Allemond v. Talos QN Exploration LLC

14 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 4:24-cv-02560

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Document 39

Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD

Page 1 of 29

United States District Court
Southem District of Texas

ENTERED
November 21, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 Filed on 11/21/25in TXSD_ _— Page 2 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 _ Filed on 11/21/25in TXSD Page 3 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 _ Filed on 11/21/25in TXSD Page 4 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 _ Filed on 11/21/25in TXSD Page 5 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 _ Filed on 11/21/25in TXSD Page 6 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 _ Filed on 11/21/25in TXSD_ _— Page 7 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39
Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 8 of 29
mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury. '" Rex Real Estate I, L.P. v. Rex Real Estate Exchange, Inc., 80 F.4th 607, 616 (5th Cir. 2023) .
The court "must view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in [the nonmovant's] favor." Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, 129 S. Ct. 846, 851 n.2 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) . The court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000) .
" [E] vidence may be considered on summary judgment provided '[its] contents can be presented in admissible form at trial [ . ] '" Ford v. Anderson County, Texas, 102 F.4th 292, 325 (5th Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (quoting Patel v. Texas Tech University, 941 F.3d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 2019) ); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c) (2) .
III. Applicable Law
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ( "OSCLA" ) . See 43 U.S.C. 1349 (b) (1) (granting jurisdiction over disputes arising out of or in connection with the exploration, development, or production of minerals on the outer Continental Shelf) . In actions brought under the OCSLA "federal law governs to the extent that there is applicable federal law; however, if there is a gap in the federal law, the law of the adjacent state is used as a gap-filler and becomes surrogate
-8-

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 _ Filed on 11/21/25in TXSD Page 9 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39
Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 10 of 29
federal maritime law nor federal common law applies in this case. 45 Therefore, Louisiana state law governs.
IV. Analysis
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are liable for his injuries under both Louisiana's negligence and premises liability laws. 46 Defendants argue that they are not vicariously liable for Plaintiff's injuries because as a matter of law principals are not liable for the negligence of their independent contractors. 47 Defendants also argue that they are not liable under a premises liability theory because (1) Plaintiff did not properly plead his premises liability claims and (2) even if Plaintiff did properly plead his premises liability claims, Plaintiff's role as an independent contractor precludes recovery. 48
In his Response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment because (1) Defendants failed to raise independent-contractor defense in their answer and the
45See id. at 16 1 2 (stating that Louisiana law applies) ; see also Rodrique v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 89 S. Ct. 1835, 1839-42 (1969) (holding that federal admiralty law does not apply to accidents occurring on fixed offshore drilling platform) ; Fontenot v. Dual Drilling Co., 179 F.3d 969, 977 (5th Cir. 1999) (" [O]ur circuit has consistently rejected attempts of litigants to have 'federal common law' override rules of Louisiana tort law in actions arising on fixed platforms on the Outer Continental Shelf.") .
46Plaintiff's Response, Docket Entry No. 22, pp. 20-23. 47Defendants MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21, pp. 17-18.
48Defendants' Reply Memorandum, Docket Entry No. 23, p. 2; pp. 9-10.
-10-

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 _ Filed on 11/21/25in TXSD Page 11 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 _ Filed on 11/21/25in TXSD Page 12 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 _ Filed on 11/21/25in TXSD Page 13 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 _ Filed on 11/21/25in TXSD Page 14 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 _ Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 15 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39
Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 16 of 29
injuries as a matter of law. 56 Plaintiff argues that there is more than a scintilla of evidence that Defendants are liable for his injuries under Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2315, 2317, 2317.1, and 2322, each of which is addressed in turn. 57 As discussed above, Louisiana law has two different premises liability statutes. While article 2317 imposes a duty on the custodian of the defective thing, article 2322 imposes a duty on the owner of the defective thing.
1. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315 (Vicarious Liability)
To establish that Defendants are liable under article 2315, Plaintiff must show: "(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard []; (2) the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard []; (3) the
the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause in fact of plaintiff's injuries []; (4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries []; and (5) the actual damages []." Audler v. CBC Innovis Inc., 519 F.3d 239, 249 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Lemann v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, 923 So.2d 627, 633 (La. 2006) ). Under Louisiana law, a principal "cannot be liable for injuries resulting from the negligent acts of an independent contractor . unless (1) the liability arises from ultrahazardous activities performed by the contractor on behalf of the principal or (2) the principal retains operational control over
56Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21, p. 15.
57Plaintiff's Response, Docket Entry No. 22, pp. 25-28.
-16-

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 _ Filed on 11/21/25in TXSD Page 17 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39
Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 18 of 29
injury, a principal . cannot be liable under the operational control exception." Coulter, 117 F.3d at 912.
Defendants argue that they did not retain control over the methods Acadian used to secure the conductor . 59 The record establishes that both FCG and Acadian contractually retained the "authority and right to direct and control all of the details" of their work. 60 Although Defendants received updates on what was happening on the platform and gave the ultimate go-ahead to stabilize the conductor, there is no evidence that Defendants ever controlled the methods that Acadian used to secure the conductor. When Daw told Defendants that the conductor was moving, they simply told Daw to ensure it was secured. 61 Defendants never told Acadian or FCG how to secure the moving conductor . 62 Ultimately, Acadian made the decision on its own to secure the conductor by using a come-along and welding support braces onto the platform. 63 Additionally, when stabilizing the conductor, Acadian used its own employees and equipment. 64
59Defendants' Reply Memorandum, Docket Entry No. 23, pp. 7-9.
60Acadian Master Service Agreement, Exhibit E to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-6, p. 2 1 5; FCG Master Service Agreement, Exhibit F to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-7, p. 2 1 5.
61Daw Deposition, Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Response, Docket Entry No. 22-3, p. 123 lines 7-24.
62 Id. 63Id. at 98-99. 64Id.
-18-

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39
Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 19 of 29
Plaintiff offers no evidence that Defendants controlled the methods used to secure the moving conductor. Because no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty under article 2315, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendants are vicariously liable for his injuries.
2. Louisiana Civil Code articles 2317 and 2317.1 (Premises Liability)
To establish that Defendants are liable under articles 2317 and/or 2317.1, Plaintiff must show: " (1) the property which caused the damage was in the 'custody' of the defendant; (2) the property had a condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm to persons on the premises; (3) the unreasonably dangerous condition was a cause-in-fact of the resulting injury; and (4) defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the risk." Voces, 2016 WL 7757384, at *5.
(a) Custody
" The first requirement for custodial liability under Louisiana [Civil] Code articles 2317 and 2317.1, is that the 'thing' that caused the injury must be in the custody of the defendant . ! " Hammons v. Forest Oil Corp., Civil Action No. 06- 9173, 2008 WL 348765, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 7, 2008) (quoting Fruge v. Parker Drilling Co., 337 F.3d 558, 565 (5th Cir. 2003) ) . Although ownership of the 'thing' creates a rebuttable presumption of custody, Leblanc v. Trappey, 838 So.2d 860, 863 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2003) , courts must also look to whether the owner "'exercises
-19-

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39
Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 20 of 29
direction and control of the thing and derives some benefit from it. / / 65 Hammons, 2008 WL 348765, at *4 (quoting Fruge, 337 F.3d at 565) ; see also Dupree v. City of New Orleans, 765 So.2d 1002, 1009 (La. 2000) .
Defendants argue that they did not have control of the platform because Daw, an employee of FCG, was in charge of the platform. 66 Under Louisiana law an owner does not retain custody of a platform when it contracts "out [of] its maintenance and inspection duties and retain [s] no control over the activities delegated to" its independent contractors. Smith v. Hall-Houston Oil Co., No. Civ.A. 98-3433, 2000 WL 6265, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2000) (finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant had custody of the platform because the defendant had "contracted out its maintenance and inspection duties and retained no control over the activities delegated to" its independent contractors) ; see also Haas v. Atlanta Richfield, 799 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant had custody and control over its platform because the defendant was "responsible for the safety of the operations on the platform" and
65As the owner and operator of the platform Defendants derived benefits from the platform. See Bourg v. BT Operating Co., Civil Action No. H-08-0596, 2009 WL 960011, at *13 (S.D. Tex. April 8, 2009) .
66See Defendants' Reply Memorandum, Docket Entry No. 23, p. 8.
-20-

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39
Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 21 of 29
had ultimate work authority). The record establishes that on the day of the accident, Daw, an employee of FCG, was the person in charge of the platform.67 Daw, not defendants, had the ultimate work authority on the platform on the day of the accident. 68 Moreover, FCG and Acadian contractually retained the "authority and right to direct and control all of the details of the [ir] Work. "69 However, it is not clear that Defendants actually contracted out its inspection and maintenance duties. Unlike in Smith, where the contracts between the defendant and its independent contractors explicitly stated that the independent contractors were assuming the duties of inspection and maintenance, 2000 WL 626, at *1, here, the contracts between Defendants and Acadian and FCG merely stated that the independent contractors will "provide work, operations, goods and services. "70 Defendants do not offer any evidence that they had completely turned the day-to-day operations over to its independent contractors. In fact, Daw stated that his job on the
67Daw Deposition Excerpts, Exhibit C to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-4, p. 5 lines 23-25; Cole Deposition, Exhibit D to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-5, p. 5 lines 10-20.
68Daw Deposition Excerpts, Exhibit C to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-4, p. 8.
69Acadian Master Service Agreement, Exhibit E to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-6, p. 2 | 5; FCG Master Service Agreement, Exhibit F to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-7, p. 2 | 5.
7ºAcadian Master Service Agreement, Exhibit E to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-6, p. 1; FCG Master Service Agreement, Exhibit F to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-7, p. 1.
-21-

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39
Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 22 of 29
platform was to be "the eyes and ears of [his] project manager, "71 Godchaux, who was employed by Defendants. 72
Defendants also argue that they did not have custody of the platform at the time of the accident because they did not retain the right to supervise the work being done on the platform. 73 Under Louisiana law an owner does not have custody of its platform if it does not "retain[] a right to supervise, direct and control activities aboard" the platform. Tajonera v. Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, L.L.C., Civil Action Nos. 13-0366, 13-0550, 13-5137, 13-2496, 13-5508, 13-6022, 13-6099, 13-6413, 14-374,
14-1714, 2015 WL 6758258, at *21 (E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2015) ; see also Hammmons, 2008
WL 348765, at *4 (finding that "the kind of supervision and control necessary to establish [the principal's] custody for purposes of Articles 2317 and 2317.1" did not exist because the contractor was only supervised by his employer and only received directions from his employer) ; Nedley v. City of Alexandria, 405 So.3d 1177, 1180-81 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2025) (affirming the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment because the defendant never controlled the methods of the independent contractor) . The evidence establishes that Plaintiff
71Daw Deposition Excerpts, Exhibit C to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-4, p. 6 line 10.
72Id. lines 12-20.
73Defendants' Reply Memorandum, Docket Entry No. 23, pp. 7-9.
-22-

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39
Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 23 of 29
was only supervised by his employer or Daw and that he only received directions from his employer . 74 Acadian chose how to secure the moving conductor . 75 However, there is evidence that (1) Defendants required its independent contractors to adhere to their safety guidelines, see Haas, 799 F.2d at 1015 (finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant had custody of the platform because they were responsible for the safety of the operations on the platform) and (2) that Defendants received daily reports from Daw about the platform, 76 see Tajonera, 2015 WL 6758258, at *20-21 (finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant had custody of the platform because the defendant maintained the right to enter the platform and had daily communication about what was happening on the platform) .
Because Defendants received daily reports about the platform, required specific safety protocols, and did not clearly contract out its inspection and maintenance duties, Defendants have failed to rebut the presumption of custody. Therefore, there is a genuine
74Allemond Deposition, Exhibit B to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-3, p. 10 lines 11-18, p. 11 lines 9-11; Daw Deposition Excerpts, Exhibit C to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-4, p. 8 lines 3-7 (establishing Daw had ultimate work authority, which required him to supervise all work on the platform) .
75Daw Deposition Excerpts, Exhibit C to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-4, pp. 46-47.
76Id. at 6 lines 12-25.
-23-

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 24 of 29
issue of material fact as to whether Defendants had custody over the platform at the time of the accident.
(b) Unreasonably Dangerous Condition
A platform owner and operator has a duty to find and correct defects that are unreasonably dangerous. Simon v. CenturyLink, Inc., 340 So.3d 88, 91 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2021) . Louisiana courts have developed a "risk-utility balancing test to determine whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous." Id. "The four pertinent factors to be considered in the risk-utility balancing test are: (1) the utility of the complained-of condition; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of harm, including the obviousness and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of preventing the harm; and (4) the nature of the plaintiff's activities in terms of social utility or whether the activities are dangerous by nature. "77 Id. (citing Bufkin v. Felipe's Louisiana, LLC, 171 So.3d 851, 856 (La. 2014) ).
Under the fourth prong of the risk-utility test, a plaintiff's status as a repairman is a significant factor in determining whether a defect is unreasonably dangerous. Celestine v. Union Oil Co. of California, 652 So.2d 1299, 1304 (La. 1995) . Although the
77Because the platform is a "structure with obvious social and economic benefits," the "community as a whole is served by the owner's efforts to maintain" it. Ladue v. Chevron, U. S.A., Inc., 920 F.2d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 1991) . The law should "encourage the owner to repair the platform, for that is the 'socially and economically desirable' state of affairs." Id.
-24-

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39
Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 25 of 29
Louisiana Supreme Court has held that there is not a repairman exception to strict liability under articles 2317 and 2322, it has also held that "the individual circumstances, including but not limited to the social, moral, economic considerations, the degree of knowledge of the repairman, the incentive or disincentive to the owner to repair the vice or defect, the reasonableness of presuming that a particular repairman is cognizant of the particular risks, and the ability of the repairmen to minimize such risks, should all be factored into and weighed in the 'unreasonable risk'
calculation." Id. In other words, the defect must create an unreasonably dangerous condition vis-a-vis the repairman. 78 Id. See also Ladue, 920 F.2d at 277 ("We need only determine whether the [defect] was unreasonably dangerous with respect to [the repairman] and those similarly situated. ") (applying articles 2317 and 2322) , and the court must consider factors such as whether the repairman was injured by the very condition he was hired to repair, whether the repairman was aware of the danger that injured him before his injury occurred, and whether the repairman had extensive training and experience.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff was injured by the very defect he was asked to
7BWhether the condition was unreasonably dangerous vis-a-vis the repairman falls under the fourth prong of the risk-utility analysis. Fisher v. Villere, 313 So.3d 1282, 1290-91 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2021) . The analysis of whether the defect is open and obvious to everyone falls under the second prong of the risk- utility analysis.
-25-

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39
Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 26 of 29
repair. 79 The evidence shows that Plaintiff knew he was welding support braces to the platform in order to limit the movement of the conductor . 80 The evidence also shows that (1) welding support braces on the platform was a routine job, 81 (2) at the time of the accident Plaintiff "was an experienced welder who previously worked on offshore structures as well as land-based pipelines, "82 (3) Plaintiff was advised on the morning of the accident "verbally and in writing at least seven (7) times to avoid pinch points through his hand and finger placement, "83 and (4) workers on the platform understood that even though the conductor was secured with a come-along, it was likely to move because of the movement from the sea. 84
Plaintiff argues that he did not know of the dangerous condition because (1) he was not warned that the conductor was
79Defendants' Reply Memorandum, Docket Entry No. 23, pp. 9-10. 80Allemond Deposition, Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff's Response, Docket Entry No. 22-2, p. 53 lines 6-14.
81Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21, pp. 7, 14; see also Daw Deposition Excerpts, Exhibit C to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-4, p. 64 lines 18-21.
82Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21, pp. 7, 14; see also Allemond Deposition, Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff's Response, Docket Entry No. 22-2, pp. 14, 20.
83Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21, p. 11; see also Safety Meeting Report, Exhibit G to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-8; Acadian HSE Management System, Exhibit H to Defendants' MSJ, Docket Entry No. 21-9.
84Daw Deposition, Exhibit 3 to Plaintiff's Response, Docket Entry No. 22-3, p. 86 lines 8-17.
-26-

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39
Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 27 of 29
moving after the come-along was in place, (2) he could not see the conductor moving while wearing his welding hood, and (3) because the heavier seas made it more likely that the conductor would move . 85 However, because Plaintiff's status as a repairman is a significant factor in determining whether a risk is unreasonable, the evidence that Plaintiff offers does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the moving conductor was an unreasonably dangerous condition vis-a-vis Plaintiff. See Fisher, 313 So.3d at 1291 (finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defect was unreasonably dangerous to the repairman because the repairman was experienced and had inspected the area before the accident) ; Duffy v. Conoco, Inc., No. Civ. A. 95-0600, 1996 WL 271635, at *5 (E.D. La. May 21, 1996) (holding that even though the plaintiff was not hired to fix the specific defect that injured him, his role as a repairman led him to be able to recognize "the possible dangers" and to " [take] steps to minimize the risk" ) .
Although there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants had custody of the platform, there is not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the moving conductor was an unreasonably dangerous condition vis-a-vis Plaintiff. Plaintiff therefore cannot establish that Defendants are liable for his injuries under articles 2317 and/or 2317.1.
85Plaintiff's Response, Docket Entry No. 22, pp. 27-28.
-27-

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 _ Filed on 11/21/25in TXSD _— Page 28 of 29

Case 4:24-cv-02560 Document 39 Filed on 11/21/25 in TXSD Page 29 of 29
None of the opinions of Plaintiff's expert, Michael P. Terrell, P.E., are impermissible conclusions of law. The opinions deal with the appropriate standard of care under the legal duties alleged by Plaintiff. Because the court has concluded that Defendants owed no legal duty to Plaintiff, Terrell's opinions are not relevant to the court's analysis. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Strike will be denied as moot.
V. Conclusion and Order
After careful consideration and for the reasons discussed above, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 21) is GRANTED, and the Motion to Strike Declaration of Michael P. Terrell, P.E. by QuarterNorth Energy LLC and Talos QN Exploration LLC (Docket Entry No. 24) is DENIED AS MOOT.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 21st day of November, 2025.
J. FR
SIM LAKE SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-29-