Phillips v. Equifax Information Services, LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
PIERRE PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff,
v.
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§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL NO. 4:25-CV-04227
EQUIFAX INFORMATION
SERVICES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This is a pro se Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) case. Pending before the
Court is Defendant Barclays Bank Delaware’s motion to compel arbitration, ECF
No. 61.1 Having considered the briefing2 and the applicable law, the Court finds the
motion has merit and grants it.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff sued multiple financial institutions and credit reporting agencies
alleging various FCRA violations. ECF No. 1 at 1–2. He alleges that certain credit
1 The district judge to whom this case is assigned referred this case for all pretrial purposes. Order,
ECF No. 17. A motion to compel arbitration is a non-dispositive matter that a magistrate judge can
resolve by order. See Brown v. Patel, No. 4:24-CV-05036, 2025 WL 1168282, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 22, 2025) (citing Glob. Indus. Contractors, LLC v. Red Eagle Pipeline, LLC, 617 F. Supp. 3d
633, 636 (S.D. Tex. 2022)), adopted, No. 4:24-CV-05036, 2025 WL 1456806 (S.D. Tex. May 21,
2025).
2 Plaintiff filed a response, ECF No. 73.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 05, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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debts were discharged during Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, but financial
institutions, including Barclays, erroneously reported those discharges to those
reporting agencies, who in turn did not correct his credit report. Id. ¶¶ 22–32. He
alleges all the defendants violated the FCRA. Id. ¶ 2.3 Barclays now seeks to compel
arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). ECF No. 61 at 1–2.
Barclay 	contends 	that 	Plaintiff 	agreed 	to 	arbitration 	under 	the 	Cardmember
Agreement 	(“Agreement”) 	entered 	when 	Plaintiff 	opened 	his 	account. 	The
Agreement states, in relevant part, that:
This arbitration provision provides for binding arbitration of all Claims
by either you or us against the other if either you or we choose to refer
the Claim to arbitration. . . . A “Claim” covered by this provision is any
claim, dispute or controversy by either you or us against the other,
arising from or relating in any way to this Agreement, your Account,
any transaction or activity on your Account, our relationship, products
or services provided by us or a third party in connection with this
Agreement or your Account, including (without limitation) claims,
dispute, or controversies based on contract, tort (including intentional
torts), fraud, agency, negligence, statutory or regulatory provisions or
any other source of law. . . . If any Claim is advanced in a court,
arbitration may be elected under this provision instead, and the right to
elect arbitration shall not be deemed to have been waived if the election
is made at any time before commencement of trial. . . . This arbitration
agreement is made pursuant to a transaction involving interstate
3 Since filing suit, Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed or otherwise settled with all defendants
except Barclays. ECF Nos. 12 (Brewery Credit Union); 78 (Capital One, N.A.); 79 (Equifax
Information Services LLC); 82 (TransUnion, LLC); 83 (Experian Information Solutions, Inc.).
Because these Defendants have been dismissed, the Court denies as moot all pending motions
against them. ECF Nos. 32, 52, 56.
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commerce, and shall be governed by the [FAA].
ECF No. 61-4 at 3.
II. 	MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION STANDARD.
A contract affecting interstate commerce is subject to the FAA. Edwards v.
Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. DR-24-CV-00021-AM-MHW, 2024 WL 4328773, at
*1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2024) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2), adopted, No. DR-24-CV-00021-
AM, 2024 WL 4329034 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2024). If a dispute arises that is subject
to arbitration under an arbitration agreement the FAA applies to, and a party files
suit in court rather than pursuing arbitration, then “the court in which such suit is
pending . . . shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” Id.
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3).
In evaluating a motion to compel arbitration for an agreement under the FAA,
two initial steps are required: (1) “determine ‘whether the parties entered into any
arbitration agreement at all’”; and (2) confirm that the claim before the court is
covered by the arbitration agreement. Aramark Servs., Inc. Grp. Health Plan v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 162 F.4th 532, 536–37 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing Archer & White
Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 935 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 2019)). Once it is
determined that the parties entered into an arbitration agreement and the claim is
covered by the agreement, courts must then consider if “a federal statute or policy
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renders the claim non-arbitrable.” Edwards, 2024 WL 4328773, at *2 (citing Dealer
Comput. Servs., Inc. v. Old Colony Motors, Inc., 588 F.3d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 2009)).
“Whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate is a question of state contract law
and is for the court” to decide, even if the cause of action arises under federal law.
Mertens v. Benelux Corp., 162 F.4th 492, 495 (5th Cir. 2025) (applying Texas
contract law in affirming a district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration
where the cause of action arose under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act).
III. 	DEFENDANT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT THIS DISPUTE IS
SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION.
A. The Parties Entered An Arbitration Agreement.
The Agreement provides that the FAA controls. ECF No. 61-4 at 3 (“This
arbitration 	agreement 	is 	made 	pursuant 	to 	a 	transaction 	involving 	interstate
commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act”). Thus, the first
question is whether the parties entered into an arbitration agreement under state law.
In Texas, “a valid contract requires an offer, acceptance, mutual assent, execution
and delivery of the contract with the intent that it be mutual and binding, and
consideration.” Hendrix v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 4:25-CV-00698-P-BP, 2026 WL
942672, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2026) (quoting In re Online Travel Co., 953 F.
Supp. 2d 713, 718 (N.D. Tex. 2013)), adopted, No. 4:25-CV-00698-P-BP, 2026 WL
940295 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2026). Where it is undisputed that there is a written
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arbitration agreement and neither party contests its validity, the parties are deemed
to be parties to a valid arbitration agreement. Aramark Servs., 162 F.4th at 537
(finding it “clear” that the parties involved “are parties to a valid arbitration
agreement” where it was undisputed there was “a written agreement and neither
party contests its validity”) (citing Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379
F.3d 327, 341 (5th Cir. 2004)). This is because under the FAA, written arbitration
agreements are “prima facie valid and must be enforced” unless the party opposing
arbitration “alleges and proves that the arbitration clause itself was a product of
fraud, coercion, or such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of the
contract.” Hendrix, 2026 WL 942672, at *2 (quoting Freudensprung, 379 F.3d at
341); see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (“A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract . . . or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract”).
The arbitration agreement here is written. ECF No. 61-4 at 3. Neither party
contests its validity. See ECF Nos. 61 at 3 (Barclays explaining that the parties had
entered into an agreement); 73 at 2 (Plaintiff noting that Barclays “seeks to compel
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arbitration of Plaintiff’s [FCRA] claims based on the card-holder agreement”
without disputing that he had entered the Agreement in the first place). Further,
Plaintiff does not allege that the clause itself arose out of fraud or coercion, nor does
he allege that there are grounds for revocation of the contract, legal or equitable. See
generally ECF No. 73. Therefore, the parties entered an arbitration agreement that
is prima facie valid and must be enforced under the FAA. See Aramark Servs, 162
F.4th at 537; see also Hendrix, 2026 WL 942672, at *2–4.
B. Plaintiff’s 	FCRA 	Claim 	Is 	Covered 	Under 	The 	Arbitration
Agreement.
The next question is whether Plaintiff’s FCRA claim falls under the arbitration
clause’s coverage. Barclays argues that it does. ECF No. 61 at 13. Plaintiff disagrees,
arguing that the clause “contains no reference to the [FCRA] or any other statutory
consumer-protection claim,” so his FCRA claims are not covered under the
Agreement’s arbitration clause. ECF No. 73 at 3.4
4 Plaintiff’s argument rests on a misstatement of the law. He suggests his cited authority “requires
an arbitration clause to ‘clearly and unmistakably’ cover a statutory claim before a court may
compel arbitration.” ECF No. 73 at 2 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007)). But
Safeco says nothing of the sort and does not address arbitration. Instead, it addresses “whether
willful failure covers a violation committed in reckless disregard of the [FRCA] notice obligation
and whether the petitioners committed reckless violations. Safeco Ins. Co., 551 U.S. at 52. Plaintiff
is reminded of his obligations under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even though
he proceeds pro se. Hamilton v. Collier, 711 F. Supp. 3d 676, 685 (S.D. Tex. 2024) (citing
Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993)). “By presenting to the court a . . . written
motion . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of that person’s knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under circumstances the . . . legal
contentions are warranted by existing law.” F ED R. C IV. P. 11(b)(2) (emphases added). Providing
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The Agreement’s arbitration clause states that it applies to “any claims,
disputes, or controversies based on . . . statutory or regulatory provisions.” ECF
No. 61-4 at 3. Multiple Fifth Circuit courts have found FCRA claims subject to
arbitration under similarly worded arbitration clauses. Edwards, 2024 WL 4328773,
at *4 (granting a motion to compel arbitration of an FCRA claim where the
arbitration clause applies to “any claims in contract, tort, statute or otherwise,
whether they now exist or arise in the future”) (collecting cases); see also Tolliver v.
Covington Credit, No. 3:19-CV-02655-M, 2020 WL 2841393 (N.D. Tex. May 31,
2020) (granting a motion to compel arbitration where the arbitration clause applied
to any dispute save for limited exceptions, even though the plaintiff argued the clause
was inapplicable because it does not specifically mention causes of action arising
under the FCRA). Plaintiff’s causes of action against Barclays arise under the FCRA.
ECF No. 1 at 30–34 (bringing causes of action under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i(c)(1),
1681n, 1681o, 1681s-2(b)). The arbitration clause at issue here therefore includes
Plaintiff’s claims against Barclays. See Edwards, 2024 WL 4328773, at *4.
these incorrect statements of law wastes this Court’s and counsel’s time. Plaintiff is cautioned that
Rule 11’s obligations and consequences—up to an including stricken filings or monetary
sanctions—apply to all who present writings to the Court, including those appearing pro se.
Fletcher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 25-20086, 2026 WL 456842, at *5–6 (5th Cir. Feb. 18,
2026) (discussing the appropriateness of sanctions for “hallucinated” cases); Vargas v. Salazar,
No. 4:23-CV-04267, 2024 WL 4804091, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2024) (noting that future
presentation “of pleadings or motions that contain ‘made up’ citations” could subject the pro se
plaintiff to sanctions), adopted, No. 4:23CV4267, 2024 WL 4804065 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2024).
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C. No Federal Statute Or Policy Renders The Claim Non-Arbitrable.
To grant Barclays’ motion to compel, the Court must determine whether there
is a federal statute or other policy that renders Plaintiff’s FCRA claims non-
arbitrable. Edwards, 2024 WL 4328773, at *2. When parties agree to arbitrate
statutory claims, “unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory right at issue,” the parties should be held
to that agreement. Id. at *4 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 26 (1991)). Nothing in the FCRA evinces any such intention. Id. at *5
(collecting cases). There is not a federal statute or policy that renders Plaintiff’s
FCRA claims against Barclays non-arbitrable. Plaintiff’s FCRA claims against
Barclays are arbitrable.
D. The Case Is Stayed.
“‘When a federal court finds that a dispute is subject to arbitration, and a party
has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, the court does not
have discretion to dismiss the suit on the basis that all the claims are subject to
arbitration.’” Hendrix, 2026 WL 942672, at *6 (quoting Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S.
472, 475 (2024)); see also Prospero v. Walmart Associates, Inc., No. EP-25-CV-
00001-KC, 2026 WL 670959, at *8 n.40 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2026) (“When a district
court determines that a lawsuit is subject to arbitration, and a party requests a stay
pending arbitration, § 3 of the FAA mandates that the court must stay the
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proceedings pending arbitration.”). The Court has found that Plaintiff’s claim against
Barclays is subject to arbitration. Barclays asked for this matter to be stayed pending
arbitration. ECF No. 61 at 14. Barclays’ request that this matter be stayed must be
granted.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendant Barclays’ Motion to Compel Arbitration,
ECF No. 61. The matter against Barclays is STAYED pending completion of
arbitration.5
Additionally, because Defendant Capital One, N.A. has been dismissed with
prejudice in this matter, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike
Capital One’s defenses, ECF No. 38. See Order, ECF No. 80 (dismissing claims
against Capital One, N.A. with prejudice); Chaziya v. Visa Sols., LLC, No. 4:24-CV-
02656, 2025 WL 1168279, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2025) (denying as moot
5 Barclays initially frames this as a Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss. ECF No. 61 at 4–
5. However, its requested relief does not seek dismissal of this matter. Id. at 14 (Barclays asking
the Court to “(1) enforce the parties’ Arbitration Provision; (2) order the parties to binding
arbitration pursuant to the express terms of the Cardmember Agreement; (3) stay this action; and
(4) award Barclays such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate and just”). As its
authority points out, when a trial court is presented with a motion to dismiss and simultaneous
motion to compel arbitration, the motion to compel arbitration should be considered first. Gardner
v. Gary Sinise Found., No. 4:23-CV-99-SDJ, 2024 WL 477516, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2024)
(citing Educ. Mgmt. Services, L.L.C. v. Slaikeu, No. CV SA-14-CA-135-OLG, 2014 WL
12586408, at *8 (W.D. Tex. May 23, 2014) (citing Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 260
(5th Cir. 1996))), adopted sub nom. Educ. Mgmt. Services, LLC v. Slaikeu, No. SA-14-CV-135-
OLG, 2014 WL 12586779 (W.D. Tex. June 12, 2014).
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remaining motions when a matter is being dismissed with prejudice), adopted,
No. 4:24-CV-02656, 2025 WL 1490498 (S.D. Tex. May 19, 2025). For the same
reason, the Court 	DENIES AS MOOT 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Equifax
Information Services, LLC’s defenses, ECF No. 52. See Order, ECF No. 79
(dismissing claims against Equifax Information Services, LLC with prejudice).
Finally, 	the 	Court 	also 	DENIES 	AS 	MOOT 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Strike
TransUnion, LLC’s defenses for the same reason, ECF No. 56. See Order, ECF
No. 82 (dismissing claims against TransUnion, LLC with prejudice).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed at Houston, Texas, on May 5, 2026.
______________________________
Dena Hanovice Palermo
United States Magistrate Judge
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