Helaire v. Villarreal et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Nameah Helaire,
Plaintiff,
v.
Houston Police Department, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-03547
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights case. Defendant Antonio Villarreal, an officer with
the Houston Police Department, has moved to dismiss Plaintiff Nameah
Helaire’s complaint (Dkt. 1) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	Dkt. 12. 	Because
Helaire failed to respond, the motion is deemed unopposed. S.D. Tex. L.R. 7.4.
Regardless, after carefully reviewing the motion, the record, and the applicable
law, the Court recommends that the motion be granted and all claims against
Officer Villarreal be dismissed.
Background
The following facts are taken as true at this stage. 	Helaire complains
that she was arrested on April 17, 2021 by an officer she refers to both as
“Christian Villarreal” and “Villarreal AC.” See Dkt. 1-2 at 6, 12-14. According
to the complaint, a passerby called the police after observing a third party,
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 14, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Bryan Newsome, physically assaulting Helaire in his car. 	See Dkt. 1-2 at 14.
Officers arrived 40 minutes later and arrested both Helaire and Newsome. See
id. The assault charge against Newsome was later dismissed. Id.
Helaire was arrested again on June 17, 2023 after Gregory Hanna—with
whom she was embroiled in a child custody dispute, see Dkt. 1-2 at 4—reported
that Helaire burned his truck. Dkt. 1 at 6. Helaire claims that she was falsely
accused, faulting the Houston Police Department (“HPD”) for taking Hanna’s
“version of events” and failing to ask Helaire first if the accusation was true.
Dkt. 1-2 	at 	5. 	The 	complaint 	acknowledges 	that 	there 	was 	a 	warrant
authorizing her arrest. See Dkt. 1 at 6. The charges were later dropped. Dkt.
1-2 at 5. But Helaire maintains that the accusation caused her mental anguish
and reputational harm that has made it difficult to secure stable housing or
employment. Id. at 6-7.
Helaire later asked authorities to investigate her June 17, 2023 arrest,
but the ensuing investigation was allegedly inadequate. 	See Dkt. 1-2 at 5.
Helaire contacted the Family Violence Unit numerous times between July 10
and July 15, 2025, but did not receive the information she sought. Dkt. 1 at 6.
She reported this issue to Officer Daniel Nunez of Internal Affairs. Id. Neither
he nor Sergeant Angel August or Officer Amtaro Montoya from the Family
Violence Unit intervened or investigated the matters she raised. Id.
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On July 16, 2025, Helaire submitted two incident reports. 	The first
listed “Austin/August,” “A Montoyo (9030),” and “Christian Villarreal” as the
relevant officers and discussed her effort to reopen the investigation of her
arson arrest. Dkt. 1-2 at 2-11. This report also complained that “HPD officers
shone a flashlight through [Helaire’s] mother’s windows without a warrant” in
June 2025. Dkt. 1-2 at 7; see also id. at 10. Helaire submitted a second incident
report involving “Antonio Roman Badge 10636” concerning “Officer Rome’s”
role in her arson arrest. See Dkt. 1-2 at 19-22.
An attached letter from Officer Nunez dated July 21, 2025 explained that
the Internal Affairs Division found that Helaire’s allegations did not reflect
any 	misconduct 	by 	HPD 	members. 	Dkt. 	1-2 	at 	1. 	In 	addition, 	“[t]he
investigative 	division 	did 	investigate 	[her] 	case” 	but 	“the 	Harris 	County
District Attorney’s office declined charges.” Id.
On July 30, 2025, Helaire sued Officers Villarreal, Christian Rome,
Nunez, Montoya, Sergeant August, the Harris County District Attorney’s
Office, and the Houston Police Department, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Dkt. 1 (complaint). On October 3, 2025 Villarreal moved to dismiss all
claims against him, invoking qualified immunity. 	Dkt. 12. 	Helaire did not
respond. The motion is ripe for resolution.
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Legal standard
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted if a party fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Id. at 678. 	Rather, “[t]he
complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true)
(3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will reveal
relevant evidence of each element of a claim.” 	See Lormand v. U.S. Unwired,
Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-
56). 	When resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] all well-
pleaded facts as true and view[s] those facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs.” 	Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation
omitted).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. 	Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d
287, 292 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)
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(per curiam)). 	But “regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or
is 	represented 	by 	counsel, 	conclusory 	allegations 	or 	legal 	conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to
dismiss.” 	Prescott v. UTMB Galveston Tex., 73 F.4th 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)); see
also Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (“[P]ro se plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the
right to relief above the speculative level.”).
Analysis
Officer Villarreal asserts that qualified immunity bars Helaire’s claims.
Dkt. 12 at 6. 	Helaire has not rebutted that defense because she failed to
respond. 	Moreover, dismissal is further warranted because Helaire has not
alleged a viable Section 1983 claim 1 against Villarreal. 	Her remaining state
law claims should also be dismissed.
I. 	Legal framework for qualified immunity
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields government
officials from civil liability. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff must “plead specific facts that both
1 The complaint mentions Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), Dkt. 1 at 4, but none of the defendants are federal
officials. The reference to Bivens is therefore disregarded.
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allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with
equal specificity.” 	Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 664 (5th Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Overcoming qualified immunity requires sufficient allegations both that
(1) the defendant’s conduct, as alleged, violated the plaintiff's constitutional
rights; and (2) the defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of
clearly established law. 	See Alexander v. Eeds, 392 F.3d 138, 144 (5th Cir.
2004). 	For the second requirement, the Court determines “whether the
allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of
the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively
unreasonable in the light of that then clearly established law.” Hare v. City of
Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998). A right was “clearly established” if
“a legislative directive or case precedent” made it “sufficiently clear such that
every reasonable officer would have understood that what he is doing violates
the law.” Keller v. Fleming, 952 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 2020).
II. 	Helaire failed to rebut the qualified immunity defense.
Helaire’s failure to respond to Officer Villareal’s invocation of qualified
immunity is fatal to her claims. See Dkt. 12 at 6 (raising qualified immunity).
The Fifth Circuit’s “well-settled precedent instructs that a party abandons a
claim by failing to defend it in response to motions to dismiss and other
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dispositive pleadings.” 	McClelland v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 63 F.4th 996,
1010 (5th Cir. 2023). 	And because Helaire has the burden to rebut qualified
immunity, see Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871-72 (5th Cir. 1997), her lack of
response means she has not met that burden.
Regardless, Officer Villarreal contends that the complaint fails to allege
a plausible basis for overcoming his qualified immunity. 	Dkt. 12 at 6. 	He
argues that the pleading does not “allege any specific conduct attributable” to
him because “[t]here is not a single mention of Officer Villarreal throughout”
the complaint. 	Dkt. 12 at 7. 	Indeed, Helaire’s pleading uses a confusing
patchwork of monikers that mix and match various officers’ first and last
names. See, e.g., Dkt. 1-2 at 2 (“Christian Villarreal”), 5 (“Antonio Roman”).
But even assuming those various permutations of Officer Villarreal’s
name target him specifically, the allegations nevertheless fail to show that he
violated any constitutional right—let alone a clearly established right. 	See
Dkt. 12 at 7. Helaire’s claims against Officer Villareal should be dismissed.
A. 	Officer Villarreal is entitled to qualified immunity on the
false arrest claims.
Generously construed, Helaire alleges that Officer Villarreal wrongfully
arrested her twice—most recently on June 17, 2023, on an arson charge, and
previously, on April 17, 2021, after an altercation in a car. Dkt. 1-2 at 4-5, 14.
Villarreal contends that Helaire’s assertions are conclusory and fail to state a
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plausible false arrest claim. 	Dkt. 12 at 6-7. 	And even if a constitutional
violation were sufficiently alleged, Officer Villareal argues that Helaire has not
shown that it was clearly established. Id. at 7. The Court agrees.
To defeat qualified immunity on a false arrest claim, “plaintiffs must
allege facts permitting an inference that defendants lacked arguable (that is,
reasonable but mistaken) probable cause for the arrests.” Club Retro L.L.C. v.
Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 207 (5th Cir. 2009). 	“The Supreme Court has defined
probable cause as the ‘facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge
that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution,
in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.’” Piazza v. Mayne, 217 F.3d 239,
245-46 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)).
First, 	Helaire’s 	allegations 	reflect 	that 	she 	was 	arrested 	for 	arson
pursuant to a warrant. See, e.g., Dkt. 1 at 6 (“I found out about the warrant”);
Dkt. 1-2 at 21 (“I had to learn about a warrant”), (the “warrant already hung
over me”). 	“Where an arrest is made under authority of a properly issued
warrant, the arrest is simply not a false arrest. 	Such an arrest is not
unconstitutional, and a complaint based on such an arrest is subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim.” 	Smith v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522, 526
(5th 	Cir. 	1982) 	(quotation 	omitted); 	see 	also, 	e.g., 	Casanova 	v. 	City 	of
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Brookshire, 119 F. Supp. 2d 639, 652 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (dismissing claim when
plaintiff “was arrested pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant”).
For the arrest to violate the Fourth Amendment, Helaire would have to
show that the officer’s affidavit submitted to procure the warrant “contains
inaccurate statements which materially affect its showing of probable cause.”
See Davis v. Strain, 676 F. App’x 285, 287 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(quotation omitted). 	That can occur if the officer “includes ‘a false statement
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth’ and ‘the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.’” 	Id.
(quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d
1104, 1113 (5th Cir. 2006)).
Nothing in the complaint satisfies that test. 	At most, the complaint
characterizes 	the 	warrant 	as 	“wrongful” 	and 	“issued 	without 	proper
procedure.” 	See Dkt. 1 at 7. 	That conclusory assertion is insufficient to
establish that the warrant was issued without probable cause, much less that
an officer made any knowing, intentional, and materially false statements to
obtain the warrant. 	And, as Villarreal notes, none of the allegations suggest
that he was the officer who obtained the warrant. See Dkt. 12 at 7.
Villarreal further argues that the false arrest claim fails because a
“failure to investigate complaints does not violate due process ….” 	Dkt. 12 at
7. That is not always true. But Helaire’s contention that her arrest “was based
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solely on statements made by” Hanna, the victim, does not show that her arrest
lacked probable cause. 	See Dkt. 1 at 6. 	“A victim’s accusation identifying an
individual as the perpetrator is generally sufficient to establish probable
cause.” Johnson v. Bryant, 1995 WL 29317, at *3 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
(citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 46 (1970)) (noting that “clearly
probable cause would exist to arrest” the plaintiff because the victim named
him as the perpetrator). 	“Reliance on a purported victim is justified unless
there is an ‘apparent reason’ to disbelieve the victim’s account.” 	Gemelli v.
Nicosia, 2024 WL 3617304, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 2024) (quoting Roy v. City of
Monroe, 950 F.3d 245, 256 (5th Cir. 2020)).
Helaire alleges no facts suggesting that Officer Villarreal had any reason
to doubt Hanna’s accusation. She does not even claim that Villarreal was the
officer who spoke to Hanna. There is no basis to conclude that Officer Villareal
violated the Fourth Amendment by arresting Helaire pursuant to a warrant.
Second, Helaire challenges her April 17, 2021 arrest after a passerby
called the police upon seeing a third party (Newsome) assault Helaire in his
car. See Dkt. 1-2 at 14. These allegations are likewise insufficient to overcome
Officer Villarreal’s qualified immunity.
Although the complaint describes the altercation that led police to be
summoned, see id., it does not state what facts and circumstances Officer
Villareal would have known when making the arrest. “Whether [an] arrest [is]
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constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest
was made, the officers had probable cause to make it—whether at that moment
the 	facts 	and 	circumstance 	within 	their 	knowledge 	…were 	sufficient 	to
warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was
committing an offense.” Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). 	Yet the complaint provides no
facts about what the passerby told the police or what Officer Villarreal would
have observed when arriving at the scene 40 minutes later. See Dkt. 1-2 at 14.
That Villarreal might have been mistaken about whether Helaire violated any
law does not itself reflect that he lacked probable cause to arrest her. 	See
Mendenhall, 213 F.3d at 230 (“Even law enforcement officials who ‘reasonably
but 	mistakenly 	conclude 	that 	probable 	cause 	is 	present’ 	are 	entitled 	to
immunity.” (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991))); Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“The Fourth Amendment is not violated by
an arrest based on probable cause, even though the wrong person is arrested.”).
Officer Villarreal is entitled to qualified immunity.
B. 	The false arrest claims are also time-barred.
Even if Helaire’s allegations of false arrest were sufficient to overcome
qualified immunity, they would still fail because they are barred by the statute
of limitations. 	This issue is properly raised sua sponte because Helaire
proceeds in forma pauperis (“IFP”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 	Dkt. 3 (notice of
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IFP 	status); 	see 	Gartrell 	v. 	Gaylor, 	981 	F.2d 	254, 	256 	(5th 	Cir. 	1993)
(recognizing that district courts can raise a limitations “defense sua sponte in
an action proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1915”); see also, e.g., Gonzales v. Wyatt,
157 F.3d 1016, 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal under Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because suit was barred by statute of limitations).
Because federal law does not supply a limitations period for Section 1983
claims, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury
suits. 	See Edmonds v. Oktibbeha Cnty., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 2012)
(Section 1983). 	In Texas, personal injury suits have a two-year limitations
period. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003. Helaire’s false arrest claims
are thus subject to a two-year limitations period.
The accrual date for Section 1983 claims, however, is governed by federal
law. 	See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). 	Here, the false arrest
claims accrued on the dates of Helaire’s respective arrests: June 17, 2023 and
April 17, 2021. See id. at 397 (“[T]he statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim
seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time
the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.”); see also Johnson
v. Harris Cnty., 83 F.4th 941, 945 (5th Cir. 2023). 	The June 17, 2023 arrest
claim thus expired on June 17, 2025 and the April 17, 2021 arrest claim expired
on April 17, 2023. 	But Helaire brought this suit on July 30, 2025, over two
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years after the most recent arrest. 	Dkt. 1. 	Her false arrest claims are time-
barred as well as insufficiently pleaded.
C. 	It is not a constitutional violation to shine a flashlight into
a home.
Helaire 	further 	claims 	that 	“HPD 	Officers” 	violated 	her 	Fourth
Amendment rights by shining a flashlight in her mother’s home without a
warrant. See Dkt. 1-2 at 7, 10. She names “Christian Villarreal” as the officer
involved. 	See id. at 2 (July 16, 2025 incident report). 	It is unclear whether
that hybridized name refers to Officer Villareal or to Officer Christian Rome,
whom Helaire had also named as a defendant. 	Given the ambiguity, Officer
Villareal understandably did not address it. But because Helaire is proceeding
IFP, the Court examines the allegations under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
concludes that, even assuming the allegations are aimed at Officer Villareal,
they fail to state a cognizable claim.
First, shining a flashlight into a home or vehicle to better view the
contents inside is not a search that can trigger Fourth Amendment protections.
See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987); see also Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (“[T]he use of artificial means to illuminate a
darkened area simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth
Amendment protection.”). That alone forecloses recovery.
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Second, Helaire alleges no facts that would give her a right to complain
about actions at her mother’s house. To claim Fourth Amendment protection,
Helaire needed to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in her mother’s
home, like being an overnight guest. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88-
89 (1998). 	No such allegation was made. 	She has not pleaded any viable
Section 1983 claims.
III. 	Any state law claims should also be dismissed.
Based on 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court also concludes that
Helaire’s stray references to Texas law provide no basis for relief against
Officer Villareal. 	This includes her laundry-list of references to the Texas
Penal Code and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in the attached June 14,
2025 incident report, which lists “Christian Villareal” (again, a hybrid name)
as an involved officer. See Dkt. 1-2 at 2, 9.
Neither the Texas Penal Code nor the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
creates a civil private cause of action. Lang v. Texas, 2010 WL 5600204, at *2
(E.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2010) (citing Aguilar v. Chastain, 923 S.W.2d 740, 745 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 1996, writ denied), and Spellmon v. Sweeney, 819 S.W.2d 206, 211
(Tex. App.—Waco 1991, no writ)), adopted in relevant part, 2011 WL 166977
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2011); see also Doe v. Bonath, 705 F. Supp. 3d 690, 706
(W.D. Tex. 2023) (dismissing official oppression claim under the Texas Penal
Code because it does not create a civil cause of action); Coltart v. Texas, 2020
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WL 5416515, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2020) (dismissing claims under Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure). 	Regardless, mere citations, unconnected to
specific factual allegations, fail to state any plausible basis for relief. See, e.g.,
Dkt. 1-2 at 9 (merely listing statutory provisions with conclusory assertions).
All claims against Officer Villareal should be dismissed with prejudice.
Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED 	that Defendant
Antonio Villarreal’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 12) be GRANTED and that all
claims 	asserted 	against 	Villarreal 	be 	DIMISSED 	WITH 	PREJUDICE,
including based on 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 	Plaintiff Nameah Helaire still has
claims against Defendants Amtaro Montoya and Angel August. 	See Dkt. 37
at 1 (noting that those Defendants were served).
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on May 14, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
Texas.
____________________________________
Yvvvoon	n	nne Y. Hoo
United States Magistrate Judge
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