
Calderon alleges that Chairman Nichols "disregarded the important need" for
Calderon to have a second storage box. (Id. at 8). He alleges that Warden Flannel,
Law Librarian Griffin, and Substitute Librarian Garza violated TDCJ policies and
state law, which he contends say that protection of legal materials is necessary and
permissible. 	(Id. at 8-9). 	Likewise, he alleges that Access to Courts Supervisor
Demiter is failing to abide by state law by refusing to permit him to protect his legal
materials. 	(Id. at 9). 	He further alleges that all of the defendants are violating his
right of access to the courts by failing to allow him to protect his iegal materials.
(Id.).
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In his More Definite Statement, Calderon admits that he has not suffered any
physical or legal harm by being denied a second storage box for his legal materials.
(Dkt. 11, pp. 1, 10-11). 	Instead, he states that he brought this action to prevent
future harm from any loss or destruction of the materials. (Id.). However, he asserts
that the denial of a second storage box is causing him mental distress because he is
concerned about the potential loss of or damage to his legal materials. 	(Id. at 10).
He asserts that he currently has a "dispute" with his state direct appeal, his state
habeas corpus application, and his federal habeas corpus proceeding, but he admits
that he has not suffered any delays or harm in any of these proceedings as a result
of not having a second storage box. 	(Id. at 2-3). 	Nevertheless, he alleges that he
may have several other actions that he would be unable to prosecute at a later time
if his legal materials were lost, damaged, or confiscated. (Id.).
Calderon also alleges that the denial of second. storage box violates TDCJ
Board Policy BP-03 .81 because he views the denial as punishment for his active
participation in litigation. 	(Id. at 4 ). 	He contends that the denial is also a way for
the defendants to harass or penalize him for participating in multiple legal actions.
(Id.). 	He further contends that the portion of the policy that limits him to retaining
copies of grievances for six months is an improper attempt to alter the statute of
limitations. (Id. at 5).
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As relief, Calderon seeks a declaration that the defendants are violating his
constitutional 	rights, 	an 	injunction 	prohibiting 	the 	defendants 	from 	further
violations of state and federal law, and an order requiring the defendants to provide
him with a second storage box for his legal materials. (Dkt. 1, p. 9).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Calderon brings his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 does not
create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to provide a remedy for
violations of statutory and constitutional rights." Lafleur v. Texas Dep 't of Health,
126 F.3d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). 	To state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
(1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Gomez
v Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). 	The first element
recognizes that "state tort claims are not actionable under federal law; a plaintiff
under[§] 1983 must show deprivation of a federal right." 	Nesmith v. Taylor, 715
F.2d 194, 195 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). 	The second element means that
generally only state actors-not private parties-can be liable for violations of civil
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rights. See Frazier v. Bd. of Tr. of Nw. Miss. Reg'! Med. Ctr., 765 F.2d 1278, 1283
(5th Cir. 1985).
B. 	The Prison Litigation Reform Act
Calderon's action is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, (PLRA).
The PLRA requires the Court to examine the legal and factual basis of a prisoner's
complaint and dismiss the case if it determines that the complaint "frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(l);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A complaint is frivolous "if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." 	Geiger
v. 	Jowers, 	404 F.3d 371, 373 	(5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1992)). 	"A complaint lacks an arguable basis in
law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint
alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." 	Siglar v.
Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319,327 (1989)). "A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact if, after providing the
plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged
are clearly baseless." 	Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013)
(cleaned up). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if
it does not contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
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relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678
(2009)).
In conducting its screening review, the Court must construe all allegations
"liberally in favor of the plaintiff' and must consider whether "with every doubt
resolved on [the plaintiff's] behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief."
Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 	Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009)
(cleaned up). 	But if the complaint does not state a claim for relief, it may be
dismissed, even before service on the defendants. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F .2d
1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986).
C. 	Pro Se Pleadings
Calderon is proceeding pro se in this action. 	Courts construe pleadings filed
by pro se litigants under a less stringent standard of review. 	See Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 ( 1972) (per curiam ). Under this standard, "[a] document filed pro
se is 'to be liberally construed."' 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But even under this
liberal standard, pro se litigants must still "abide by the rules that govern the federal
courts." 	E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475,484 (5th Cir. 2014). 	They must
"properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible claim
to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders, present summary judgment
evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal." Id. ( cleaned up).
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Thus, while pro se litigants are held to less stringent pleading standards than
attorneys, they "still must actually argue something that is susceptible of liberal
construction." 	Toole v. Peak, 361 F. App'x 621, 621 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Calderon alleges that the defendants are violating TDCJ policies, state law,
and federal law by denying him a second storage box for his legal materials. 	He
contends that TDCJ regulations allow for a second storage box and that the denial
of his request prevents him from maintaining all of the materials he needs to pursue
his various claims in the state and federal courts. His claims must be dismissed for
two reasons.
First, Calderon's state law claims are not properly raised in a § 1983 action.
As 	explained 	above, 	§ 1983 	provides 	a 	means 	to 	redress 	violations 	of the
Constitution and federal law. 	See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994).
Violations of state laws and regulations, standing alone, do not rise to the level of a
violation of federal law. See Nesmith, 715 F.2d at 195. Therefore, violations of state
law or state rules and regulations are not a basis for imposing liability under § 1983.
See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1986) (violations of state law do not
become constitutional violations just because the defendant is a state official);
Meyers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (the failure to
comply with prison rules and regulations does not, without more, give rise to a
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constitutional violation); Giovanni v. Lynn, 48 F.3d 908, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1995)
(state law violations do not form the basis of§ 1983 liability); Bush v. Viterna, 795
F.2d 1203, 1204 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming dismissal of claim characterized as "an
illegitimate effort to seek federal enforcement of state law").
Calderon's claims alleging that the defendants are violating TDCJ rules and
regulations and state law by denying him a second storage box do not state a claim
for relief under§ 1983. 	These claims must be dismissed with prejudice as legally
frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
Second, Calderon's allegations fail to state a claim for the denial of his
constitutional right of access to the courts. 	"While the precise contours of a
prisoner's right of access to the courts remain somewhat obscure, the Supreme Court
has not extended this right to encompass more than the ability of an inmate to prepare
and transmit a necessary legal document to a court." 	Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F .3d
816, 821 (5th Cir. 1993) (footnote omitted). To state a claim for denial of that right,
the plaintiff must allege facts showing ( 1) that a state official interfered with his
ability to access the courts, and (2) that he has suffered an actual injury as a result of
the interference. 	See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1996); Chriceol v.
Phillips, 169 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see also Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (to succeed on an access-to-courts claim, the
plaintiff must show that he "suffered an injury by being shut out of court").
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Speculation about the potential loss of a hypothetical claim is insufficient to meet
this standard. 	See Whitaker v. Livingston, 732 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) ("One is not entitled to access the courts merely to argue that there might be
some remote possibility of some constitutional violation.").
Calderon's allegations do not meet the required standard. Even assuming that
he could show that the denial of the second storage box constituted interference-a
'.
finding the Court does not make-he has failed to show that he has suffered any
injury as a result. 	He does not show that any of his pending cases have been
adversely impacted by the lack of a second storage box for his legal materials. 	He
does not identify a specific claim that he wanted to pursue but could not because of
the lack of a storage box. Indeed, it is clear that the lack of a second storage box has
not impacted his ability to access the courts, as evidenced by his filing of a new civil-
rights action while this action has been pending. See Calderon v. Gordon, et al, No.
4:26-cv-5616 (S.D. Tex.), filed July 14, 2026. 	Calderon's allegations thus fail to
state a claim based on the alleged denial of his right of access to the courts. 	His
claims 	on 	this 	basis 	must 	be 	dismissed 	with 	prejudice 	under 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. The civil-rights action filed by Agustin Calderon, (Dkt. 1), is DISMISSED
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with prejudice as frivolous and for failing to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
2. Any pending motions are DENIED as moot.
3. Final judgment will be separately entered.
4. This dismissal counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The Clerk shall send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to the
plaintiff. The Clerk shall also send a copy of this dismissal to the Three-Strikes List
Manager at the following email: Three Strikes@txs.uscourts.gov.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on --,----MIL61!!!!!!!D~~1.,,1~L-lf1-71-------'' 2026.
~(UL-.
~HITTNER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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