Le v. Bondi et al

HAID U CL E,
Petitioner,
VS.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
§
§
§
§
§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-06257
§
PAMELA BONDI, et al., 	§
§
Respondents. 	§
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The petitioner, Hai Due Le, is a detainee in the custody of United States Department
of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officials. He has
a final removal order and a deferral of removal from Vietnam. 	He filed this petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 	§ 2241 , challenging his re-detention without
changed circumstances. 	Doc. No. 1. 	Respondents have filed a motion for summary
judgment (Doc. No. 11) , and petitioner filed a reply in opposition (Doc. No. 13). Petitioner
also filed an emergency motion for an expedited decision (Doc. No. 14) , in which
Respondents have indicated their agreement (Doc. No. 	18) . 	The Court has carefully
considered the pleadings, submissions of the parties, and applicable law and GRANTS
habeas relief for the reasons that follow.
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United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 21, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. 	BACKGROUND
The petitioner, Hai Due Le, is a citizen of Vietnam who entered the United States
around 1980 as a refugee. He was admitted after inspection and became a legal permanent
resident. 	After he was admitted to the United State s, Le was convicted of several serious
criminal offenses, including attempted murder and aggravated assault, and was confined in
prison in Penn sy lvania. Doc. No. 11-1 at 3-4.1 On January 15, 2019, while he was in state
custody, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations ( "E RO") in Philadelphia issued him a
Notice to Appear pursuant to Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), Section
237(a)(2)(A)(iii), and Section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. at
4. On January 22, 2019, he was paroled from state prison and taken into ICE custody. Id .
On August 22 , 2019, an Immigration Judge ("IJ") ordered Le deported. Le appealed
the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), and the case was remanded to
the IJ on September 3, 2020. Id. 	On May 20, 2020, while his case was on appeal, he was
released on an Order of Recognizance (Form I-220) due to COVID concerns. 	Id . 	On
September 21 , 2020, the IJ granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against
Torture ("DCAT"), and his order of removal became final that day. 	Id .; Doc. No. 1 at 2.
Le does not controvert these facts .
1 In support of their motion for summary judgment , Respondents submit a Sworn Declaration of
Deportation Officer Da vid Scarberry, who stated these facts about Le 's criminal record and
immigration background. S ee Doc. No. 11 - 1. Le does not dispute that he was convicted of these
serious crimes which jeopardized his immigration status.
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Le claims, and Respondents do not refute, that at some point after he was ordered
removed, he was released on an Order of Supervision ("OSUP") under 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.5 ,
241.13 , because evidence in Petitioner's 	file 	demonstrated there was 	no 	significant
likelihood of his removal to Vietnam in the reasonably foreseeable future . Doc. No. 1 at
2. Le argues that his release on an OSUP is an indication of an implicit finding that he was
not a flight risk or a danger to the community, and Respondents do not contend otherwise.
On November 13 , 2025, ICE detained Le when he attended a regularly scheduled check-
in , 	even 	though 	he 	had 	attended 	all 	regular 	check-ins 	and 	complied 	with 	all 	the
requirements ofhis OSUP.
Le alleges that Respondents violated their own regulations in revoking his OSUP
because he was never served with any Notice of Revocation of Release nor provided an
informal interview to challenge the reasons for the revocation. Doc. No. 1 at 16. He claims
his re-detention violated the law because there were no changed circumstances showing
that removal was likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 22.
Le further argues that his detention is indefinite because he cannot be deported to
Vietnam based on the deferral under CAT, he has no passport or birth certificate, and
Respondents have not identified any third country willing to accept his removal. He claims
that each time Respondents have tried to get travel documents for him, they have failed or
received no response. 	Doc. No. 13 at 3- 5, 16.
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Respondents move for summary judgment, contending that Petitioner 's detention is
lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 because Le has not been detained this time for more than the
presumptively reasonable 180 days under Zadvydas and that he does not show that removal
is not likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. They also generally assert that they are
working on removing him to a third country.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 28 U.S.C. § 2241
Section 2241 (c)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code "applies to persons held
' in custody under or by color of the authority of the United State s."' Muna/ v. Geren, 553
U.S. 674, 686 (2006) (citing § 224l(c)(l)). "An individual is held ' in custody' by the
United States when the United States official charged with his detention has 'the power to
produce' him." Id. (quoting Wal es v. 	Whitney, 5 S. Ct. 1050, 1054 (1885); see also 28
U.S.C. § 2243 ("The writ ... shall be directed to the person having custody of the person
detained")).
Habeas corpus is available to a person challenging the legality of immigration-
related detention. D em ore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510,517 (2003); Gudiel Polanco v. Garland,
839 F. App'x 804, 805 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding that where the alien challenged his
detention rather than any removal order, his challenge "must be brought pursuant to a
habeas corpus petition" in district court). Courts retain jurisdiction to review an alien 's
detention "insofar as that detention presents constitutional issues, such as those raised in a
habeas petition." Oyelude v. Chertoff, 125 F. App'x 543 , 546 (5th Cir. 2005) (unpublished
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op.) (citation omitted). 	Where, as here, a habeas petition "'ra ises only issues of law, or
questions regarding the legal implications of undisputed facts,'" a court need not hold a
hearing to decide the case and grant habeas relie f. See Gomez Vallecios v. Noem, No. EP-
25-CV-573-KC, 2025 WL 3853219, at* 1 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2025) (quoting Tijerina v.
Thornburgh, 884 F.2d 861 , 866 (5th Cir. 1989) and concluding that the petition could be
granted without a hearing because it presented questions of law and facts were resolved in
favor of the respondents); see also Alves da Silva v. 	US. 	Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, No. 25-CV-284-LM-TSM, 2025 WL 2778083, at* 1 (D.N.H. Sept. 29, 2025)
(noting that a "petition 'may be resolved on the merits without [an evidentiary] hearing
when, as here, the material facts are not in dispute. "' (citation omitted)).
B. Summary Judgment
To be entitled to summary judgment, the pleadings and summary judgment evidence
must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 	The moving party bears the
burden of initially pointing out to the court the bas is of the motion and identifying the
portions of the record demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue for trial. 	Duckett v.
City of Cedar Park, Tex., 950 F.2d 272,276 (5th Cir. 1992). Thereafter, "the burden shifts
to the nonmoving party to show with 's ignificant probative evidence' that there exists a
genuine issue of material fact." Hamilton v. Seque Software, In c., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285 , 1295 (5th Cir. 1994)). "Because
this case arises in a summary judgment posture, [the court] view[s] the facts in the light
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most favorable to [Petitioner], the nonmoving party." Canady v. Davis, 687 F. App 'x 362,
365 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 ,
1769 (2015)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Le seeks release on the same conditions that he had with his previous OSUP,
contending that his re-detention violated his constitutional rights because Respondents
violated several immigration regulations promulgated to provide due process. 	Among
other things, he also contends that his continued detention is punitive rather than to help
effect his removal, in violation of due process under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001 ), because there is no significant likelihood that he will be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future. He argues that he has shown good reason to believe that his removal is
not likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future and that Respondents fail to rebut
that showing with evidence sufficient to show that his removal is likely to occur in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S . Const. amend. V. 	In Zadvydas , the Supreme Court held that the INA does
not authorize "indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention" of noncitizens subject to final
orders of removal. 533 U.S . at 699. The Court explained that " [a] statute permitting
indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem" and that
"[f]reedom from imprisonment- 	from government custody, detention, or other forms of
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physical restraint- 	lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects." Id. ( citing Foucha
v. Louisiana, 504 U.S . 71, 80 (1992)).
"When an alien has been found to be unlawfully present in the United States and a
final order of removal has been entered, the Government ordinarily secures the alien's
removal during a subsequent 90-day statutory 'removal period,' during which time the
alien normally is held in custody." 533 U.S. at 682. Inadmissible noncitizens or those with
certain criminal convictions may be detained beyond the removal period, 8 U.S.C. §
123 l(a)(6), but the statute "limits an alien' s post-removal-period detention to a period
reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States," and "does
not permit indefinite detention." 	Zadvydas , 533 U.S . at 689. The Court established a " 6-
month presumption" of reasonableness following the issuance of a removal order. 	Id. at
701.
After 	the 	six-month 	period 	of "presumptively 	reasonable" 	detention 	ends, 	a
petitioner seeking release from detention must show there is "good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. " Id.; see
also Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543---44 (5th Cir. 2006) (denying a Zadvydas claim
where petitioner offers "nothing beyond conclusory statements"). Once a petitioner meets
this burden, the burden shifts to the respondents to "respond with evidence sufficient to
rebut that showing." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
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Le's order ofremoval was final on September 21 , 2020. Doc. No. 1 at 2. He states
that he is not sure how long he spent in detention after his removal order was final and
before he was granted release on an OSUP, but he estimates it was about one month. Id.
Respondents do not dispute this or provide a record of how long he was detained after his
removal order was final.
The Court finds that Le has been detained now for more than six months in the
aggregate, based on his uncontroverted representation that he was confined for about a
month before he was released on an Order of Supervision and has been detained since
November 13 , 2025 , over five months, for his current detention. See Avdulovic v. Tat e, et
al. , No. 4:25-CV-05873 , 2025 WL 4640735 , at * 1 n. l (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22 , 2025) (noting
that " [m Jany district courts have held that the Zadvydas period is cumulative and that
periods of re-detention should be aggregated with the initial period of detention following
the final removal order") (citing cases). Therefore, Le has been detained for longer than
the six-month presumptively reasonable period set forth in Zadvydas.
In addition, the Court finds that Le has met his burden to show that there is good
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future. 	First, as Le points out, the only country presently designated (or
identified by the Respondents) for removal is Vietnam, and he cannot be removed there
because he was granted deferral of that removal under the CAT (DCAT) . 	Second, Le' s
uncontroverted facts show that he has no passport, no birth certificate, and there is no
indication that Vietnam will respond to any 	of these 	requests 	for such documents.
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Respondents have not identified any country to which they have even made an inquiry
about accepting Le's removal, let alone received a response from any such country.
Courts have found that a petitioner meets his burden to show good reason where he
alleges non-conclusory facts, Andrade, 459 F3d at 543-44; where he alleges that he
received deferral of removal to his home country and that ICE had not identified a third
country willing to accept him; or where he had a deferral and travel documents had not
been secured from any third country. 	See, e.g., Trejo v. 	Warden of ERO El Paso East
Montana, 807 F. Supp. 3d 697, 705-06 (W.D. Tex. 2025); Baltodano v. Bondi, --- F.
Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 3484769, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 2025).
The Court finds that Le's allegations are not conclusory and instead specifically
show that he has been granted a DCAT and cannot be removed to his home country;
Respondents have not identified a third country willing to accept him; and he has no
passport or birth certificate. 	Doc. No. 1 at 4, Doc. No. 13 at 16. 	Le has met his burden
under Zadvydas to show that there is good reason to believe that removal is not reasonably
likely in the foreseeable future.
Because Petitioner has shown good reason, the burden then shifts to Respondents to
"respond with evidence sufficient to rebut [a petitioner's] showing." Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 701. "[G]eneralized statements about removal efforts and avennents of likelihood of
removal alone are insufficient to satisfy respondents' evidentiary burden." Chang v. Pere z,
et al., No. 5:25-cv-294, slip op. at 9 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2026) (citing Zamanpour v. Perez,
No. 5:25-cv-224, slip op. at 16 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 2025)); see also Baltodano, 2025 WL
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3484 7 69 , at * 5. 	Likewise, this burden is not satisfied by a pending request for travel
documents alone. 	Trejo, 807 F. Supp.3d at 706.
Respondents do not meet their burden to show that removal is likely anytime soon,
let alone in the reasonably foreseeable future. 	They do not contest that Le has no passport
or birth certificate and do not show that there have been any specific efforts to procure such
documents. They do not dispute that they cannot remove him to Vietnam, and they do not
name any third countries to which they have made any inquiries. 	Their attestations about
removing him soon are conclusory. 	Respondents do not allege that any third country has
agreed to accept Petitioner's removal and fail to rebut Petitioner's showing of good reason
to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future.
On this record, the Court finds that Petitioner's continued detention violates due
process because there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future. Accordingly, Le is entitled to relief on the indefinite detention claims in his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. Because the Court finds that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, Le must be released. Zadvydas, 533 U.S .
701 (holding that a noncitizen "may be held in confinement until it has been determined
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future") .
The Court orders his release subject to the conditions set forth below. 	While the Court is
ruling in Petitioner's favor, this ruling does preclude the Government from asking this
Court to reconsider its ruling if the circumstances precluding removal change.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION AND ORDER
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Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 11) is DENIED.
2. 	Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, (Doc. No. 1) , is GRANTED.
3. 	All other pending motions, if any, are DENIED as MOOT.
4. 	Respondents must release Petitioner by 5:00 p.m. in a public place agreed on
by the parties within two days of the date this Order is entered, under the
same conditions that were in effect in hi s previous Order of Supervision.
Respondents must notify his counsel of the exact time and location of release at
least four hours before his release.
5. 	Petitioner shall not be re-detained without a showing that there has been a
material change in circumstances, for example, a showing that Petitioner's
documents are ready, that a third country has agreed to accept Petitioner, and
that Petitioner has been provided notice of that third country and an opportunity
to object to the third country removal.
6. 	The 5-day notice provision from the Court's January 9 Order, (Doc. No. 4),
REMAINS IN EFFECT. No later than two days after Petitioner's release, by
5 :00 p.m., the parties shall provide the Court with a status update concerning
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Petitioner' s release. The parties should al so notify the Court of the conditions, if
an y, of his release.
7. 	Within 5 days of the Petitioner' s release, the parties shall file a joint status update
and indicate whether this case may be closed.
l\ 5-\-SIGNED this ____ day of April 2026.
ANDREW S. HANEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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