Woodson v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC et al The Clerk shall reject all submissions from Woodson unless explicitly authorized.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JOSHUA DEANTHONY
WOODSON,
Plaintiff,
versus
LAKEVIEW LOAN
SERVICING, LLC, et al,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:25-cv-04700
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
ORDER ADOPTING
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Joshua DeAnthony Woodson initiated this
action on October 1, 2025. Dkt 1. He proceeds here pro se.
He states seven causes of action. In essence, his complaint
concerns default proceedings with respect to his home
mortgage. See Dkt 45 (first amended complaint).
Plaintiff currently has twenty pending motions in this
action. Only the “Emergency Ex Parte Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction”
filed on February 27, 2026, is the subject of this order.
Dkt 70.
This matter was referred for disposition to Magistrate
Judge Yvonne Y. Ho. She issued a Memorandum and
Recommendation recommending that the motion be denied
because Plaintiff (i) manufactured any “emergency” by
waiting until just before the challenged foreclosure sale to
seek relief, and (ii) failed to demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits. Dkt 73.
Plaintiff filed objections, asserting error in the
Memorandum and Recommendation because it (i) found
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 04, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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his chain-of-title argument “irrelevant,” (ii) “overlooked
record evidence of actual notice” to Defendants,
(iii) “penalized Plaintiff for lack of pre-discovery evidence,”
(iv) found his FDCPA claim barred by law, and (v) ignored
the procedural history leading up to the challenged sale.
Dkt 81 at 2–4. He also argues that he’s suffering an
“ongoing constitutional deprivation resulting from denial
of e-filing access.” Id at 4–9.
The district court reviews de novo those conclusions of
a magistrate judge to which a party has specifically
objected. See FRCP 72(b)(3) & 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(C); see
also United States v Wilson, 864 F2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir
1989, per curiam). The district court may accept any other
portions to which there’s no objection if satisfied that no
clear error appears on the face of the record. See Guillory v
PPG Industries Inc, 434 F3d 303, 308 (5th Cir 2005), citing
Douglass v United Services Automobile Association, 79 F3d
1415, 1430 (5th Cir 1996, en banc); see also FRCP 72(b)
advisory committee note (1983).
Upon de novo review and determination, Plaintiff’s
objections lack merit. Objections one through five fail for
reasons stated in the well-reasoned Memorandum and
Recommendation. See Dkt 73. His objection regarding
electronic filing is also plainly meritless. Plaintiff hasn’t
been denied “meaningful access to the courts,” nor does the
Constitution guarantee a right to electronic filing for pro se
litigants. To the contrary, Plaintiff has over twenty motions
and related filings currently pending. The excessive
volume of his recent filings undercuts any claim of
deprivation in that regard. See Dkt 91 (order on proliferate
filings).
The objections by Plaintiff to the Memorandum and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are OVERRULED.
Dkt 81.
No clear error otherwise appears upon review and
consideration of the Memorandum and Recommendation,
the record, and the applicable law.
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The Memorandum and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED as the Memorandum and
Order of this Court. Dkt 73.
The motion by Plaintiff Joshua Woodson for temporary
restraining order is DENIED. Dkt 70.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on _______________, at Houston, Texas.
___________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
May 04, 2026
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