Newton Green v. O'Malley

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Case 4:24-cv-04383 Document 24 _ Filed 03/10/26 in TXSD Pagelof5

United States District Court
Southem District of Texas

ENTERED
March 10, 2026
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JACQUELINE CHERYL NEWTON §
GREEN, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-04383
§
MARTIN O'MALLEY, e¢ al., §
§
Defendants. §
ORDER

Before the Court are United States Magistrate Judge Richard W. Bennett’s Memorandum
and Recommendation filed on February 20, 2026 (Doc. #22) and Plaintiff Jacqueline Cheryl
Newton Green’s (“Plaintiff”) Objections (Doc. #23). The Magistrate Judge’s findings and
conclusions are reviewed de novo. FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States y,
Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (Sth Cir, 1989). Having reviewed the Memorandum and
Recommendation, Plaintiff's Objections, and applicable legal authority, the Court adopts the
Memorandum and Recommendation as this Court’s Order,

Plaintiff filed this action on November 8, 2024, alleging that the Social Security
Administration Commissioner Frank Bisignano' (“Commissioner”) improperly denied her
application for disability imsurance benefits, with a disability onset date of August 1, 2019. Doc.

#1. Plaintiff seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), challenging the Administrative Law

' Frank Bisignano was sworn in as the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025.
Bisignano is “automatically substituted” as the defendant in this suit. FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive
notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security
or any vacancy in such office.”).

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 4:24-cv-04383 Document 24 _ Filed 03/10/26 in TXSD Page2of5

Judge’s (“ALJ”) finding that her bilateral knee impairments were not severe and that her residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) did not require additional limitations to accommodate her vision and
other impairments. Doc. #17. Following administrative proceedings, on April 29, 2024, ALJ
Kelly Matthews determined Plaintiff was not disabled at Step Five of the five-step sequential
evaluation.2, Doc. #22 at 2-3. The Appeals Council denied review on September 4, 2024,
rendering the ALJ’s decision the Commissionet’s final decision. /d@ at 4. In his Memorandum
and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Bennett recommends the Court affirm the
Commissioner’s decision. Doc. #22.

Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether the
decision is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied proper
legal standards, Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (Sth Cir, 2005); Taylor y, Astrue, 706 F.3d
600, 602 (Sth Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonabie mind
might accept to support a conclusion”——-more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Perez,
A415 F.3d at 461. The Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner. Taylor, 706 F.3d at 602 (“Any findings of fact by the Commissioner which are
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.”).

In her first objection, Plaintiff argues the ALJ applied an incorrect severity standard under
Stone vy. Heckler when determining that her bilateral knee impairments were not severe, and that

the evidence does not support a non-severity finding. 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (Sth Cir. 1985); Doc.

* The five-step evaluation process of a disability claim consists of: (1) whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
(3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from
doing past relevant work; and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any
other work, Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271 (Sth Cir. 2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520).
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#23 at 3-9, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erroneously relied on neurological findings—specifically,
heel-to-knee-to-shin and finger-to-nose tests—that assess cerebellar function rather than knee
limitations. fe, at 7-8. Even assuming the ALJ applied an imprecise severity standard, remand is
required only upon a showing of prejudice, meaning that a different outcome “might” have resulted
from the error. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995). The ALJ found at least one
severe impairment at Step Two, proceeded through the remainder of the sequential evaluation, and
conducted an RFC analysis accounting for the combined effects of Plaintiffs impairments. Doc.
#22 at 3. The ALJ’s Step Two finding is supported by substantial evidence, including the April
2022 consultative examination by Dr. Cynthia Cotton documenting normal gait, normal tandem
walk, full squat capacity, and the ability to walk on heels and toes without difficulty. Doc. #22 at
6. Plaintiff's disagreement with the ALJ’s weighing of the December 2022 Sanders examination
against these findings does not establish the absence of substantial evidence. See Jones v, Saul,
No. 4:20-cv-772, 2021 WL 2895867, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2021) (plaintiffs burden is to show
the absence of substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision, not merely to highlight contrary
evidence), Accordingly, this objection is overruled.

Plaintiff next argues the ALJ’s RFC determination is unsupported by substantial evidence
because it fails to include limitations from her vision impairments, bilateral knee impairments,
obesity, and hypertension. Doc. #23 at 11-20. Specifically, Plaintiff contends the RFC should
have incorporated the left-side near acuity, far acuity, depth perception, and field-of-vision
limitations opined by the initial state agency physician—an opinion the ALJ herself deemed
persuasive—as well as the more restrictive vision limitations described by examining
ophthalmologist, Dr. Khokhar. fd. at 13-19, An RFC determination need not mirror any particular
medical opinion; the ALJ is required to consider all relevant medical and non-medical evidence
and explain the basis for the ALJ’s functional findings. Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272

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(5th Cir, 2002); 20 C.F.R. § 404,1545(a)(3). The ALJ’s decision addressed Plaintiff's vision
impairments in the RFC by limiting her to occasional exposure to workplace hazards and
precluding work requiring frequent peripheral vision, and she explained her assessment of the
relevant opinion evidence, including those of Dr. Khokhar and the state agency physicians. Doc.
#22 at3, 10. Plaintiffs objection amounts to a request that the Court reweigh conflicting evidence,
which falls outside the scope of judicial review. Perez, 415 F.3d at 461, Thus, this objection is
overruled,

Plaintiff also objects that the ALJ’s finding that she can perform detailed but not complex
work is unsupported, arguing that the opinions of examining psychologist Dr. Osborn and the state
agency psychologist at the reconsideration level support a limitation to simple work. Doc. #23 at
17-19. The ALJ evaluated the persuasiveness of each medical opinion based on supportability
and consistency with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)\(2). The ALJ found the
initial state agency psychologist’s opinion-—which assessed capacity for detailed but not complex
work with moderate limitations—to be persuasive, noting Plaintiff's reported ability to follow
instructions and fair memory function, and discounted the more restrictive opinions of Dr. Osborn
and the reconsideration-level psychologist. Doc, #22 at 10, The existence of contrary evidence
does not negate substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination. Jones v. Saul, 834 F,
App’x 839, 842 (5th Cir. 2020). Likewise, this objection is overruled,

Plaintiff further argues that substantial evidence does not support the finding that she can
perform the six to eight hours of walking and standing required of medium work. Doc, #23 at 19-
21. The ALJ explained that the medium exertion restriction accounts for the combined effects of
Plaintiff's history of cerebral vascular accident, left homonymous hemianopsia, and diabetes
mellitus, supported by treatment records documenting normal gait without an assistive device,

five-out-of-five strength in all extremities, normal motor tone, and intact hand and finger dexterity.

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Doc. #22 at 11. Plaintiff's reliance on the antalgic gait documented in the December 2022 Sanders
examination does not compel a different conclusion. The ALJ weighed that finding against the
April 2022 consultative examination by Dr. Cotton—which documented normal gait, the ability
to walk on heels and toes without difficulty, and full squat capacity—all recorded less than eight
months prior, and against October 2023 treatment records confirming Plaintiff could move all four
extremities. Doc. #22 at 6-7. It is the ALJ’s province to resolve such conflicts in the medical
record, and the Court may not substitute its own assessment of the evidence. Johnson v. Colvin,
595 F. App’x 443, 444 (Sth Cir. 2015). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the
evidence the ALJ relied upon fails to constitute substantial evidence. As such, this objection is
overruled.

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff's objections raise new legal theories or causes of action not
previously asserted in her Complaint or in briefing before Judge Bennett, those arguments are not
properly before the Court and will not be considered. See Freeman vy. Cnty. of Bexar, 142 F.3d
848, 851 (Sth Cir. 1998) (noting that “a party who objects to the magistrate judge’s report waives
legal arguments not made in the first instance before the magistrate judge”).

In conclusion, the Court adopts the Memorandum and Recommendation (Doc #22) as its
Order. Accordingly, Defendant Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #11) is
GRANTED, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #17) is DENIED, the
Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED, and Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case,

It is so ORDERED,

MAR 1 0 2026

Date The Honorablef Alfred H. Bennett
United States District Judge

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