Scott v. Moving Solutions Van Lines LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MIGNON SCOTT,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-02079
MOVING SOLUTIONS VAN LINES LLC,
et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Partial Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants New Destiny, LLC
and Moving Solutions Van Lines (“Defendants”). ECF No. 28. The only issue raised in the Motion
is whether Plaintiff’s state law claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) are
preempted by the Carmack Amendment. The Court held a hearing on the Motion on January 14,
2026, at which the Court expressed agreement with Defendants’ argument but allowed Plaintiff
five days to file additional briefing addressing the question of whether Plaintiff’s DTPA claims
relating to overcharges fell within the preemptive effect of the Carmack Amendment as interpreted
by the Fifth Circuit. See Minute Entry of January 16, 2024. No additional briefing has been
received.
Because the Court agrees with Defendants that, as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit, the
Carmack Amendment preempts all state law claims arising out of the interstate transportation of
household goods, including claims not directly related to damage or loss of goods, the Court now
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 02, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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GRANTS Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s state law DTPA
claims WITH PREJUDICE.
The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate
Commerce Act “provide[s] the exclusive cause of action for loss or damages to goods arising from
the interstate transportation of those goods by a common carrier.” Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines,
343 F.3d 769, 778 (5th Cir. 2003) (emphasis original). “[T]he complete pre-emption doctrine
applies” to the Carmack Amendment. Id. “The purpose of the Amendment is to establish uniform
federal guidelines designed in part to remove the uncertainty surrounding a carrier’s liability when
damage occurs to a shipper’s interstate shipment.” Heniff Transportation Sys., L.L.C. v. Trimac
Transportation Servs., Inc., 847 F.3d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 2017). The Fifth Circuit “has repeatedly
recognized the ‘broad reach’ of the Carmack Amendment.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that her DTPA claims do not fall within the preemptive effect of the
Carmack Amendment because they relate to Defendants’ alleged failure to abide by a binding cost
estimate for Plaintiff’s cross-country move, rather than to alleged damages to or loss of Plaintiff’s
goods. But while the plain text of the Carmack Amendment speaks in terms of “loss or injury to
property,” the 	Fifth 	Circuit 	has 	interpreted 	the Amendment 	more broadly 	as 	“generally
preempt[ing] state law claims arising out of the shipment of goods by interstate carriers.” Heniff
Transportation Sys., 847 at 190. In Moffit v. Bekins Van Lines Co., the Fifth Circuit held that all
of the plaintiffs’ state law claims relating to the late shipment of their belongings, including DTPA
claims did not involve loss or damage of goods, were preempted by the Carmack Amendment. 6
F.3d 305, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1993). While the Moffit court did not provide a detailed explanation of
the plaintiff’s state law claims, it stated that to allow the plaintiff’s DTPA claims would “defeat
the purpose of the [Amendment] to create uniformity out of disparity” by “substitut[ing] a
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paramount and national law as to the rights and liabilities of interstate carriers subject to the
Amendment.” Id. The same logic applies here to Plaintiff’s DTPA claims.
Multiple district courts in this circuit have similarly found that the Carmack Amendment
preempts state law claims relating to misrepresentations by interstate carriers. See, e.g., Franyutti
v. Hidden Valley Moving & Storage, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 775, 776 (W.D. Tex. 2004) (finding
that the plaintiff’s DTPA claim that the defendant moving company “charged him a higher amount
than orally agreed to and delivered the goods at least three days late” was preempted); id. at 778
(“[The Carmack Amendment] provides the exclusive cause of action for any claim arising out of
the interstate transportation of household goods.”) (emphasis added); Von Der Ahe v. 1-800-Pack-
Rat, LLC, 597 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1060 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (holding that DTPA claims regarding
misrepresentations about the condition of a storage facility were preempted). Plaintiff has not cited
any federal cases from the Fifth Circuit holding otherwise.
Plaintiff additionally maintains that her state law DTPA claims should not be dismissed
because the federal regulations that governing an interstate moving company’s violation of a
binding estimate do not have preemptive effect. See ECF No. 30 at 3 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 375.401(i)
and 49 U.S.C. § 14104(b)(1)(C)).1 But this argument misses the point. Defendants’ Motion argues
that the preemptive effect of the Carmack Amendment is broad enough to encompass all state law
claims arising out of the interstate transportation of household goods—even those, like Plaintiff’s,
1 Plaintiff relies on Hamilton v. Moving Nation Deliveries, LLC, No. 5:19-CV-527-BO, 2020 WL
2850903 (E.D.N.C. June 2, 2020) for the proposition that a plaintiff may be “entitled to relief under
both federal law and state deceptive trade practices act for violations including 49 C.F.R. 375.401
and 375.403 for failing to follow federal law regarding binding estimates.” See ECF No. 30 at 3.
But even setting aside the fact that this is a district court opinion from outside of the Fifth Circuit
decided on a motion for default judgment, the case is inapposite. Plaintiff in this case has not
asserted a cause of action under 49 C.F.R. § 375.401 or 375.403, See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10
(Complaint), and the Hamilton Court did not address preemption under the Carmack Amendment.
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related to violation of a binding cost estimate rather than damage or loss of goods. Defendants do
not claim that the federal regulations cited by Plaintiff have preemptive effect, nor do they need
to. Because the Fifth Circuit has broadly interpreted the preemptive effect of the Carmack
Amendment, the existence of separate federal regulations regarding binding estimates does not
impact the analysis.
The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 28).
Plaintiff’s state law DTPA claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s claims
under the Carmack Amendment may proceed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed at Houston, Texas on February 2, 2026.
_______________________________
Keith P. Ellison
United States District Judge
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