Timonin et al v. Toregaliyev et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
ALEX TIMONIN AND TUSSUP
KULTUMANOV,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ZHANNAT TOREGALIYEV AND
PENSKE LEASING AND RENTAL
COMPANY,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§ 	Civil Action No. H-25-4319
§
§
§
§
§
§
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Penske Leasing and Rental Company's
Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 7). Having considered the motion,
submissions, and applicable law, the Court determines that Defendant's motion
should be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident. On April 15, 2025, Defendant
Zhannat Toregaliyev ("Toregaliyev") collided with the back of a vehicle operated
by Plaintiffs Alex Timonin and Tussup Kultumanov (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") while
driving a vehicle he rented from Defendant Penske Leasing and Rental Company
("Penske"). Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the collision, Plaintiffs suffered
serious bodily injuries. Based on the foregoing, on July 28, 2025, Plaintiffs filed suit
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 27, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 4:25-cv-04319 Document 8 Filed 02/27/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 7

in state court alleging a claim of negligence against Toregaliyev, and a claim of
vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior against Penske. On
September 11, 2025, Penske removed the case to this Court pursuant to the Court's
diversity jurisdiction. On February 4, 2026, Penske filed the pending motion for
summary judgment, contending that no genuine issue of material fact exists in this
matter. 1 A review of the record in this matter reveals that Plaintiffs have failed to file
a response to Penske's motion for summary judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when "there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Coleman v. Haus. Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
Initially, the movant bears the burden of presenting the basis for the motion and the
elements of the causes of action upon which the nonmovant will be unable to
establish a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to come forward with specific
facts showing there 	is 	a genuine dispute for trial. 	See Fed. R. 	Civ. 	P. 	56(c);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). "A
1 See Defendant Penske Leasing and Rental Company's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Document No. 7 at 1-12.
2
Case 4:25-cv-04319 Document 8 Filed 02/27/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 7

dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
But the nonmoving party's bare allegations, standing alone, are insufficient to
create a material dispute of fact and defeat a motion for summary. If a reasonable
jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party, then summary judgment is
appropriate. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmovant's burden cannot
be satisfied by "conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, 	or 	'only a
scintilla of evidence."' Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343
(5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.
1994)). Uncorroborated self-serving testimony cannot prevent summary judgment,
especially 	if the 	overwhelming 	documentary 	evidence 	supports 	the 	opposite
scenario. Vais Arms, Inc. v. Vais, 383 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, it
is not the function of the Court to search the record mi the nonmovant' s behalf for
evidence which may raise a fact issue. Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1137
n.30 (5th Cir. 	1992). Therefore, "[a]lthough we consider the evidence and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of
its pleadings but must respond by setting forth specific facts indicating a genuine
issue for trial." Goodson v. City ofCorpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 2000).
3
Case 4:25-cv-04319 Document 8 Filed 02/27/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 7

The Court may not grant summary judgment based merely on the procedural
failure to respond. Hibernia Nat 'l Bank v. Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima,
776 F.2d 1277, 	1279 (5th Cir. 	1985); 	see also 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. P. 	56 	advisory
committee's note to 2010 amendments. Rather, the movant must bear its initial
burden to show that no issue of material fact exists, and that the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If issues of material fact
clearly exist within the summary judgment record, then summary judgment is
improper. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 440 (5th Cir.
2000) ("Before the non-moving party is required to produce evidence in opposition
to the motion, the moving party must first satisfy its obligation of demonstrating that
there are no factual issues warranting trial." (quoting Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540,
543 (5th Cir. 1993)).
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
Penske moves for summary judgment, contending there is no genuine issue of
material fact for a jury to consider in this matter. Plaintiffs did not respond to
Penske's motion for summary judgment, failing to rebut or offer evidence to counter
Penske's contentions. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.4, failure to respond is taken as a
representation of no opposition. S.D. Tex. Local R. 7.4. Regardless of Plaintiffs'
procedural failure to respond, the Court will consider, i'n tum, each claim Penske
contends is conclusively refuted by its proffered summary judgment evidence.
4
Case 4:25-cv-04319 Document 8 Filed 02/27/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 7

Plaintiffs assert a claim against Penske pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat
superior. In layman's terms, Plaintiffs seek to hold Penske vicariously liable for
De_fendant Toregaliyev's alleged negligence in operating a rental truck from Penske.
Under federal law, "[a]n owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to
a person ... shall not be liable under the law of any State ... for harm to persons or
property that results or arises out of the use ... of the vehicle during the period of the
rental or lease." 49 U.S.C.A. § 30106(a).
Here, 	Penske 	contends 	that Plaintiffs' 	claim 	for 	v1canous 	liability 	is
preempted against Penske, -because Penske is a vehicle owner who leased their
vehicle to another, protecting Penske from vicarious liability under federal law. A
review of the record in this case reveals that Penske is engaged in the business of
renting motor vehicles to citizens in the community. Penske also offers summary
judgment evidence to confirm that the vehicle at issue in this _case was rented to
Defendant Toregaliyev and not operated by Penske during the motor vehicle
accident.2 Penske further contends that because they are the owner of the vehicle,
and Plaintiffs fail to allege any independent negligence claim against them, Penske
is protected from Plaintiffs' -ownership-based vicarious liability claim based on the
2 See Defendant Penske Leasing and Rental Company's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Document No. 	7, 	Exhibit A-1 	(Penske 	Rental Agreement with Defendant Zhannat
Toregaliyev ).
5
Case 4:25-cv-04319 Document 8 Filed 02/27/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 7

plain language of 49 U.S.C.A. § 30106(a). Plaintiffs offer no rebuttal to contradict
Penske's contentions.
Accordingly, because Penske is protected from ownership-based vicarious
liability under federal law, and Plaintiffs offer no other independent claim for
negligence against Penske, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to raise a genuine issue
of material fact to survive Penske's motion, and thus, find summary judgment is
proper in this matter.
Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to show the Court
adequate proof of service with regards to one remaining defendant in this matter,
Zhannat Toregaliyev. A review of the record in this case reveals that Mr. Toregaliyev
was never served with summons and complaints as is required by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. If a defendant is not served within ninety days after the complaint
is filed, the Court must: (1) dismiss the action without prejudice; or (2) order service
be made within a specified time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). It has been well over eight
months since the complaint was originally filed in state court. 3 Therefore, the Court
finds Plaintiffs claims against the remaining Defendant Zhannat Toregaliyev should
be dismissed without prejudice Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).
3 See Plaintiff's Initial Petition, Document No. 1, Exhibit 1 at 10-16.
6
Case 4:25-cv-04319 Document 8 Filed 02/27/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 7

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendant Penske Leasing and Rental Company's Motion for
Summary Judgment (Document No. 7) is GRANTED. The Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiffs' claim against Defendant Zhannat Toregaliyev is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this~ day of February, 2026.
7
DAVID HITTNER
United States District Judge
Case 4:25-cv-04319 Document 8 Filed 02/27/26 in TXSD Page 7 of 7