Houston Fleeting Services LLC v. M/V YANGZE, her engines, tackle, apparel, bunkers, etc., in rem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
IN RE: THE COMPLAINT AND
PETITION OF HOUSTON
FLEETING SERVICES LLC, AS
OWNER OF THE VESSEL, M/V
MISS PEGGY, ITS ENGINE,
TACKLES, ETC., IN THE CAUSE
OF EXONERATION FROM OR
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
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Case No. 4:24-CV-02705 c/w 4:24-
CV-2855; 4:24-CV-02739; and 4:24-
CV-02759
JUDGE PALERMO’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1
This case concerns a fatal maritime collision on the Houston Ship Channel.
Before the Court is Ladon Shipping Pte., Ltd.’s partial motion for summary
judgment, seeking dismissal of the punitive and non-pecuniary damages sought by
Claimants 	Mark 	Doyle; 	Richard 	Ancar; 	and 	Karribian 	Scott, 	as 	personal
representative of the Estate of Aquarius Lowman (“the Estate”) (collectively,
“Claimants”). ECF No. 156. Claimants respond that their non-pecuniary and
punitive damages are recoverable under general maritime law. ECF Nos. 158, 160,
161.2 Finding Claimants’ punitive and nonpecuniary damages are unrecoverable, the
Court recommends that Ladon’s motion for summary judgment be granted and
Claimants’ claims seeking punitive and non-pecuniary damages be dismissed. ECF
1 The district judge to whom this case is assigned referred this case for all pretrial proceedings.
Order of Referral, ECF No. 16.
2 Tierney Love, a.n.f. of M.L., filed a response. ECF No. 159. Ladon also filed a reply. ECF
No. 164.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 05, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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No. 156.3
I. 	BACKGROUND
As a result of the July 19, 2024 collision in the Houston Ship Channel between
two vessels, the M/V YANGZE 7 and the M/V MISS PEGGY, Aquarius Lowman
(the “decedent”), a seaman working on the M/V MISS PEGGY, died and other crew
members were injured. Petitioners Ladon Shipping, Pte. Ltd., as owner of the M/V
YANGZE 7, and Houston Fleeting Services, LLC, (“HFS”) as owner of the M/V
MISS PEGGY, filed suit for exoneration from or limitation of liability. Claimants
have pending claims in the Limitation Action.
On February 18, 2025, the Court entered a report and recommendation to grant
HFS’s motion to dismiss Ancar and Doyle’s claims for punitive damages under the
Jones Act and general maritime unseaworthiness. ECF No. 98. The Court also
3 Throughout the parties’ briefing, counsel misidentify Judge Palermo as “Magistrate.” The title
magistrate is obsolete in the United States Courts. More than thirty years ago, Congress created
the title of United States Magistrate Judge to reflect the role we play in relieving the burgeoning
caseloads of the United States District Courts and the corresponding burdens on district judges.
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 5089, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321 (1990) (“After the
enactment of this Act, each United States magistrate . . . shall be known as a United States
magistrate judge.”). Calling a magistrate judge “magistrate” is the equivalent of calling a district
judge “district,” or a bankruptcy judge “bankruptcy.” The proper way to refer to a magistrate judge
orally or in writing is “Judge.” It is an important distinction that Plaintiff's counsel failed to
recognize. See Tyran S. v. Kijakazi, No. 4:22-CV-1736, 2023 WL 6540852, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
6, 2023); Bird v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Agency, No. 4:20-CV-275, 2022 WL 90515, at *1,
n.1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2022); Young v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., No. 20-CV-01816-LK, 2022 WL
1061940, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2022); Bormuth v. Whitmer, 548 F. Supp. 3d 640, 642 n.1
(E.D. Mich. 2021); United States v. Higby, 544 F.Supp.3d 861 (S.D. Iowa 2015); Sanches v.
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156, 172, n.13 (5th Cir. 2011). Counsel is
reminded to use the correct title, in the future, when referring to Judge Palermo or any magistrate
judge.
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entered a report and recommendation to grant HFS’s motion to dismiss the Estate’s
claims for damage claims accrued after the decedent’s lifetime, including lost future
earnings or loss of support. ECF No. 109. The District Judge adopted both
recommendations. ECF No. 143.
On September 8, 2025, the Court entered a Bifurcation Order, finding that the
Court 	will 	address 	negligence, 	seaworthiness, 	privity, 	knowledge, 	and
apportionment of fault in one limitation proceeding, and if necessary, damages, may
proceed in a separate proceeding in a court of the Claimants’ choosing. ECF No. 140.
Afterwards, the Court denied Ladon’s motions for summary judgment addressing
Claimants’ non-pecuniary and punitive damages, finding that the Estate’s amended
complaint and the Court’s Bifurcation Order mooted Ladon’s arguments. ECF
No. 144. Ladon filed objections. ECF No. 149. The Court entered an amended order
partially denying Ladon’s motions for summary judgment and ordering Ladon to
refile its motion for summary judgment addressing Doyle, Ancar, and the Estate’s
non-pecuniary damages. ECF No. 152. Ladon then filed the instant motion for
summary judgment. ECF No. 156.
II. 	THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
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317, 322 (1986). “The moving party ‘always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion’ and identifying the record
evidence that ‘it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.’” Trevino v. Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co., No. 7:24-CV-00297, 2025 WL
2781742, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2025) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323).
“[I]f the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue ... , he must establish
beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the [claim or affirmative]
defense to warrant judgment in his favor.” S&B INFRASTRUCTURE, LTD., v.
FLUOR FEDERAL PETROLEUM OPERATIONS, LLC, No. 3:25-CV-00011, 2026
WL 501581, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2026) (quoting Access Mediquip L.L.C. v.
UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., 662 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2011)). “Where the movant
does not bear the burden of proof, his burden is satisfied by showing that the other
party has a ‘failure of proof on an essential element of its claim [or affirmative
defense].’” Id. (quoting Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 329
(5th Cir. 2020)). “A party makes this showing by introducing evidence or by
‘pointing out . . . an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’”
Id. (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). “If the [movant] succeeds on that
showing, the burden shifts to the [nonmovant] to demonstrate that there is a genuine
issue of material fact and that the evidence favoring the [nonmovant] permits a jury
verdict in the [nonmovant]'s favor.” Id. (quoting Joseph, 981 F.3d at 329). Summary
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judgment evidence “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, and reasonable inferences must be drawn in that party’s favor.” Warren v.
Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 932 F.3d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 2019).
III. 	LADON’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
GRANTED.
A. 	The Motion for Summary Judgment is Not Moot.
Ladon argues that Claimants’ Second Amended Complaint4 and the Court’s
Bifurcation Order do not moot the instant motion for summary judgment. ECF
No. 156 at 15. Certain of the Claimants argue that the Court’s Bifurcation Order,
ECF No. 140, defers determination of damages matter to a court of Claimants’
choosing and, therefore, the motion for summary judgment should be denied as
moot. ECF Nos. 159 at 2–5; 160 at 3–4; 161 at 7.
The motion for summary judgment, which the Court specifically ordered
Ladon to file, is not mooted by the Court’s Bifurcation Order. In the Bifurcation
Order, 	the 	Court 	bifurcated 	proceedings 	“such 	that 	the 	Court 	will 	address
negligence, seaworthiness, privity, knowledge, and apportionment of fault in one
limitation proceeding, and then damages, if necessary, will be addressed in a
separate proceeding in a forum of the Claimants’ choosing.” ECF No. 104. The
4 Although Ladon preemptively addressed the argument, none of Claimants argue that the motion
for summary judgment is mooted by the filing of the Estate’s amended complaint. Even so, Ladon
filed the instant motion for summary judgment in response to Claimants’ operative complaints.
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Court’s primary reason for granting bifurcation was to respect Claimants’ right to a
jury. ECF No. 104.
The issue in the instant motion for summary judgment do not violate the
Bifurcation Order or Claimants’ right to a jury trial.5 Whether Claimants are entitled
to punitive or non-pecuniary damages is not a question of fact to be determined by
a jury, federal or state, but rather a question of law for the Court to determine. See
Wade v. Clemco Indus. Corp., No. CV 16-502, 2017 WL 434425, at *4 (E.D. La.
Feb. 1, 2017) (“This Court is faced with the purely legal question of whether a
seaman can recover non-pecuniary damages against a non-employer third-party
tortfeasor under general maritime law.”). By only determining whether Claimants
are entitled to non-pecuniary and punitive damages, something the Court has already
done with regards to HFS, the Court does not impede on Claimants’ chosen courts’
determinations of damages’ amounts, if any. See In re Hyatt Corp., 262 F.R.D. 538,
548 (D. Haw. 2009) (“As such, in the same way that the Court has bifurcated liability
and compensatory damages, it will decide in this proceeding the issue of liability for
punitive damages (that is, the question of whether the Limitation Plaintiffs' conduct
warrants the imposition of punitive damages), but the state court proceedings will
5 The Court does not construe Ladon’s motion for summary judgment as an objection to the Court’s
Bifurcation Order, as suggested, ECF No. 159 at 4, namely because the relief sought in Ladon’s
motion does not violate the Bifurcation Order.
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determine what amount of punitive damages, if any, should be imposed.”).6
Determining whether Claimants are entitled to punitive and non-pecuniary damages
is question of law and an issue of determining liability—not assessing an amount of
damages. See id.
Finding the motion is not moot, the Court now turns to the merits.
B. 	Claimants May Not Recover Non-pecuniary Damages or Punitive
Damages from Ladon.7
Claimant Mark Doyle brings a claim against Ladon for general maritime
negligence and seeks to recover, among other damages: (1) mental anguish in the
past 	and 	future; 	(2) 	disfigurement 	in 	the 	past 	and 	future; 	and 	(3) 	and
exemplary/punitive damages. ECF No. 62. Claimant Richard Ancar brings a claim
against Ladon for general maritime negligence and seeks to recover, among other
6 Finding that the Bifurcation Order does not moot the motion for summary judgment, the Court
does not reach Ladon’s arguments related to judicial economy.
7 Ladon argues that general maritime governs Claimants’ claims because both the locality
condition and traditional maritime activity conditions are satisfied. ECF No. 156 at 8. Claimants
Ancar and Doyle do not dispute the relevance of their status as Jones Act seamen. See ECF
Nos. 160, 161. But, the Estate argues that Lowman’s status as a seamen is irrelevant; “Lowman
was killed in Texas’s territorial waters by a non-employer, and that no applicable maritime
regulation forecloses non-pecuniary and punitive damages, guide whether such damages are
recoverable from Ladon for Lowman’s general maritime law claims.” ECF No. 158 at 9. State
statutes govern wrongful death actions where the decedent was a non-seafarer and the death
occurred on navigable waters. Ortega Garcia v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 3d 882, 890 (S.D.
Tex. 2019), aff’d, 986 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun,
516 U.S. 199, 215 (1996)); see also Yamaha, 516 U.S. at n.2 (“By “nonseafarers,” we mean
persons who are neither seamen covered by the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688 (1988 ed.), nor
longshore workers covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 901 et seq.”). The Estate alleged Lowman was a Jones Act seamen. ECF No. 146. Accordingly,
the Claimants are all Jones Act seamen and general maritime law applies. See Matter of Bonvillian
Marine Serv., Inc., No. CV 19-14651, 2022 WL 3280110, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 11, 2022).
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damages: (1) mental anguish in the past and future; (2) disfigurement in the past and
future; (3) and exemplary/punitive damages. ECF No. 58. The Estate brings a claim
against Ladon for general maritime negligence and gross negligence and seeks to
recover, 	among 	other 	damages: 	(1) 	physical 	pain 	and 	mental 	anguish 	that
Mr. Lowman suffered at the time of the incident in question to the time of his death;
(2) loss of past earnings; (3) loss of support and services; (4) miscellaneous expenses
related to Mr. Lowman’s passing, including burial and funeral costs; (5) loss of
society and companionship, including the losses of love and affection; (6) loss of
nurture; (7) mental anguish and grief; (8) and exemplary damages. ECF No. 146.
Ladon argues that as Jones Act seamen, Claimants may not recover non-
pecuniary damages against a non-employer tortfeasor like Ladon. ECF No. 156
at 9–10. Ladon further argues that Claimants are not entitled to punitive damages
against Ladon under the Jones Act or general maritime law because Fifth Circuit
authority has clarified that punitive damages are only available for a Jones Act
seamen against their employer under a maintenance and cure claim. ECF No. 156
at 12, 13. Claimants respond that they are entitled to their damages against Ladon
because they are long-recognized available remedies in general maritime law. ECF
Nos. 158 at 16; 161 at 14. Upon review of binding Fifth Circuit authority, the Court
finds that Claimants are not entitled to punitive damages.
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Like Claimants point out, “the availability of punitive damages under
common law and general maritime law predates the Constitution.” See Wade, 2017
WL 434425, at *4 (citing Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 409-11
(2009) (re-affirming the “general rule that punitive damages were available at
common law [and] extended to claims arising under federal maritime law.”)). But,
“in Miles v. Apex, the Supreme Court held that a seaman cannot recover non-
pecuniary damages from his Jones Act employer either under a Jones Act negligence
claim or under a general maritime law claim of unseaworthiness.” Id. (citing Miles
v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990)). Consequently, “courts extended the
reasoning in Miles, nearly eliminating non-pecuniary damages in maritime personal
injury and wrongful death cases.” Id. (collecting cases).
Then in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, the Supreme Court clarified that
“its holding in Miles did not abolish all punitive damages under maritime law,” as
such a reading of Miles “is far too broad,” and reiterated that “[b]ecause punitive
damages have long been an accepted remedy under general maritime law, and
because nothing in the Jones Act altered this understanding, such damages for the
willful and wanton disregard of the maintenance and cure obligations should remain
available in the appropriate case as a matter of general maritime law.” Id. (quoting
Miles, 498 U.S. 557 U.S. at 419-20).
More confusion followed. See id. (“it was unclear whether punitive damages
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were recoverable under general maritime law for non-maintenance and cure claims
or were limited to only maintenance and cure claims.”) (comparing cases). In
McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., the Fifth Circuit “reviewed the historical
development of punitive damages in general maritime law and concluded that when
a seaman’s personal injury or wrongful death claim was based only on general
maritime law, punitive damages were available,” thereby extending the holding of
Townsend to non-maintenance and cure claims. Id. (citing McBride v. Estis Well
Serv., L.L.C., 731 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2013), rev’d en banc, 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir.
2014). But, “on a rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed the panel and
concluded that Townsend was limited to maintenance and cure claims and that ‘the
reasoning in Miles remains sound’ for seaman personal injury and wrongful death
claims,” and held “that neither a seaman, nor his survivor, can recover punitive
damages for personal injury or wrongful death claims based on either the Jones Act
or general maritime law.” 	Id. (quoting 768 F. 3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, (2015)).8
In The Dutra Group v. Batterton, the Supreme Court “again upheld Miles and
ruled that a seaman could not recover punitive damages for unseaworthiness claims
8 Like Miles, the facts of McBride involved a “personal representative of a deceased seaman [who]
sued the employer for wrongful death under the Jones Act and general maritime law.” Id. at *5
(quoting McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
2310 (2015)).
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against a vessel owner/operator.” In re Belden Investments LLC, No. 2:20-CV-
01486, 2021 WL 2315841, at *2 (W.D. La. June 7, 2021) (citing 139 S.Ct. 2275,
2287 (2019); Scarborough v. Clemco Industries, 391 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding seaman’s survivors could not recover non-pecuniary damages against non-
employer third party in maritime wrongful death claim); Rocket v. Belle Chasse
Marine Transp., LLC, 260 F.Supp.3d 688 (E.D. La. 2017) (holding that seaman was
not entitled to non-pecuniary damages, including punitive damages, in claim against
non-employer third party); Lewis v. Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. 2016 WL 3902597
at *3 (E.D. La. 2016) (“In light of the Supreme Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s
precedents, it is clear that a Jones Act seaman or his or her representative cannot
recover nonpecuniary losses for wrongful death under the Jones Act or general
maritime law)); see also Rinehart v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco L.P., No. CV 15-6266, 2017
WL 1407699, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 20, 2017) (“Although the Scarborough decision
seemed at one time to be undermined by Townsend, it was bolstered by the en banc
decision in McBride. It is now clear in the Fifth Circuit that under both the Jones Act
and general maritime law, a seaman’s claim against both employers and non-
employers does not include punitive damages.”).
In sum, “the Fifth Circuit has now made it clear that under both the Jones Act
and general maritime law, a seaman's damages against both employers and non-
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employers are limited to pecuniary losses.” Wiltz v. M-I L.L.C., No. CV 17-4943,
2018 WL 620041, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2018) (collecting cases).9
Here, Claimants bring their claims under general maritime law, and so they
are “bound by any limitations on damages that exist under that body of law.” Wade,
2017 WL 434425, at *5. “[I]n wrongful death cases brought under general maritime
law, a survivor’s recovery from employers and non-employers is limited to
pecuniary losses.” Id. (citing McBride, 768 F.3d at 391). Furthermore, a seaman is
9 Claimants argue that this is not clear and instead, the Court should use the Townsend and Batteron
frameworks and public policy to find they are entitled to recover nonpecuniary and punitive
damages from Ladon. ECF Nos. 158 at 7; 161 at 12–16. Claimants cite to Collins v. A.B.C. Marine
Towing, L.L.C., No. CIV.A. 14-1900, 2015 WL 5254710, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2015) as their
primary example within the Fifth Circuit, but the Collins court later ruled:
As this Court explained in Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C., “neither the
Miles nor the en banc McBride opinions address an action by a seaman against a
non-employer third party tortfeasor.” No. 14-1900, 2015 WL 5254710 (E.D. La.
Sept. 9, 2015). However, as Plaintiff has elected to bring this claim under general
maritime law, she is bound by any limitations on damages that exist under that body
of law. It has become clear since the en banc opinion in McBride that in wrongful
death cases brought under general maritime law, a survivor’s recovery from
employers and non-employers is limited to pecuniary losses. McBride, 768 F.3d
at 391. This is supported by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Scarborough v. Clemco
Industries, which held a seaman may not recover punitive damages against either
his employer or a non-employer third party. 391 F.3d 660, 668 (5th Cir. 2004).
While the Scarborough decision at one time seemed to be undermined by
Townsend, it has been given clarity and vitality by the en banc decision in McBride.
Scarborough is based on Miles, which is the foundation for the Fifth Circuit’s en
banc decision in McBride. McBride, 768 F.3d 382. Although the result may be
different under another body of law, the Fifth Circuit has now made it clear that
under both the Jones Act and general maritime law, a seaman’s damages against
both employers and non-employers are limited to pecuniary losses. 3 Thus,
Plaintiff’s claims for non-pecuniary damages in this case are controlled by the Fifth
Circuit’s holdings in McBride and Scarborough, and must be dismissed.
Wade, 2017 WL 434425, at *5. Like Wade, as noted above, the majority of courts in the Fifth
Circuit rely on these and other Fifth Circuit opinions to find Claimants may only recover pecuniary
damages from a non-employer like Ladon. See id. The Court agrees.
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not entitled to non-pecuniary damages, including punitive damages, in a claim
against a non-employer third party. Rocket, 260 F.Supp.3d 688. Accordingly,
Claimants’ claims for punitive damages should be dismissed.
Certain of Claimants’ non-pecuniary damages: disfigurement, Mr. Lowman’s
family’s mental anguish and grief, loss of society and companionship, loss of love
and affection, and loss of nurture, Doyle’s and Ancar’s mental anguish, fare no
better. See In re Belden Investments LLC, No. 2:20-CV-01486, 2021 WL 2315841,
at *3 (W.D. La. June 7, 2021) (“The type of damages sought by Claimants are
prohibited 	under 	the 	Jones 	Act 	and 	general 	maritime 	law 	negligence 	or
unseaworthiness claims. Claimant’s claims for non-pecuniary damages which
include punitive damages, loss of society and companionship damages, loss of love
and affection damages, and damages as a result of Claimant’s mental anguish and
grief are not recoverable and will be dismissed with prejudice.”); In re Sanco
Holding AS, 548 F. Supp. 2d 390, 395 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (“As a matter of law, in
maritime 	wrongful 	death 	actions, 	mental 	anguish 	or 	grief 	damages 	are 	not
cognizable.”); Lewis v. Noble Drilling Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 3902597, at *3 (E.D.
La. July 19, 2016) (“Nonpecuniary damages are those that are ‘incapable of being
defined by any recognized measure of value,’ such as damages for loss of society or
damages for grief or mental anguish.”) (quoting McBride, 768 F.3d at 386); Wilson
v. Marquette Transp. Co., LLC, No. CV 22-3765, 2024 WL 3202344, at *2 (E.D.
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La. June 27, 2024) (a seamen suing for personal injury was “not entitled to damages
for loss of enjoyment of life, scarring and disfigurement, or any other non-pecuniary
damages.”) (citing In re Adriatic Marine, LLC, 2022 WL 1239950, at *2 (E.D. La.
Apr. 27, 2022)).
But, certain of Claimants’ damages should survive summary judgment:
Mr. Lowman’s physical pain and mental anguish, loss of past earnings, loss of
support and services, and burial and funeral expenses, Ancar and Doyle’s mental
anguish. See Sanco Holding AS, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (“[Pre–Death Pain and
Suffering] damages are considered pecuniary damages, recoverable as survival
damages to the decedent’s estate under both the Jones Act and general maritime
law.”) (quoting Neal v. Barisich, 707 F.Supp. 862, 867 (E.D.La.1989)); Miles, 498
U.S. at 30 (discussing Sea–Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 591 (1974),
“[t]he Court held that a dependent plaintiff in a maritime wrongful death action could
recover for the pecuniary losses of support, services, and funeral expenses”); Hudson
v. Diamond Offshore Mgmt. Co., No. CV 24-1240, 2025 WL 2419722, at *2 (E.D.
La. Aug. 21, 2025) (seamen suing for personal injury damages may recover mental
anguish as pecuniary damages) (collecting cases); Galland v. Harvey Gulf Int’l
Marine, LLC, No. CV 23-3392, 2025 WL 2634339, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 12, 2025)
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(same).10
Accordingly, Ladon’s motion for summary judgment should be granted and
Claimants’ 	requests 	for 	punitive 	damages 	and 	non-pecuniary 	damages 	for
disfigurement, Mr. Lowman’s family’s mental anguish, grief, loss of society and
companionship, loss of love and affection, and loss of nurture, be dismissed.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court RECOMMENDS that Ladon’s motion for summary judgment be
GRANTED IN PART. ECF No. 156. Claimants’ claims for non-pecuniary and
punitive damages should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. However, the
Estate’s claims for damages for Mr. Lowman’s physical pain and mental anguish,
loss of past earnings, loss of support and services, and burial and funeral expenses,
and Ancar and Doyle’s mental anguish damages remain.
The 	Parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED . R.
CIV . P. 72(b). Failure to file timely objections will preclude review of factual
findings or legal conclusions, except for plain error. Quinn v. Guerrero, 863 F.3d
353, 358 (5th Cir. 2017).
10 Claimants are mistaken that Galland permits recovery of disfigurement—in Galland, the parties
agreed that plaintiffs were not entitled to nonpecuniary damages, such as disfigurement. Galland,
2025 WL 2634339, at *6.
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Signed at Houston, Texas, on May 5, 2026.
Dena Hanovice Palermo
United States Magistrate Judge
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