O'Neal v. City Of Houston et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
BRANDON E O'NEAL,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-CV-04777
CITY OF HOUSTON, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant City of Houston’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment.
ECF No. 55. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
PART.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Both the parties and the Court are intimately familiar with the facts of this case, so the
Court declines to repeat them here at length. Briefly, Plaintiff Brandon O’Neal is a firefighter
employed by the City of Houston. O’Neal is currently employed as a Senior Communication
Captain in the Houston Fire Department’s (HFD) Office of Emergency Communications (“OEC”)
located at the Houston Emergency Center (“HEC”), where he works as a dispatcher.
O’Neal is a nondenominational Christian. Since 2020, O’Neal has worn a beard. According
to O’Neal, his Christian faith compels him to wear a beard, particularly during observance of the
“Nazarite Vow.” ECF No. 55, Ex. N (“My religious belief is to have a beard as commanded and
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 07, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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required in the Holy Bible.”); ECF No. 55; Ex. U (“When I observe the Nazarite Vow it requires
no razor to touch my head and let the hair grow long.”).
O’Neal’s belief in beard wearing conflicts with the Houston Fire Department’s grooming
policy, which requires that firefighters be cleanshaven at all times. ECF No. 55, Ex. R. On August
4, 2022, O’Neal requested an exception from the clean-shaven policy on the basis of his religious
belief. ECF No. 55 at 9. The request was denied on December 3, 2022. Id., Ex. P. The denial
restated the grooming policy but did not provide additional explanation. Id. O’Neal emailed
Assistant Fire Chief Rodney West, asking why his request had been denied. ECF No. 55 at Ex. Q.
Chief West responded that O’Neal’s supporting documentation did not support a religious
exemption from the Department’s grooming policy. Id. O’Neal submitted a second request for
accommodation on March 11, 2023, citing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(EEOC) guidelines that “If the employer reasonably needs more information, the employer and
the employee should engage in an interactive process to discuss the request.” ECF No. 55, Ex. S.
After a lengthy back and forth between O’Neal and his superiors in the Department, the request
was ultimately denied on April 16, 2024. ECF No. 55, Ex. DD. Again, the denial did not provide
a specific reason, but rather directed O’Neal to the grooming policy. Id.
O’Neal remains employed with the Fire Department. However, since it came to the
Department’s attention that O’Neal was violating the grooming policy, he has been denied the
opportunity to work overtime hours. The Department has been clear that O’Neal’s noncompliance
with the grooming policy is the reason for not allowing him to work overtime. ECF No. 55, Ex.
BB.
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Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on December 21, 2023. His remaining claims are for religious
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s remaining
claims.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. Religious Discrimination
“Religion,” for purposes of Title VII, is defined to include “all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
“To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff
must present evidence that (1) []he held a bona fide religious belief, (2) h[is] belief conflicted with
a requirement of h[is] employment, (3) h[is] employer was informed of h[is] belief, and (4) []he
suffered an adverse employment action for failing to comply with the conflicting employment
requirement.” Carter v. Loc. 556, Transp. Workers Union of Am., 156 F.4th 459, 478–79 (5th Cir.
2025). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant unlawfully failed to accommodate his bona fide
religious belief, which impacted the terms and conditions of his employment—namely, being
denied the opportunity to work overtime. “Failure-to-accommodate claims. . . can be proven by
showing the [plaintiff’s] need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in an employer’s
[adverse] decision.” Id.
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Employers “have a defense against a failure-to-accommodate claim if accommodating the
employee’s religious practice or observance would impose an undue hardship [on the conduct of
the employer’s business].” Id.
i. 	Sincerity
Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff’s belief conflicted with a requirement of his
employment, that the City was aware of Plaintiff’s belief, or that the denial of overtime constitutes
and adverse employment action. Rather, Defendant “disputes that Plaintiff has, or can, establish a
bona fide religious belief with respect to his espoused religious practice of wearing a beard.” ECF
No. 55 at 16. Defendant “concedes O’Neal has a faith belief encompassing much more than the
sole practice of wearing a beard and that religious practices can evolve and harden over time,” but
argues that “O’Neal’s practice of wearing a beard. . . lacks markers of sincerity.” Id. at 19.
Defendant’s basic contention is that because O’Neal became aware of the existence of religious
exemptions to employment requirements in 2019 and began wearing a beard in 2020, while his
face was covered by a mask, but did not request accommodations until 2022, he cannot—as a
matter of law—establish a sincerely held religious belief in beard wearing. Additionally,
Defendant appears to argue that because O’Neal expressed some willingness to compromise his
shaving requirements in hopes of agreeing on an accommodation, his belief is insincere.
The Court rejects this argument. There is ample evidence from which a jury could conclude
that 	O’Neal’s 	beliefs 	with 	regard 	to 	beard 	wearing 	were 	sincere, 	despite 	the 	supposed
inconsistencies pointed to by Defendant. During the interactive process, O’Neal provided the City
with a letter from his pastor, which stated: “Brandon took the Nazarite Vow. The Nazarite Vow is
taken by individuals who have voluntarily dedicated themselves to God. Part of the vow is to wear
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a beard for religious reasons.” ECF No. 81, Ex. A. During various meetings with City personnel
regarding his accommodations request, O’Neal pointed to specific Bible passages that supported
his belief. ECF No. 55, Ex. N. Most importantly, both Chief West, who interviewed O’Neal about
his accommodations request, and Chief Pena, the ultimate decisionmaker, acknowledged in their
depositions that they did not question the sincerity of O’Neal’s belief. ECF No. 81, Ex. B at 3
(Chief West Deposition); id., Ex. C at 33 (Chief Pena Deposition). It is Chiefs Pena’s and West’s
assessments of the sincerity of O’Neal’s belief that is relevant to his Title VII claim, not defense
counsel’s. This evidence is clearly sufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact as to the sincerity
of Plaintiff’s religious belief.
ii. 	Undue Hardship
Defendant next contends that even assuming Plaintiff has met his burden to show a prima
facie case of religious discrimination, summary judgment should be granted because, as a matter
of law, Defendant has shown that accommodating Plaintiff’s requested accommodation would
present an undue hardship.
Title VII’s “enduring requirement is that employers must deviate from neutrally applicable
policies as a religious accommodation for employees when doing so would not impose undue
hardship.” Loc. 556, Transp. Workers Union of Am., 156 F.4th 459, 484 (5th Cir. 2025)
The Supreme Court recently clarified that “‘undue hardship’ is shown when a burden is
substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business.” Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 468
(2023). Thus, “an employer must show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result
in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business.” Id. at 470. In
making this determination, “courts must. . . take[] into account all relevant factors in the case at
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hand, including the particular accommodations at issue and their practical impact in light of the
nature, ‘size and operating cost of [an] employer.’” Id. at 470-71 (internal citation omitted).
Here, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether accommodating O’Neal’s
religious practice posed an undue hardship to the City (or more specifically the Fire Department).
At the outset, the parties disagree on the nature of O’Neal’s requested accommodation. O’Neal
contends that he requested an exemption from the grooming policy that would allow him to wear
a beard of up to three inches from the chin and one and a half inches from the face, including
during the Nazarite Vow. Defendant contends that Plaintiff refused to specify a beard length and
thickness that would remain consistent during the Nazarite Vow and thus requested a “total
exemption” to the grooming policy.
While the Court agrees with Defendant that a “total exemption” to the grooming policy
during periods when O’Neal was observing the Nazarite Vow would present an undue hardship, a
jury could easily conclude that this was not what O’Neal requested. It is helpful to examine the
specific language used by O’Neal. In an October 20, 2022 email, City employee Shelby Walker
informed Plaintiff that he needed to provide “the particulars of the beard specification” requested,
including “length from chin” and “height/thickness.” ECF No. 55, Ex. O at 1. Plaintiff responded
as follows:
1. I ask for the allowance of the beard to be 3 inches from the chin. Though I may
not typically keep this length normally, it may be necessary to complete a Nazirite
vow for a particular time. 2. I ask for the allowance of thickness to about 1 1/2 inch
from the face. As earlier stated, typically would be less but in the necessity to
complete a Nazarite vow I can estimate this length.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). A jury could clearly interpret O’Neal as requesting a maximum length
of three inches and maximum thickness of one and a half inches—even during the Nazarite Vow—
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rather than a “total exemption” from the grooming policy. Indeed, this is the natural reading of
O’Neal’s request.
The relevant question is therefore whether, as a matter of law, Defendant has shown that
allowing O’Neal to wear a three inch long, one-and-a-half-inch thick beard presented an undue
hardship. The Court concludes that it has not. Notably, Plaintiff does not work in an active
firefighting setting and is not deployed in emergencies. Rather, he works in dispatch at the Houston
Emergency Center (HEC), alongside many other City and non-City employees. He is not required
to wear personal protective gear and has not even been issued such gear. ECF No. 81, Ex. B. Chief
West specifically stated in his deposition that safety concerns were not relevant to the denial of
Plaintiff’s request. See ECF No. 81, Ex. B (“Q: [D]id safety come into play in the decision to deny
Captain O’Neil’s request? A: Safety did not.”). Additionally, the Court took judicial notice of the
fact that other City employees who work alongside Plaintiff at the HEC, such as police officers,
wear beards. See Minute Entry for February 11, 2026. Finally, the undue burden now asserted by
Defendant in its summary judgment motion—“safety concerns related to O’Neal’s ability to wear
SCBA face piece and/or other safety equipment”—were never mentioned in the letters denying
O’Neal’s 	requests 	for 	accommodation. 	Thus, 	a 	jury 	could 	reasonably 	conclude 	that
accommodating O’Neal’s religious practice would not pose an undue hardship to the City.1
1 Even assuming that the accommodation offered by Defendant after this Court ordered the parties
to confer and attempt to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation could be properly considered
by a jury (of which the Court is not convinced), the Court also agrees with Plaintiff that a jury
could find the proposed accommodation inadequate. Defendant offered to allow Plaintiff to wear
a beard of up to 10 millimeters and to take vacation from work during periods where he is
observing the Nazarite Vow. Given Plaintiff’s religion requires him to abstain from shaving during
observance of the Nazarite Vow, a 10-millimeter beard would likely be insufficient. A jury could
likewise reasonably conclude that requiring Plaintiff to take unpaid time off from work during his
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B. Retaliation
Defendant also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII
retaliation claim. To the extent that Plaintiff is actually making such a claim, the Court agrees.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show “(1) that he engaged in
activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a
causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Ikossi–Anastasiou v.
Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 579 F.3d 546, 551 (5th Cir.2009) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
In his Amended Complaint, O’Neal alleges that he was “retaliated against” on the basis of
his request for accommodation and subsequent EEOC complaint. CITE. He asserts the same
purported adverse employment action at issue in his religious discrimination claim, namely, denial
of overtime hours. However, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that he was denied overtime on
account of his request for accommodation or EEOC claim, rather than his admitted noncompliance
with the grooming policy. Indeed, Plaintiff states in his complaint that “The City] continues to
retaliate against [him] by refusing to accommodate his sincerely held religious beliefs and by
refusing to allow him to work overtime assignments.” ECF No. 17 at ¶ 24. This merely restates
Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim. Additionally, the Amended Complaint does not actually
list retaliation as a cause of action.
Plaintiff has not substantively addressed Defendant’s arguments with regard to retaliation
in his summary judgment response. Since Plaintiff has not pointed to any facts suggesting “that a
religious observance, which could significantly impact Plaintiff’s income, was insufficient to
accommodate his practice.
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causal link existed between [his request for accommodation and EEOC claim] and the adverse
[employment] action,” summary judgment in favor of Defendant is warranted on Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim. Ikossi–Anastasiou, 579 F.3d at 551. The allegation that the City illegally
disciplined Plaintiff for his failure to comply with the grooming policy is properly assessed under
Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 55) is therefore DENIED
as to Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim and GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed at Houston, Texas on March 6, 2026.
_______________________________
Keith P. Ellison
United States District Judge
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