Adkins v. Shepherd Safety Systems, LLC, et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
SARA ADKINS,
Plaintiff,
V.
SHEPHERD SAFETY SYSTEMS,
LLC & PELICAN ENERGY
PARTNERS, LP,
Defendant.
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ORDER
Civil Action No. H-24-4854
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
(Document No. 13). Having considered the motion, submissions, and applicable law,
the Court determines that the motion for summary judgment should be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a matter involving alleged employment harassment and retaliation.
Around the Summer of 2020, Plaintiff Sara Adkins ("Plaintiff') began working as
the Controller, and later as CFO, for Defendants Shepherd Safety Systems, LLC
("Shepherd") and Pelican Energy Partners ("Pelican") (collectively "Defendants").
Plaintiff alleges that, during a business trip in January 2023, Defendants' COO
Matthew Crook ("Crook") made sexually inappropriate comments to her and acted
1
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 13, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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inappropriately towards her. 1 Plaintiff contends that she reported the incident to
Human Resources but that no actions were taken to remedy the situation.2 Plaintiff
further alleges that "she was forced to resign in December 2023 after enduring
unwelcome sexual harassment from her coworker Matthew Crook." 3
Based on the foregoing, on November 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit in the 269th
District Court of Harris County, Texas, asserting a claim for"[ v]iolation of the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act - 	Retaliation[.]" 4 On November 	11, 2024,
Plaintiff amended her complaint to assert a claim for "[v]iolation of the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
amended-Retaliation[.]" 5 On December 11, 2024, Defendants removed the case to
this 	Court pursuant 	to 	federal 	question jurisdiction. 6 On 	October 	27, 	2025,
1 Notice of Removal, Document No. 	1, Exhibit D at 	13 (Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint).
2 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Document No. 1, Exhibit D at 14.
3 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Document No. 1, Exhibit D at 13.
4 Notice 	of Removal, 	Document No. 	1, 	Exhibit D at 7 	(Plaintiff's 	Original
Complaint).
5 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Document No. 1, Exhibit D at 16.
6 Notice of Removal, Document No. 1 at 1.
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Defendants moved for summary judgment. 7 On November 	17, 	2025, Plaintiff
responded in opposition. 8
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when "there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Coleman v. Haus. Jndep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
Initially, the movant bears the burden of presenting the basis for the motion and the
elements of the causes of action upon which the nonmovant will be unable to
establish a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to come forward with specific
facts showing there is a genuine dispute for trial. 	See Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	56(c);
Matsushita Elec. Jndus. Co. v.- Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). "A
dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
7 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Document No. 13 at 1.
8 Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Document No. 14 at 1.
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But the nonmoving party's bare allegations, standing alone, are insufficient to
create a material dispute of fact and defeat a motion for summary. If a reasonable
jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party, then summary judgment is
appropriate. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmovant's burden cannot
be satisfied by "conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, 	or 'only a
scintilla of evidence."' Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343
(5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.
1994)). Uncorroborated self-serving testimony cannot prevent summary judgment,
especially 	if the 	overwhelming 	documentary 	evidence 	supports 	the 	opposite
scenario. Vais Arms, Inc. v. Vais, 383 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, it
is not the function of the Court to search the record on the nonmovant' s behalf for
evidence which may raise a fact issue. Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1137
n.30 (5th Cir. 	1992). Therefore, "[a]lthough we consider the evidence and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of
its pleadings but must respond by setting forth specific facts indicating a genuine
issue for trial." Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 2000).
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
Defendants move for summary judgment, contending there is no genuine issue
of material fact for a jury to consider in this matter. In response, Plaintiff contends
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that there is a dispute as to a material fact and that the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment should be denied.
Plaintiff alleges a claim for "[v]iolation of the Texas Commission on Human
Rights Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended - Retaliation"
contending that, following her complaints regarding Crook, "she was increasingly
isolated such that she felt compelled to resign, Defendants removed access to her
accounts so that she could not do her work, and she was suddenly terminated before
the end of her two-week period." 9 A Plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim must
generally show: "(I) 'that he is engaged in a protected activity;' (2) 'that an adverse
employment action occurred;' and (3) 	'that a causal link existed between the
protected activity and the adverse action."' Pineda v. UPS, Inc., 360 F.3d 483,487
(5th Cir. 2004). The complainant carries the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case. See McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If the
complainant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the actions. See Id.; Campos
v. Steves & Sons, Incorporated, IO F.4 th 515, 525 (applying the McDonnel Douglas
burden-shifting scheme to Texas retaliation claims).
9 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Document No. 1, Exhibit D at 16.
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Most pertinent here, a resignation is only considered an adverse employment
action if it qualifies as a constructive discharge. Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp, 237
F.3d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 2001). 	"To establish 'constructive discharge,' the plaintiff
must make a further showing: She must show that the abusive working environment
became 	so 	intolerable 	that 	her 	resignation 	qualified 	as 	a 	fitting 	response."
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 133 (2004). The Fifth Circuit has
considered the following factors that give rise to a constructive discharge: "(1)
demotion; 	(2) 	reduction 	in 	salary; 	(3) 	reduction 	in 	job 	responsibilities; 	(4)
reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a
younger supervisor; ( 6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer
calculated 	to 	encourage 	the 	employee's 	resignation; 	or 	(7) 	offers 	or 	early
retirement[.]" Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2000).
Here, Defendants contend that "Plaintiffs claim for constructive discharge
fails under the Fifth Circuit's objective test" and that "Plaintiffs only alleged act of
retaliation prior to her resignation was her belief that Shepherd did not take remedial
measures." 10 In response, Plaintiff contends that "[t]he lack of support from her
employer led Plaintiff to feel compelled to resign, which constitutes another adverse
10 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Document No. 13 at 6, 8.
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employment action, as she was constructively terminated." 11 A review of the record
in this matter reveals that Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence supporting any of
the factors traditionally considered by the Fifth Circuit with respect to constructive
discharge. Based on the foregoing, and given the Supreme Court's clear guidance
that constructive discharge requires an additional showing ofintolerability, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue
of material fact as to constructive discharge, and thus, failed to raise a genuine issue
of material fact as to any adverse employment action. 12 Given the Fifth Circuit's
clear guidance that a claim 	for 	retaliation requires 	a showing 	of an adverse
employment action, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue
11 Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Document No. 14 at 1;
see also Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Document No. 1, Exhibit D at 16 ("Because of
the ongoing situation with Crook, and because no one at the company took any remedial
measures, despite having every opportunity to do so, Adkins' job had become increasingly
intolerable.").
12 The Court notes that Plaintiff fails to plead facts or provide any evidence as to
any of the factors traditionally considered by the courts. See Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207
F.3d 776,782 (5th Cir. 2000). To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to allege that the lack of
remedial measures by Defendants constitutes an adverse employment action, the Court
rejects 	this 	argument 	noting 	"an 	employer's 	failure 	to 	investigate 	a 	discrimination
complaint cannot be considered an adverse employment action taken in retaliation for filing
the same discrimination complaint." Leckemby v. Greystar Management Services, LP, No.
1:13-CV-873-DAE, 2015 WL 3408667 (W.D. Tex. May 26, 2015) (citing Fincher v.
Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 721 (2nd Cir. 2010)).
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of material fact as to her claims for retaliation and finds that summary judgment
should be granted accordingly. 13
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No.
13) is GRANTED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this~ day of February, 2026.
DAVID HITTNER
United States District Judge
13 Considering the Court's finding that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of
material 	fact 	as 	to 	an 	adverse 	employment action, 	the 	Court declines 	to 	consider
Defendants' remaining argument related to causation.
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