Edmonds v. Maac Transport & Logistics, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Alvin 	Edmonds, 	Individually 	and
for Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
M.A.A.C. Logistics LLC,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-02270
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) case. After obtaining entry
of default, Dkt. 10, Plaintiff Alvin Edmonds filed a motion for default judgment
against Defendant M.A.A.C. Logistics LLC (“Maac Logistics”). 	Dkt. 14. 	The
motion requests unpaid minimum wages, liquidated damages, and attorneys’
fees 	and 	costs. 	See 	id. 	at 	3-4. 	After 	carefully 	considering 	Edmonds’s
submission, his pleading, the record, and the applicable law, it is recommended
that his request for default judgment be granted in part, but that an award of
damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs should await an evidentiary hearing.
Edmonds’s subsequent (and duplicative) motion for entry of default, Dkt. 15,
is denied as moot.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Background
The following facts are alleged in the complaint. 	For purposes of the
pending motion, they are taken as true at this stage.
Edmonds worked as a truck driver for Maac Logistics from March 2023
to February 2025. Dkt. 3 at 3. Edmonds regularly worked more than 24 hours
straight and was often away from home for days or weeks at a time. 	Id. 	But
he was paid on a “per-mile basis,” which did not account for all his hours
worked, including for non-driving tasks such as waiting with or securing the
truck. 	Id. at 3-4. 	According to Edmonds, there are numerous workweeks for
which he was paid less than the minimum hourly-wage rate, whether under
the FLSA or the applicable state’s minimum wage laws. 	Id. at 4. 	Edmonds
complained to Maac Logistics, but nothing was done. Id.
Edmonds originally sued an entity named Maac Transport & Logistics
LLC on May 16, 2025. Dkt. 1 at 3 (listing Maac Transport & Logistics, LLC as
the sole defendant and its registered agent as Republic Registered Agent,
LLC). 	On May 20, 2025, Edmonds amended his complaint, this time naming
a new entity as defendant—M.A.A.C. Logistics, LLC. Dkt. 3 at 3 (listing Maac
Logistics as the sole defendant and its registered agent as Anthony King).
Edmond alleged, in his individual capacity and on behalf of “all the class of
similarly situated employees or putative class members,” federal claims under
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the FLSA and state minimum wage claims under Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Illinois, and New Mexico law. Id.
Summons was issued on May 28, 2025. Dkt. 7. According to the return
of service, the summons was served on Anthony King, “who is designated by
law to accept service of process” on behalf of Maac Logistics. Dkt. 8.
Maac Logistics did not answer or otherwise appear to defend this case.
That prompted Edmonds to request entry of default, which the clerk of court
granted. Dkts. 9, 10. He then moved for default judgment, seeking damages,
attorneys’ fees, and costs. 	Dkt. 14. 	And despite the clerk’s entry of default,
Edmonds filed yet another motion for entry of default. 	Dkt. 15. 	The motions
are ripe for resolution.
Legal Standard
Default proceedings involve three steps: default, entry of default, and
default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. A default occurs “when a defendant
has failed to plead or otherwise respond to the complaint within the time
required by the Federal Rules.” 	N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141
(5th Cir. 1996); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). “An entry of default is what the
clerk enters when a plaintiff establishes the default by affidavit or otherwise
pursuant to Rule 55(a).” Axcess Glob. Scis., LLC v. Ozcan Grp., Inc., 2024 WL
3259700, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 2024). A default judgment can then be entered
if a plaintiff applies for such relief under Rule 55(b)(2). See id.
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“A default judgment is a judgment on the merits that conclusively
establishes the defendant’s liability.” 	United States ex rel. M-CO Constr. Inc.
v. Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1987). District courts have
discretion to determine whether entry of default judgment is warranted. 	See
Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 	But the Fifth
Circuit instructs that “[d]efault judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored
by the Federal Rules and resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.” Sun
Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir.
1989). 	A plaintiff “is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right,”
even if the defendant “is technically in default.” 	Lewis, 236 F.3d at 767
(quoting Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)).
A request for default judgment “must be supported by well-pleaded
allegations and must have a sufficient basis in the pleadings.” 	Wooten v.
McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation
omitted). 	“The well-pleaded allegations are assumed to be true, except those
regarding damages.” 	Axcess Glob. Scis., LLC, 2024 WL 3259700, at *2 (citing
Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.
1975)). 	Any doubts about the appropriateness of a default judgment must be
resolved in favor of the defaulting party. See id.
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Analysis
As a preliminary matter, Edmonds’s amended complaint asserts claims
under various states’ minimum wage laws, Dkt. 3 at 6-13, but he does not seek
default judgment on these claims. Edmonds has abandoned those claims, and
the Court does not consider them further.
And although Edmonds brought this suit as a collective action, see Dkt.
3 at 11-13, no collective action has been certified. Nor has Edmonds amended
the complaint to include any opt-in plaintiffs. 	Cf. Dishmon v. Newkirk Logs.,
Inc., 2026 WL 234499, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2026) (denying default
judgment because opt-in plaintiffs “are not named plaintiffs in the Complaint”
and no collective action was certified). 	Rather, Edmonds seeks a default
judgment for himself alone. See Dkt. 14 at 5.
As for Edmonds’s FLSA minimum wage claim—the sole claim on which
he 	seeks 	default 	judgment, 	and 	only 	in 	his 	individual 	capacity—default
judgment is merited, both procedurally and substantively. 1 	But a hearing is
necessary to determine the appropriate relief.
1 As a predicate to seeking default judgment, Edmonds filed a motion for entry of
default on August 8, 2025, see Dkt. 9, which was granted by the clerk, Dkt. 10.
Edmonds’s duplicative and later-filed motion for entry of default, see Dkt. 15 (filed
April 14, 2026), is therefore denied as moot.
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I. 	Edmonds has shown that he properly served Maac Logistics.
The Court must first confirm that it has jurisdiction to grant default
judgment. 	See Sys. Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V VIKTOR KURNATOVSKIY,
242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2001) (describing this as the court’s “affirmative
duty” 	when 	addressing 	a 	motion 	for 	default 	judgment). 	Subject-matter
jurisdiction is proper because Edmonds’s claim arises under federal law,
namely the FLSA. See Dkt. 3 at 4-6 (asserting FLSA claim); 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(federal question jurisdiction). And for personal jurisdiction, the key question
is whether Maac Logistics was properly served. See Rogers v. Hartford Life &
Acc. Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Avdeef v. Royal Bank
of Scotland, P.L.C., 616 F. App’x 665, 672 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (noting
that “proper service of process is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the entry of a
default judgment”). 	Absent valid service of process, any default judgment
against Maac Logistics would be void. See Rogers, 167 F.3d at 940.
There are two ways to serve business entities like Maac Logistics. 	One
option is to serve the entity under the law of the state where the district court
is 	located 	or 	where 	service 	was 	made. 	See 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 4(h)(1)(A)
(incorporating Rule 4(e)(1)). 	The second option is to serve the summons and
complaint on “an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process and—if the
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agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires—by also mailing
a copy of each to the defendant ….” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B).
Service here complies with Rule 4’s second method of service. 	“The
general rule is that a signed return of service constitutes prima facie evidence
of valid service ….” 	People’s United Equip. Fin. Corp. v. Hartmann, 447 F.
App’x 522, 524 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quotations omitted). 	The record
includes a “Proof of Service” signed by a process server named Mashariki
Arceneaux “under the penalty of perjury.” Dkt. 8. This document reflects that,
on June 7, 2025 at 4:26 p.m., Arceneaux personally delivered copies of the
summons and complaint to Anthony King at 2105 Irene St., La Marque, Texas
77568. 	Id. 	The document describes King as a person “designated by law to
accept service of process on behalf of” Maac Logistics, and that King “identified
themselves as the person authorized to accept with identity confirmed by
subject reaching for docs when named.” 	Id. 	Indeed, the Texas Comptroller’s
website identifies Maac Logistics’s registered agent as Anthony King and its
registered office street address as 2105 Irene St., La Marque, Texas 77568. See
Tex. 	Comptroller 	of 	Pub. 	Accts., 	Franchise 	Tax 	Account 	Status,
https://perma.cc/M8N6-WZNZ (last accessed May 20, 2026). 	And nothing in
the 	return 	of 	service 	raises 	doubts 	regarding 	the 	proprietary 	of 	service.
Because Edmonds has met his burden to show that service of the complaint
and summons was made on Maac Logistics’s registered agent, this Court can
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exercise personal jurisdiction over Maac Logistics. 	See, e.g., Camacho v.
Sajeda Inc., 2025 WL 746555, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2025) (effective service
where return of service established that business entity was served by personal
delivery of summons and complaint to its registered agent), adopted by 2025
WL 746571 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2025).
II. 	Default judgment is procedurally warranted.
The next inquiry is whether default judgment is procedurally warranted.
Six factors inform this inquiry: “[(1)] whether material issues of fact are at
issue, [(2)] whether there has been substantial prejudice, [(3)] whether the
grounds for default are clearly established, [(4)] whether the default was
caused by a good-faith mistake or excusable neglect, [(5)] the harshness of a
default judgment, and [(6)] whether the court would think itself obliged to set
aside the default on the defendant’s motion.” Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d
886, 	893 	(5th 	Cir. 	1998) 	(numeration 	added). 	All 	factors 	favor 	default
judgment.
First, there are no disputed factual issues because Maac Logistics has
not responded to this suit. 	Edmonds’s well-pleaded facts are thus taken as
true. See Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206 (“The defendant, by his default, admits
the plaintiff’s well pleaded allegations of fact ….”).
Second, Maac Logistics’s lack of response prejudices Edmonds by halting
the adversarial process and thwarting his ability to obtain relief. See Alvarado
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Martinez v. Eltman L., P.C., 444 F. Supp. 3d 748, 753 (N.D. Tex. 2020);
Innovative Sports Mgmt., Inc. v. Paisa’s Truck LLC, 2024 WL 625316, at *3
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2024) (prejudice where the defendant’s “failure to respond
threatens to bring the adversary process to a halt”) (quotation omitted).
Third, grounds for default are clearly established. 	The Clerk of Court
properly entered default after Maac Logistics failed to answer or otherwise
defend. 	See Dkt. 10 (entry of default); Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (failure to appear is
grounds for default). Such a failure to defend or appear likewise permits entry
of default judgment. See United States v. $37,603.00 in US Currency, 2021 WL
3013337, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 16, 2021).
For the last three factors, nothing in the record indicates that Maac
Logistics defaulted due to a good-faith mistake or excusable neglect. 	Neither
does anything suggest that default 	judgment 	would be 	unduly 	harsh or
vulnerable to challenge later. 	See Griffin v. O’Brien, Wexler, & Assocs., LLC,
680 F. Supp. 3d 772, 781 (E.D. Tex. 2023) (default judgment was “not unusually
harsh” because defendants “has ample opportunity to respond” but “failed to
do so”); see also Jenkins & Gilchrist v. Groia & Co., 542 F.3d 114, 119 (5th Cir.
2008) (considerations for setting aside a default judgment are: “whether the
default was willful, whether setting it aside would prejudice the adversary, and
whether a meritorious defense is presented”) (quotation omitted). 	All factors
indicate that default judgment is procedurally appropriate. See, e.g., Orozco v.
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SBX 	Logistics, 	LLC, 	2026 	WL 	886295, 	at 	*3 	(S.D. 	Tex. 	Mar. 	31, 	2026)
(analogous conclusions made default judgment procedurally appropriate in
FLSA case).
III. 	Default judgment is substantively appropriate.
The next inquiry examines the merits of Edmonds’s claims. There must
be “a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment [to be] entered.”
Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206. 	The Court evaluates whether the factual
allegations in the complaint, if taken as true, would state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. 	United Cmty. Bank, Inc. v. Loven Bf, Inc., 2020 WL
5045310, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 22, 2020), adopted by 2020 WL 5039496 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 26, 2020). This is a lower threshold than the standard for surviving
a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	See Wooten, 788 F.3d at
499-500 (allegations need only provide fair notice of the claim under Rule 8,
particularly when the defaulting defendant chose to forgo moving for dismissal
or a more definite statement).
Edmonds’s amended complaint alleges that Maac Logistics failed to pay
required minimum wages in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C).
Dkt. 3 at 4-5. To prevail, Edmonds must allege facts to show: (1) an employer-
employee 	relationship 	existed 	during 	the 	unpaid 	minimum 	wage 	claims
periods; (2) the employee engaged in activities within the coverage of the FLSA;
(3) the employer violated the FLSA’s minimum wage requirements; and (4) the
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amount of minimum wage compensation due. See Punger v. Farrah Martinez,
PLLC, 2025 WL 2930299, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2025) (citing Johnson v.
Heckmann Water Resources (CVR), Inc., 758 F.3d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 2014)).
For 	the 	first 	and 	second 	requirements, 	Edmonds 	provided 	enough
allegations to support an employer-employee relationship under the FLSA, and
to show that Edmonds’s activities trigger FLSA coverage. 	The FLSA defines
an “employer” broadly to reach “any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d); see also
McLaughlin v. Seafood, Inc., 867 F.2d 875, 877 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)
(emphasizing that the FLSA’s definition is broader than the common-law
definition of employer). In addition, to be covered by the FLSA, the employee
must 	have 	either 	“engaged 	in 	commerce” 	or 	be 	employed 	as 	part 	of 	an
“enterprise engaged in commerce.” 	29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 	“Either individual
or enterprise coverage is enough to invoke FLSA protection.” Martin v. Bedell,
955 F.2d 1029, 1032 (5th Cir. 1992). 	For individual coverage, courts examine
“whether 	[an 	employee’s] 	work 	is 	so 	directly 	and 	vitally 	related 	to 	the
functioning of an instrumentality or facility of interstate commerce as to be, in
practical effect, a part of it, rather than isolated local activity.” 	Sobrinio v.
Med. Ctr. Visitor’s Lodge, Inc., 474 F.3d 828, 829 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
Alternatively, enterprise coverage extends to a business with “employees
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or that has
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employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that
have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person; and … whose
annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000.”
Montoya Garcia v. Overnight Cleanse, LLC, 2021 WL 902494, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 22, 2021) (quotations omitted), adopted by 2021 WL 1012146 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 9, 2021).
According to Edmonds, Maac Logistics employed Edmonds to drive loads
of cargo to its customers. See Dkt. 3 at 3-4; see also Dkt. 14-1 at 2 (Edmonds’s
declaration). Edmonds regularly handled and transported cargo from state-to-
state. Dkt. 3 at 11-12; see also Dkt. 14-1 (recounting his driving multiple loads
across state-lines). 	Taking these allegations as true, Maac Logistics qualified
as Edmonds’s “employer” under the FLSA by operating the business for which
Edmonds worked. And Edmonds’s allegations that he frequently handled and
delivered cargo from state-to-state suffice to trigger individual FLSA coverage.
See Sobrinio, 474 F.3d at 829 (“Any regular contact with commerce, no matter
how small, will result in coverage.”) (quotations omitted).
Moreover, Edmonds’s allegations reflect that Maac Logistics willfully
violated FLSA’s minimum wage requirements. 	Section 206 provides that
“every employer shall pay to each of his employees” wages of “not less than …
$7.25 an hour.” 	29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 	If an employer’s violation was willful, a
three-year, instead of a two-year, statute of limitations applies. 	Id. 	§ 255(a).
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A violation is willful if the employer “knew or showed reckless disregard for …
whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.” Singer v. City of Waco, 324
F.3d 813, 121 (5th Cir. 2003).
Edmonds alleges that his wages “frequently fell short of the minimum
wage when dividing all weekly wages paid by all weekly hours worked ….”
Dkt. 3 at 5. 	This was because Maac Logistics paid Edmonds on a “per-mile”
basis that did not account for all hours worked, including those spent on non-
driving tasks. 	Id. at. 4. 	Those allegations are supported by Edmonds’s
declaration that he is owed $2,233 in unpaid minimum wages. Dkt. 14-1 at 3.
Further, Edmonds allegedly complained about Maac Logistics’s pay practices,
but to no avail, and that Maac Logistics knowingly, willfully, and recklessly
carried out a “pattern or practice” of failing to pay him. Id. at 2, 5.
Those well-pleaded allegations support Edmonds’s FLSA claim. See, e.g.,
Montoya Garcia, 2021 WL 902494, at *5 (allegations that defendant knew
about 	but 	failed 	to 	investigate 	the 	legality 	of 	its 	payroll 	practices 	and
intentionally refused to pay FLSA-required wages were sufficient to support
default judgment on willfulness). 	He is entitled to default judgment against
Maac Logistics.
IV. 	A damages hearing is necessary to award relief.
The final issue concerns Edmonds’s request for unpaid wages, liquidated
damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 	“A default judgment does not establish
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damages, which must be supported by evidence.” United States v. Hernandez,
794 F. Supp. 3d 456, 473 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (citing Shipco, 814 F.2d at 1014).
The Court “may conduct hearings … when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it
needs to … determine the amount of damages.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(B). An
evidentiary hearing in unnecessary if those damages can be “determined with
certainty by reference to the pleadings and supporting documents ….” 	James
v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1993).
Edmonds seeks $2,233 in unpaid minimum wages, $2,233 in liquidated
damages, $3,120 in attorneys’ fees, and $510 in costs. Dkt. 14-1 at 3, Dkt. 14-
2 at 2. 	While Edmonds is entitled to unpaid minimum wages, liquidated
damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, a hearing and further submissions are
necessary to adequately quantify those figures.
A. 	Edmonds 	fails 	to 	substantiate 	his 	request 	for 	unpaid
minimum wages.
Edmonds seeks damages in the form of unpaid minimum wages. 	Dkt.
14-1 at 3. 	This comports with the FLSA, which provides that an employer in
violation of the statute’s minimum wage provision is “liable to the employee …
affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages ….” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
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Edmonds calculates that he is owed $2,233 in unpaid minimum wages
based on “good faith estimations of his hours worked.” 2 	Dkt. 14 at 4; Dkt. 14-
1 at 3. But he fails to show how he calculated this figure. He does not provide
his hours worked, his hourly rate, relevant dates, or other substantiation. See,
e.g., 	Orozco, 	2026 	WL 886295, 	at 	*5 	(awarding 	damages where plaintiff
provided wage damages table and affidavit as to amount of hours worked); Vela
v. M&G USA Corp., 2020 WL 421188, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2020) (plaintiff’s
declaration established unpaid hours and hourly rates). Edmonds’s conclusory
assertion is insufficient. 	See Holladay v. OTA Training, LLC, 2015 WL
5916440, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2015) (“The flaw in Plaintiff’s unpaid
minimum wages and overtime requests is that she provides nothing other than
her own sparse declarations in support.”). A hearing is therefore required.
B. 	Liquated damages cannot be resolved at this time.
The Court’s inability to resolve Edmonds’s unpaid wages at this juncture
also affects his request for liquidated damages. The FLSA allows plaintiffs to
recover 	an 	amount 	equal 	to 	their 	unpaid 	wages 	as 	liquidated 	damages.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 	This award is limited “if the employer shows … that the
2 The motion also states that Edmonds “calculate[ed] $8,354.78 in unpaid overtime
using 	a 	blended 	straight 	time 	rate 	of 	$17 	to 	$20 	per 	hour 	during 	two-year
employment.” Dkt. 14 at 4. That is plainly wrong because Edmonds has not asserted
a claim for overtime wages, and his declaration attempts to substantiate only a small
fraction of that figure.
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[FLSA violation] was in good faith and that [it] had reasonable grounds for
believing that [the violation] was not a violation of the [FLSA].” Id. § 260.
There is no indication that Maac Logistics acted in good faith or had
reasonable grounds for believing that its actions were lawful under the FLSA.
But because Edmonds has not substantiated his unpaid wages, the Court
cannot resolve the interrelated amount of liquidated damages at this stage.
C. 	The Court defers determining the appropriate quantum of
attorneys’ fees and costs.
Finally, Edmonds seeks attorneys’ fees and costs. 	Attorneys’ fees and
costs are recoverable under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Edmonds’s current fee application does not account for the evidentiary
hearing that will need to occur. 	So rather than resolve the issue of fees
piecemeal, the better course is to wait until all attorney work is completed
before evaluating the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees and costs.
The Court notes, however, that certain sums sought for costs are not
recoverable. 	“In FLSA cases, the only costs that can be awarded are those
listed 	in 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1920 	unless 	‘explicit 	statutory 	or 	contractual
authorization’ provides for recovery of others.” Fernandes v. Northline Enters.,
Inc., 2022 WL 3229510, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 25, 2022) (quoting Gagnon v.
United Technisource, Inc., 607 F.3d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 2010)), adopted by
2022 WL 3227872 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2022). This excludes costs for postage and
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private process servers, which Edmonds has included, see Dkt. 14 at 4. 	See
Smith W. Tex. Props., Ltd. v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 555 F. Supp. 3d 342,
348-49 (W.D. Tex. 2021) (disallowing postage costs); Marmillion v. Am. Int’l
Ins. Co., 381 F. App’x 421, 431 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (noting “absent
exceptional 	circumstances, 	the 	costs 	of 	a 	private 	process 	server 	are 	not
recoverable under Section 1920,” citing Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 257 (5th Cir. 1997)). 	But the ultimate quantum of
attorneys’ fees and costs will be deferred until Edmonds files an updated
application after the damages hearing occurs.
Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Alvin
Edmonds’s motion for default judgment (Dkt. 14) be GRANTED IN PART,
and that Defendant M.A.A.C. Logistics LLC be found liable for violating the
FLSA, but that Plaintiff’s recoverable damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs must
await a hearing.
It is further ORDERED that the damages hearing will be scheduled by
separate entry. 	After the hearing, the Court will set a deadline for filing a
renewed application for attorneys’ fees and costs.
It is further ORDERED that Edmonds’s duplicate motion for entry of
default (Dkt. 15) is DENIED AS MOOT.
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The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on May 20, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_______________________________________
Yvvvoon	n	nne Y. Hooo
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 4:25-cv-02270 Document 16 Filed 05/20/26 in TXSD Page 18 of 18