Toomer v. O'Malley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CHARIKA T.,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-cv-4156
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Charika T. (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against Defendant
Frank Bisignano1 (“Commissioner”) seeking review of the denial of benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act. (ECF Nos. 1, 9). Plaintiff filed a Brief
in Support of her Social Security Appeal. 	(ECF No. 9). 	Pending before the
Court2 is the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 	(ECF No. 15).
Plaintiff opposes the motion. 	(ECF No. 16). 	Based on a review of the motion,
arguments, and relevant law, the Court RECOMMENDS Commissioner’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15) be GRANTED. 	The Court
1 Frank Bisignano was sworn in as the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7,
2025. Bisignano is “automatically substituted” as the defendant in this suit. FED. R. CIV. P.
25(d); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection
shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner
of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
2 On October 28, 2024, this case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF
No. 3).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 23, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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FURTHER RECOMMENDS the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED
and the case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff filed a claim for disability insurance benefits on January 5,
2023, alleging disability starting on March 23, 2018. 	(ECF No. 5-4 at 20).3
Plaintiff’s claims were initially denied by the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) on April 27, 2023, and again on reconsideration on July 17, 2023.4 (Id.).
On August 31, 2023, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge. 	(Id.). 	On January 24, 2024, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
David Gutierrez held a telephonic hearing. (Id.). Plaintiff was represented by
counsel at the hearing. 	(Id.). 	Teresa Rodgers, a vocational expert (“VE”),
appeared and testified at the hearing. 	(Id.). 	On February 16, 2024, ALJ
Gutierrez issued a decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled at Step Five.5 (Id. at
3 The Administrative Record in this case can be found at ECF No. 5.
4 Plaintiff had filed a previous application for disability insurance benefits on October
2, 2019, which was denied on February 14, 2020; therefore, her instant application could only
address disability from the period of time beginning on February 15, 2020. (ECF No. 5-3 at
18). 5 In considering a disability claim, an ALJ must conduct a five-step evaluation that
examines: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets
or equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;
(4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5)
whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. 	Masterson v.
Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
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33). On February 28, 2024, the Appeals Council remanded Plaintiff’s case. (Id.
at 40). The Appeals Council Order stated:
The [ALJ] hearing decision does not contain adequate rationale for
the assessed non-exertional limitations. 	The residual functional
capacity assessment is the most a claimant is capable of doing
despite 	their limitations, 	and the assessment 	must 	include a
narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each
conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings)
and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations) . . .
The 	hearing 	decision, 	however, 	does 	not 	contain 	a 	narrative
discussion regarding these limitations in the residual functional
capacity. 	Specifically, it is unclear as to what evidence was
considered in limiting the claimant to no work as part of a team or
in tandem with others or tolerate contact with the general public
for 	no 	more 	than 	10% 	of 	the 	workday. 	Therefore, 	further
evaluation 	of 	the 	claimant’s 	residual 	functional 	capacity 	is
necessary.
(Id. at 42). 	The Appeals Council directed the ALJ on remand to give “further
consideration to the claimant’s maximum residual functional capacity and
provide appropriate rationale with specific references to evidence of record in
support of the assessed limitations.” (Id. at 43).
On July 10, 2024, ALJ Ross Stubblefield held a telephonic hearing. (ECF
No. 5-3 at 18). 	Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing. 	(Id.).
Kassandra Humphress, a VE, appeared and testified at the hearing. (Id.). At
Step One, the ALJ found Plaintiff had engaged in substantial gainful activity
from September 2021 to December 2022. 	(Id. at 21). 	At Step Two, the ALJ
found Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: “migraine headaches;
obesity; posttraumatic stress disorder; major depressive disorder; generalized
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anxiety disorder; and panic attacks (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).” 	(Id.). 	At Step
Three, the ALJ found Plaintiff: “does not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d),
404.1525, 404.1526).” 	(Id. at 23). 	The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she
can lift or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently;
she can stand or walk for 6 hours in an 8 hour day; she can sit for
6 hours in an 8 hour day; she can occasionally climb ramps or
stairs; she can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, or balance;
she can never climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; she must avoid all
exposure to unprotected heights and hazardous machinery; she
can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; she
can respond appropriately to supervisors, coworkers, the public,
and usual work situations; she can deal with changes in a routine
work setting; and she can have only occasional interaction with the
public, coworkers, and supervisors.
(Id. at 25). 	At Step Four, the ALJ found Plaintiff “is unable to perform any
past relevant work.” 	(Id. at 32). 	At Step Five, the ALJ found there were jobs
that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform—such as a price marker, office helper, and mail sorter—and therefore
Plaintiff was not disabled as defined under the Social Security Act. (Id. at 33–
34).
Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council and the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review on August 26, 2024. 	(Id. at 2). 	Thus, the ALJ’s
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decision represents the Commissioner’s final decision in the case. See Sims v.
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106–07 (2000).
II. 	Legal Standard
The Court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner on a Social
Security disability claim is exceedingly deferential. Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d
600, 602 (5th Cir. 2012). “[R]eview of Social Security disability cases ‘is limited
to two inquiries: (1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the proper
legal standard.’” Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Perez 	v. 	Barnhart, 	415 	F.3d 	457, 	461 	(5th 	Cir. 	2005)). 	When 	the
Commissioner’s decision is reached by applying improper legal standards, the
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 	Singletary v. Bowen, 798
F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion’ and constitutes
‘more than a mere scintilla’ but ‘less than a preponderance’ of evidence.”
Hardman v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Newton v. Apfel,
209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000)). “‘Any findings of fact by the Commissioner
which are supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.’” 	Heck v. Colvin,
674 F. App’x 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Taylor, 706 F.3d at 602).
Even 	so, 	judicial 	review 	must 	not 	be 	“so 	obsequious 	as 	to 	be
meaningless.” 	Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotations
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omitted). 	The substantial evidence standard is not a rubber stamp for the
Commissioner’s 	decision 	and 	involves 	more 	than 	a 	search 	for 	evidence
supporting the Commissioner’s findings. Singletary, 798 F.2d at 822–23; Cook
v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985). 	Rather, a reviewing court must
scrutinize the record as a whole, taking into account whatever fairly detracts
from the substantiality of evidence supporting the Commissioner’s findings.
Singletary, 798 F.2d at 823. The court “‘may not reweigh the evidence . . . , nor
try the issues de novo, nor substitute [its] judgment for the [Commissioner’s],
even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s] decision.’”
Johnson v. Colvin, 595 F. App’x 443, 444 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harrell v.
Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988)).
III. 	Discussion
Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by substantial
evidence because “the ALJ improperly relied on his own interpretation of raw
medical data to assess how [Plaintiff’s] mental and physical impairments
affected her ability to work.” (ECF No. 9 at 5). Commissioner argues the ALJ’s
RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence despite the ALJ not
relying on a medical opinion to formulate the RFC. (See ECF No. 15).
Plaintiff notes that the state agency medical consultants found that
Plaintiff had no severe impairments and did not assess how her impairments
would affect her ability to work. 	(ECF No. 9 at 9). 	Plaintiff further states,
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“Dan Beaudry, MD, opined that [Plaintiff] had a marked limitation in her
ability to understand, remember, or apply information and extreme limitations
in her abilities to interact with others; concentrate, persist, or maintain pace;
and adapt or manage herself because she was easily overwhelmed and had a
poor frustration tolerance.” 	(Id.). 	In turn, Plaintiff argues, “the ALJ rejected
all these opinions and succumbed to the temptation to play doctor. . . . [t]he
ALJ [] assessed how [Plaintiff’s] physical impairments affect her ability to work
without support from a medical opinion.” (Id. at 9, 11).
“The ALJ makes an RFC determination based on all the relevant medical
and other evidence in the record.” 	Gonzales v. Colvin, No. 3:15-cv-0685, 2016
WL 107843, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)).
“[A]n ALJ’s RFC determination is improperly based on his lay opinion when
substantial evidence does not support the RFC.” 	Moreira v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., No. 24-cv-00021, 2025 WL 1090895, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27,
2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 24-cv-21, 2025 WL 943413
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2025) (citing Taylor, 706 F.3d at 602). 	‘“There is no
requirement that an ALJ’s RFC finding must mirror or match a medical
opinion.’” Donna A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:22-cv-111, 2023 WL 5004867,
at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 17, 2023), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.
Donna A. v. Kijakazi, No. 5:22-cv-111, 2023 WL 5004073 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4,
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2023) (quoting Nic R. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:22-cv-00106, 2023 WL 2529930, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2023)).
As mentioned, to support her position that the ALJ substituted his lay
opinion, Plaintiff cites the opinions of Dr. Dan Beaudry (“Dr. Beaudry”) and
state agency consultants (“SAC”). 	(ECF No. 9 at 9). 	As such, the Court will
address each opinion.
In his opinion, the ALJ noted that Dr. Beaudry opined Plaintiff “had a
marked 	limitation 	in 	her 	ability 	to 	understand, 	remember, 	or 	apply
information, and an extreme limitation in her ability to interact with others,
to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace, and to adapt or manage herself. She
was easily overwhelmed, and she had a poor frustration tolerance.” (ECF No.
5-3 at 31). However, the ALJ found this opinion was not well supported by the
treating 	psychiatric 	records 	because 	the 	records 	“showed 	[Plaintiff]
experienced 	a 	good 	response 	to 	medications, 	and 	she 	demonstrated 	only
minimal symptoms at medical visits, as reflected in recorded mental status
examinations.” (Id.).
Additionally, the ALJ noted that “a marked or extreme limitation [was]
inconsistent 	with 	[Plaintiff’s] 	actual 	functioning” 	because 	“[s]uch 	severe
limitation would suggest a need for inpatient treatment;” however, Plaintiff
had not required inpatient treatment during the alleged period of disability.
(Id.). 	Moreover, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the “ability to learn new
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tasks and routines, apply for and interview for jobs, keep a schedule, balance
her responsibilities at home and at work, and interact appropriately with
supervisors and teachers.” 	(Id.). 	This is because the record showed Plaintiff
was a single parent and full-time care provider to her young child; she was able
to manage a household, prepare meals, and shop for groceries and necessities
while also working part time or attending classes online; she attended online
higher education and almost completed her bachelors’ degree; and she engaged
in significant work activity throughout the alleged period of disability, some of
which had risen to the level of substantial gainful activity. (Id.).
As to the SACs, the ALJ explained the SACs’ opinions found Plaintiff
had no severe physical or mental impairments. 	(Id. at 31–32). 	Specifically,
the ALJ noted that in April 2023, a state agency medical consultant, Dr. Hope
Folarin, found Plaintiff had no severe physical impairments, and three months
later, another state agency medical consultant, Dr. Patty Rowley, concurred
with that opinion. (Id. at 31). Upon review, the ALJ determined these opinions
were supported by a 2023 physical examination showing Plaintiff had “normal
gait, range of movement, and muscle strength” and “by her ability to perform
a wide range of activities of daily living independently.” (Id. at 31–32).
Similarly, the ALJ noted that in April 2023, a state agency psychological
consultant, 	Dr. 	Linette 	Castillo, 	found 	Plaintiff 	had 	no 	severe 	mental
impairments, and three months later, another state agency psychological
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consultant, Dr. Nicole Mannis, concurred with that opinion. 	(Id. at 32). 	The
ALJ 	determined 	these 	opinions 	were 	supported 	by 	Plaintiff’s
“ability to perform a wide range of activities of daily living, including managing
a household, caring for a child, and managing her finances.” 	(Id.). 	However,
the ALJ acknowledged the SAC opinions were inconsistent to the extent they
conflicted with Plaintiff’s persistent obesity, ongoing use of migraine headache
medication, reports of poor sleep, history of psychiatric hospitalization, and
ongoing mental health treatment. 	(Id.). 	Accordingly, based on the totality of
evidence, the ALJ determined his RFC finding based on “the treating medical
evidence and the evidence of what the claimant is actually able to do.” 	(Id.).
In light of this evidence, the ALJ concluded “[w]ith appropriate limitations, the
claimant can perform a wide range of unskilled work, so she is not disabled.”
(Id.).
To be sure, the ALJ’s RFC determination need not completely match or
mirror a medical opinion so long as his determination is supported with
substantial evidence. 	See Mendoza v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 5:24-cv-
055-BJ, 2025 WL 906225, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2025) (“Given that an RFC
determination is not required to match or mirror a medical opinion, the ALJ
was permitted to develop an RFC that differed from the medical opinions
provided while still being supported by substantial evidence.”). 	The record
contains 	sufficient 	medical 	and 	evidentiary 	support 	for 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC
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determination. 	See id. at *7 (“This is simply not a case where there are no
credible evidentiary sources or medical findings to support the decision.”).
Because the ALJ used the treating medical evidence to support his RFC
determination, the ALJ did not substitute his lay opinion for medical opinions
and his RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Colvin,
No. 1:16-cv-271, 2017 WL 3896679, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Sep. 6, 2017) (holding the
RFC that plaintiff is capable of light duty work was supported by substantial
evidence as “the ALJ considered all of the medical evidence and [plaintiff’s]
subjective complaints of pain.”).
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Commissioner’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15) be GRANTED. 	The Court
FURTHER RECOMMENDS the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED
and the case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
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SIGNED in Houston, Texas on January 23, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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