Montoya v. Bondi et al

UNITED S TATES DISTRICT C OURT
S OUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
VIRGINIA MONTOYA
CABANAS ,
Petitioner,
vs.
P AMELA BONDI, et al,
Respondents.
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CIVIL ACTION N O
4:25-cv-04830
J UDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Virginia Montoya Cabanas is a citizen of
Mexico who has lived in the United States without lawful
permission for over twenty years. She was taken into
custody by Immigration and Customs Enforcement in June
2025, where she currently remains. Respondents are sued
in their official capacity as officers or employees of the
United 	States 	and 	are 	collectively 	referred 	to 	as 	the
Government.
Pending is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, by
which Petitioner challenges her detention without a bond
hearing. Dkt 1. She asserts that she’s entitled to such a
hearing 	under 	8 	USC 	§1226(a), 	which 	provides 	for
discretionary detention during removal proceedings.
Pending 	also 	is 	a 	motion 	by 	the 	Government 	for
summary judgment. Dkt 8. It contends that no detention
hearing is required, because Petitioner is an “applicant for
admission” under 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A), which provides for
mandatory detention during removal proceedings.
The text of §1225(b)(2)(A) supports the Government’s
position. As such, its motion for summary judgment is
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 13, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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granted, and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
denied.
1. 	Background
Petitioner Virginia Montoya Cabanas is a citizen of
Mexico who has resided in the United States since April
2001. Dkt 1 at ¶¶42–43. Both she and her husband were
detained by ICE after a traffic stop on June 6, 2025. Id
at ¶48. 	Petitioner 	admitted 	to 	ICE 	Enforcement 	and
Removal 	Operations 	that 	“she 	unlawfully 	entered 	the
United States, that she did not possess or present any valid
entry documents, and that she was not admitted or paroled
into the United States.” Dkt 8-1 at ¶4 (declaration of
Deportation Officer Matthew Alexander).
Petitioner 	has 	no 	criminal 	history 	and 	no 	prior
encounters with immigration officials or law enforcement.
Dkt 1 at ¶¶43, 47. She and her husband were living in
Claxton, Georgia, at the time of her arrest. Id at ¶42. She
is now detained in Houston, Texas, and her husband is
detained in Bakersfield, California. Id at ¶49. And she has
three children who are US citizens, with the youngest
being ten years old. Id at ¶44. The petition states that her
continuing detention is “inflicting significant harm on her
family.” Id at ¶56. Her children are experiencing “deep
emotional distress” and “depression.” Ibid.
ICE charged Petitioner with removability pursuant to
8 USC §1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien “present in the United
States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived
in the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by the Attorney General.” Dkt 8-1 at ¶5. The
Department of Homeland Security also instituted removal
proceedings 	against 	Petitioner 	pursuant 	to 	8 	USC
§1229(a). Dkt 1 at ¶57.
While 	in 	detention, 	Petitioner 	requested 	a 	bond
hearing before the immigration court. Id at ¶51. The
Government there argued that Petitioner wasn’t eligible
for a bond hearing because she was subject to mandatory
detention under 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A). Ibid. Although the
immigration judge explicitly found that Petitioner was “not
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a danger or flight risk,” she then further determined that
jurisdiction was lacking to redetermine custody, given
reliance by the Government on §1225(b)(2)(A). See Dkt 8-2
(order of IJ). This itself followed from a recent unpublished
ruling by the Board of Immigration Appeals, holding that
an alien who entered without admission or parole, despite
residing 	in 	the 	United 	States 	for 	a 	decade, 	was 	an
“applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention
under 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A). See Dkt 1 at ¶31 n 2. The BIA
later issued a precedential decision to the same effect on
September 	5, 	2025. 	See 	Matter 	of 	Hurtado, 	29 	I&N
Decision 216 (BIA 2025).
Petitioner reserved her right to appeal the decision of
the IJ to the BIA but then didn’t do so. See Dkt 8-2 at 3
(order noting 	reservation 	of 	appeal). The 	deadline 	for
appeal has now passed. Ibid.
Petitioner 	is 	currently 	detained 	at 	the 	Houston
Processing Center. Dkt 1 at ¶49. She filed the subject
petition for a writ of habeas corpus on October 9, 2025. See
Dkt 1. She states causes of action for (i) violation of the
INA, and (ii) violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Id at ¶¶59–65.
The Government was ordered to show cause. Dkt 3. It
complied and also moved for summary judgment. Dkt 8.
2. 	Legal standard
“[A]bsent 	suspension, 	the 	writ 	of 	habeas 	corpus
remains available to every individual detained within the
United States.” Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 525
(2004). “A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus
if a petitioner is in federal custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law.” Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi,
2025 	WL 2886346, *1 	(SD 	Tex), 	citing 	8 	USC 	§2241
(internal citations omitted). “If a district court entertains a
habeas petition, then it must either award the writ or order
the respondent to show cause as to why the writ should not
be granted, unless it is apparent from the application that
the petitioner is not entitled to the requested relief.” Ibid,
citing 28 USC § 2243 (emphasis added).
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3. 	Analysis
a. 	Exhaustion of remedies
As 	noted 	above, 	Petitioner 	preserved 	her 	right 	to
appeal the IJ order but then didn’t do so. The Government
didn’t 	initially 	raise 	the 	issue 	of 	exhaustion 	of
administrative 	remedies. 	See 	Dkt 	8. 	But 	given 	its
jurisdictional import, the Government was directed to brief
exhaustion 	at 	hearing 	in 	a 	similar 	case 	before 	the
undersigned that presented the same statutory issue. See
Maceda Jimenez v Thompson et al, 4:25-cv-05026, Dkt 6
(minute entry). The Government then briefed the issue in
their supplemental filing in this case. See Dkt 14 at 7–9.
Petitioner responded accordingly. See Dkt 18 at 15–19.
The 	Government 	contends 	that 	failure 	by 	the
Petitioner to appeal the decision of the IJ to the BIA bars
consideration of her petition here. Dkt 14 at 7–9. It cites in
support Fuller v Rich, where the petitioner argued that
administrative appeal was futile because the deadline for
filing the appeal had passed. 11 F3d 61, 62 (5th Cir 1994).
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding waiver of exhaustion
not 	justified 	“until 	[the 	petitioner] 	actually 	appeals”
because “we do not know what the appeals board will do
with [petitioner’s] claim, and until the appeals board has
been given an opportunity to act, [petitioner] has not
exhausted 	his 	administrative 	remedies.” 	Ibid. 	With
reference to Matter of Hurtado, 29 I&N Decision 216 (BIA
2025), the Government further argues that mere likelihood
of the BIA to deny relief in reliance on that decision is
insufficient to demonstrate futility. Dkt 14 at 8–9.
Petitioner 	maintains 	to 	the 	contrary 	that 	any
exhaustion requirement should be waived because (i) the
BIA doesn’t have jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional
issues, (ii) appeal would be futile, and (iii) Petitioner is
suffering irreparable harm while detained that would be
compounded by delay. See Dkt 18 at 15–19.
It is well settled that a “person seeking habeas relief
must first exhaust available administrative remedies.”
Hinojosa v Horn, 896 F3d 305, 314 (5th Cir 2018). But any
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exhaustion requirement is prudential, as no statutory
proscription is cited in this context. See Covarrubias v
Vergara, 2025 WL 2950096, *6 (SD Tex). And the Fifth
Circuit holds that exceptions to exhaustion are appropriate
where 	the 	available 	administrative 	remedies 	are
(i) unavailable, (ii) wholly inadequate, (iii) patently futile,
or (iv) when a constitutional challenge is advanced that is
unsuitable 	for 	determination 	in 	an 	administrative
proceeding. 	See 	Fuller, 	11 	F3d 	at 	62; 	Garner 	v 	US
Department of Labor, 221 F3d 822, 825 (5th Cir 2000).
The 	IJ 	here 	issued 	a 	decision 	denying 	custody
redetermination to Petitioner on jurisdictional grounds
upon finding that Petitioner’s detention was governed by
8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A). See Dkt 8-2 (order of IJ). Petitioner
plainly had a right to appeal that determination to the BIA.
See 8 CFR 1236.1(d)(3). Her failure to pursue an available
appeal does suggest a failure to exhaust an available
administrative remedy.
Complicating that course of action, however, is the July
2025 joint policy decision by the Departments of Justice
and 	Homeland 	Security 	to 	apply 	§1225(b)(2)(A) 	to 	all
“applicants 	for 	admission,” 	including 	individuals 	like
Montoya. See Dkt 18 at 18 n 2. Petitioner argues that
appeal to BIA would have been futile because the BIA
operates under DOJ authority. See id at 18, citing 8 CFR
§1003.1. 	She 	further 	argues 	that 	the 	BIA 	issued 	a
nonprecedential 	decision 	in 	May 	2025 	applying 	the
Government’s 	interpretation 	of 	§1225(b)(2)(A), 	further
suggesting futility. See Dkt 18 at 18 n 3. And this was
confirmed shortly 	thereafter in 	the BIA’s 	precedential
decision in Matter of Hurtado, 29 I&N Decision 216 (BIA
2025), which addressed the statutory construction dispute
at issue here. In sum, it held that, regardless of length of
time 	in 	the 	United 	States, 	immigration 	judges 	lack
authority to grant bond to aliens present in the United
States without admission under §1225(b)(2)(A).
The Hurtado decision issued on September 5, 2025.
Nothing 	in 	the 	record 	suggests 	that 	the 	BIA 	would
reconsider that reasoned decision, given its recency. And
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even if Petitioner had pressed an appeal to the BIA, it
doesn’t appear that such decision would be available for
appeal directly to the Fifth Circuit. See 8 USC §1252(a)(1)
(limiting jurisdiction of courts of appeals to review of final
orders of removal). As well, it must be recognized that
Petitioner here challenges her detention on constitutional
grounds. See Dkt 1 at ¶¶62–65 (asserting violation of right
to 	due 	process). 	Such 	challenge 	falls 	outside 	the
jurisdiction of the BIA. Falek v Gonzales, 475 F3d 285, 291
n 4 (5th Cir 2007) (explaining “there is no dispute that the
BIA has no power to adjudicate constitutional claims”).
As 	such, 	failure 	to 	appeal 	in 	these 	circumstances
shouldn’t be counted as an impermissible failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Consideration of the merits is
thus proper.
b. 	Applicability of §1225(b)(2)(A) or §1226(a)
The parties primarily dispute the appropriate statute
by which to measure the permissibility of Petitioner’s
detention pending otherwise valid removal proceedings.
The Government seeks to enforce 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A).
Petitioner favors 8 USC §1226(a). As always, “our inquiry
begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the
text is unambiguous.” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v United States,
541 US 176, 183 (2004).
Section 1225 governs the inspection, detention, and
removal of aliens seeking admission into the United States.
Section 1225(a)(1) quite broadly defines which aliens are
“applicants for admission,” stating with emphasis:
An alien present in the United States who
has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United 	States 	(whether 	or 	not 	at 	a
designated port of arrival and including an
alien who is brought to the United States
after 	having 	been 	interdicted 	in
international 	or 	United 	States 	waters)
shall 	be 	deemed 	for 	purposes 	of 	this
chapter an applicant for admission.
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Section 1225(b)(2)(A) then prescribes specific detention
requirements, stating with emphasis added:
[A]n 	alien 	who 	is 	an 	applicant 	for
admission, if the examining immigration
officer determines 	that 	an alien 	seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be
detained 	for 	a 	proceeding 	under section
1229a of this title.
The parties agree that this statute, if applicable, requires
mandatory detention. See Dkts 1 at ¶60 & 8 at 1.
On the other hand, §1226(a) states:
On 	a 	warrant 	issued 	by 	the 	Attorney
General, an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the
alien is to be removed from the United
States. Except as provided in subsection (c)
and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested
alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with
security 	approved 	by, 	and
containing 	conditions 	prescribed
by, the Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole; but
(3) may not provide the alien with work
authorization . . . .
The parties agree that this statute, if applicable, permits
discretionary detention. See Dkts 8 at 5 & 18 at 1. The
Supreme Court observes, “Federal regulations provide that
aliens detained under §1226(a) receive bond hearings at
the outset of detention.” Jennings v Rodriguez, 583 US 281,
306 (2018), citing 8 CFR §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1).
The Government maintains that Petitioner is subject
to mandatory detention under §1225(b)(2)(A). In its view,
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she is an “applicant for admission” for the very reason that
she is an alien “present in the United States who has not
been admitted.” Dkt 8 at 6. And under the plain text of the
§1225(b)(2)(A), 	such 	individuals 	“shall 	be 	detained”
without bond. Id at 7–9.
Petitioner argues instead that she is entitled to the
bond hearing attendant to discretionary detention under
§1226(a). In doing so, she concedes that she is an “applicant
for admission” under the statute. Dkt 18 at 12. But she
disputes 	that 	she 	was 	seeking 	admission, 	given 	her
decades-long residence in the United States. Dkt 1 at ¶41.
She 	further 	argues 	that 	her 	petition 	requesting
construction in favor of §1226(a) finds support in legislative
history, statutory structure, longstanding ICE practice,
and what she describes as “judicial consensus” of district
courts. See Dkts 1 at ¶¶ 21–41 (petition) & 18 at 2–15.
Simply put, the statutory text of §1225(b)(2)(A) governs
in this case. Adopted in such conclusion is the reasoning of
Judge James Wesley Hendrix in Rene Garibay-Robledo v
Kristi Noem, et al, 1:25-cv-00177-H (ND Tex 2025). The
statutory definition of applicant for admission is broad
and, indeed, so broad that Petitioner doesn’t dispute that
she is such a person. See Dkt 18 at 12. That factual
determination itself resolves the question as to whether
§1225(b)(2)(A) applies. For example, see Digital Realty
Trust, Inc v Somers, 583 US 149, 160 (2018), quoting
Burgess v United States, 553 US 124, 130 (2008): “When a
statute includes an explicit definition, [courts] must follow
that definition, even if it varies from a term’s ordinary
meaning.”
Attempts by Petitioner to distinguish an applicant for
admission from an alien seeking admission are unavailing.
First, as Judge Hendrix observed, there is “no material
disjunction—by the terms of the statute or the English
language—between the concept of ‘applying’ for something
and 	‘seeking’ 	something.” 	Garibay-Robledo, 	1:25-cv-
00177-H at 8–9. That Petitioner has resided in the United
States without valid permission for years thus doesn’t
render §1225(b)(2)(A) inapplicable.
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Second, there isn’t a separate concept applicable to an
“arriving 	alien” 	as 	distinct 	from 	an 	“applicant 	for
admission.” Petitioner points to regulatory language that
an “arriving alien” is defined as “an applicant for admission
coming or attempting to come into the United States.”
Dkt 18 at 13, quoting 8 CFR 1.2. Put differently, she says,
an arriving alien is an applicant who is doing something,
such as seeking admission under §1225(b)(2)(A). Dkt 18
at 13; for example, see Martinez v Hyde, 2025 WL 2084238,
*6 (D Mass) (holding §1225(b) inapplicable upon finding
applicant seeking admission roughly interchangeable with
arriving alien). The problem with the argument, however,
is that Congress could have said that §1225(b) applied only
to arriving aliens if that’s what was meant. But it didn’t,
even 	as 	three 	other 	closely 	related 	subsections 	did.
See §1225(a)(2) (“arriving alien who is a stowaway” isn’t
eligible to apply for admission); §1225(c)(1) (referring to
situation where immigration officer or immigration judge
“suspects 	that 	an 	arriving 	alien 	may 	be 	admissible”);
§1225(d)(2) 	(titled 	with 	respect 	to 	authority 	“to 	order
detention and delivery of arriving aliens”). Congress chose
not to use “arriving alien” in §1225(b)(2)(A). As such, it
simply cannot be said to be limited to aliens arriving at the
border.
Third, 	legislative 	history 	certainly 	cannot 	provide
reason to depart from clear statutory text. Petitioner seeks
by this to argue that the structure and legislative history
of §1225(b) limits its applicability to ports of entry. Dkt 18
at 3. She cites a conference report that putatively states,
“§302 ‘revises section 235 of the INA to consolidate the
inspection and removal process at ports of entry.” Ibid.
Upon close check, for whatever reason, no such quote
appears to exist in the cited conference report. Regardless,
upon finding that the text of a statute is unambiguous,
consideration of legislative history is inappropriate. See
United States v Kaluza, 780 F3d 647, 658 (5th Cir 2015),
citing 	Carrieri 	v 	Jobs.com 	Inc, 	393 	F3d 	508, 	518–19
(5th Cir 2004).
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Fourth, 	it 	must 	be 	recognized 	that 	a 	great 	many
decisions in the district courts agree with the position of
Petitioner. In one of her filings, she collects thirty citations.
See Dkt 10 at 2–3. In another, she focuses on five for
emphasis. See Dkt 18 at 2, citing Martinez v Hyde, 2025
WL 2084238 (D Mass); Lopez-Arevelo v Ripa, 2025 WL
2691828 (WD Tex); Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 2025 WL
2886346 	(SD 	Tex); 	Covarrubia 	v 	Vergara, 	2025 	WL
2950097 (SD Tex); Alvarez Puga v Assistant Field Office
Director, Krome North Service Processing Center, et al,
2025 WL 2938369 (SD Fla). But others have decided to the
contrary, in addition to Judge Hendrix in Garibay-Robledo
and the BIA in Hurtado. For example, see Dkts 16, 20 & 21,
collectively 	citing 	Vargas 	Lopez 	v 	Trump, 	2025 	WL
2780351 (D Neb), Chavez v Noem, 2025 WL 2730228 (SD
Cal), Sandoval v Acuna, 2025 WL 3048926 (WD La), and
Olalde v Noem, 2025 WL 3131942 (ED Mo). Until such time
as the Fifth Circuit takes up this issue and gives an
authoritative 	construction, 	it 	remains 	incumbent 	upon
district 	courts 	to 	each 	make 	their 	own, 	independent
assessment.
And last, amendment to §1226 by the recent Laken
Riley Act doesn’t imply that §1225(b)(2)(A) should be read
contrary to its clear terms. This amendment was enacted
in January 2025 and requires mandatory detention for
aliens who are inadmissible and have been arrested for,
charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 USC
§1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). Petitioner herself doesn’t appear to
raise contention in this regard. But many of the authorities
cited above in part conclude that, if Congress intended for
§1225(b)(2)(A) to govern all inadmissible aliens, then this
recent amendment is superfluous to the extent that it
prescribes mandatory detention within §1226 as to only
certain 	criminal inadmissible aliens. For example, see
Alvarez Puga, 2025 WL 2938369 at *5.
Such conclusion isn’t warranted. It’s undisputed that
prior 	Administrations 	for 	decades 	applied 	§1226(a) 	to
individuals like Petitioner, thus declining to exercise the
full extent of executive authority available under the INA.
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See Dkt 1 at ¶28. As noted, Congress enacted the Laken
Riley Act in January 2025, well prior to DHS under the
present Administration issuing guidance clarifying that
“section 235 of the [INA], rather than section 236”—that is,
§1225, rather than §1226—“is the applicable immigration
detention authority for all applicants for admission.” ICE
Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority
for 	Applications 	for 	Admission, 	AILA 	Document 	No
25071607, 	American 	Immigration 	Lawyers 	Association
(July 8, 2025).
“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume
it intends its amendment to have real and substantial
effect.” Peavy v WFAA-TV, Inc, 221 F3d 158, 169 (5th Cir
2000), quoting Stone v INS, 513 US 386, 397 (1995). Here,
at the time of enactment, the Laken Riley Act did have
such effect, given that it required mandatory detention for
criminal, inadmissible aliens who had not been subject to
it—under either §1225 or §1226—by longstanding practice
of 	prior 	Administrations. 	But 	this 	means 	only 	that
Congress determined to narrow aspects of the discretion
available 	to 	any 	Administration 	prioritizing 	removal
proceedings toward §1226. It doesn’t follow that the Laken
Riley Act undercuts the more fulsome, executive authority
that Congress provided to exist independently under the
text of §1225(b)(2)(A).
Simply put, amendment by the recent Laken Riley Act
to §1226 isn’t superfluous. Beyond that, and regardless, the
Supreme Court holds, “Redundancy in one portion of a
statute is not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another
portion of the statute contrary to its text.” Barton v Burr,
590 US 222, 239 (2020). As noted by Judge Hendrix in
Garibay-Robledo, “the canons of statutory construction
should only be used to resolve remaining ambiguity, not to
inject it where it does not exist.” 1:25-cv-00177-H at 9
(internal quotations omitted). The text being clear, it is
appropriately applied as written.
As summarized at the outset, the personal and family
circumstances of Petitioner are no doubt sympathetic. But
§1225(b)(2)(A) by its terms applies to her and supports the
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position of the Government as to mandatory detention.
Inquiry beyond that, as to whether such position is the best
or 	wisest 	use 	of 	executive 	enforcement 	priorities, 	or
whether 	it 	is 	in 	line 	with 	the 	priorities 	of 	prior
Administrations, simply isn’t the remit of an Article III
court. It is instead the subject of legislation and the result
of elections, both of which have consequences.
c. 	Putative violation of due process
The claim by Petitioner for violation of her right to due
process briefly alleges, “The government’s detention of
[her] without a bond redetermination hearing to determine
whether [s]he is a flight risk or danger to others violates
her right to due process.” Dkt 1 at ¶65. No other briefing of
a constitutional dimension appears in her other filings. See
Dkts 5, 10, 11, 18 & 19.
This assertion appears to present nothing beyond the
larger contention as to the relevant and applicable statute
to apply. That has been resolved above. And no assertion is
made that the application of 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A) is itself
unconstitutional, if determined to be the correct statute.
It should be noted that the undersigned inquired at
hearing as to the requirement within §1225(b)(2)(A) that
an “examining immigration officer” determine that “an
alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted.” The Government was directed to
identify who that particular officer was in this case, while
also explaining more generally the duties of that officer.
See Dkt 13 (minute entry). This was intended to ensure
that Petitioner had received the process to which she was
entitled even under §1225(b)(2)(A).
The Government subsequently explained that the INA
defines “immigration officer” as “any employee or class of
employees of the [INS] or of the United States designated
by the Attorney General . . . to perform the functions of an
immigration 	officer.” 	Dkt 	14 	at 	2–3, 	citing 	8 	USC
§1101(a)(18). Implementing regulations further define an
“immigration officer” to include “deportation officers.” See
8 CFR § 1.2. The Government thus contends that the
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supervisory deportation officer who gathered information
about Petitioner after her arrest and determined that she
wasn’t admissible qualifies as the “examining immigration
officer.” Dkt 14 at 3. It also provides proof as to the identity
of such officer and performance of such duty. See Dkt 15
at 1 (sealed supplemental brief).
Petitioner argues to the contrary that the “examining
immigration officer” referenced in §1225(b)(2)(A) is limited
to Customs and Border Protection officers conducting “face-
to-face assessment of an applicant for admission at a port
of entry.” Dkt 18 at 7. But the statutory text, regulations,
and 	relevant 	authority 	don’t 	impose 	such 	a 	narrow
meaning on the word “examine.” And nothing by definition
pertains to ports of entry alone. Petitioner observes that
the ordinary dictionary meaning of the examine is to
“inspect or investigate closely.” Id at 15; see New Oxford
American Dictionary (3rd edition 2010) (defining examine
as to “investigate thoroughly”). But such definition doesn’t
suggest that an “examining immigration officer” excludes
from its ambit a supervisory deportation officer charged
with gathering information and making determinations
regarding 	admissibility 	of 	an 	individual. 	The 	natural
reading of the statute instead dictates the contrary.
In short, the Government provided the process to which
Petitioner was due under §1225(b)(2)(A). As such, and as
pleaded, the claim with respect to violation of due process
fails.
4. 	Conclusion
It’s noted that several abnormalities appear in the
response by Petitioner to the supplemental brief of the
Government. Dkt 18. For example, the brief states that the
Government cited three cases that aren’t actually cited.
See id at 4–5. Substantive inaccuracies also exist in both
quotations and characterizations of cited case law. See id
at 	3–4. 	This 	may 	be 	related 	to 	the 	use 	of 	artificial
intelligence 	products. 	Whatever 	the 	cause, 	counsel 	is
simply cautioned to ensure that all citations are checked
and all arguments are properly supported prior to filing.
Case 4:25-cv-04830 Document 23 Filed on 11/13/25 in TXSD Page 13 of 14

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The petition for writ of habeas corpus by Petitioner
Virginia Montoya Cabanas is DENIED. Dkt 1.
The motion for summary judgment by the Government
is GRANTED. Dkt 8.
A final judgment will enter separately.
S O ORDERED.
Signed on November 13, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Hon Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
Case 4:25-cv-04830 Document 23 Filed on 11/13/25 in TXSD Page 14 of 14