Arenas-Santoyo v. Dickey et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
EDEN ISAIAS ARENAS SANTOYO, 	§
§
Petitioner, 	§
§
vs. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. H-25-5555
§
GRANT DICKEY, etal., 	§
§
Respondents. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Through counsel, noncitizen Eden Isaias Arenas-Santoyo filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking his immediate release from
immigration detention. (Dkt. 1). He also filed a motion for temporary injunction to
prevent his removal from the United States while his petition was pending. (Dkt. 2).
The Court denied his request for immediate release, but granted the temporary
injunction in part and ordered an expedited answer from the ,,respondents. 	(Dkt. 5).
The respondents answered with a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary
judgment. (Dkt. 10). Arenas-Santoyo filed a response. (Dkt. 11 ). Having reviewed
the petition, the motion and response, the pleadings, and the law, the Court denies
the respondents' motion for summary judgment, grants Arenas-Santoyo's petition in
part, and orders the respondents to afford Arenas-Santoyo a bond hearing within
seven days from the date of this Order or else release him.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 24, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. 	BACKGROUND
The parties do not dispute the basic facts of this case. 	Arenas-Santoyo is a
native of Venezuela who entered the United States with inspection in 2022. (Dlct. 1,
p. 3). 	In March 2023, he filed an application for asylum, which remains pending.
(Id. at 4). 	In November 2025, he was arrested by ICE officials in Houston, Texas,
and charged with removability. 	(Id.). 	Arenas-Santoyo has not sought a bond
hearing, and he remains detained without bond while his removal proceedings are
pending. (Id.).
In his habeas petition, Arenas-Santoyo contends that his detention is unlawful
because he does not have a final order of removal, he has not committed any crimes,
and he does not pose a danger to the community. (Id. at 5- 7). He asks the Court to
order his 	immediate release from 	detention and enjoin the respondents 	from
removing him from the United States. (Id. at 7-8).
The 	respondents 	answered 	the 	petition 	with 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	or,
alternatively, a motion for summary judgment. 	(Dkt. 10). 	The respondents first
contend that the petition should be dismissed because Arenas-Santoyo failed to
exhaust his 	administrative 	remedies 	before 	filing 	his 	petition. 	(Id. 	at 	4-5).
Alternatively, the respondents contend that because Arenas-Santoyo is subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). 	(Id. at 6-12). They contend that
this result is supported by the plain language of§ 1225(b), the Board of Immigration
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Appeals' decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 291. & N. Dec. 216, 221-27 (BIA
2025), and persuasive decisions from other district courts. (Id.).
Arenas-Santoyo filed a timely response to the motion. 	(Dkt. 11). 	He first
contends that he should not be required to exhaust his administrative remedies when
doing so would be futile. 	(Id. at 1-2). Second, he contends that he is not subject to
detention under 	§ 1225(b); 	instead, 	at most he 	is 	subject to 	detention under
§ 1226(a), which would require the respondents to afford him a bond hearing. 	(Id.
at 2-4). 	Because the respondents have not provided him with a bond hearing, he
contends his current detention is illegal and that he is entitled to be released.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Arenas-Santoyo seeks release through a petition for writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	To be entitled to a federal writ of habeas corpus, the
petitioner must show that he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States[.]" 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	The petitioner has the
burden to demonstrate that a constitutional violation has occurred. 	See Orellana v.
Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) ("[N]either habeas nor civil rights
relief can be had absent the allegation by a plaintiff that he or she has been deprived
of some right secured to him or her by the United States Constitution or the laws of
the United States." (quoting Hilliard v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 759 F.2d 1190,
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1192 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam))). Absent a constitutional violation, the writ will
not issue.
B. 	Motions for Summary Judgment
In response to Arenas-Santoyo's petition, the respondents moved for entry of
summary judgment. "As a general principle, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, relating to summary judgment, applies with equal force in the context of
habeas corpus cases." 	Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760,764 (5th Cir. 2000). Under
Rule 56, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." 	FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 	A fact is "material" if its
resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the suit under governing
law. 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 	An issue is
"genuine" if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Id. 	The moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law"
when the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of the case on which he or she had the burden of proof. 	See Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The respondents 	first 	contend that Arenas-Santoyo's petition should be
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dismissed because he has not exhausted his administrative remedies. 	(Dkt. 10, pp.
4-5). The Court disagrees for three reasons.
First, no applicable statute or rule requires Arenas-Santoyo to exhaust his
administrative remedies. In the immigration context, "exhaustion of administrative
remedies is statutorily required only on appeals from final orders of removal."
Hniguira v. Mayorkas, No. H-23-3314, 2024 WL 1201634, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
20, 2024 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(l)). 	Arenas-Santoyo is not appealing a final
order of removal, so exhaustion is not statutorily required.
Second, prudential exhaustion is not required here. 	"[I]n the absence of a
statutory requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the jurisprudential
doctrine of exhaustion controls." 	Taylor v. United States Treasury Dep 't, 127 F .3d
470, 475 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 	Prudential exhaustion is a court-created
doctrine intended to protect administrative agency authority and promote judicial
efficiency. 	See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006). 	But when a "legal
question is fit for resolution and delay means hardship, a court may choose to decide
the issues itself." Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (quoting Shala/av. Ill. Council on Long Term Care,
Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000)).
The issue in this case "boils down to a matter of statutory interpretation,"
which "belong[ s] historically within the province of the courts." 	Id. 	Other courts
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faced with similar issues have found that preventing six months or more oft.mlawful
detention (bond determinations typically take six months or more) outweighs the
BIA's interest in detaining an individual while the bond determination is resolved
on appeal. 	Id.; see also Lopez-Arevelo v. 	Ripa, No. EP-25-cv-337, 2025 WL
2691828, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 2025) (waiving exhaustion in a similar case
because "[t]o wait, indefinitely, for a ruling on that appeal would be inappropriate
because 	it would 	exacerbate 	[the petitioner's] 	alleged 	constitutional 	injury-
detention without a bond hearing"). 	Under these circumstances, requiring Arenas-
Santoyo to exhaust his administrative remedies before pursuing habeas relief would
satisfy neither purpose of prudential exhaustion. 	The Court will not impose that
requirement under these circumstances.
Third, the respondents' 	own briefing estabiishes that reqmnng Arenas-
Santoyo to pursue his administrative remedies would be futile. 	A petitioner need
not 	exhaust 	claims 	when he 	can 	demonstrate 	"the 	futility 	or inadequacy 	of
administrative review." 	Gardner v. Sch. Bd. Caddo. Par., 958 F.2d 108, 112 (5th
Cir. 1992); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988). The futility exception
applies when exhaustion would be "clearly useless" and "it is certain [a] claim will
be denied." All.for Hippocratic Med. v. Food & Drug Adniin., No. 23-10362, 2023
WL 2913725, at *15 (5th Cir. Apr. 12, 2023) (per curiam) (cleaned up); see also
Carr v. Saul, 593 U.S. 83, 93 (2021) ("[T]his Court has consistently recognized a
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futility exception to exhaustion requirements.").
The record before this Court demonstrates that requiring Arenas-Santoyo to
exhaust his administrative remedies would be futile. 	The respondents contend that
the Court should require Arenas-Santoyo to request a bond hearing while at the same
time arguing that immigration judges have no jurisdiction to consider a request for
bond. The Court will not require Arenas-Santoyo to participate in such a charade.
The Court finds that requiring Arenas-Santoyo to attempt to exhaust a non-
existent 	remedy 	is 	neither 	required, 	prudent, 	nor 	legally 	supportable. 	The
respondents' motion to dismiss for lack of exhaustion is denied.
B. 	Detention Pending a Removal Decision
Arenas-Santoyo challenges his continued detention during the pendency of
his removal proceedings. This case is one of a flood of cases filed across the country
challenging the federal government's authority to require mandatory detention for
certain noncitizens while their removal proceedings are in progress. At issue in these
cases 	is the proper interpretation and application of § 1225(b) and § 1226(a).
Arenas-Santoyo contends that if he is subject to detention, then the plain language
of the statutes and longstanding precedent place him within the discretionary
•detention provision of§ 1226(a). 	The respondents contend that the plain language
of the statutes shows that Arenas-Santoyo is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b).
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Section 1225, entitled "Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal
of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing," provides,
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of alien who is an
applicant 	for 	admission, 	if 	the 	examining 	immigration 	officer
determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a
doubt 	entitled to 	be 	admitted, 	the 	alien 	shall 	be 	detained 	for 	a
proceeding under [8 U.S.C. § 1229a].
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (emphasis added).
In contrast,§ 1226, entitled "Apprehension and detention of aliens," provides,
in pertinent part:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested
and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
from the United States. 	Except as provided in subsection (c) and
pending such decision, the Attorney General-
( 1) 	may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) 	may release the alien on -
(A) 	bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or
(B) 	conditional parole; but
(3) 	may 	not 	provide 	the 	alien 	with 	work 	authorization
(including 	an 	"employment 	authorized" 	endorsement 	or 	other
appropriate work permit) unless the alien is lawfully admitted for
permanent resident or .otherwise would (without regard to removal
proceedings) be provided such authorization.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
For decades, the Department of Homeland Security has applied § 1226(a),
rather than§ 1225(b), to noncitizens who are apprehended while already present in
the United States without having been admitted or paroled. 	See, e.g., Savane v.
Francis, No. 1:25-cv-6666-GHW, 2025 WL 2774452, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
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2025) ( citation omitted). 	The Department's own regulations concerning asylum
procedures adopt this interpretation and application of§ 1225(b) and § 1226(a). See
Inspection & Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens;
Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323
(proposed Mar. 6, 1997) ("Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are
present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who
entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.").
Likewise, the Supreme Court has stated that the government is authorized to detain
"aliens seeking admission into the country" under § 1225(b) while detaining "aliens
already in the country" under§ 1226(a). 	See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
300 (2018). 	Under this longstanding precedent, Arenas-Santoyo would be subject
to discretionary detention under § 1226(a) and so would be entitled to a hearing at
which his request for release on bond would be considered.
However, the respondents have recently "revisited [their] legal position on
detention and release authorities" under § 1225(b) and § 1226(a). 	ICE Memo:
Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications for Admission,
available at https://perma.cc/4Q6X-GAZC (last visited Dec. 18, 2025). This Interim
Guidance states that the Department of Homeland Security has now "determined
that [§ 1225] of the [INA], rather than [§ 1226], is the applicable immigration
detention authority for all applicants for admission." Id. 	The Interim Guidance goes
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on to explain this newly adopted position:
An "applicant for admission" is an alien present in the United States
who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States, whether
or not at a designated port of arrival. 	Effective immediately, it the
position of DHS that such aliens are subject to detention under
[§ 1225(b)(2)(A)]·and may not be released from ICE custody except
by [§ 1182] parole . ... 	For custody purposes, these aliens are now
treated in the same manner that "arriving aliens" have historically been
treated. 	The only aliens eligible for a custody determination and
release 	on 	recognizance, 	bond, 	or 	other 	conditions 	under
[§ 1226(a)] during removal proceedings are aliens admitted to the
United States ... with the exception of those subject to mandatory
detention under[§ 1226(c)].
Id. (emphasis in original).
Arenas-Santoyo contends that because he entered the United States with
inspection and was apprehended in the interior of the country more than three years
• after he arrived, he is neither an "arriving alien" nor is he "seeking admission." (Dkt.
11, pp. 2-3). He also contends that the respondents' reading of the statutes is absurd,
resulting in a situation in which § 1225 becomes "a lifetime mandatory-detention
provision" that is triggered solely at the whim of ICE. 	(Id.). 	In contrast, the
respondents contend that Arenas-Santoyo falls squarely within § 1225(b) because in
the context of § 1225(b)(2), the phrases "seeking admission" and "applying for
admission" are "plainly synonymous." (Dkt. 10, p. 7). Therefore, "[r]ead properly,
a person 'seeking admission' is just another way of describing a person applying for
admission, meaning he is an applicant for admission, which includes both those
individuals 	arriving 	in 	the 	United 	States 	and 	those 	already 	present without
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admission." 	(Id.). 	The Court disagrees with the respondents' position for several
reasons.
First, a basic canon of statutory construction is that "differences in language
... convey differences in meaning." 	Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U.S. 685,
698 (2022) (quoting Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 86
(2017)); see also Covarrubias v. Vergara, No. 5:25-CV-112, 2025 WL 2950097, at
*4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025) ("[w]hen two different phrases are used in a statute, a
variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning" (citing A. Scalia & B. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012))). 	The respondents'
argument that the Court should treat the different phrases within the statute as
synonymous contradicts this maxim.
Second, well-established principles of statutory construction require courts to
give meaning to each phrase in a statute rather than construing the statute in a way
that renders parts of it superfluous. See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31
(2001) ("It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon
the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word
shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant") (cleaned up); 	United States ex rel.
Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023) ("every clause and
word of a statute should have meaning") (cleaned up). 	But the respondents'
interpretation of§ 1225(b) would make certain portions of it superfluous. 	As one
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court has recently explained:
If, as Respondents argue, § 1225(b)(2)(A) were intended to apply to all
"applicant[ s] for admission," there would be no need to include the
phrase "seeking admission" in the statute. 	That is, rather than stating
that mandatory detention is required for any "applicant for admission,
if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,"
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added), the statute would instead provide
for 	mandatory 	detention for 	any "applicant for 	admission, 	if the
examining immigration officer determines that [the] 	alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted."
Lopez Benitez v. 	Francis, No. 25-CIV-5937(DEH), 2025 	WL 2371588, at 	*6
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 	13, 2025) (emphasis and strike-through in original); see also
Castanon-Nava v. 	US. 	Dep 't of Homeland Security, 	No. 25-3050, 2025 	WL
3552514, at *8-9 (7th Cir. Dec. 11, 2025) (rejecting the respondents' proffered
construction of§ 1225(b)(2)(A) as "violating one of the cardinal rules of statutory
construction"). 	This Court likewise rejects the respondents' efforts to violate this
well-established principle.
Third, courts may consider the titles of statutes when interpreting their
provisions. See, e.g., Fla. Dep 't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S.
33, 47 (2008) ("[S]tatutory titles and section headings are tools available for the
resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute." (quoting Porter v. Nuss le, 534
U.S. 516, 528 (2002))); see also United States v. Moore, 71 F.4th 392, 397 (5th Cir.
2023). 	Here, the title of§ 1225 states that it applies to the "expedited removal of
inadmissible arriving aliens." In contrast, the title of§ 1226 states that it applies to
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the "apprehension" of noncitizens who are already present in the country. 	These
titles contradict the respondents' argument that § 1225 applies to noncitizens who
have been present in the country for years and instead support the government's
longstanding interpretation that § 1225 applies to noncitizens intercepted at the
border while § 1226 applies to noncitizens apprehended away from the border years
after they entered.
Based on these three principles of statutory construction, this Court, like many
others, is not persuaded by the respondents' argument that their current interpretation
of the statutes is guided by their plain language. See e.g., Castanon-Nava, 2025 WL
3552514, at *10 (affirming the respondents' motion to stay the release of the
petitioner because the respondents "are not likely to succeed on the merits of their
argument"). 	The respondents are not entitled to summary judgment in their favor
based on the plain language of the statutes.
In the alternative, the respondents contend that this Court should defer to the
BIA'~ recent decision in Matter ofYajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025),
but the Court need not do so. 	The Administrative Procedures Act "specifies that
courts, not agencies, will decide 'all relevant questions of laws' arising on review of
agency action . . . and set aside any such action inconsistent with the law as they
interpret it." Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 392 (2024) (quoting
5 U.S.C. § 706) (emphasis in original). The Court finds thatHurtado's interpretation
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of§ 1225 and§ 1226 is inconsistent with the language of the statutes themselves, as
well 	as 	with 	the 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security's 	own 	longstanding
interpretation and application of those statutes. 1 See Castanon-Nava, 2025 WL
3552514, at *9 n.13 ("It also does not escape our notice that Defendants' recent
reliance on § 1225(b)(2)(A) to detain noncitizens discovered within the United
States upends decades of practice."). Because the Hurtado decision utterly ignores
the Department's U-turn on the proper interpretation and application of§ 1225 and
§ 1226, the Court finds that decision to be unpersuasive.
Finally, the respondents argue that the Court should consider "persuasive
decisions from other district courts." (Dkt. 10, p. 10). The respondents suggest that
this Court "reconsider" its earlier rulings that found in favor of Arenas-Santoyo's
position and instead adopt the respondents' position. 	(Id. 	at 10). 	However, the
respondents offer no new persuasive authority that would tend to show that their
1
The Department issued its Interim Guidance setting forth its new interpretation of
§ 1225 without providing a notice-and-comment period that would in most cases be
required by 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) for agency rulemaking. Nevertheless, the Court recognizes
that "interpretive rules," which· are "issued by an agency to advise the public of the
agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers" are not subject to the
notice-and-comment requirement. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass 'n, 575 U.S. 92, 96-97
(2015). 	Such interpretive rules may also be amended without providing a notice-and-
comment period under§ 553(b). Id at 102. The respondents do not address whether their
new interpretation of§ 1225 constitute·s only an interpretive rule. But assuming that to be
the case, the convenience of avoiding the notice-and-comment requirement "comes as a
price: Interpretive rules 'do not have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that
weight in the adjudicatory process."' Id. at 97 (quoting Shala/av. Guernsey Mem '/Hosp.,
514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)). 	The Court is therefore not bound by the Department's new
"interpretive rule," assuming it qualifies as such.
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position is correct. They do not plausibly distinguish the authorities upon which this
Court relies, nor do they provide a credible explanation for the recent change in their
interpretation and application of the relevant statutes. Nothing in their motion leads
the Court to believe that its independent analysis of the statutes, case law, and
legislative 	and 	administrative 	history 	is 	incorrect. 	The 	Court 	declines 	the
respondents' invitation to reverse itself.
Based on the analysis and principles set out above, the Court finds that the
question of whether Arenas-Santoyo's detention should be continued is governed by
§ 1226(a) rather than § 1225(b). 	Arenas-Santoyo is not an "arriving alien"; he
arrived in this country more than three years ago. 	He therefore does not fall under
the plain language of § 1225(b). 	Instead, he was arrested while present in the
country, and he is being detained pending a decision on whether he is to be removed.
As such, he falls under§ 1226(a).
However, under § 1226(a), Arenas-Santoyo 	is not entitled to immediate
release; instead, under these circumstances, "[m]any courts have ... found it
appropriate to give the Government a short window in which to complete the bond
hearing, or else release the petitioner." 	Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at * 13
(citing Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, No. l:25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729, at *9
(D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025) (collecting cases)). 	At that hearing, the respondents will
have the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that Arenas-Santoyo
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either presents a danger to the community or is a flight risk.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	The respondents' motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary
judgment, (Dkt. 10), is DENIED.
2. 	Arenas-Santoyo's petition. for writ of habeas corpus, (Dkt. 	1), 1s
GRANTED in part.
3. 	The respondents are ORDERED to provide Arenas-Santoyo with an
individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven (7) days of the
date of this Order or else immediately release him from custody.
4. 	Until the bond hearing is held, the respondents are PROHIBITED
from removing Arenas-Santoyo from, or transferring him outside of, the Southern
District of Texas.
5. 	Arenas-Santoyo's motion for a temporary restraining order, (Dkt. 2), is
DENIED. (Dkt. 2).
The Clerk of Court will provide a copy of this Order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas on 	<::[;;._. .....,, ·l- -8 	, 2025.
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