Collins v. Florida Department of Revenue et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JEFFREY LEE COLLINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE, et al.,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. H-25-1163
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case arises out of a 2008 administrative child-support order against Jeffrey Lee
Collins. (Docket Entry No. 6 at 2). Collins alleges that he has only one biological child. (Id.).
But the Florida Department of Revenue executed a child-support order establishing paternity for
two children. (Id. at 3).
In July 2024, Collins attempted to have both children take paternity tests. (Id. at 3–4).
Only one complied. (Id.). He argues, based on these facts, that Elvira Broomfield, the mother of
both children, knowingly misrepresented the paternity of her child. (Id. at 4).
In February 2025, the Department placed a levy on his accounts at the Navy Federal Credit
Union for $128,535.54 in past-due child support. (Id. at 5). The notice also warned Collins that
the Department planned to seize his assets, including funds in his accounts at the Navy Federal
Credit Union. (Id.).
In March 2025, Collins filed this lawsuit against the Department and Broomfield. (Docket
Entry Nos. 1, 6). The complaint alleges claims of intrinsic fraud, extrinsic fraud, and unjust
enrichment against both the Department and Elvira Broomfield, (Docket Entry No. 6 at 6, 10);
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 16, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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violations of the Due Process Clause, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act, and Florida’s Good Dad Act, as well as negligence and breach of fiduciary duty
claims, against the Department; and claims of fraud and misrepresentation against Broomfield.
(Id. at 8–9). Collins seeks a declaratory judgment (1) that the child-support order is void due to
fraud and lack of jurisdiction; and (2) that the enforcement actions, including levies and credit
reporting, were unlawful. (Id.). He seeks compensatory and punitive damages for financial and
emotional harm. (Id.). Collins separately moves to vacate the child-support order. (Docket Entry
No. 3).
Broomfield moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state
a claim. (Docket Entry No. 34). The Department has not yet moved to dismiss because it was
only recently served. (Docket Entry Nos. 53, 54). The Department’s motion to quash service is
pending. (Docket Entry No. 55).
In December 2025, Magistrate Judge Richard W. Bennett issued a Memorandum and
Recommendation on the motion to vacate and motion to dismiss. (Docket Entry No. 49). Judge
Bennett concluded that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case based on the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, because Collins’s claims are intertwined with the state-court order. (Id.
at 9–10). Collins objected to the Memorandum and Recommendation. (Docket Entry No. 50).
The court reviews the recommendations de novo. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). The
court adopts the Memorandum and Recommendation in part.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars part of Collins’s complaint. See Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Under the
doctrine, federal district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court
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losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). This principle is narrow
in application: federal courts cannot “modify or reverse state court judgments,” except when
authorized by Congress. Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir.
2004). The doctrine does not prevent federal courts from awarding “relief that would ameliorate
the effects of an adverse state court judgment.” Miroth v. Cnty. of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1154
(9th Cir. 2025); accord Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 383 (5th Cir. 2013).1
Based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court adopts Judge Bennett’s recommendation
to deny Collins’s motion to vacate. The motion requests relief this court does not have subject-
matter jurisdiction to grant. The motion to vacate, (Docket Entry No. 3), is denied.
The court also adopts in part Judge Bennett’s recommendation to dismiss the plaintiff’s
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Collins’s complaint requests relief that the court
does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to grant, based on claims—including intrinsic and
1 Truong collected instructive examples. Compare Scott v. Fortenberry, 278 Fed. App’x. 440, 441 (5th Cir.
2008) (Rooker-Feldman does not bar a § 1983 claim for damages arising from court reporter’s failure to
prepare a trial transcript and consequent delay of his criminal appeal because the suit did not challenge his
conviction); Drake v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 353 Fed. App’x. 901, 905 (5th Cir. 2009) (Rooker-
Feldman does not bar a state-court loser’s claim for damages as to state-court winner’s allegedly fraudulent
statements in state-court litigation); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Guy, 682 F.3d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 2012) (Rooker-
Feldman does not bar a claim that the state-court plaintiffs’ lawyers obtained a settlement judgment through
fraudulent misrepresentations); Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 162,
171 (3d Cir.2010) (Rooker-Feldman does not bar claims that the defendants had conspired to engineer its
loss in state court by exercising improper influence on state judges); McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d
382, 392–93, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2006) (Rooker-Feldman does not bar claims that state-court opponents
committed fraud and abuse of process, but does bar a claim that an adverse receivership order was illegal),
with Price v. Porter, 351 Fed. App’x. 925, 926–27 (5th Cir. 2009) (Rooker-Feldman bars due process and
equal protection claims that a state-court judge should have recused himself due to a conflict of interest);
Morris v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 443 Fed. App’x. 22, 24 (5th Cir. 2011) (Rooker-Feldman bars
a claim that a foreclosure judgment is unlawful “because [the plaintiff] is complaining of injuries caused
by the state court judgments”); Mosley v. Bowie County, 275 Fed. App’x. 327, 328–29 (5th Cir. 2008)
(Rooker-Feldman bars a claim that a state child-support order is void, but not a claim that state government
defendants violated the federal plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in the course of enforcing the order).
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extrinsic fraud—that the court does not have subject-jurisdiction to consider. For these reasons,
Broomfield’s motion to dismiss, (Docket Entry No. 34), is granted in part. Count 1 of Collins’s
complaint is dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The court does not adopt Judge Bennett’s recommendation to dismiss Collins’s complaint
in full, because this court has subject-matter jurisdiction over his requests for “relief that would
ameliorate the effects of” the child-support order, Miroth, 136 F.4th at 1154, and his claims that
seek redress for wrongs committed in the course of enforcing the order, see Truong, 717 F.3d at
383; Mosley, 275 Fed. App’x. at 328–29. Although other doctrines—such as preclusion or the
Heck bar—may defeat Collins’s claims, subject-matter jurisdiction does not.
Broomfield also moved to dismiss Collins’s claims against her for lack of federal-question
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. (Docket Entry No. 34 at 7–9). Broomfield’s argument
that the court lacks federal-question jurisdiction is irrelevant. Collins alleged diversity jurisdiction
instead: he alleged that he is a citizen of Texas, (Docket Entry No. 6 at 1), that both the Department
and Broomfield are citizens of Florida, (id. at 2); and that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000, (id. at 2, 5). The court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Collins’s remaining claims.
Broomfield’s argument that Collins failed to state a claim is successful, in part. Collins’s
fraud and misrepresentation claims do not appear viable. Those claims, under Florida law, require
“injury by the party acting in reliance” on allegedly fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.
Bostic v. Bodie, No. 24-10126, 2025 WL 1443834, at *9 (11th Cir. May 20, 2025) (per curiam)
(quoting In re Harris, 3 F.4th 1339, 1349 (11th Cir. 2021)).2 The facts alleged do not show that
Collins relied on the alleged misrepresentations about his paternity; the Department and other
2 The court assumes that Florida law applies because the relevant events appear to have taken place in
Florida. Collins does not specify under which common law he sues. The parties do not meaningfully
dispute the applicable law at this stage in the litigation.
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judicial officials did. By contrast, Collins’s unjust-enrichment claim is potentially viable, because
it requires payment for benefits voluntarily but inequitably accepted and retained. See id. at *8
(citing Tooltrend, Inc. v. CMT Utensili, SRL, 198 F.3d 802, 805 (11th Cir. 1999)). Broomfield
does not cite case law showing that Collins cannot state a claim for unjust enrichment based on a
fraudulently-obtained judgment. For these reasons, Broomfield’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, (Docket Entry No. 34), is granted in part.
Collins’s fraud and misrepresentation claims against Broomfield are dismissed, without
prejudice. The parties did not fully brief these issues. Broomfield mentions Collins’s common-
law claims in passing and did not address the elements of the relevant claims Collins asserted.
(See Docket Entry No. 34 at 8, 9). Litigants normally waive “cursory” arguments that are
undeveloped. ODonnell v. Harris County, No. H-16-cv-1414, 2025 WL 3033987, at *9 n.4 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 30, 2025). Dismissing with prejudice Collins’s complaint based on arguments not fully
raised in Broomfield’s brief would be inequitable. Collins requested leave to amend, (Docket
Entry No. 50 at 5–6), and Broomfield has not opposed that request. Leave to amend is to be
“freely” granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). For these reasons, Collins may amend his complaint.
In conclusion, Judge Bennett’s recommendations, (Docket Entry No. 49), are adopted in
part. Collins’s motion to vacate, (Docket Entry No. 3), is denied. Broomfield’s motion to dismiss,
(Docket Entry No. 34), is granted in part and denied in part. Collins’s intrinsic and extrinsic fraud
claims, as well as his requests to vacate or modify the state-court order, are dismissed, without
prejudice. Collins’s fraud and misrepresentation claims against Broomfield are dismissed, without
prejudice. Collins’s unjust enrichment claim against Broomfield remains, but Broomfield may
move to dismiss that claim after Collins amends his complaint. Collins must amend his complaint
no later than February 13, 2026. The case remains referred to Judge Bennett.
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SIGNED on January 16, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
________________________________
Lee H. Rosenthal
Senior United States District Judge
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