Herrera Naranjo v. Uhls et al

UNITED S TATES DISTRICT C OURT
S OUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JOSE VIDAL HERRERA
N ARANJO,
Petitioner,
versus
BRYAN U HLS , et al,
Respondents.
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CIVIL ACTION N UMBER
4:25-cv-05756
J UDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER ON DISMISSAL
Petitioner Jose Vidal Herrera Naranjo was born in
Ecuador and entered the United States without lawful
permission over two decades ago. Dkt 1 at ¶1. In 2017, he
was placed in removal proceedings and later applied for
cancellation of removal. Ibid. He was taken into custody by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement when he appeared
before an immigration court for hearing regarding those
proceedings on August 5, 2025. Id at ¶2.
Petitioner is currently being held at the Joe Corley
Processing Center in Conroe, Texas. Id at ¶3. Respondents
are sued in their official capacity as officers or employees
of the United States and are collectively referred to as the
Government.
Pending is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, by
which Petitioner challenges his detention without a bond
hearing. Dkt 1. He asserts that he’s entitled to such
hearing 	under 	8 	USC 	§1226(a), 	which 	provides 	for
discretionary detention during removal proceedings. See id
at 	¶¶36–39. 	The 	Government 	responds 	that 	no 	bond
hearing is required because Petitioner is an “applicant for
admission” under 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A), which provides for
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 31, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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mandatory detention during removal proceedings. Dkt 7
at 1–2.
This 	action 	presents 	the 	same 	issue 	of 	textual
interpretation 	recently 	addressed 	and 	resolved 	by 	the
undersigned 	in 	Montoya 	Cabanas 	v 	Bondi, 	2025 	WL
3171331 (SD Tex). Counsel for Petitioner was so advised
and 	responded 	to 	the 	Montoya 	Cabanas 	decision, 	in
addition 	to 	presenting 	other 	novel 	arguments 	not
considered there. Dkt 8 (reply).
Upon 	due 	consideration 	of 	the 	additional 	textual
argument raised by Petitioner, the undersigned maintains
the ruling in Montoya Cabanas. The construction given
8 USC §§1225 and 1226 in that case thus controls here.
Petitioner’s discussion of the Laken Riley Act warrants
attention. See Dkt 8 at 4–5. He argues that the Act creates
a “surplusage problem” under the Government’s reading of
§1225(b)(2), asserting that the correct inquiry is “whether
Petitioner’s or the Government’s construction of section
1225(b)(2) ‘fits most logically and comfortably into the body
of previously and subsequently enacted law.’” Ibid, quoting
West Virginia University Hospital v Casey, 499 US 83, 100
(1991). On that basis, he contends that the Government’s
interpretation 	renders 	the 	Laken 	Riley 	Act 	largely
redundant. See id at 5.
To the contrary, canons of statutory construction (like
the presumption against superfluity) apply only where the
text is ambiguous. See United States v Moore, 71 F4th 392,
395 (5th Cir 2023): “If applicable, canons of construction
can be used to resolve remaining ambiguity.” Indeed, Casey
itself explains, “Where a statutory term presented to us for
the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that
permissible 	meaning 	which 	fits 	most 	logically 	and
comfortably 	into 	the 	body 	of 	both 	previously 	and
subsequently 	enacted 	law.” 	499 	US 	at 	100 	(emphasis
added). 	But 	where, 	as 	here, 	the 	statutory 	text 	is
unambiguous, 	canons 	of 	construction 	don’t 	support
departure from that text.
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Petitioner 	also 	contends 	that 	the 	manner 	of 	his
arrest—outside 	of 	an 	immigration 	courtroom 	while
appearing for hearing—violated his right to due process.
Dkt 1 at ¶30–35. 	He maintains that other courts to
consider the constitutionality of such “hallway arrests”
have 	found 	due-process 	violations. 	See 	Dkt 	8 	at 	7
(collecting cases).
This argument depends in part upon his assertion that
he 	is 	erroneously 	detained 	under 	§1225(b)(2) 	without
opportunity for a bond hearing. Dkt 1 at ¶¶30–35. To the
contrary, 	it 	has 	been 	determined 	that 	§1225(b)(2)(A)
lawfully applies here. Beyond that, the scope of judicial
inquiry into immigration legislation is quite limited given
the plenary power of Congress over such matters. See
Fiallo v Bell, 430 US 787, 792 (1977): “This Court has
repeatedly emphasized that ‘over no conceivable subject is
the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is
over’ the admission of aliens.” Congress hasn’t provided for
a bond hearing under §1225(b)(2), and Petitioner hasn’t
persuasively identified any basis for imposing additional
procedural requirements not required by statute.
It 	does 	appear 	the 	Government 	has 	adopted 	a
widespread practice of taking aliens into custody when
they appear for court. Such practice has thus become a
recurring fact pattern in many petitions of those seeking
release on habeas corpus. But upon review, the cases cited
by Petitioner don’t hold that the location of arrest is itself
a due-process violation, nor do they provide any persuasive
justification as to why that should be a determinative
factor in this context. For example, see INS v Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 US 1032, 1036 (1984): “The mere fact of an
illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation
proceeding.” Absent a connection that undermines the
lawfulness 	of 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	pursuant 	to 	the
immigration 	laws, 	argument 	that 	such 	practice 	has
unintended consequences or is poor policy is simply beyond
the jurisdiction afforded upon inquiry on habeas corpus.
Lastly, 	Petitioner 	contends 	that 	prior 	work
authorizations that he received during the pendency of his
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asylum proceedings “give[ ] rise to some meaningful liberty
interest.” Dkt 8 at 8. But employment authorizations don’t
convey legal status. See Figueroa v Holden, 455 F Appx
492, 493 (5th Cir 2011). Having found that the present
detention 	by 	the 	Government 	is 	constitutional 	and
authorized 	by 	statute, 	the 	fact 	that 	Petitioner 	was
previously granted an employment authorization by the
Government doesn’t alter that conclusion.
* 	* 	*
In so concluding, respectful acknowledgement is given
to the seven other district court judges in the Houston
Division who have also recently reached the statutory issue
presented in this case. Each has determined under similar
circumstances in favor of §1226 over §1225. For example,
see Ortega-Aguirre v Noem, 4:25-cv-04332 (SD Tex, Oct 10,
2025) (Bennett, J); Hernandez Lucero v Noem, 4:25-cv-
03981 (SD Tex, Oct 23, 2025) (Ellison, J); Aslamov v
Bradford, 4:25-cv-04299 (SD Tex, Oct 30, 2025) (Hanks, J);
Mejia Juarez v Bondi, 4:25-cv-03937 (SD Tex, Oct 27, 2025)
(Hoyt, J); Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 2025 WL 2886346,
(SD Tex) (Rosenthal, J); Reyes-Lopez v Noem, 4:25-cv-
04629 (SD Tex, Nov 21, 2025) (Lake, J); Espinoza Andres v
Noem, 4:25-cv-05128 (SD Tex, Dec 2, 2025) (Hittner, J).
Another three judges in this Division haven’t reached
decision, but two have it currently pending before them.
For example, see Romero Moreno v Tate, 4:25-cv-04903
(SD Tex) (Hanen, J); Martinez-Sarres v Warden, 4:25-cv-
05273 (SD Tex) (Werlein, J).
That said, until the Fifth Circuit gives a definitive
interpretation, it is simply up to each district court judge
to give the text his or her own best reading. And in that
regard, it’s also noted that at least two cases from the
Southern District of Texas are currently pending before the
Fifth Circuit on this issue. See Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi,
25-20496 (cited above, per Rosenthal, J); Covarrubias v
Vergara, 25-40701 (per Kazen, J, SD Tex, Laredo Division).
Three 	are 	also 	pending 	from 	the 	Western 	District 	of
Louisiana. 	See 	Kostak 	v 	Trump, 	25-30620; 	Ventura
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Martinez v Trump, 25-30621; and Lopez-Santos v Noem,
25-30656.
* 	* 	*
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
Dkt 1.
This action is DISMISSED.
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SO ORDERED.
Signed on December 31, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
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