Martinez et al v. SN Servicing Corporation et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Raquel Vega Cervantes Martinez,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SN 	Servicing 	Corporation 	and
Family 	Benefit 	Life 	Insurance
Company,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-01270
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
On 	November 	10, 	2025, 	Defendant 	Family 	Benefit 	Life 	Insurance
Company filed a “Motion to Withdraw the Reference” to the undersigned judge.
Dkt. 70. The Court construes the motion as an objection to the order (Dkt. 14)
referring this case to the undersigned for all pretrial purposes under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). 	That objection should be overruled, and the motion be denied,
because it misconstrues the undersigned’s authority over this case.
The parties’ consent is required only if a U.S. Magistrate Judge is to
preside over a trial in the case and resolve all dispositive matters without
further District Judge review. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). It is not required before
a U.S. District Judge can refer a case to a U.S. Magistrate Judge to resolve non-
dispositive matters and issue recommendations over dispositive matters. 	See
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 12, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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id. § 636(b); Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The consent
of the parties is not required under this section.”); Yu v. Texas, 2025 WL
1030535, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7 2025) (“[O]rders referring cases to a magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 USC § 636(b)(1) do not require the consent of the
parties.”) (Eskridge, J.). That is what the District Judge did when entering an
order that referred this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). Dkt.
14. Defendant’s position on that referral is immaterial.
Moreover, Defendant’s motion improperly raises various challenges to
the undersigned’s prior rulings to which Defendant failed to timely object or
otherwise waived. 	For example, Defendant argues that it has not been
properly served. 	See Dkt. 70 at 11. 	But Defendant failed to raise the lack of
service of process or otherwise challenge personal jurisdiction when filing its
motion 	to 	dismiss. 	See 	Dkt. 	22 	(limiting 	contentions 	to 	Rule 	12(b)(6)
arguments; no mention of Rule 12(b)(2), (b)(4), or (b)(5)). All arguments about
lack of formal service of process have been waived. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
In addition, Defendant filed no objection to the September 26, 2025
Order (Dkt. 53) that granted Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend and denied
without prejudice both Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief and Defendant’s
motion to dismiss the previous pleading that Plaintiff was about to supersede
and moot with the amended complaint. 	None of those rulings conclusively
resolved a claim or defense. Indeed, the Court explicitly preserved Defendant’s
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right to renew its arguments for dismissal after receiving and reviewing
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. 	See Dkt. 53. 	Regardless, the 14-day window
for objecting to the Order has long since expired. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), (b)
(same 	deadline 	for 	objecting 	to 	rulings 	and 	recommendations 	on 	non-
dispositive and dispositive matters).
At bottom, Defendant cannot use an untenable objection to the referral
of this case as an end-run around the mechanisms and deadlines for objecting
to the undersigned’s rulings and recommendations, much less as a means to
raise yet other challenges that it has yet to properly present to this Court. 1 To
the extent that Defendant wishes to make other challenges to the merits of
Plaintiffs’ claims, Plaintiff Raquel Cervantes Martinez’s conduct, or Plaintiffs’
addition of any new parties, the appropriate means to address them is to raise
them in a standalone motion that complies with the federal rules and the
procedures of this Court. 	See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a) (deadline for filing a
motion to dismiss). An objection to a referral to which no objection can validly
be lodged is not the proper vehicle for relief.
1 	Defendant’s 	complaints 	about 	certain 	restrictions 	in 	the 	scheduling 	order—
including regarding motions to dismiss or for summary judgment—concern standard
requirements of the referring district judge in cases of this type. See U.S. Dist. Judge
Charles Eskridge, Forms 5a, 5b and 5c, Standard, Abbreviated and Class Action
Scheduling and Docket Control Orders, available at https://perma.cc/Y66E-S95F.
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Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED 	that Defendant
Family Benefit’s “Motion to Withdraw the Reference” (Dkt. 70) be DENIED.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on November 12, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
,
_____________________________________
Y	Y	Yvvvoonne Y. H	H	Hooo
United States Magistrate Judge
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