Fielder v. Bisignano

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
IRA WESLEY F.,
Plaintiff,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-3385
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Ira Wesley F. (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against Defendant
Frank 	Bisignano1 	(“Commissioner”) 	seeking 	review 	of 	the 	denial 	of
Supplemental Security Income Benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act. (ECF No. 1). Pending before the Court2 are the Parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment. 	(ECF Nos. 13, 19). 	Based on a review of the motions,
arguments, and relevant law, the Court RECOMMENDS Commissioner’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19) be GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
13) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court FURTHER
1 Frank Bisignano was sworn in as the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7,
2025. Bisignano is “automatically substituted” as the defendant in this suit. FED. R. CIV. P.
25(d); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection
shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner
of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
2 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 9).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 24, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 16

2
RECOMMENDS 	this 	case 	be 	REMANDED 	to 	the 	Social 	Security
Administration for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff filed a claim for disability insurance benefits on February 25,
2021, alleging disability starting on January 2, 2015. 	(ECF No. 4-4 at 32).3
Plaintiff’s claims were initially denied by the Social Security Administration
in May 2021 (id. at 46), and again on reconsideration in November 2021 (id. at
53). 	On 	December 	9, 	2021, 	Plaintiff 	requested 	a 	hearing 	before 	an
Administrative Law Judge. 	(ECF No. 4-5 at 45). 	On December 6, 2023,
Administrative Law Judge Michelle Whetsel (the “ALJ”) held a telephonic
hearing. 	(ECF No. 4-3 at 15–28). 	Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the
hearing. (Id. at 15). Nicole Fuscaldo, a vocational expert (“VE”), appeared and
testified at the hearing. (Id.).
On January 18, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision, finding Plaintiff not
disabled at Step Five.4 	(Id. at 15–28). 	At Step One, the ALJ found Plaintiff
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 25, 2021, the
3 The Administrative Record in this case can be found at ECF No. 4.
4 In considering a disability claim, an ALJ must conduct a five-step evaluation that
examines: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets
or equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;
(4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5)
whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. 	Masterson v.
Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 16

3
application date. 	(Id. at 17). 	At Step Two, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the
following 	severe 	impairments: 	“stroke/Erb’s 	palsy 	with 	residual 	deficits,
diabetes mellitus, high blood pressure, diabetic neuropathy, congestive heart
failure, speech disorder/neurological disorder, vision loss, and obesity (20 CFR
416.920(c)).” 	(Id.). 	At Step Three, the ALJ found Plaintiff: “did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).” 	(Id. at 18). 	The ALJ
determined that Plaintiff has the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except, he can
occasionally 	climb 	ramps 	and 	stairs, 	but 	should 	never 	climb
ladders, 	ropes, 	or 	scaffolds. 	The 	claimant 	can 	occasionally,
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. 	He should avoid even
moderate 	exposure 	to 	extreme 	heat 	and 	extreme 	cold. 	The
claimant 	should 	avoid 	all 	exposure 	to 	dangerous 	moving
machinery, unprotected heights, and wet, slippery, or uneven
surfaces. 	He can occasionally reach in all directions, including
overhead, with his right upper extremity. 	The claimant can
frequently 	handle 	and 	finger 	with 	his 	right 	hand. 	He 	can
occasionally push, pull, and operate foot controls bilaterally. 	The
claimant can 	remember and follow 	detailed, 	but 	not 	complex
instructions. 	He can perform the tasks assigned, but not at a
production rate pace; however, he can meet the end of day work
goals. The claimant can have occasional contact with co-workers,
supervisors, and the general public. 	He can frequently use near,
far, 	accommodation, 	field 	of 	vision, 	color 	vision, 	and 	depth
perception bilaterally.
(Id. at 19). 	At Step Four, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform any
past relevant work. 	(Id. at 26). 	At Step Five, the ALJ found there were jobs
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 16

4
that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform—such as a router, routing clerk, housekeeper, document preparer,
surveillance systems monitor, eyeglass polisher, and nut sorter—and therefore
Plaintiff was not disabled as defined under the Social Security Act. (Id. at 27).
Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council and the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review on October 21, 2024. 	(Id. at 2). 	Thus, the ALJ’s
decision represents the Commissioner’s final decision in the case. See Sims v.
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106–07 (2000).
II. 	Legal Standard
The Court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner on a Social
Security disability claim is exceedingly deferential. Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d
600, 602 (5th Cir. 2012). “[R]eview of Social Security disability cases ‘is limited
to two inquiries: (1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the proper
legal standard.’” Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Perez 	v. 	Barnhart, 	415 	F.3d 	457, 	461 	(5th 	Cir. 	2005)). 	When 	the
Commissioner’s decision is reached by applying improper legal standards, the
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 	Singletary v. Bowen, 798
F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion’ and constitutes
‘more than a mere scintilla’ but ‘less than a preponderance’ of evidence.”
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 16

5
Hardman v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Newton v. Apfel,
209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000)). “‘Any findings of fact by the Commissioner
which are supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.’” 	Heck v. Colvin,
674 F. App’x 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Taylor, 706 F.3d at 602).
Even 	so, 	judicial 	review 	must 	not 	be 	“so 	obsequious 	as 	to 	be
meaningless.” 	Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotations
omitted). 	The substantial evidence standard is not a rubber stamp for the
Commissioner’s 	decision 	and 	involves 	more 	than 	a 	search 	for 	evidence
supporting the Commissioner’s findings. Singletary, 798 F.2d at 822–23; Cook
v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985). 	Rather, a reviewing court must
scrutinize the record as a whole, taking into account whatever fairly detracts
from the substantiality of evidence supporting the Commissioner’s findings.
Singletary, 798 F.2d at 823. The court “‘may not reweigh the evidence . . . , nor
try the issues de novo, nor substitute [its] judgment for the [Commissioner’s],
even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s] decision.’”
Johnson v. Colvin, 595 F. App’x 443, 444 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harrell v.
Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988)).
III. 	Discussion
Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal: (1) the ALJ impermissibly relied on
her own lay interpretation of the medical evidence to develop an RFC that is
unsupported by substantial evidence (ECF No. 13 at 5); and (2) the hearing
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 16

6
decision does not 	contain an adequate evaluation of opinion evidence in
assessing Plaintiff’s RFC because the ALJ committed reversible error by
discounting opinion evidence without first applying the factors set forth in 20
CFR 	404.1520(c)(2) 	and 	416.920(c)(2) 	(id. 	at 	12–13). 	Conversely,
Commissioner 	contends 	substantial 	evidence 	supports 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC
determination. (ECF No. 19 at 6).
a. Lay Opinion
First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ impermissibly relied on her own lay
interpretation of the medical evidence to develop an RFC that is unsupported
by substantial evidence. 	(ECF No. 13 at 5). 	Specifically, Plaintiff argues the
ALJ rejected the only doctors of record who rendered an opinion on the use of
Plaintiff’s right hand and, by doing so, rendered her own opinion of the limiting
effect of the use of Plaintiff’s ability to handle and finger with his right hand.
(ECF No. 13 at 9). Commissioner disagrees. (ECF No. 19 at 6–7).
The ALJ assesses a claimant’s RFC “based on all of the relevant medical
and other evidence.” 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). 	When evaluating physical
limitations, the ALJ will “first assess the nature and extent of [Plaintiff’s]
physical 	limitations 	and 	then 	determine 	[Plaintiff’s] 	residual 	functional
capacity for work activity on a regular and continuing basis.” Id. § 404.1545(b).
The ALJ “must build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and
the final determination.” Price v. Astrue, 401 F. App’x 985, 986 (5th Cir. 2010).
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 16

7
The ALJ is not required to adopt a specific physician’s assessment when
determining a plaintiff’s RFC. 	See Miller v. Kijakazi, No. 22-60541, 2023 WL
234773, 	at 	*4 	(5th 	Cir. 	Jan. 	18, 	2023). 	Nevertheless, 	“the 	ALJ 	cannot
completely disregard medical testimony in making an RFC determination.”
Jones v. Kijakazi, 625 F. Supp. 3d 549, 553 (S.D. Miss. 2022). 	However, “the
ALJ 	is 	not 	required 	to 	have 	a 	medical 	opinion 	that 	matches 	his 	RFC
determination[,]” so long as substantial evidence supports the determination.
Myers v. Saul, No. 20-cv-445, 2021 WL 4025993, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 3, 2021).
As such, an ALJ’s RFC determination is improperly based on his lay opinion
when substantial evidence does not support the RFC. See Taylor, 706 F.3d at
602.
To any general argument that the ALJ relied on her own lay opinion, the
Court disagrees. 	Here, the ALJ considered the opinions of the following
doctors: Jeanine Kwun; Kim Rowlands; Daryl K. Daniel; Arindam Sarkar;
Donna Bloodworth; and Lynette Causey. (See ECF No. 4-3 at 23–25).
Dr. Kwun examined Plaintiff at the initial level of review and Dr.
Rowlands examined Plaintiff at the reconsideration level. 	(Id. at 23). 	Both
doctors opined that Plaintiff could perform the demands of light work just as
the ALJ determined. 	(Id.). 	The ALJ noted that she found both medical
opinions 	to 	be 	somewhat 	persuasive 	and 	were 	consistent 	with 	the 	RFC
determination that Plaintiff’s conditions, while severe, are not disabling and
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 7 of 16

8
should be limited to light exertion. (Id.). However, the ALJ found the evidence
available at the hearing level showed a need for “more restrictive limits on
[Plaintiff’s] abilities to be exposed to workplace hazards, as well as using his
extremities.” (Id.).
As to Dr. Daniel, the ALJ noted his opinion did not provide a “function-
by-function assessment of [Plaintiff’s] abilities related to work activity.” 	(Id.
at 24). 	However, the ALJ found the information provided in Dr. Daniel’s
opinion was “consistent with the evidence available to [sic] hearing level and
was therefore considered when determining [Plaintiff’s RFC].” (Id.).
As to Dr. Sarkar, the ALJ noted that Dr. Sarkar opined that Plaintiff’s
limitations made regular employment impossible. 	(Id.). 	The ALJ found Dr.
Sarkar’s 	opinion 	slightly 	persuasive, 	reasoning 	that 	“the 	opinion 	[that
Plaintiff] cannot lift more than 5 pounds, grasp objects, write, or type or reach
overhead seems not to be so wholly supported by or consistent with the
providers treatment history or the other evidence of record.” (Id. at 25).
Dr. Bloodworth opined that Plaintiff was “completely and permanently
disabled.” 	(Id.). 	The 	ALJ 	found 	“the 	opinion 	unpersuasive 	as 	the
determination of disabled is reserved to the Commissioner.” 	(Id.). 	However,
the ALJ explained that she considered other information contained in Dr.
Bloodworth’s opinion when developing Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id.).
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 8 of 16

9
Lastly, the ALJ identified Dr. Causey’s opinion that Plaintiff did not
have 	a 	medically 	determinable 	mental 	impairment 	as 	persuasive. 	(Id.).
However, the ALJ still provided for limitations regarding social interactions
when developing Plaintiff’s RFC.
This case is not an instance where an ALJ has “reject[ed] the only
physicians to opine on Plaintiff’s limitations, interpret[ed] the raw medical
data himself, and impose[d] an RFC in contravention of all opining medical
sources.” 	Garcia v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-263, 2018 WL 1513688, at *3 (W.D.
Tex. Mar. 27, 2018); see Williams v. Astrue, 355 F. App’x 828, 831 (5th Cir.
2009) (reversing and remanding because the ALJ improperly interposed his
own opinion when there was “no evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that
[Plaintiff] can stand or walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday”).
Regarding Plaintiff’s argument that “the ALJ rejected the only doctors
of record who rendered a medical opinion on the use of Plaintiff’s right hand”
(ECF No. 13 at 9), the Court disagrees. The ALJ does not state in her decision
that she “rejected” any of the medical opinions. 	See Fleming v. Saul, No. 19-
cv-701, 2020 WL 4601669, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2020) (“Although the ALJ
did not adopt in its entirety any one medical opinion of record in fashioning his
RFC, he also did not completely reject every opinion either.”). In fact, the only
opinion that the ALJ found “unpersuasive” was Dr. Bloodworth and it was only
as to the issue of Plaintiff’s disability determination. 	(ECF No. 4-3 at 25).
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 9 of 16

10
Otherwise, Dr. Bloodworth’s opinion, 	along with the rest of the medical
opinions, were considered by the ALJ in developing Plaintiff’s RFC, many of
which addressed the use of Plaintiff’s right hand. (See id. at 23–25).
As such, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ impermissibly relied on her
own lay interpretation of the medical evidence to develop an RFC that is
unsupported by substantial evidence (ECF No. 13 at 5) is without merit.
b. Evaluation of Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff 	also 	argues 	that 	the 	ALJ 	committed 	reversible 	error 	by
discounting opinion evidence without first applying the factors set forth in 20
CFR 404.1520(c)(2) and 416.920(c)(2). 	(ECF No. 13 at 13). 	Commissioner
disagrees. (ECF No. 19 at 8–9).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c is a rule regarding RFC determinations that
governs all claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. Because Plaintiff filed his
claim on February 25, 2021, this rule applies. This rule addresses how the ALJ
is to consider and articulate medical opinions and prior administrative medical
filings in evaluating a claimant’s RFC. 	The rule states that the ALJ is no
longer required to defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including
controlling weight, to any medical opinion or prior administrative medical
finding. Id. § 404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ is to consider the persuasiveness
of all medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings using the
same specific factors outlined in the rule, the most important of which are
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 10 of 16

11
“supportability” 	and 	“consistency.” 	Id. 	The 	ALJ 	must 	articulate 	how
persuasive he finds each of the opinions in the record. Id. § 404.1520c(b).
The ALJ must provide an “adequate” discussion of his reasons for finding
a particular medical opinion to be persuasive or unpersuasive. 	Enrique A. v.
Bisignano, No. 1:25-cv-122, 2026 WL 1252096, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2026)
(citing Cooley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 587 F. Supp. 3d 489, 499 (S.D. Miss.
2021)). 	The standard for an “adequate” discussion is whether the ALJ’s
persuasiveness explanation allows the court to conduct a meaningful review of
whether his findings as to the particular medical opinion was supported by
substantial evidence. Id. (citing Cooley, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 499).
Plaintiff’s motion does not appear to identify a specific opinion that he
argues the ALJ failed to evaluate properly. 	However, in Plaintiff’s response,
Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not determine the persuasiveness of Dr. Daniel’s
medical opinion. 	(ECF No. 20 at 11, 16). 	Plaintiff also adds that the “ALJ
failed to consider the supportability of Dr. Sarkar and Dr. Bloodworth’s
opinions. (Id. at 13).
When 	discussing 	Dr. 	Daniel’s 	opinion, 	the 	ALJ 	stated 	that 	she
“assign[ed] no specific degree of persuasion to [Dr. Daniel’s] opinion as it
provide[d] 	no 	function-by-function 	assessment 	of 	the 	claimant’s 	abilities
related to work activity.” (ECF No. 4-3 at 24). The ALJ continued by stating,
“[h]owever, the information provided is consistent with the evidence available
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 11 of 16

12
to [sic] hearing level and was therefore considered when determining the
claimants’ [RFC].” (Id.).
The Court is unaware of a requirement that a medical opinion must
provide 	a 	function-by-function 	assessment 	before 	the 	ALJ 	is 	required 	to
consider 	the 	consistency 	and 	supportability 	of 	a 	medical 	opinion. 	See
McDonald v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-86, 2022 WL 17798108, at *5 (D.N.H. Dec. 19,
2022) (“[T]he regulations direct the ALJ to consider the consistency and
supportability of a medical opinion, not whether it provides a function-by-
function 	assessment 	of 	the 	patient’s 	functional 	capacity.”) 	(citing 	§
416.920c(c)). 	Further, 	“[a] 	medical 	opinion 	is 	not 	required 	to 	include 	a
function-by-function assessment of the claimant’s RFC.” Id. (citing Jimenez v.
Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-25178, 2022 WL 4794878, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 14, 2022),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:20-cv-25178, 2022 WL 4761310
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2022)).
Here, the ALJ clearly reviewed Dr. Daniel’s medical opinion, analyzed
whether 	the 	opinion 	was 	consistent 	with 	other 	medical 	evidence, 	and
considered the opinion when developing Plaintiff’s RFC. 	(See ECF No. 4-3 at
24). 	However, the ALJ does not address the supportability5 of Dr. Daniel’s
5 	“‘Supportability’ 	focuses 	on 	how 	well 	the 	medical 	evidence 	and 	supporting
explanations given by the medical provider support the provider’s opinion.” Kilby v. Kijakazi,
No. 4:20-cv-3035, 2022 WL 1797043, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(c)(1) 	(“The 	more 	relevant 	the 	objective 	medical 	evidence 	and 	supporting
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 12 of 16

13
medical opinion. 	See Cooley, 2021 WL 4221620, at *6 (finding the ALJ
committed 	legal 	error 	where 	the 	court 	could 	not 	discern 	how 	the 	ALJ
considered the “supportability” or “consistency” factors in determining the
persuasiveness of a treating physician’s medical opinion).
As 	to 	Dr. 	Sarkar, 	the 	ALJ 	found 	the 	opinion 	to 	be 	“only 	slightly
persuasive.” (ECF No. 4-3 at 25). Specifically, the ALJ states:
While 	the 	diagnoses 	of 	Erb’s 	palsy 	is 	consistent 	with 	the
longitudinal evidence of record, the opinion the claimant cannot
lift more than 5 pounds, grasp objects, write, or type or reach
overhead seems not to be so wholly supported by or consistent with
the providers treatment history or the other evidence of record.
While the evidence of record shows some decreased strength in the
claimant’s right upper extremity, the evidence is not consistent
with the limitation to overall lifting of no greater than 5 pounds
with the apparent lack of any use of the right upper extremity or
hand. 	(See Exs C1FC22f, hearing testimony). 	For example,
focused 	examinations 	noted 	3/5 	strength 	in 	the 	right 	upper
extremity and only mild decrease in sensory responses. (C7F and
C16F).
Further, many exams show normal range of motion with no noted
decrease in strength (See Ex CC14F, C11F, C22F, C19F, and
C17F). The evidence is most consistent with limiting the claimant
to no greater than a light exertion with occasional reaching in all
directions including overhead with the right upper extremity and
frequent handling and fingering with the right hand. 	(See Exs
C1F-C22F).
explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or
prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.”)).
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 13 of 16

14
(Id.) (emphasis added). 	While the ALJ addresses the consistency of Dr.
Sarkar’s medical opinion, the ALJ’s singular reference to “supportability” is
lacking. 	See Cooley, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 499 (“The measuring stick for an
‘adequate discussion’ is whether the ALJ’s persuasiveness explanation enables
the court to undertake a meaningful review of whether his finding with regard
to the particular medical opinion was supported by substantial evidence and
does not require the Court to merely speculate about the reasons behind the
ALJ’s persuasiveness finding or lack thereof.”) (internal citations omitted).
Similarly, 	as 	to 	Dr. 	Bloodworth, 	the 	ALJ 	found 	the 	opinion
“unpersuasive” 	because Dr. Bloodworth opined as to 	Plaintiff’s 	disability
status. 	(ECF No. 4-3 at 25). 	However, the ALJ acknowledges that other
portions 	of 	Dr. 	Bloodworth’s 	opinion 	were 	considered 	when 	determining
Plaintiff’s RFC. 	(Id.). 	Yet, the ALJ did not address the supportability or
consistency of Dr. Bloodworth’s opinion. (Id.).
“In other words, the ALJ simply fails to engage in any meaningful
discussion of the consistency and supportability of [these] medical opinion[s].
This is error.” Shugart v. Kijakazi, No. 3:21-cv-00007, 2022 WL 912777, at *4
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2022); see also Cooley, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 500 (“Stated
differently, significant gaps exist in the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Tanious’
medical opinion that leave this Court unable to build a ‘logic bridge’ between
the evidence and his finding.”).
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 14 of 16

15
The Court must now turn to the question of whether the ALJ’s error was
harmless. See Cooley, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 501. “Harmless error exists when it
is inconceivable that a different administrative conclusion would have been
reached absent the error.” Bornette v. Barnhart, 466 F. Supp. 2d 811, 816 (E.D.
Tex. 2006). Given that the ALJ’s discussion is insufficient to meet the demands
of 	20 	C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1520c(b)(2) 	insofar 	as 	the 	Court 	cannot 	undertake
meaningful review of her findings as to three of the six medical opinions
available, the Court finds that this legal error prevents the Court from
determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. 	See
Cooley, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 501; Shugart, 2022 WL 912777, at *4 (“I conclude
that it is conceivable that the ALJ could make a different administrative
decision upon further review.”).
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Commissioner’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19) be GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
13) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court FURTHER
RECOMMENDS 	this 	case 	be 	REMANDED 	to 	the 	Social 	Security
Administration for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 15 of 16

16
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on June 24, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 4:25-cv-03385 Document 21 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 16 of 16