Perez v. Fort Bend Independent School District et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CRUZ MARIA PEREZ AS NEXT
FRIEND OF D.J., A MINOR
CHILD,
Plaintiff,
V.
FORT BEND INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-0609
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Defendant Fort Bend Independent School District’s
(FBISD’s) Motion for Partial Dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).1 ECF
12. Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition and FBISD has filed a Reply. ECF
20; ECF 26. Having considered the parties’ submissions and the law, the Court
recommends the Motion be granted for the reasons set forth below.
I. Background
This case involves allegations of sexual assault of child at school. At the
time of the events giving rise to the lawsuit, Plaintiff’s child, D.J., was a
five-year-old kindergarten student at Lula Belle Elementary School in the
1 The District Judge referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), the Cost and Delay Reduction Plan under the Civil Justice Reform Act,
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. ECF 22.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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FBISD. ECF 1 ¶2. D.J.’s teacher for the 2022-23 school year was Defendant
Luis Reyes Aguilar. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff alleges Aguilar sexually abused D.J. in
the classroom and bathroom at Lula Belle in addition to sexually abusing other
students by directing them to play inappropriate touching games. Id. ¶ 12-17.
D.J. disclosed the abuse to Plaintiff, her mother, in September 2022. Id. ¶18.
Plaintiff promptly reported the abuse to FBISD, but the District did not properly
investigate and did not place Aguilar on leave. Id. ¶ 20-22. As far as Plaintiff
is aware, FBISD did not report the incident to Child Protective Services (CPS)
because CPS never contacted her to interview D.J. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff removed
D.J. from Aguilar’s classroom. Id. ¶24. As a result of the abuse, D.J. began
exhibiting signs of trauma and was afraid to go to school, causing Plaintiff to
start homeschooling D.J. Id. ¶ 25-33.
Plaintiff filed the instant action as next friend of D.J. on February 11, 2025.
ECF 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts claims against both Aguilar and FBISD under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and against FBISD under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681-1688.2
FBISD now moves to dismiss the § 1983 claim against it for failure to state a claim
for liability pursuant to the standard set forth in Monell v. New York City Dep’t of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). ECF 12. FBISD also moves to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages under § 1983 and Title IX and for emotional
2 Plaintiff’s state law tort claims against Aguilar have been dismissed. ECF 24.
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distress damages under Title IX. Id. Plaintiff confirmed in her Response that she is
not seeking punitive damages against FBISD and is not seeking emotional distress
damages under Title IX. ECF 20 at 3 n.1. Therefore, the Court recommends
dismissal of the punitive and emotional distress damage claims based on Plaintiff’s
representations.
II. Rule 12(b)(6) Standards
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009); Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009). In reviewing a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this Court
“accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Alexander v. AmeriPro Funding, Inc., 848 F.3d 698, 701 (5th Cir.
2017) (citing Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464,
467 (5th Cir. 2004)). However, the court does not apply the same presumption to
conclusory statements or legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Generally, the court may consider only the allegations in the complaint and
any attachments thereto in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. If a motion to dismiss
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refers to matters outside the pleading it is more properly considered as a motion for
summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). However, the court may take judicial
notice of public documents and may also consider documents a defendant attaches
to its motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) if the documents are referenced in the
plaintiff’s complaint and central to the plaintiffs’ claims. See Norris v. Hearst Trust,
500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224
F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000); King v. Life Sch., 809 F. Supp. 2d 572, 579 n.1
(N.D. Tex. 2011).
In this case, Defendants have submitted FBISD “DBAA” Policies titled
“Employment Requirements and Restrictions Pre-Employment Reviews,” (ECF 12-
1); Aguilar’s Background Check (ECF 13, filed under seal); FBISD “FFH” Policies
titled “Student Welfare Freedom for Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation”
(ECF 12-3); and FBISD “Standard Operating procedures Title IX Formal Complaint
Handbook” (ECF 12-4). The Court could consider these Exhibits because they are
referenced in, and central to, Plaintiff’s Complaint. However, the Court has not
relied on any of the Exhibits in issuing this ruling. Therefore, there is no need to
convert the instant motion to a motion for summary judgment.
III. Legal Standards
Plaintiff has sued FBISD pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of D.J.’s
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and for violation of
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Title IX due to Aguilar’s sexual abuse. FBISD does not dispute that Defendant
Aguliar was a state actor and that he engaged in horrible conduct that deprived D.J.
of her Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity. However, FBISD contends
it cannot be held liable under section 1983 because Plaintiff cannot satisfy the
requirements of Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
A. Legal Standards Governing a § 1983 Claim for Violation of
Fourteenth Amendment Rights
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the rights to due process and equal
protection. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a mechanism for an individual to seek redress
for a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The essential elements of a §
1983 claim are: (1) a violation of a constitutional right (2) by a person acting under
color of state law. Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir.
2000) (holding that a § 1983 equal protection claim requires a plaintiff to plead a (1)
violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (2) by a person acting under
color of state law)). The Fifth Circuit recognizes that the substantive due process
component of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of school children to
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bodily integrity. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451–52 (5th Cir.
1994).
B. Legal Standards Governing Municipal Liability Under Monell
It is well-established that a municipality is not vicariously liable for the acts
of its employees. Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir.
2003) (stating “Municipal liability cannot be sustained under a theory of respondeat
superior” (citations omitted)). Therefore, in addition to the general § 1983 standards
set forth above, a due process claim against a school district or municipality must
plausibly allege (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker
(3) that was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right. Id.;
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001); see also S.J. as
Next Friend of N.J. v. Perryton Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 2:24-CV-168-Z-BR, 2024 WL
4906751, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 2024) (Fifth Circuit citations omitted)).
The Fifth Circuit recognizes three ways in which a plaintiff may establish a
municipal policy under Monell: (1) written policy statements, ordinances, or
regulations; (2) “a widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to
constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy;” and (3) a single decision
in “rare circumstances” when the specific act that forms the basis of the § 1983 claim
is performed by the final policy-making authority. Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph,
925 F.3d 209, 214–15 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted); see also Zarnow v. City of
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Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 168 (5th Cir. 2010) (recognizing Monell liability
based on a formal statement of a policymaker and a widespread practice so common
as to constitute a custom).
Under the second Webb category—a widespread practice so common that it
fairly represents municipal policy—the Fifth Circuit recognizes Monell actions
based on failure to train or supervise employees or the adoption of a deficient policy.
Est. of Coates v. Hawthorne, No. 24-40561, 2025 WL 2794278, at *7 (5th Cir. Oct.
1, 2025) (stating the elements of a Monell claim based on failure to discipline and
failure to train and/or supervise); Stapleton v. Lozano, 125 F.4th 743, 753 (5th Cir.
2025) (recognizing failure to train as a type of Monell claim, citing Hutcheson v.
Dallas Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021)).
IV. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Claims
A. Plaintiff fails to allege an official FBISD policy under Monell.
The School Board is the official policy maker for FBISD schools. See TEX.
EDUC. CODE §§ 23.01, 23.26; Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 1241, 1245 (5th
Cir. 1993) (holding that final policymaking authority in an independent school
district in Texas rests with the district's board of trustees). Plaintiff alleges that
Aguilar’s assaults on D.J. were the result of eight FBISD policies:3
3 The Complaint does not identify the School Board as the final policymaker for FBISD. See ECF
1. Plaintiff argues that it is not required to identify a specific policymaker at the pleading stage.
ECF 20 at 10. Identification of a policymaker is a required element of a § 1983 Monell claim, but
it is sufficient that Plaintiff pled FBISD as the policymaker without specifically identifying the
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Defendant Aguilar acted in accordance with FBISD’s policy, custom,
practice, and usage to (a) failing to fully and/or adequately investigate
reports of actual or suspected sexual abuse of students by teachers,
particularly Defendant Aguilar; (b) failing to appropriately screen or
perform background checks on applicants before licensing and hiring
them to be FBISD teachers; (c) failing to train, or failing to adequately
train, its employees on receiving, acting upon, or investigating reports
of sexually inappropriate behavior or reports of suspicion of sexually
inappropriate behavior by teachers; (d) failing to train, or failing to
adequately train, its employees on identifying signs of actual or
suspected sexually inappropriate behavior by teachers toward students;
(e) failing to train, or failing to adequately train, its employees on
identifying signs that a student has been, or has potentially been,
sexually abused by an adult; (f) failing to supervise its teachers’
behavior towards their students; (g) failing to appropriately discipline
and/or investigate teachers and/or staff who engage in, are accused of
engaging in, and/or are suspected of engaging in sexually inappropriate
behavior with students; and (h) otherwise ignoring student, parent, and
teacher’s safety concerns when FBISD teachers are alleged or
suspected of sexually assaulting students.
ECF 1 ¶80. The FBSID policies or customs alleged by Plaintiff fall into four general
categories:
1. Failure to Investigate—identified in (a), (g) and (h) above;
2. Failure to Screen—identified in (c) above;
3. Failure to Supervise—identified in (f) above; and
4. Failure to Train—identified in (b), (d), and (e) above.
See also, e.g., id. ¶54 (alleging that “[i]t is highly predictable and plainly obvious
that the failure to adequately screen FBISD teacher applicants, to adequately train
FBISD employees . . . and to adequately supervise, discipline, and/or investigate
Board. S.J. as Next Friend of N.J., 2024 WL 4906751, at *6.
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FBISD teachers accused of suspected sexually inappropriate behavior with students
. . . would cause . . . D.J. to be deprived of their constitutional right of bodily integrity
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
Plaintiff does not allege, and it would be absurd to suggest, that FBISD has
promulgated written policies, ordinances, or regulations authorizing Aguilar’s
sexual abuse of students. Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues in its Response that her
Monell claim “concerns FBISD’s written policy statements.” ECF 20 at 10. Despite
this argument, it is patently clear from the Complaint that Plaintiff bases her claim
on the second type of policy recognized in Webb, i.e., a widespread practice of
failing to implement sufficient policies and/or failing to abide by existing policies
and procedures regarding screening applicants, training, etc. 4 See ECF 1 ¶86
(alleging FBISD acted with deliberate indifference by “deliberating and
intentionally [choosing] not to implement policies, customs, practices, and usages
that would prevent and/or mitigate sexual abuse of female minor students by adult
staff”); see also id ¶¶ 55-56; see also Est. of Coates, 2025 WL 2794278, at *7
(explaining that the second type of policy identified in Webb includes a policy of
failure to train).
“A customary policy consists of actions that have occurred for so long and
4 The third type of policy—a single action by the final policymaker—is not implicated under the
facts of this case.
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with such frequency that the course of conduct demonstrates the governing body's
knowledge and acceptance of the disputed conduct.” Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 168.
Plaintiff alleges no facts showing FBISD’s failures to screen, train, supervise, and
investigate are so widespread and common that they rise to the level of an official
policy. Plaintiff makes only conclusory allegations that such widespread practices
exist. This is insufficient to state a claim under Monell. See Spiller v. City of Texas
City, Police Dep't, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) ("The description of a policy or
custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation, moreover,
cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.").
Although Plaintiff offers a few different theories in support of her § 1983
claim—that FBISD failed to adopt a policy; adopted a deficient policy; or failed to
follow policy—none are supported by sufficient factual allegations. Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to identify any policy FBISD has failed to adopt. 5 Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to allege the ways in which FBISD’s policies regarding training,
supervision, screening, and/or investigating are deficient and fails to make any
"direct references to the particular inadequacies" of the current policies. See Zarnow,
614 at 170. To the extent Plaintiff claims FBISD employees routinely do not follow
5 FBISD attached as Exhibits to its motion policies regarding investigating sexual abuse claims,
performing background checks, and training and supervising employees, as well as a copy of the
background check run on Aguilar. ECF 12-1 – 12-4; ECF 13. As noted above, the Court does not
consider these Exhibits in the context of this Motion to Dismiss. However, these Exhibits are
relevant to the decision to deny leave to amend.
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FBISD policies, the Complaint fails to plead facts indicating FBISD knows the
polices are so routinely flouted as to make lack of compliance the de facto policy.
Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 168.
It is simply not enough to allege, as Plaintiff has here, that because an incident
occurred there must be a policy or custom that caused it. Ratliff v. Aransas Cty.,
Texas, 948 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that to plausibly plead a practice
“so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law, [a plaintiff]
must do more than describe the incident that gave rise to [her] injury.”). In sum,
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plead an official policy that was the moving force
behind the deprivation of D.J.’s constitutional rights, and thus her § 1983 claim
against FBISD should be dismissed.
B. Plaintiff also fails to allege sufficient facts showing FBISD acted
with deliberate indifference.
In order to hold a municipality liable under § 1983, “a plaintiff must show
‘[a]ctual or constructive knowledge of [a] custom’ that is ‘attributable to the
governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body ha[s]
delegated policy-making authority.’” J.T. v. Uplift Educ., 679 F. Supp. 3d 540, 558
(N.D. Tex. 2023) (citing Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir.
1984)). Where, as here, a plaintiff’s claim of municipal liability is based on a
deficient or inadequate policy, the pleadings must state facts tending to show: (1)
an inadequate policy (2) directly caused the constitutional violation and (3) the
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policymakers were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm. Sanders-Burns v.
City Of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2010); Kitchen v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., 759
F.3d 468, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (abrogated on other grounds) (addressing claim of
inadequate training policies); James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir.
2009) (holding that the official policy or custom underlying a plaintiff’s § 1983
claim must itself be unconstitutional or must have been adopted “with deliberate
indifference to the known or obvious fact that such constitutional violations would
result”). Deliberate indifference is a “stringent standard of fault requiring proof that
a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.”
McWilliams v. City of Houston, No. 21-20369, 2022 WL 17337820, at *4 (5th Cir.
Nov. 30, 2022) (quoting Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 410-11 (1997)).
Plaintiff argues that “a failure to adopt a policy can be deliberately indifferent
when it is obvious that the likely consequences of not adopting a policy will be a
deprivation of constitutional rights.” ECF 20 at 16 (citing Doe v. Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist., No. 5:16-CV-01233, 2017 WL 11825006, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 24,
2017). But Plaintiff fails to plead that FBISD’s decisionmakers—the School
Board—had actual or constructive notice that a particular inadequacy or omission in
FBISD's policies was likely to cause a teacher to violate a child’s constitutional right
to bodily integrity through sexual abuse. See J.T. v. Uplift Educ., 679 F. Supp. 3d at
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559. Because there is no officially promulgated policy in this case, Plaintiff must
plead facts showing the School Board had actual or constructive knowledge that its
policies were deficient. Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 761 (5th
Cir. 1993) (holding that the deliberate indifference standard “preclude[s] a finding
of liability on the basis of negligence, that is, on what the Board should have
known” (emphasis in original)).
Plaintiff attempts to satisfy the knowledge requirement of her Monell claim
by alleging “upon information and belief” that “Aguilar had been “previously
convicted of sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child.” ECF
1 ¶43. This allegation is devoid of any facts explaining the basis for Plaintiff’s
“information and belief.” The Court finds this singular, unsupported allegation
insufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden.
In sum, Plaintiff’s position is that FBISD should be held responsible for the
intentional, horrific conduct of its employee. While the desire to hold FBISD liable
for that conduct is understandable, Monell precludes respondeat superior liabilty.
The Supreme Court has made it plain that “municipal liability must be predicated
upon a showing of ‘fault,’ not merely ‘responsibility.’” Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep.
Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 757 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 391 (1989)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant FBISD
cannot survive FBISD’s Motion to Dismiss.
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C. Leave to amend should be denied.
Plaintiff has not requested leave to amend. See ECF 20. In this way, Plaintiff
has indicated that she has pled her best case. Wiggins v. Louisiana State Univ.-
Health Care Servs. Div., 710 F. App'x 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2017) (explaining that a
plaintiff “may indicate she has not pleaded her best case by stating material facts
that she would include in an amended complaint to overcome the deficiencies
identified by the court.”); Spiller, 130 F.3d at 167 (denial of leave to amend approved
where plaintiff stood on the sufficiency of her pleadings and did not offer a sufficient
amended complaint). Therefore, the Court finds that amendment would be futile
and recommends dismissal with prejudice.
V. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS that FBISD’s
Partial Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. The Court further RECOMMENDS that
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, as well as her claims for punitive and emotional distress
damages, against FBISD be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk of the Court shall send copies of the memorandum and
recommendation to the respective parties, who will then have fourteen days to file
written objections, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file written
objections within the time period provided will bar an aggrieved party from attacking
the factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
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Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on
other grounds.
Christina A. Bryan
United States Magistrate Judge
Signed on January 19, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
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