Saddleback Exploration, LLC v. Brunelle et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
S ADDLEBACK E XPLORATION, LLC 	§
Interpleader-Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL A CTION N O. 4:23-CV-03091
§
BARBARA BRUNELL ET AL., 	§
Interpleader-Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Motion”) by Interpleader Defendant Gary D. Pickens, Trustee for Hart Revocable
Trust (“Hart”).1 ECF 138. 	Having reviewed the Motion—to which no party
responded, the applicable law, and the record, the Court RECOMMENDS the
Motion be GRANTED for the reasons discussed below.
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background.
Interpleader-Plaintiff Saddleback Exploration, LLC (“Saddleback”) is the
successor operator2 of the Stonegate 6 No. 1H Well (“6-1H Well)” in Winkler
County, Texas, and the Owner of the Lease that covers the 6-1H Well. 	Because
Saddleback acknowledges that it owes royalties from the production of the 6-1H
1 The District Judge referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), the Cost and Delay Reduction Plan under the Civil Justice Reform Act,
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. ECF 100.
2 Saddleback is the successor to Boyd & McWilliams Energy Group, Inc., the original lessee. ECF
7 ¶ 1. In August 2024, Formentera Operations, LLC acquired Saddleback, but the Court continues
to refer to Interpleader Plaintiff as Saddleback, as does its counsel. ECF 132; ECF 140.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 18, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Well but is unsure about to whom the royalties are owed, Saddleback brought this
interpleader action to determine potentially conflicting claims by royalty interest
owners. 	ECF 7 ¶ 2. 	Initially, the interpleader action named hundreds of
Interpleader-Defendants (Id. at ¶¶ 6-156), but many of those parties failed to appear
or have been dismissed. ECF 107; ECF 143.
Saddleback’s Amended Complaint in Interpleader was filed on October 6,
2023. 	ECF 7. 	Interpleader Defendant Hart answered the Amended Complaint in
Interpleader (ECF 35) and then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF 112.
The Court granted Hart’s Motion for Summary Judgment in part and determined that
the deeds through which Hart and other parties claim to derive their interests
conveyed floating, as opposed to fixed, royalty interests. 	ECF 105; ECF 128.
Saddleback then sought a new title opinion which addressed the ownership of the
floating royalty interests. 	The new title opinion was distributed to the Parties in
March 2025. 	On June 5, 2025, Hart filed a Supplemental Motion for Summary
Judgment asking the Court to grant Hart the right to receive royalty payments
according to the ownership of royalty interests set forth in the new title opinion. ECF
138. 	The Court ordered any party who wanted to respond to the Motion do so by
November 12, 2025. ECF 144. No party filed a response.
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II. 	Legal Standards.
A. Summary judgment standard.
Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issues of material fact exist,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 	FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to prove there
are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. 	Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.
v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). 	Dispute about a material fact is
“genuine” if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving
party. Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 2016). “An issue is material if
its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” 	Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd.
v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 290 F.3d 303, 310 (5th Cir. 2002). 	If the
moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the
pleadings and must present evidence such as affidavits, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file to show “specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
The court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. R.L. Inv. Prop., LLC
v. Hamm, 715 F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2013). 	In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment the Court does not “weigh evidence, assess credibility, or determine the
most reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.” Honore v. Douglas, 833
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F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 1987). 	However, “[c]onclus[ory] allegations and denials,
speculation, 	improbable 	inferences, 	unsubstantiated 	assertions, 	and 	legalistic
argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine
issue for trial.” U.S. ex rel. Farmer v. City of Houston, 523 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir.
2008) (citation omitted).
B. Interpleader standard.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, district courts have original jurisdiction over
interpleader actions where the property at issue is worth $500 or more and two or
more adverse claimants are minimally diverse. 28 U.S.C. § 1335. The intent behind
statutory interpleader is to resolve conflicting claims to a single fund and protect the
stakeholder from claims by multiple parties. See Wausau Ins. Companies v. Gifford,
954 F.2d 1098, 1100–01 (5th Cir. 1992).
An interpleader action usually consists of two stages. First, the court decides
whether the requirements for statutory interpleader have been met “by determining
if there is a single fund at issue and whether there are adverse claimants to that fund.”
Rhoades v. Casey, 196 F.3d 592, 600 (5th Cir. 1999). If the requirements are met,
the court then determines the rights of the claimants. Id. The court may adjudicate
the second step at the summary judgment stage if there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding entitlement to the fund. Id.; Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Sanders, 787 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
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III. 	Analysis.
A. The requirements for an interpleader action are satisfied.
To meet the requirements of statutory interpleader, the interpleader-plaintiff
must file an action concerning a single fund worth $500 or more; the interpleader-
plaintiff must deposit the fund into the registry of the court; two or more adverse
claimants must claim to be entitled to the fund; and those claimants must be
minimally diverse. Auto Parts Mfg. Mississippi, Inc. v. King Const. of Houston,
L.L.C., 782 F.3d 186, 192–93 (5th Cir. 2015); Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarty,
No. 2:25-CV-00903, 2025 WL 2941127, at *2 (W.D. La. Oct. 16, 2025).
All the requirements for an interpleader action are satisfied in this case. The
royalty amounts in question are worth over $500 and Saddleback deposited the funds
with the Court. 	ECF 7 ¶ 3; ECF 38 (original deposit into registry in amount of
$101,302.35). The royalty payments comprise a single fund arising from the same
origin: the non-participating royalty interest on oil production from a specific lease.
See Gifford, 954 F.2d at 1101; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Guerra, No. A-06-CA-198-
SS, 2006 WL 8432427, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2006) (finding similar scenario of
claimants with production royalty interests and mineral lessee-stakeholder met
requirements of statutory interpleader). The remaining Interpleader-Defendants are
minimally diverse: Hart, Matthew-Link Properties, Ltd., and others are Texas
citizens and Moody Bible Institute of Chicago is an Illinois citizen. 	See ECF 7 ¶¶
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26, 48, 71. The Interpleader Defendants’ claims are adverse because each claims an
interest in the same fund, even though the individual interests to which each claims
to be entitled are not necessarily mutually exclusive. See Hussain v. Bos. Old Colony
Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 623, 632, 634 n. 40 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is well settled that claims
to the stake need not be mutually exclusive . . . courts have also found that adversity
of claims is satisfied when additional claims to a fund are derivative of one particular
claimant's right to the fund” or a stakeholder’s “liability is limited and the combined
claims are in excess of such limited liability”). 	Therefore, the interpleader
requirements are met, and the Court looks to the second step, adjudicating Hart’s
right to the fund.
B. Hart is entitled to summary judgment on its claim to the production
royalties.
Where a non-moving party fails to respond to a motion for summary
judgment, the court may accept “as undisputed the facts . . . listed in support of . . .
[the] motion for summary judgment.” Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174
(5th Cir. 1988) (finding that district court did not err in granting summary judgment
because non-movant “made no opposition to motion . . . [and movant’s] submittals
made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment.” [emphasis in original]).
See also Morgan v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 114 F. Supp. 3d 434, 437 (S.D. Tex. 2015)
(collecting cases). Given the lack of response from any Interpleader Defendant, the
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Court takes the facts alleged in Hart’s Motion as undisputed, particularly because
the Court extended the deadline for Parties to respond. ECF 144.
Hart asserts that it owns the following interests in the South 3/4ths of Section
6, Block B-6, Public School Land Survey, A-1310, 482.5 acres, more or less, in
Winkler County, Texas (the “NPRI Property” where the 6-1H Well is located): 1/2
x “1/64 of 1/8 of the landowner’s 1/8 royalty interest” in SE4NW4 of Section 6 and
1/2 x “1/64 of 1/8 of the landowner’s 1/8 royalty interest” in the SE4 of Section 6.
ECF 138 ¶ 2. In support, Hart attached an affidavit from Ariane Doggett, a landman,
who completed a review of the relevant land records of the County Clerk of Winkler
County for the period March 13, 1883, to January 5, 2024, and concluded that Hart
owned the same interest. ECF 138-1 ¶ 3.
Doggett noted that Hart’s interest can be traced back to three deeds conveying
floating royalty interests (as previously determined by this Court on the initial
Motion for Summary Judgment) from Paul Vitek to Mid-Tex Company, which then
conveyed the interest to William J. Gorndt and Etta M. Fackler, who conveyed their
interests to Continental Gulf Syndicate Ltd. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. Doggett further explained
that Royalty Roundup Inc. received half of Continental Gulf’s interest (via a mesne
conveyance), and upon forfeiture of the corporate charter, the assets were distributed
to the owners, Jack L. Hart and Nancy Hart. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 5-6. 	Upon Nancy Hart’s
death, Jack L. Hart acquired her interest in the corporation’s assets, which he
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conveyed to the Hart Revocable Trust in 1990.3 See ECF 138-2 at 67-68 (the new
title opinion sought by Formentera Operations, LLC); ECF 112-1 at 37. The deeds
and other documents included with Doggett’s affidavit attached to the First Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF 112), and incorporated by reference in the pending
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 138 ¶ 3), corroborate this chain of title. ECF
112-1.
Hart 	claims 	the 	evidence 	presented 	demonstrates 	that 	it 	owns 	a 	non-
participating royalty interest equal to 0.00024414 percent of the proceeds of
production from the property described above, which includes the 6-1H Well. ECF
138 ¶ 6. Doggett, after examining the new title opinion and other documents, agreed.
ECF 138-1 ¶ 6. 	The new title opinion finds the same non-participating royalty
interest was owned by the Trustee of Royalty Roundup, Inc., or its successors or
assigns (ECF 138-2 at 25), which Hart claims to be. 	See ECF 138 ¶ 6. Therefore,
Hart has presented unrebutted summary judgment evidence demonstrating its
entitlement to a 0.00024414 non-participating royalty interest.
3 The new title opinion posits that judicial action is required to ascertain the successor to Royalty
Roundup, Inc. 	ECF 138-2 at 68. 	The state-law corporate dissolution question is not properly
before this Court, so this recommendation does not encompass that issue.
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IV. 	Conclusion and Recommendation.
For the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Interpleader-
Defendant Hart’s currently pending Motion For Summary Judgment (ECF 138) be
GRANTED.
The 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	shall 	send 	copies 	of 	the 	memorandum 	and
recommendation to the respective parties, who will then have fourteen days to file
written objections, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 	Failure to file written
objections within the time period provided will bar an aggrieved party from attacking
the factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on
other grounds.
Christina A. Bryan
United States Magistrate Judge
Signed on December 18, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
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