Lynch v. O'Malley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CAMILLA L.,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-366
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Camilla L. (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against Defendant
Frank Bisignano1 (“Commissioner”) seeking review of the denial of benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act. (ECF Nos. 1, 15). Pending before the
Court2 are the Parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. 	(ECF Nos. 15,
19).3 Based on a review of the motions, arguments, and relevant law, the Court
RECOMMENDS Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
19) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15)
1 Frank Bisignano was sworn in as the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7,
2025. Bisignano is “automatically substituted” as the defendant in this suit. FED . R. CIV. P.
25(d); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection
shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner
of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
2 On March 11, 2025, this case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF
No. 4). 3 The Commissioner’s filing is docketed as a “response” to Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment but it is also captioned as the Commissioner’s own motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 19).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 19, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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be DENIED. 	The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS the Commissioner’s
decision be AFFIRMED and the case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff filed a claim for disability insurance benefits on August 31,
2021, alleging disability starting on May 31, 2021. 	(ECF No. 5-3 at 20).4
Plaintiff’s claims were initially denied by the Social Security Administration
on September 27, 2022, and again on reconsideration on February 15, 2024.
(Id.). 	On 	March 	13, 	2024, 	Plaintiff 	requested 	a 	hearing 	before 	an
Administrative Law Judge. 	(Id.). 	On August 20, 2024, Administrative Law
Judge Kelly Matthews (the “ALJ”) held a telephonic hearing. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff
was represented by counsel at the hearing. (Id.). Byron Pettingill, a vocational
expert (“VE”), appeared and testified at the hearing. (Id.).
On September 19, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision, finding Plaintiff not
disabled at Step Five.5 	(Id. at 29–30). 	At Step One, the ALJ found Plaintiff
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 31, 2021, the alleged
onset date. (Id. at 22). At Step Two, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the following
4 The Administrative Record in this case can be found at ECF No. 5.
5 In considering a disability claim, an ALJ must conduct a five-step evaluation that
examines: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets
or equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;
(4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5)
whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. 	Masterson v.
Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
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severe impairments: “renal cell carcinoma, obesity, hypertension, bilateral hip
degenerative 	joint 	disease, 	lumbar 	spondylosis/degenerative 	disc 	disease,
cervical degenerative disc disease, and left shoulder degenerative joint disease
(20 CFR 404.1520(c)).” 	(Id. at 22). 	At Step Three, the ALJ found Plaintiff:
“does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).”
(Id. at 24). 	The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the Residual Functional
Capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she
can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffold, she can occasionally
climb ramps and stairs, frequently balance, occasionally stoop,
kneel, crouch, and crawl. She can frequently reach in all directions
with the left upper extremity.
(Id. at 24). 	At Step Four, the ALJ found Plaintiff “is unable to perform any
past relevant work.” (Id. at 28). At Step Five, the ALJ found there were jobs
that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform—such 	as a 	security 	guard, gait [sic] guard,6 merchant patroller
business services—and therefore Plaintiff was not disabled as defined under
the Social Security Act. (Id. at 29).
6 The ALJ’s written decision refers to “gait guard.” (ECF No. 5-3 at 29). However, the
cited Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) number, 372.667-030, corresponds to “gate
guard.” The Court therefore construes the reference as a typographical error.
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Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council and the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review on November 22, 2024. (Id. at 2). Thus, the ALJ’s
decision represents the Commissioner’s final decision in the case. See Sims v.
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106–07 (2000).
II. 	Legal Standard
The Court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner on a Social
Security disability claim is exceedingly deferential. Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d
600, 602 (5th Cir. 2012). “[R]eview of Social Security disability cases ‘is limited
to two inquiries: (1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the proper
legal standard.’” Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Perez 	v. 	Barnhart, 	415 	F.3d 	457, 	461 	(5th 	Cir. 	2005)). 	When 	the
Commissioner’s decision is reached by applying improper legal standards, the
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 	Singletary v. Bowen, 798
F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion’ and constitutes
‘more than a mere scintilla’ but ‘less than a preponderance’ of evidence.”
Hardman v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Newton v. Apfel,
209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000)). “‘Any findings of fact by the Commissioner
which are supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.’” 	Heck v. Colvin,
674 F. App’x 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Taylor, 706 F.3d at 602).
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Even 	so, 	judicial 	review 	must 	not 	be 	“so 	obsequious 	as 	to 	be
meaningless.” 	Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotations
omitted). 	The substantial evidence standard is not a rubber stamp for the
Commissioner’s 	decision 	and 	involves 	more 	than 	a 	search 	for 	evidence
supporting the Commissioner’s findings. Singletary, 798 F.2d at 822–23; Cook
v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985). Rather, a reviewing court must
scrutinize the record as a whole, taking into account whatever fairly detracts
from the substantiality of evidence supporting the Commissioner’s findings.
Singletary, 798 F.2d at 823. The court “‘may not reweigh the evidence . . . , nor
try the issues de novo, nor substitute [its] judgment for the [Commissioner’s],
even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s] decision.’”
Johnson v. Colvin, 595 F. App’x 443, 444 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harrell v.
Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988)).
III. 	Discussion
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in (1) evaluating Plaintiff’s mental
impairments; (2) finding Plaintiff’s impairment of diabetic neuropathy as non-
severe; (3) determining Plaintiff’s RFC because she failed to accommodate all
of Plaintiff’s impairments and assess medical source statements; and (4)
considering whether Plaintiff has transferable skills to other work in the
national economy. 	(ECF No. 15 at 8). 	The Commissioner argues these
arguments fail because the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence in the record
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in accordance with the applicable regulations in arriving at her RFC finding.
(ECF No. 19 at 3–4). The Court will address each argument in turn.
A. Plaintiff’s Mental Impairments
First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s mental
impairments “because the ALJ failed to evaluate the impairments as required
by the regulations” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. (ECF No. 15 at 8). Plaintiff
contends 	that, 	although 	the 	ALJ 	acknowledged 	Plaintiff 	has 	“medically
determinable mental impairments of depression and generalized anxiety” and
included “specific finding[s] as to the degree of limitation in each of the
functional areas” described in paragraph (c) of section 404.1520a, the ALJ did
not meet the regulation’s other requirements. 	(Id. at 9). 	Namely, that
according to section 404.1520a(e)(2), the ALJ “must show the significant
history, including examination and laboratory findings, and the functional
limitations that were considered in reaching a conclusion about the severity of
the mental impairment(s).” 	(Id.). 	Additionally, because the ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s mental impairments of anxiety result in “mild” limitations in the
domain of concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace, Plaintiff contends
the ALJ erred by not accounting for these limitations in the RFC. 	(Id. at 10).
Further, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s mental
impairments result in only “mild” limitations is not supported by the record
because state agency doctor Scott Spoor found evidence Plaintiff suffered from
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anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD), and the ALJ failed to
recognize this and did not obtain additional psychiatric evidence. 	(Id.).
Similarly, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in assigning persuasiveness to
certain medical opinions, such as those by state agency psychologist Robert
White and consultative physician Dr. Frank Ponce, because those opinions are
deficient in assessing Plaintiff’s mental impairments. (Id. at 11–12).
“The steps outlined in § 404.1520 apply to the evaluation of physical and
mental impairments.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(a). If the ALJ determines that a
claimant has “a medically determinable mental impairment(s),” the ALJ “must
specify the symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings that substantiate the
presence of the impairment(s) and document [their] findings in accordance
with paragraph (e)” of § 404.1520a. 	Id. at § 404.1520a(b)(1). 	The ALJ “must
then rate the degree of functional limitation resulting from the impairment(s)
in accordance with paragraph (c) of [§ 404.1520a] and record [their] findings
as set out in paragraph (e)[.]” 	Id. at § 404.1520a(b)(2). 	The four broad
functional 	areas 	in 	which 	the 	ALJ 	will 	rate 	the 	degree 	of 	a 	claimant’s
functional limitation are: (1) understand, remember, or apply information; (2)
interact with others; (3) concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and (4) adapt
or manage oneself. 	Id. § 404.1520a(c)(3). 	When the ALJ rates the degree of
limitation in these areas, the ALJ uses the following five-point scale: None,
mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. 	Id. at § 404.1520a(c)(4). 	If the ALJ
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rates the degrees of limitation as “none” or “mild,” that “will generally conclude
that [the] impairment(s) is not severe, unless the evidence otherwise indicates
that there is more than a minimal limitation in [claimant’s] ability to do basic
work activities.” Id. at § 404.1520a(d)(1).
“[W]ithout a finding of severe mental impairments, an ALJ is not
required to make an RFC assessment.” Mendoza v. Saul, No. 1:20-cv-104, 2021
WL 4555812, at *7 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 2021), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 1:20-cv-00104, 2021 WL 4555197 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2021) (citing
§ 404.1520a(d); Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 705 (5th Cir. 2001) (“If the degree
of functional loss falls below a specified level in each of the four areas, the ALJ
must find the impairment ‘not severe,’ which generally concludes the analysis
and terminates the proceedings.”)). 	“When assessing RFC, all impairments,
even those determined not to be severe, must be considered. 	However,
consideration does not require incorporation.” Mendoza, 2021 WL 4555812, at
*7. 	ALJs are not bound by findings made by State agency or other program
physicians and psychologists, but they may not ignore these opinions and must
explain the weight given to the opinions in their decisions. Johnson v. Astrue,
No. 10-cv-422, 2010 WL 5437262, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2010). 	“[A]n ALJ
is not required to adopt a medical opinion verbatim.” Elizabeth A. H. v. Dudek,
No. 4:24-cv-00035, 2025 WL 2429036, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2025). 	The
Court finds the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s mental limitations, when taken
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with the evidence discussed below, comported with the requirements of §
404.1520a.
Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s “medically determinable mental
impairment of depression and generalized anxiety does not cause more than
minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform basic mental work
activities and is therefore nonsevere.” 	(ECF No. 5-3 at 23). 	In making this
finding, the ALJ explicitly followed § 404.1520a—the ALJ identified the
medically 	determinable 	mental 	impairments, 	rated 	Plaintiff’s 	degree 	of
limitation in each of the four functional areas, and documented those findings
in the written decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(b)–(e). Specifically, the ALJ
found “no limitation” in Plaintiff’s ability to understand, remember, or apply
information; interact with others; or adapt or manage oneself, and only a “mild
limitation” in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace because Plaintiff
“reported that she has pain, and she has to sleep during the day due to
medication 	and 	fatigue.” 	(ECF 	No. 	5-3 	at 	23). 	Nonetheless, 	the 	ALJ
“considered all of [Plaintiff’s] medically determinable impairments, including
those that are not severe, when assessing [her] residual functional capacity.”
(Id.).
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her mental
impairments 	because 	the 	RFC 	does 	not 	include 	mental 	limitations 	is
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unavailing. Where, as here, the ALJ finds a mental impairment “non-severe”
after applying the special technique of § 404.1520a, the ALJ is not required to
include corresponding mental limitations in the RFC absent evidence that the
impairment 	causes 	more 	than 	minimal 	work-related 	limitations. 	See
Mendoza, 2021 WL 4555812, at *7 (“[T]he ALJ found Mendoza’s mental
limitations to be mild; without a finding of severe mental impairments, an ALJ
is not required to make an RFC assessment”). Although the ALJ was required
to consider all impairments—severe and non-severe—when formulating the
RFC, “consideration does not mandate incorporation.” Id.
The 	ALJ 	also 	reasonably 	relied 	on 	the 	opinion 	of 	state 	agency
psychologist Dr. White, who opined Plaintiff had no limitations in three
functional areas and only a mild limitation in concentration, persistence, or
pace, which indicated a non-severe mental impairment. 	(ECF No. 5-3 at 28).
The ALJ found this opinion persuasive and explained that it was supported by
the record, including Plaintiff’s testimony that she is taking medication for
anxiety and depression and medication to help her sleep. 	(Id.). 	Additionally,
although the ALJ did not assign persuasiveness to consultative examiner Dr.
Ponce’s opinion because he “did not give a function-by-function assessment of
[Plaintiff’s] ability to perform work related activity,” the ALJ explained “some
of the observations noted in [his] report are consistent with the medical
records.” 	(Id.). 	And though some state agency medical opinions opined there
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was insufficient evidence to make a determination in this matter, the ALJ did
not assign persuasiveness to such opinions (Id. at 27–28), and he was not
required to obtain additional psychiatric evidence or further develop the record
where substantial evidence supported the non-severity finding. 	See S.K. v.
O’Malley, No. 3:24-cv-092, 2024 WL 2162777, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2024)
(concluding substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision and he was
therefore not required to obtain a medical source statement or additional
expert testimony, where the ALJ evaluated Plaintif’s mental limitations by
discussing Plaintiff’s mental health treatment, providers’ opinions, and her
own testimony and reports).
As such, the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in evaluating
Plaintiff’s mental impairments, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
finding that Plaintiff’s depression and anxiety were non-severe.
B. Plaintiff’s Diabetic Neuropathy (Step 2)
Second, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in finding that her diabetes
mellitus with resulting neuropathy is not a severe impairment. 	(ECF No. 15
at 14). 	Plaintiff contends that the medical evidence establishes diabetic
neuropathy 	affecting 	her 	lower 	and 	upper 	extremities 	and 	that 	this
impairment meets the severity standard under Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d
1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) (explaining an impairment can be considered as not
severe only if it is a slight abnormality having such minimal effect on the
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individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s
ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience).7 (Id. at 14–
17). Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ’s failure to find diabetic neuropathy
severe was prejudicial because the RFC does not adequately account for
limitations in standing and walking, and that proper consideration would have
limited Plaintiff to sedentary work. (Id. at 17–18).
At Step Two, “the claimant bears the burden of showing that he has a
severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the
claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” McMillan v.
Saul, No. 18-cv-0037, 2019 WL 4601862, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2019). “The
step two requirement that the claimant have a severe impairment is generally
considered to be ‘a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless
claims.’” Id. (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996)).
“But because the regulations require a claimant to show only ‘a
severe’ impairment, that is, one severe impairment in order to
avoid a denial of benefits at step two, the failure to find a particular
impairment severe at step two is not reversible in and of itself as
long as the ALJ finds that at least one other impairment is severe.”
Id. (emphasis in original). 	“However, even if an impairment is found non-
severe at step two, the ALJ must still ‘consider the limiting effects of all [a
7 See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (“If you do not have any impairment or combination
of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not
disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and work experience.”)
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claimant’s] impairment(s), even those that are not severe, in determining
[RFC].’” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(e)). 	Put differently, the failure to
designate a particular impairment as severe is not reversible error so long as
the ALJ finds at least one severe impairment and proceeds with the sequential
evaluation. 	See Jodie C. v. Berryhill, No. 3:18-cv-1687, 2019 WL 3101689, at
*15 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:18-cv-
1687, 2019 WL 3081538 (N.D. Tex. July 15, 2019) (“Moreover, even if the ALJ
had committed error, the Fifth Circuit has stated that a failure to make a
severity finding at step two is not reversible error when an ALJ continues with
the sequential evaluation process.”).
Here, the ALJ found multiple severe impairments and proceeded beyond
Step Two. (ECF No. 5-3 at 22–24). The ALJ explicitly acknowledged Plaintiff’s
diabetes mellitus as a medically determinable impairment but found it non-
severe, explaining that it was “controlled with medication throughout the
record” and caused “no more than minimally vocational relevant limitations.”
(Id. at 23; see also ECF No. 5-10 at 212–31; 5-12 at 257–73).8 To that end, the
ALJ explained:
To be a severe impairment the medical evidence must establish
more 	than 	a 	slight 	abnormality 	or 	combination 	of 	slight
abnormalities that would have more than a minimal effect on an
8 	The 	ALJ 	also 	expressly 	cited 	Social 	Security 	Ruling 	(SSR) 	85-28 	(medical
impairments that are not severe) and articulated the correct severity standard. (ECF No. 5-
3 at 23).
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individual’s ability to work. 	The impairment must significantly
limit 	a 	person’s 	physical 	or 	mental 	ability 	to 	do 	basic 	work
activities . . . for a continuous period of at least twelve months. The
undersigned find that the claimant’s . . . diabetes mellitus . . . are
“non-severe” . . . in that they cause no more than minimally
vocational relevant limitations.
(Id. at 23). Accordingly, unlike a case in which the ALJ misapplies the severity
standard, here the ALJ applied the proper legal framework. 	Moreover, even
assuming arguendo that the ALJ should have found diabetic neuropathy
severe at Step Two, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate reversible error because the
ALJ 	explicitly 	“considered 	all 	of 	the 	claimant’s 	medically 	determinable
impairments, 	including 	those 	that 	are 	not 	severe, 	when 	assessing 	the
claimant’s residual functional capacity.” (Id.). See also Rodriguez v. Kijakazi,
No. 22-cv-357, 2023 WL 5808388, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 22-cv-357, 2023 WL 5814389 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 7,
2023) (“Moreover, even assuming that the ALJ erred in finding that ‘diabetic
neuropathy’ was not a medically determinable impairment, such error was
harmless 	because 	the 	ALJ 	found, 	at 	step 	two, 	that 	at 	least 	one 	other
impairment is a severe, medically determinable impairment; considered, in
assessing the RFC, Rodriguez’s diabetic neuropathy; and ultimately found, at
step four, that Rodriguez is not disabled.”).
Plaintiff relies on McMillian v. Saul to argue that the ALJ’s step-two
finding was reversible error; however, that reliance is misplaced. (ECF No. 15
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at 17; ECF No. 20 at 2). 	In McMillian, the court remanded because the ALJ
both 	misstated 	the 	Stone 	severity 	standard 	and 	failed 	to 	consider 	the
functional effects of the omitted impairments in the RFC. McMillian, 2019 WL
4601862, at *4–6. 	Here, by contrast, the ALJ articulated the correct severity
standard and incorporated functional limitations into the RFC that reasonably
account for Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms, including pain, fatigue, and lower-
extremity limitations. 	(See ECF No. 5-3 at 26 (“She can perform light work
occasionally stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling due to pain despite
having a full range of motion she reported ongoing tenderness on examination.
. . . She has difficulty with walking. She leans to the left when she walks but
can frequently balance and occasionally climb ramps and stairs. 	She should
never climb ladders ropes and scaffolds.”)).
Indeed, the RFC limits Plaintiff to light work with significant postural
and 	exertional 	restrictions, 	including 	never 	climbing 	ladders, 	ropes, 	or
scaffolds; occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; and occasional stooping,
kneeling, crouching, and crawling. (ECF No. 5-3 at 24). These limitations are
consistent with the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s overall physical condition,
including lower-extremity symptoms, and undermine Plaintiff’s assertion that
the 	ALJ 	failed 	to 	account 	for 	the 	functional 	effects 	of 	neuropathy.
“[C]onsideration does not require incorporation.” Mendoza, 2021 WL 4555812,
at *7.
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Plaintiff’s argument that she should have been limited to sedentary work
amounts to a request that the Court reweigh the medical evidence, which it
may not do. 	Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1988). 	Although
the record contains evidence of diabetic neuropathy, substantial evidence also
supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the impairment did not impose greater
functional limitations than those reflected in the RFC. Conflicts in the medical
evidence are for the ALJ—not the Court—to resolve. Anthony v. Sullivan, 954
F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992) (“This Court may not reweigh the evidence or try
the issues de novo. 	Rather, conflicts in the evidence are for the Secretary to
resolve.”) (citations omitted).
As such, because the ALJ applied the correct legal standards at Step
Two, proceeded beyond that step, and considered Plaintiff’s diabetes mellitus
when formulating the RFC, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate reversible error.
C. Plaintiff’s RFC Determination
Third, 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC 	determination 	is 	not
supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate
medical 	source 	statements 	and 	failed 	to 	accommodate 	all 	of 	Plaintiff’s
impairments, 	including 	pain, 	fatigue, 	neuropathy-related 	symptoms, 	and
alleged limitations in standing, walking, and reaching. (ECF No. 15 at 18–26).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of treating
physician Dr. Guidry, relied too heavily on state agency consultants, and failed
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to incorporate Plaintiff’s complaints of urinary frequency and shoulder pain
into the RFC. (Id. 20–25). The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly
evaluated the opinion evidence under the applicable regulations and that the
RFC reflects a reasonable assessment of Plaintiff’s functional limitations based
on the record. (ECF No. 19 at 8–15).
An RFC determination represents “the most [a claimant] can still do
despite [her] limitations.” 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). 	The ALJ maintains
discretion in determining the weight given to the medical evidence and is “not
required to incorporate limitations in the RFC that he did not find to be
supported in the record.” 	Wells v. Kijakazi, No. 4:20-cv-3167, 2022 WL
17548603, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2022) (quoting Fleming v. Saul, No. 19-cv-
701, 2020 WL 4601669, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2020)). 	Under the current
regulatory framework, no medical opinion is entitled to controlling weight;
instead, the ALJ evaluates persuasiveness primarily based on supportability
and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), (b)(2).
Here, 	as 	previously 	discussed, 	the 	ALJ 	conducted 	a 	detailed 	RFC
analysis 	and 	evaluated 	Plaintiff’s 	testimony, 	objective 	imaging, 	physical
examinations, 	treatment 	history, 	and 	opinion 	evidence, 	and 	ultimately
concluded that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform a restricted range of
light work with significant postural and exertional limitations. 	(ECF No. 5-3
at 24–28).
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Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinion of
treating 	physician 	Dr. 	Guidry. 	(ECF 	No. 	15 	at 	20–23). 	While 	Plaintiff
emphasizes the treating relationship, the regulations do not require deference
to treating-source opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). The ALJ explained
that Dr. Guidry’s opinion was unpersuasive because it was “not consistent with
the 	mild 	findings 	of 	the 	consultative 	examination” 	and 	contained 	vague
terminology that was not well supported by objective findings in the record.
(ECF No. 5-3 at 27). 	The ALJ further found the opinion inconsistent with
examination findings, showing Plaintiff “had a normal range of motion in all
directions,” “[h]er strength and overall tone were normal,” and “[s]urgery was
not warranted” regarding her spine, “only conservative treatment.” (Id. at 25–
26; see also ECF No. 5-12 at 35–39). The ALJ found the state agency medical
opinions of Dr. Ponce and Dr. White more reliable because they were supported
by record evidence and consistent with the overall medical record. 	(ECF No.
5-3 at 27–28). 	Although Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s weighing of the
opinions, “conflicts in the evidence are for the [ALJ] to resolve,” and the Court
may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. 	Anthony, 954
F.2d at 295. 	Moreover, the ALJ was not required to adopt any opinion
verbatim and was entitled to craft an RFC that differed from all medical
opinions so long as it was supported by substantial evidence. See Elizabeth A.
H., 2025 WL 2429036, at *4–5.
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Plaintiff also contends that the RFC fails to accommodate her pain,
fatigue, and neuropathy-related symptoms. (ECF No. 15 at 25–26). However,
the RFC includes multiple limitations that directly address these complaints,
including restrictions on climbing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and
reaching, as well as a limitation to light work. (ECF No. 5-3 at 24). The ALJ
explicitly discussed Plaintiff’s reports of pain, difficulty walking, tenderness on
examination, and fatigue, but concluded that the objective evidence and
treatment history did not support greater limitations. (Id. at 24–26). An ALJ’s
decision to discount subjective complaints is entitled to deference where, as
here, the ALJ provides specific reasons supported by the record. See Leslie G.
v. Kijakazi, No. 5:21-cv-202, 2023 WL 2536111, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2023)
(“[A]n ALJ’s analysis regarding a plaintiff’s subjective complaints is ‘entitled
[to] considerable deference,’ so long as the ALJ ‘weighs the objective medical
evidence 	and 	assigns 	articulated 	reasons 	for 	discrediting 	the 	[plaintiff's
complaints].’”); Smith v. Colvin, No. 1:14-cv-195, 2016 WL 762693, at *15 (N.D.
Miss. Feb. 25, 2016) (“So long as the ALJ articulates credible and plausible
reasons for rejecting a claimant’s subjective complaint and there is substantial
evidence to support the reasons given, the court will not upset the ALJ’s
credibility findings.”).
Plaintiff’s argument that the RFC should have limited her to sedentary
work again asks the Court to reweigh the evidence. The existence of evidence
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that could support a more restrictive RFC does not establish reversible error
where substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. 	See Acuna v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-cv-00238, 2022 WL 1216573, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
23, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-cv-00238, 2022 WL
884482 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2022) (“In sum, while there is some evidence in the
record to support Acuna’s claim that the RFC determination should have
included greater restrictions, this Court is not allowed to reweigh the evidence,
and the substantial evidence standard requires only more than a scintilla, but
less than a preponderance, of evidence in support of the ALJ’s conclusion.”);
McCray v. Saul, No. 4:20-cv-3, 2021 WL 933859, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 11,
2021), aff’d sub nom. McCray v. Kijakazi, No. 21-60401, 2022 WL 301544 (5th
Cir. Feb. 1, 2022) (“The court cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute its
judgment for the Commissioners and so long as substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s findings, they must be affirmed.”).
D. Plaintiff’s Transferable Skills (Step Five)
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at Step Five by failing to
properly consider whether Plaintiff has transferable skills. (ECF No. 15 at 26–
30). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s Step Five finding fails because
the ALJ did not adequately identify which specific skills from Plaintiff’s past
relevant work as a correctional facility guard were transferable to other jobs
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and because the tasks identified by the vocational expert constitute mere
“aptitudes,” not “skills.” (Id. at 26–28). The Court disagrees.
Relying on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ expressly found that Plaintiff’s
past work was “semi-skilled” and identified discrete work activities that the
VE 	testified 	constituted 	acquired 	skills, 	including 	inspecting 	conditions,
locking 	doors 	and 	gates, 	monitoring 	inmate 	conduct, 	guarding 	facility
entrances, screening visitors, and maintaining records and daily logs. 	(ECF
No. 5-3 at 28). 	The ALJ here articulated both the source occupation and the
specific work activities forming the basis of the transferability finding, relied
on vocational expert testimony, and identified representative occupations
requiring those same skills without additional training. 	See, e.g., Underwood
v. Bowen, 828 F.2d 1081, 1083 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting claimant’s argument
that transferable skills were not established where vocational expert identified
specific work skills from prior employment that carried over to other jobs, even
though the new jobs did not require all skills from the past work).
Plaintiff’s reliance on Miller v. Shalala, 825 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Tex.
1993), to support his argument is unavailing. 	In Miller, the claimant’s past
work 	was 	unskilled, 	and 	the 	record 	contained 	no 	vocational 	evidence
identifying transferable skills or jobs to which they would transfer. Id. at 781–
82. Here, by contrast, Plaintiff does not dispute that her past work was semi-
skilled, and the vocational expert explicitly testified that the identified work
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activities constituted transferable skills that would apply to other semi-skilled,
guard-related occupations.9 (ECF No. 5-3 at 29).
While Plaintiff characterizes the identified activities as common or
simplistic, the issue is not whether such activities exist outside the workplace,
but whether Plaintiff acquired and exercised them in a vocational setting
requiring 	judgment, 	consistency, 	and 	responsibility, 	as 	reflected 	in 	the
Dictionary 	of 	Occupational 	Titles 	(“DOT”) 	classification 	and 	vocational
testimony. See Burton v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 13-cv-661, 2014 WL 775616, at
*13 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2014) (finding VE’s testimony that plaintiff had skills
transferable from her semi-skilled data entry job to semi-skilled work as a
check cashier and reception clerk was substantial evidence on which the ALJ
could rely because the Fifth Circuit does not require great specificity in the
expert’s testimony about plaintiff’s transferable skills in order to render that
testimony substantial evidence). The ALJ was entitled to rely on the testimony
of 	the 	VE, 	which 	was 	expressly 	found 	“consistent 	with 	the 	information
contained in the [DOT].” (ECF No. 5-3 at 29).
9 See SSR 82-41, 1982 WL 31389, at *2–3 (work skills and their transferability)
(recognizing that transferable skills arise from the acquired capacity to perform work
activities with facility, even when those activities involve traits such as alertness or judgment
exercised in a work context). 	SSR 82-41 further identifies recordkeeping and reporting
functions as transferable clerical skills, undermining Plaintiff’s contention that maintaining
logs cannot constitute a transferable skill. Id. at *3.
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Accordingly, the ALJ applied the proper legal standards, and substantial
evidence supports the Step-Five determination that Plaintiff has transferable
skills and can perform other work existing in significant numbers in the
national economy.
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Commissioner’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15) be 	DENIED. 	The Court
FURTHER RECOMMENDS the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED
and the case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on February 18, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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