Davis v. PennyMac Loan Services, LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
ANGELA JO DA VIS,
Plaintiff,
V.
PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES,
LLC, et. al.,
Defendants.
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§ 	Civil Action No. H-25-4895
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ORDER
Pending before the Court are Defendant Pennymac Loan Services, LLC's
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Document
No. 	19), 	and 	Defendants 	Everett 	Financial, 	Inc., 	and 	Mortgage 	Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc.' s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint
(Document No. 21). Having considered the motions, submissions, and applicable
law, the Court determines that both motions should be granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This is an alleged wrongful foreclosure case. On October 14, 2025, pro se
Plaintiff Angela Jo Davis ("Davis") filed suit against Defendants Pennymac Loan
Services, 	LLC 	("Pennymac"), 	Mortgage 	Electronic 	Registration 	System, 	Inc.
i'
("MERS"), Everett Financial, Inc. d/b/a Supreme Lending ("Everett"), and "Does 1-
10." 	Davis 	alleges 	a 	litany 	of 	allegations 	surrounding 	an 	alleged 	wrongful
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 02, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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foreclosure of real property located at 1041 Shore Shadows Drive, Huffman, Texas
77336 	("the 	Property"), 	which 	include 	causes 	of action 	for: 	(1) 	declaratory
judgment; (2) constructive fraud and fraud in the factum; (3) fraudulent assignment
and robosigning; (4) violations of the Truth in Lending Act; (5) violations of the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; (6) violations of the Federal Debt Collection
Practices Act; (7) constructive fraud; (8) quiet title; (9) wrongful foreclosure and
attempted conversion of property; and (10) unjust enrichment. 1 On November 12,
2025, Davis amended her complaint to assert additional claims for "slander of title"
and "post-servicing misrepresentation. " 2
On November 6, 	2025, Defendant Pennymac moved to dismiss Davis's
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 3 On December 3,
2025, 	Defendants 	Everett 	and 	MERS 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	Davis's 	complaint,
contending that Davis's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 4
1 See Pro Se Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relieffor Fraud,
Wrongful Foreclosure, Securitization Misconduct, Double Pledging of Collateral, and
Violations of the Truth in Lending Act and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, With
Affidavit of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw, Document No. 1 at 12-15.
2 See Pro Se Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Document No. 13 at 18-22.
3 See Defendant Pennymac Loan Services, LLC 's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Document No. 19 at 1-14.
4 See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Document No.
21 at 1-28.
2
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IL STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although "the pleading standard Rule 8 announces
does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' ... it demands more than . . . 'labels
and conclusions."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell At!.
Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, " [t]he
'court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff."' In re Katrina Canal Breeches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.
2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F .3d 464,
467 (5th Cir. 2004)). To survive the motion, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
"Conversely, 'when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point
of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.'" Cuvillier
v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).
3
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Ill. LAW & ANALYSIS
Defendants move separately to dismiss Davis's complaint against them,
contending that: (1) Davis has not satisfied the general pleading standard under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a); and (2) Davis has already litigated identical
claims against Defendants in this Court, and thus, are barred from bringing these
claims again under the doctrine of res judicata. The Court construes all pro se filings
liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
"[R] es judicata bars the litigation of claims that either have been litigated or
should have been raised in an earlier suit." Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh,
428 F.3d 559,571 (5th Cir. 2005). The doctrine ofresjudicata applies when "(1) the
parties are identical or in privity; (2) the judgment in the prior action was rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded by a final
judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was involved in
both actions." Sacks v. Tex. S. Univ., 83 F.4th 340, 344 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Test
Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005)). The doctrine
of res judicata "bars all claims that were or could have been advanced in support of
the cause of action on the occasion of its former adjudication ... not merely those
that were adjudicated." Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Miss., 701 F.2d 556, 560 (5th
Cir. 1983) (en bane).
4
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Here, Defendants contend that Davis previously sued Pennymac and Everett
in her individual capacity in a case that was removed from state court to the Southern
District of Texas and assigned to this Court. See El Shadd Al Express Tr. v. Everett
Fin., Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1885831 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2025) (hereinafter
"the First Lawsuit"). 5 A review of the record of the First Lawsuit before this Court
reveals that a final judgment was rendered by this Court ordering that Defendant
Pennymac's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted in its entirety. See 	id.
Defendants further contend that the First Lawsuit and present lawsuit share a
common nucleus of operative facts evidenced by Davis's assertion of identical
causes of action between the two lawsuits. In the First Lawsuit, Davis brought suit
challenging her lender's right to foreclose on the subject property alleging defects in
the note and deed of trust. A review of Davis's amended complaint in this matter
reveals an identical fact pattern as those facts presented in the First Lawsuit.
In response, Davis contends that the parties are not identical or in privity
between the First Lawsuit and the present lawsuit, because Davis did not sue in her
individual capacity, but instead as the "trust protector" of the "El Shaddai Express
5 The Court notes that while the parties are not identical in the present and First
Lawsuit, the only additional defendant in the present lawsuit is Defendant MERS, which
Defendants contend is in privity with Pennymac as the original beneficiary and the
subsequent beneficiary of the underlying loan.
5
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Trust." 6 On balance though, a review of Davis's complaint in the First Lawsuit
reveals her self-identification as "Angela Jo Davis" and a shared identity of interest
in the alleged ownership of the property. Davis's only other contention regarding
why the doctrine of res judicata should not apply in this case is that the present
lawsuit arises from "new facts, new assignments, new statutory violations, new
injuries, and a 2025 foreclosure process."7 A review of the complaints found in the
First Lawsuit and present lawsuit reveals identical attached exhibits, all of which
were dated decades prior, containing information that was available at the time of
Davis's filing of the First Lawsuit. Defendants further contend that to the extent
Davis's present lawsuit contains additional claims separate from the First Lawsuit,
the Fifth Circuit has made clear that claims are barred if they "could have been
previously asserted in the prior lawsuits." See Nguyen v. Bank of Am., NA., 539 F.
App'x 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2013).
Having considered the pending motions, submissions, and applicable law, the
Court finds that Davis's claims are barred pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata
because: (1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the judgment in the prior action
6 See Defendant Pennymac Loan Services, LLC 's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Document No. 19, Exhibit A, at 5 [Plaintiffs
First Lawsuit Complaint].
7 See Pro Se Plaintiff's Response to Defendants Pennymac Loan Services and
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint,
Document No. 21 at 12-13.
6
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was rendered by this Court, a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action
was concluded by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claims are
involved in both actions. 8 Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants' motions to
dismiss should be granted and Davis's claims against them should be dismissed.
Davis also asserts claims against "Does 1-10." The .Court notes that Davis
filed this case in this Court on October 14, 2025. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(m), service was required to be made upon all Defendnats ninety days
later, by January 12, 2026. A review of the record in this case reveals that Davis has
failed to serve any of the unidentified Doe Defendants either by the timeline required
under the Federal Rules or by the date of this Order. Based on the foregoing, the
Court finds that Davis's claims against the unidentified Doe Defendants should be
dismissed.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby
ORDERS 	that Defendant Pennymac 	Loan 	Services, 	LLC's 	Motion to
Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6) (Document No. 19) is
GRANTED. The Court further
8 Considering the Court's finding that the doctrine of res judicata bars Plaintiffs
claims, 	the 	Court 	declines 	to 	consider Defendants' 	arguments 	related 	to 	pleading
sufficiency and timeliness.
7
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ORDERS that Defendants Everett Financial, Inc., and Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc.' s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Am.ended Complaint
(Document No. 21) is GRANTED. The Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff Angela Jo Davis's claims against Defendants are
DISMISSED.
THIS IS A FINAL JUDGMENT.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this~ day of February, 2026.
8
DAVID HITTNER
United States District Judge
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