Thomas v. Thomas et al

4:25-cv-05816Txsd10 févr. 2026

Texte intégral

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JERRY LEE THOMAS,
(Inmate# 146893),
Plaintiff,
vs.
HOPE THOMAS, et al.,
Defendants.
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§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. H-25-5816
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Jerry Lee Thomas (Inmate# 146893), is a pretrial detainee in
custody at the Brazos County Detention Center. 	Proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, he filed a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that
Brazos County District Attorney Caleb Beacham, court-appointed counsel Stephen
Gustitis, Thomas's child's mother Hope Thomas, City of Bryan Police Detective C.
McConnell, and City of Bryan Police Officer Whitehead violated his civil rights in
connection with his arrest and ongoing state-court criminal proceedings. 	(Dkt. 1).
Thomas's action is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which
requires the Court to screen complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief from the
government as soon as feasible after docketing and dismiss any claims that are
frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 10, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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that seek money damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (providing for the screening of
suits filed by persons proceeding in forma pauperis). 	Having conducted the
required screening of Thomas' s complaint, the Court dismisses this action for the
reasons explained below.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Publicly available records show that Thomas is currently in jail awaiting trial
on a charge of assault on a pregnant person. See Jail Records Search, https://portal-
txbrazos.tylertech.cloud/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2026). On December 1, 2025, he filed
a civil-rights complaint, naming as defendants District Attorney Beacham, Attorney
Gustitis, Hope Thomas, Detective McConnell, and Officer Whitehead and alleging
various violations of his civil rights. (Dkt. 1, p. 3).
Specifically, Thomas alleges that on November 16, 2024, Hope Thomas
started an argument with him while they were at home with their children. 	(Id. at
4). 	The argument escalated, and Hope Thomas scratched Thomas's face. 	(Id.).
Thomas put his arms up to block her from scratching him and pushed her into a
wall. (Id.). When she continued to try to scratch him, Thomas hit Hope Thomas in
the face with his hand, and both of them fell to the ground. (Id.). 	Thomas then left
the house to try to de-escalate the situation. (Id.). After he left, Hope Thomas called
the police. (Id.).
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When the police arrived, Hope Thomas apparently told them that Thomas
had started the fight. (Id.). 	Thomas alleges that she fabricated this story, which the
police believed, to get him arrested. 	(Id. at 3). He alleges that Officer Whitehead
and Detective McConnell acted with reckless disregard for the truth by believing
Hope Thomas's story and arresting him. 	(Id.).
Thomas alleges that District Attorney Beacham has engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct by selectively prosecuting Thomas, by denying him bond on three
separate occasions, and by offering him only prison time to resolve the charge. (Id.).
Thomas alleges that court-appointed counsel Gustitis has provided ineffective
assistance by tampering with his phone, which had evidence that he was not the
aggressor, and by telling the court that he did not need a bond reduction. (Id.).
As relief for these alleged violations, Thomas seeks to "get my truth out"
•because he is in jail on "false probable cause." (Id. at 4).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Thomas brings his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	"Section 1983 does not
create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to provide a remedy for
violations of statutory and constitutional rights." Lafleur v. Texas Dep 't of Health,
126 F.3d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). 	To state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
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(1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law; See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Gomez
v Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). 	The first element
recognizes that "state tort claims are not actionable under federal law; a plaintiff
under[§] 1983 must show deprivation of a federal right." 	Nesmith v. Taylor, 715
F.2d 194, 195 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). 	The second element means that
generally only state actors-not private parties-can be liable for violations of civil
rights. See Frazier v. Bd. of Tr. ofNw. Miss. Reg'lMed. Ctr., 765 F.2d 1278, 1283
(5th Cir. 1985).
B. 	The Prison Litigation Reform Act
The PLRA, which governs Thomas's action, requires the Court to examine
the legal and factual basis of a prisoner's complaint and dismiss the case if it
determines that the complaint "(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief." 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
A complaint is frivolous "if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." 	Geiger
v. 	Jowers, 	404 F.3d 371, 	373 	(5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1992)). 	"A complaint lacks an arguable basis in
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law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint
alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." 	Siglar v.
Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 327 (1989) ). "A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact if, after providing the
plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged
are clearly baseless." 	Rogers v. 	Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013)
(cleaned up). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if
it does not contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678
(2009)).
In conducting its screening review, the Court must construe all allegations
"liberally in favor of the plaintiff' and consider whether "with every doubt resolved
on 	[the 	plaintiff's] 	behalf, 	the 	complaint states 	any 	valid 	claim 	for 	relief."
Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 	Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009)
(cleaned up). 	But if the complaint does not state a claim for relief, it may be
dismissed, even before service on the defendants. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F .2d
1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986).
C. 	Pro Se Pleadings
Thomas is proceeding pro se in this action. 	Courts construe pleadings filed
by prose litigants under a less stringent standard of review. 	See Haines v. Kerner,
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404 U.S. 519,520 (1972) (per curiam). Under this standard, "[a] document filed pro
se is 'to be liberally construed."' 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But even under this
liberal standard, pro se litigants must still "abide by the rules that govern the federal
courts." 	E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475,484 (5th Cir. 2014). 	They must
"properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible claim
to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders, present summary judgment
evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal." Id. (cleaned up).
They must also still allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. 	See Taylor v.
Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Toole v. Peak, 361 F.
App'x 621, 621 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (a self-represented litigant "still must
argue something that is susceptible to liberal construction").
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Claims Against District Attorney Beacham
Thomas identifies Beacham as the District Attorney for Brazos County, and
he alleges that Beacham has engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by selectively
prosecuting him, by denying him bond three times, and by offering him only prison
time to resolve his charges.
But district attorneys, who prosecute cases on behalf of the State, are entitled
to absolute immunity for actions they take to prosecute a defendant in a criminal
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case. 	See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 	(1976). 	This includes
immunity "for their conduct in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's
case insofar as that conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process." 	Wooten v. Roach, 964 F.3d 395, 407 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1981)).
Thomas's allegations concern Beacham's alleged actions in bringing and
pursuing the currently pending criminal charges against Thomas. 	Because the
actions Thomas challenges are part of the judicial phase of the criminal proceedings
against him, Beacham is immune from the relief Thomas is seeking. 	Thomas's
claims against District Attorney Beacham are dismissed under§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)
as seeking relief against a defendant who is immune.
B. 	Claims Against Attorney Gustitis
Thomas alleges that Attorney Gustitis has been court-appointed to represent
him in the state-court criminal proceedings, and he contends that Gustitis is
providing ineffective assistance of counsel in several respects. But court-appointed
defense counsel may not be sued under § 1983 for actions taken in defending an
individual charged with criminal acts.
To be liable under§ 1983, the defendant must be acting under color of state
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law in taking the challenged actions. 1 Neither public defenders nor appointed or
retained private defense attorneys act under color of state law when performing a
lawyer's traditional functions in representing a criminal defendant because, in that
capacity, he or she is acting on behalf of the defendant rather than on behalf of the
State. 	See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,318, 324-25 (1981); Mills
v. Crim. Dist. Court No. 3, 837 F.2d 677,679 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that "private
attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors, and generally
are not subject to suit under section 1983"); Amir-Sharif v. Dallas Cnty. Public
Defender's Office, 233 F. App'x 364, 365 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (dismissing
claims against a county's public defenders "because they are not state actors for
§ 1983 purposes").
In his capacity as court-appointed defense counsel for Thomas, Gustitis is not
acting "under color of state law" while taking actions to represent him. 	Thomas's
disagreements with Gustitis's trial strategy may give rise to a malpractice action,
but they do not support a claim for a violation of constitutional rights under § 1983.
1
Limited exceptions to this general rule exist when the plaintiff can show that the
private actor was implementing an official government policy or when the private actor's
actions are fairly attributable to the government. 	See Rundus v. City of Dallas, Tex., 634
F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2011). A private party who conspires with state actors to deprive
another of his constitutional rights may also be considered a state actor. 	See Priester v.
Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414,421 (5th Cir. 2004). Thomas's complaint does not allege
facts showing that any of these exceptions apply to his case.
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Thomas's claims against Attorney Gustitis are dismissed under§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
C. 	Claims Against Hope Thomas
Thomas alleges that Hope Thomas fabricated a story that Thomas assaulted
her to secure Thomas's arrest. But, as explained above, to state an actionable claim
under§ 1983, the plaintiff must show that the defendant, while acting under color
of state law, 	deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United 	States
Constitution, or a federal statute, or both. 	See Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 357
(5th Cir. 2003). To act "under color of state law," the defendant must be either an
officer of the state or "a willful participant in joint action with the State or its
agents." Cherry Knoll, L.L.C. v. Jones, 922 F.3d 309,319 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)). A§ 1983 action is not merely a federal
substitute for a state-law claim.
Thomas does not allege any facts showing that Hope Thomas is a state
official, that she was acting under color of state law when she reported the alleged
assault, or that she conspired with state actors to deprive him of his rights under
federal law. Thomas therefore does not state a cause of action under§ 1983 against
Hope 	Thomas. 	His 	claims 	against 	Hope 	Thomas 	are 	dismissed 	under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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D. 	Claims Against Detective McConnell and Officer Whitehead
Thomas alleges that Detective McConnell and Officer Whitehead showed a
reckless disregard forthe truth by arresting him, knowing that there was no probable
cause under the true facts. 	The Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994), prohibits Thomas from proceeding with these claims at this
time.
Heck bars any cause of action under § 1983, regardless of the type of relief
sought, that would necessarily imply that a conviction or sentence is invalid unless
the conviction has already been invalidated through. proper channels. 	Id. at 487-
88. 	Heck also applies to pending charges when the allegations would, if true,
necessarily imply that those charges or potential convictions are invalid. 	See, e.g.,
Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) ("[I]f he is
convicted and evidence is presented by the prosecution at his criminal trial which
is a direct or indirect product of one or more of his arrests, then his section 1983
damage claims challenging the validity of his arrests would appear to undermine
the validity of his conviction and hence be barred by Heck."); Agbonifo v. Boyden,
No. H-17-1872, 2017 WL 3267790, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 2017).
Thomas's claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution would, if true,
necessarily implicate the validity of the pending criminal charge and any potential
conviction. 	Because of this, his civil-rights claims against Detective McConnell
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and Officer Whiteh~ad are premature. Thomas may raise his claims in the pending
state-court proceedings. 	But until he receives 	a ruling that satisfies 	fleck's
fav~rable-termination requirement, no federal action has yet accrued under § 1983.
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 488-89. And because no cause of action has yet accrued, his
claims against McConnell and Whitehead are frivolous within the meaning of
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b). 	See Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102-03
(5th Cir 1996) ("A § 1983 claim which falls under the rule in Heck is legally
frivolous unless the conviction or sentence at issue has been reversed, expunged,
invalidated, or otherwise called into question.").
Thomas's claims against Detective McConnell ·and Officer Whitehead are
therefore dismissed with prejudice to be reasserted when the Heck conditions are
satisfied. 	See Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1998); Johnson v.
McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing,the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. Thomas's 	civil-rights 	claims· against District Attorney 	Caleb 	Beacham,
Attorney Stephen Gustitis, and Hope Thomas, (Dkt. 1), are DISMISSED
with prejudice.
2. 	Thomas's civil-rights claims against Bryan Police Detective C. McConnell
and Officer Whitehead, (Dkt. 1), are DISMISSED with prejudice to be
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reasserted when and if the Heck favorable-termination condition is satisfied.
3. Any pending motions are DENIED as moot.
4. Final judgment will be separately entered.
5. This dismissal will count as a "strike" for purposes of28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The Clerk shall send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to the
•plaintiff. The Clerk shall also send a copy of this dismissal to the Three-Strikes List
Manager at the following email: Three Strikes@txs.uscourts.gov.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas on ___·.·......	If~·~~~~,._J......• ~1)___, 2026.
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