Ye v. Rivas

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Jianfei Ye,
Plaintiff,
v.
Milton E. Rivas,
Defendant.
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§ 	Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-05432
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MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DENY IFP APPLICATION
On November 12, 2025, Plaintiff Jianfei Ye filed a motion requesting
leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. 2. In addition to his complaint,
Dkt. 1, Ye filed two supplements with various attachments. 	See Dkt. 11, 12.
After considering Ye’s submissions and the applicable law, it is recommended
that Ye’s request for IFP status be denied.
Legal standard
Ye’s application is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). 	Section 1915
provides 	that 	“[a]ny 	court 	of 	the 	United 	States 	may 	authorize 	the
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil
or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor”
upon a showing that “the person is unable to pay such fees or give security
therefor.” 	But the right to proceed in forma pauperis is not absolute. 	“Under
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 23, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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§ 1915(e)(2)(B), the district court is required to dismiss an IFP case ‘at any
time’ if it determines that the case is ‘frivolous or malicious’ or ‘fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.’” 	Doe v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 131
F.4th 323, 327 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii)).
A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Diamond v. City of Rayville, 127 F.4th 935, 938 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). “A complaint lacks an arguable
basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if
the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not
exist.” 	Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013). 	“[A] court may
dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are clearly
baseless, a category encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and
delusional.” 	Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (quotations and
citations omitted).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it
alleges insufficient facts, when taken as true, to state a basis for relief that is
plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Butler v.
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S. Porter, 999 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam)). 	But “regardless of whether the plaintiff is
proceeding pro se or is represented by counsel, conclusory allegations or legal
conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a
motion to dismiss.” 	Prescott v. UTMB Galveston Tex., 73 F.4th 315, 318 (5th
Cir. 2023) (quoting Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir.
2002)); see also Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir.
2016) (per curiam) (“[P]ro se plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that
raise the right to relief above the speculative level.”).
Analysis
This is a dispute between neighbors. 	Ye is a landlord who rented his
property to a series of African-American families. See Dkt. 11 at 2 (supplement
to the complaint). According to the complaint, Defendant Milton E. Rivas sent
text messages to Ye complaining about Ye’s tenants. 	Id. at 2-4. 	The text
messages from Rivas are as follows:
“I don’t know how you keep getting[] [y]our renters but trust me
ima make sure I put an end to you keep putting Crazy people next
door to me …. This is a family oriented neighborhood [n]ot a party
place … You should be ashamed.”
“You keep bringing people next to me I have to live with … I should
sue you for the last tenant that wrecked my car … And the one
after was a pedifile [sic] ….”
“Call your lawyer … I have mine ready … And trust me you will
loose [sic] the ability to rent to these types of people … If you don’t
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want to see my messages stop putting crazy people next door ….
Put families not people that the government pays their rent … I’m
ready to take you to court. Your [sic] a bad property owner [a]nd
I’m going to end it ….”
Dkt. 1-5 at 6-8. 	Relying on those text messages, Ye asserts a statutory claim
under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3617, and Texas common-law claims
for 	defamation 	and 	intentional 	infliction 	of 	emotional 	distress. 	But 	the
allegations fail to support recovery on any of those theories.
I. 	Ye has not stated a claim under the Fair Housing Act.
The complaint does not state a viable claim under the Fair Housing Act.
The provision Ye cites makes it illegal
to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the
exercise or enjoyment of … or on account of his having aided or
encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any
right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 ….
42 U.S.C. § 3617. Of the provisions listed in Section 3617, the only potentially
relevant one is Section 3604, which prohibits housing discrimination based on
either “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin,” or based on
“a handicap of” the “buyer or renter” or anyone “associated with that buyer or
renter.” Id. § 3604(a), (b), (f)(1), (f)(2). The term “handicap” means
(1) 	a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person’s major life activities,
(2) 	a record of having such an impairment, or
(3) 	being regarded as having such an impairment.
Id. § 3602(h). 	To state a Section 3617 retaliation claim, the plaintiff must
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establish (1) he was engaged in an activity protected by the Fair Housing Act;
(2) the defendant took adverse action against him; and (3) that a causal
connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. Cox
v. Phase III, Invs., 2013 WL 3110218, at *10 (S.D. Tex. June 14, 2013).
Even assuming that Ye adequately alleged that he engaged in protected
activity—an issue that this Court need not resolve—he nonetheless fails to
articulate 	a 	causal 	connection 	between 	Rivas’s 	text 	messages 	and 	any
protected activity. 	Ye asserts that, by referring to the tenants as “crazy
people,” “government-paid renters,” and stating that the neighborhood is
“family-oriented, not for those kinds of people,” Rivas expresses animosity
“rooted in social-class bias, mental-disability stigma, and racial or ethnic
stereotyping ….” 	Dkt. 1 at 4. 	But Rivas’s complaints target the tenants’
behavior, not any protected characteristic.
When calling the tenants “crazy people,” Rivas used the term colloquially
to describe the tenants’ rowdy or unlawful conduct, and not to suggest that
they had a mental disability. See Dkt. 1-5 at 9-14 (Rivas complaining about a
tenant’s activity levels (“This is … not a party place”), that the last tenant
“wrecked [his] car,” and that another tenant was a pedophile). 	Similarly,
Rivas’s complaint that “[t]his is a family oriented neighborhood, not a party
place” 	cannot 	reasonably 	be 	construed 	as 	discrimination 	based 	on 	any
protected status—as opposed to complaining about the tenants’ disruptive
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actions. 	Ye’s attempt to characterize references to “government housing
tenants” as being “racially coded” references to “Black residents” is facially
unsupported and insufficient to suggest a cognizable retaliation claim. 	See
Dkt. 11 at 3-4; see, e.g., Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop.
Co., 920 F.3d 890, 912 (5th Cir. 2019) (advertisements stating a “no vouchers”
policy, without more, do not express a racial preference under Section 3604).
The Fair Housing Act provides no basis for recovery.
II. 	Ye has not stated a defamation claim.
The complaint also alleges that Rivas’s text statement accusing Ye of
renting to pedophiles is defamatory. 	Dkt. 1 at 3. 	Under Texas law, the
elements of defamation are: (1) the publication of a false statement of fact to a
third party, (2) that was defamatory concerning the plaintiff, (3) with the
requisite degree of fault, and (4) damages, in some cases. 	In re Lipsky,
460 S.W.3d 579, 593 (Tex. 2015). 	Ye does not allege that Rivas published a
false statement of fact to a third party. 	Instead, Rivas’s text statement was
made directly to Ye. 	Moreover, nothing indicates that Rivas’s statement is
false. Ye’s defamation claim fails.
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III. 	No recovery is available for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
As his final claim, Ye alleges that Rivas’s text messages constitute
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). 	Dkt. 1 at 3. 	Texas law
treats this claim as “a gap-filler tort” available only in rare instances where a
defendant intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in such an unusual
way that no other theory of recovery is available. See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.
v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004). An IIED claim “should not be
extended to circumvent the limitations placed on the recovery of mental
anguish damages under more established tort doctrines.” 	Standard Fruit &
Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 68 (Tex. 1998).
IIED is unavailable “[w]here the gravamen of a plaintiff’s complaint is
really another tort ….” 	See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 144 S.W.3d at 447. 	This
is so even if a plaintiff cannot succeed under an alternative statutory or
common-law theory premised on the same underlying facts. See id. at 448; see
also Draker v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318, 323-24 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2008, no pet.) (“If the gravamen of Draker’s complaint was defamation, it
matters not whether she succeed on, or even made, such a claim.”).
At bottom, Ye is unhappy that Rivas demanded that Ye stop renting to
people that Rivas believed were noisy, careless, or otherwise inappropriate.
Yet the gravamen of the complaint, which alleges impairment of or retaliation
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against Ye’s rental to certain tenants, falls within the purview of the Fair
Housing Act, leaving no gap to fill. That alone precludes the IIED claim, even
if Ye’s Fair Housing Act claim also fails. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 144
S.W.3d at 448 (“If the gravamen of a plaintiff's complaint is the type of wrong
that the statutory remedy was meant to cover, a plaintiff cannot maintain an
intentional infliction claim regardless of whether he or she succeeds on, or even
makes, a statutory claim.”).
Rivas’s challenged conduct also does not satisfy the strict threshold for
recovery, even if an IIED claim were otherwise available. 	IIED is limited to
conduct “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.” 	Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619,
621 	(Tex. 	1993). 	“[M]ere 	insults, 	indignities, 	threats, 	annoyances, 	petty
oppressions, or other trivialities do not rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous conduct.” GTE S.W., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 612 (Tex. 1999).
Rivas’s text messages do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.
Ye presents a handful of text communications over a two-day period, see Dkt.
1-5 at 6, not a “regular and continuous pattern of behavior” that “rise[s] to the
level of extreme and outrageous conduct.” 	See Gaspard v. Beadle, 36 S.W.3d
229, 238 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.], 2001, pet. denied) (“It is only when
[malicious and abusive] conduct becomes a regular and continuous pattern of
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behavior that it will rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.”).
Although Ye claims that he “fear[ed] for personal safety and property,” Dkt. 1
at 4, Rivas’s text messages made no such threats. 	See, e.g., Williams v. Shell
Exploration and Production Co., 2014 WL 3555741, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.], July 17, 2014, no pet.) (denying claim for intentional
infliction of emotion distress when comments made “may be characterized as
rude and insulting” but do not “rise to the level of terrorizing, threatening, and
assaultive conduct.”). 	Even if IIED were cognizable in this context, Ye has
nevertheless failed to allege that Rivas engaged in extreme and outrageous
conduct. There is no viable IIED claim.
Recommendation and Order
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Jianfei
Ye’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. 2) be DENIED.
It is further RECOMMENDED that this case be DISMISSED, and that
Ye’s motions for summary judgment (Dkt. 4), for temporary restraining order
(Dkt. 5), and to appear by Zoom (Dkt. 6) be DENIED AS MOOT.
It is further ORDERED that March 13, 2026 initial conference (Dkt. 17)
is hereby CANCELED.
Plaintiff 	has 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
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appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this Memorandum and
Recommendation to Plaintiff by email and regular mail, to Plaintiff’s record
addresses.
Signed on December 23, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_______________________________________
Y	Y	Yvvvooon	nne Y. H	H	Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
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