Moore v. City of Houston et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
TANISHA MOORE AND
DESTINY CEASAR,
Plaintiffs,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-cv-3048
CITY OF HOUSTON, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Defendant Officers Cameron Overstreet
(“Overstreet”), Jaime Vargas (“Vargas”), Jesse Seay (“Seay”), Daryl Hudeck
(“Hudeck”), Sean McCreary (“McCreary”), Erik Holland (“Holland”), Brandon
Hollis (“Hollis”), Tony Villa (“Villa”), Charles Dexter (“Dexter”), Marco Lopez
(“Lopez”) (collectively, “Defendant Officers”), the Houston Police Department,
and Defendant City of Houston’s (the “City”) Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 68).1 Based on a review of the motion, arguments, and relevant law,
the Court RECOMMENDS the motion (id.) be GRANTED.
1 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 40).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 12, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. 	Background2
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs 	Tanisha 	Moore 	(“Moore”) 	and 	Destiny 	Ceasar 	(“Destiny”)
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this civil rights action on behalf of Dexter
Ceasar (“Ceasar”), arising from Ceasar’s encounter with officers of the Houston
Police Department that led to his death. (See ECF No. 44). Moore is Ceasar’s
mother, and Destiny is his sister. (Id.). Plaintiffs assert federal and state law
claims for excessive force, wrongful death, survival action, municipal liability,
and related theories. (Id.).
On 	August 	28, 	2024, 	the 	Court 	issued 	a 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation, recommending several motions to dismiss be granted. (ECF
No. 41). On September 26, 2024, the District Judge adopted the Memorandum
and Recommendation and granted leave to amend. (ECF No. 43). On October
18, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint and added Destiny as a
plaintiff. 	(ECF No. 44). 	The City and Officers separately filed Motions to
Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 45–46). However, neither the City nor Officers moved to
2 The procedural history and factual allegations underlying this case were set forth in detail
in the Court’s prior Memorandum and Recommendation. (See ECF No. 49). The Court therefore
summarizes only the facts as supported by the summary judgment evidence and pertinent to
resolution of the present motion.
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dismiss the state law claims (see ECF Nos. 45–46).3
On 	May 	30, 	2025, 	the 	Court 	issued 	a 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation, recommending the City’s Motion to Dismiss be granted and
the Officers’ Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. 	(ECF
No. 49). 	The Court recommended dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against the
City for municipal liability and wrongful death under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
dismissal of several claims against the Officers, while allowing Plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and § 1983 wrongful death claim to
proceed only against Officer Overstreet. (Id.).4
On 	September 	15, 	2025, 	the 	District 	Judge 	adopted 	that
recommendation, thereby leaving the state law claims against the City and
Officers, as well as the Fourth Amendment and wrongful death claims under
§ 1983 against Overstreet. (ECF No. 52).
Thereafter, the City and the remaining Officers—excluding Overstreet—
filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs’ state law claims
against 	them. 	(ECF 	No. 	58). 	On 	April 	23, 	2026, 	the 	Court 	issued 	a
Memorandum 	and 	Recommendation, 	recommending 	that 	the 	motion 	be
3 Plaintiffs brought a survival action claim and wrongful death claim against the City
and Officers pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 71.004(a), 71.002–
71.021. (ECF No. 44 at 24–25).
4 The Court also recommended dismissing Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the Houston
Police Department because it is a subdivision of the City and not a separate entity with the
capacity to be sued. (ECF No. 49 at 7–8).
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granted because Plaintiffs’ wrongful death and survival claims under Texas
law were not viable and were independently barred. (ECF No. 71).5
Accordingly, the only remaining claims before the Court are Plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and § 1983 wrongful death claim
against Overstreet. 	(Id.). 	On March 30, 2026, Defendants filed the present
Motion for Summary Judgment. 	(ECF No. 68). 	Plaintiffs have not filed a
response.6
B. Factual Background
Plaintiffs’ claims arise from an incident on April 25, 2022, when officers
with the Houston Police Department SWAT Team and Crime Suppression
Team attempted to execute a felony arrest warrant for Ceasar at a gas station
located in Houston, Texas. 	(ECF No. 44 at 5). 	After officers surrounded the
vehicle in which Ceasar was located, the officers directed Ceasar to get out of
the vehicle; however, Ceasar did not comply and continued to talk to his sister
on the phone. (Id. at 7–8). Officer Seay then fired two rounds of tear gas into
Ceasar’s vehicle while he was still on the phone. (Id. at 8). The parties dispute
the events that followed.
5 As of the date of this Memorandum and Recommendation, the April 23, 2026
Memorandum and Recommendation is still pending before the District Judge. (ECF No. 71).
6 On February 13, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Unopposed Motion to
Withdraw after holding a hearing. 	(ECF Nos. 66–67). 	Defendants filed their motion for
summary judgment on March 30, 2026 (ECF No. 68), and the time for filing a response has
passed. Therefore, the motion is ripe for decision.
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Plaintiffs allege that, after the second can of tear gas was deployed,
Officer Overstreet fired a gunshot that struck Ceasar in the head. 	(Id. at 8).
Plaintiffs allege that throughout the time Ceasar remained inside the car, he
did not pose an immediate threat and Officer Overstreet’s use of deadly force
was excessive and caused Ceasar’s death. (Id. at 9–10).7
Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ account and contend that Ceasar died
from a self-inflicted gunshot wound while inside the vehicle after refusing the
officers’ repeated commands to exit. 	(ECF No. 68). 	In support, Defendants
rely on officer body-worn-camera (BWC) video evidence and the medical
examiner’s autopsy report. (ECF Nos. 69–70).
II. 	Legal Standard
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 56. 	Rule 56(a) instructs the Court to “grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	See
Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2019). “Summary judgment
is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
7 Plaintiffs concede that a gun was recovered from Ceasar’s car, but allege he did not
shoot himself with it. (ECF No. 44 at 10).
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a judgment as a matter of law.’” Talasek v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 16 F.4th
164, 168 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986)). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law.” Bazan ex rel. v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir.
2001) (emphasis omitted); see Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 406
(5th Cir. 2021). 	“An issue is ‘genuine’ if it is real and substantial, as opposed
to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.” 	Bazan, 246 F.3d at 489 (emphasis
omitted). 	The Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir.
1997).
The movant is tasked with the initial burden of informing the Court of
the basis for the motion and pointing to relevant excerpts in evidence that
demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact. See Coastal Agric.
Supply, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 759 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). The movant may also argue that the
nonmovant failed to produce evidence in support of at least one element of a
cause of action for which he bears the burden of proof. 	See Austin v. Kroger
Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2017).
If the movant satisfies the initial burden, it shifts to the nonmovant who
must produce evidence of a genuine factual dispute; he may not merely rest on
the allegations in his pleading. 	See Coastal Agric. Supply, Inc., 759 F.3d at
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505 (quoting Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.
2005)). The Court should not accept “[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable
inferences, 	[or] 	unsupported 	speculation” 	as 	sufficient 	to 	carry 	the
nonmovant’s burden. 	Brown v. City of Houston, Tex., 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th
Cir. 2003). However, where there is evidence of a genuine factual dispute, such
disputes are 	resolved 	in 	favor of the 	nonmoving 	party 	“when 	an 	actual
controversy exists, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of
contradictory facts.” 	Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525
(5th Cir. 1999); McCarty v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., Inc., 864 F.3d 354, 358 (5th
Cir. 2017). 	Further, a genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Baker v. Coburn, 68
F.4th 240, 244 (5th Cir. 2023), as revised (May 19, 2023). 	“When opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (noting that where one party’s
version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury
could have believed him, the court “should not have relied on such visible
fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape”).
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III. 	Discussion
At this stage of the litigation, the only remaining claims are Plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and § 1983 wrongful death claim
against Overstreet. 	(See ECF No. 71). 	The Court previously dismissed all
claims against the remaining Defendants, including all state-law claims. (Id.).
Accordingly, the present motion is properly analyzed as to whether a genuine
dispute of material fact exists regarding whether Overstreet used excessive
force against Ceasar and whether any such force caused Ceasar’s death.
Plaintiffs did not file a response, and pursuant to Local Rule 7.4, failure
to respond is taken as a representation of no opposition. 	S.D. T EX. L OCAL R.
7.4. 	Regardless of Plaintiffs’ failure to respond, the Court will consider the
merits of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment before the Court. See Day
v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat. Ass’n, 768 F.3d 435 (5th Cir. 2014) (“A motion for
summary judgment cannot be granted simply because there is no opposition. .
. . However, a court may grant an unopposed summary judgment motion if the
undisputed facts show that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Defendants contend that the summary judgment evidence conclusively
establishes that Ceasar died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound and that
Overstreet did not discharge his weapon at Ceasar. (ECF No. 68). In support,
Defendants 	rely 	on 	officer 	BWC 	footage, 	including 	Overstreet’s, 	the 	gas
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station’s 	surveillance 	video, 	and 	the 	Harris 	County 	Medical 	Examiner’s
autopsy report. 	(ECF Nos. 68–70). 	Defendants have met their initial burden
under 	Rule 	56(c); 	and 	therefore, 	Plaintiffs 	must 	produce 	evidence
demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact. Based on the record before the
Court, Plaintiffs have not submitted evidence creating a genuine dispute of
material fact as to their claims. 	See Grado v. Dimmitt Police Dep’t, No. 2:24-
cv-147, 	2026 	WL 	923021, 	at 	*3 	(N.D. 	Tex. 	Mar. 	9, 	2026), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:24-cv-147, 2026 WL 922734 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 2,
2026) (“‘[A] court may rely on video evidence to resolve any claimed genuine
disputes of material fact and rule on summary judgment.’ Therefore, when the
video 	‘blatantly 	contradicts’ 	[Plaintiff’s] 	version 	of 	events, 	the 	video 	will
control.” (quoting Hodge v. Engleman, 90 F.4th 840, 846 (5th Cir. 2024))).
The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from excessive force
during a seizure. 	Joseph on behalf of Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319,
332 (5th Cir. 2020). 	“A violation of this right occurs when a seized person
suffers an injury that results directly and only from a clearly excessive and
objectively unreasonable use of force.” 	Id. 	“Determining whether force was
excessive or unreasonable is a ‘necessarily fact-intensive’ and case-specific
inquiry.” 	Id. 	“The test for reasonableness is ‘not capable of precise definition
or mechanical application.’” Id.
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Similarly, “a plaintiff seeking to recover on a wrongful death claim under
§ 1983 must prove both the alleged constitutional deprivation required by §
1983 and the causal link between the defendant’s unconstitutional acts or
omissions and the death of the victim, as required by the state’s wrongful death
statute.” 	Slade v. City of Marshall, Tex., 814 F.3d 263, 264 (5th Cir. 2016).
“Texas law is clear that [u]nder the Wrongful Death Act, liability may be
predicated only on an injury that causes an individual’s death.” 	Id. (internal
quotations omitted). 	“That is, a plaintiff seeking to recover under Texas’s
wrongful 	death 	statute 	must 	demonstrate 	that 	the 	defendant’s 	wrongful
actions more likely than not caused the decedent’s death—not just that they
reduced the decedent’s chance of survival by some lesser degree.” 	Id. at 264–
65.
Here, the summary judgment record does not support Plaintiffs’ theory
that Overstreet shot Ceasar. Instead, the evidence establishes the following:
• 	The video evidence reflects that, after officers surrounded Ceasar’s
vehicle, issued repeated commands for Ceasar to exit, and deployed tear
gas, the officers believed a gunshot originated from inside the vehicle.
(See ECF No. 68 at 4–5 (citing HPD C RITICAL INCIDENTS, HPD Critical
Incident - 2022-04-25 at 7506 Martin Luther King Blvd. (YouTube, May
20, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ftiv068RuP8&t=6s); ECF
No. 70 (Overstreet BWC footage)).
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• 	Overstreet’s body camera footage does not show him discharging his
weapon. 	Instead, Overstreet stepped away from the scene for several
minutes after an initial tear gas deployment to reorient himself from his
exposure to the gas. (Id. at 00:19:00–00:26:30). Upon gearing up with a
tactical gas mask and returning to the scene, Overstreet waited nearby
with other officers as law enforcement continued to direct Ceasar to put
his gun away and exit the vehicle. (Id. at 00:26:30–00:42:00). After what
seems like another tear gas deployment (id. at 00:42:00), Overstreet
again leaves to reorient himself from the tear gas exposure, before
shortly returning to the group of officers around the vehicle (id. at
00:42:00–00:49:00). 	At that point, officers can be heard discussing
whether Ceasar shot himself, as he remained unresponsive (id. 	at
00:51:00–00:51:30).
• 	Thereafter, Overstreet and a few other officers entered the adjacent gas
station store from the back to get a view of Ceasar and to deploy a non-
lethal projectile into the car to observe his response. 	(Id. at 00:52:30–
1:00:00).
• 	After perceiving no response, Overstreet and the officers exited the store
through the back and waited on the side of the building as other officers
extracted Ceasar from the car, at which point Ceasar was already
incapacitated and then given medical attention. (Id. at 1:00:30–1:07:00).
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• 	The Harris County Medical Examiner classified Ceasar’s death as a
suicide caused by a gunshot wound to the head. (ECF No. 69-4).
Hence, Plaintiffs’ allegation that Overstreet fired the fatal shot is not
supported by competent summary judgment evidence. 	See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (holding that a
nonmovant must present more than “metaphysical doubt” or speculation to
survive summary judgment). Plaintiffs have not produced testimony, forensic
evidence, 	or 	video 	evidence 	contradicting 	Defendants’ 	evidence. 	At 	the
summary judgment stage, Plaintiffs must produce evidence demonstrating a
genuine dispute of material fact. They have not done so. See Carico v. Bristow,
No. 5:22-cv-00095, 2024 WL 1635258, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2024), appeal
dismissed, No. 24-40239, 2024 WL 4527117 (5th Cir. May 13, 2024), aff’d, No.
24-40239, 2025 WL 2254515 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2025) (“[T]he video evidence from
the officer’s bodycams provides multiple vantage points of the shooting and the
Defendant’s investigation leading up to the shooting. And that video evidence
is 	not 	disputed 	or 	contradicted 	by 	the 	rest 	of 	the 	summary 	judgment
evidence.”).
On 	this 	record, 	no 	reasonable 	jury 	could 	conclude 	that 	Overstreet
discharged his weapon or that any force attributable to him caused Ceasar’s
death. 	Because causation is an essential element of both the excessive force
and wrongful death claims, the absence of evidence on this point is dispositive.
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See Todaro v. City of Kenner, No. 96-cv-2977, 1998 WL 382138, at *2 (E.D. La.
July 8, 1998) (“[E]even viewing the [evidence] in the light most favorable to
plaintiffs, . . . there is no showing of objectively excessive force. Therefore the
excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment is without merit.”); id. at
*3 (“As for battery or excessive use of force, the Court has no evidence to
support this claim. 	The wrongful death claim does not survive because
plaintiffs cannot show that if excessive force were used, it caused plaintiff’s
death.”); see also Grado, 2026 WL 923021, at *5 (“The undisputed evidence
shows that Ontiveros did not handcuff [Plaintiff]; accordingly, [Plaintiff’s]
complaint that Ontiveros handcuffed him too tightly is meritless. As the Fifth
Circuit has noted, ‘[p]ersonal involvement is an essential element of a civil
rights cause of action.’ 	Because Ontiveros had no personal involvement in
handcuffing [Plaintiff], Ontiveros’s Motion [for Summary Judgment] should be
granted on the excessive force claim against him.”).
As such, Overstreet is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and § 1983 wrongful death claim.8
8 Even assuming arguendo that a constitutional violation could be inferred, Overstreet
would be entitled to qualified immunity. 	Plaintiffs have not produced evidence that
Overstreet used force, much less force that was objectively unreasonable under clearly
established law. See Dauterive v. Marcal, No. 22-cv-3067, 2025 WL 3628112, at *6-9 (E.D.
La. Dec. 15, 2025) (granting summary judgment and qualified immunity after concluding no
material fact dispute existed and that the officer’s use of deadly force was objectively
reasonable); Hodge v. Engleman, 90 F.4th 840, 845–47 (5th Cir. 2024) (concluding defendants
were properly granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity because bodycam
footage contradicted plaintiff’s claim that the decedent posed no threat, but instead showed
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Although 	Plaintiffs’ 	remaining 	claims 	have 	proceeded 	against 	only
Officer Overstreet, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
names “John Doe” among defendants. (See ECF No. 44). However, a John Doe
defendant has not been timely identified or served in this action, and should
therefore be dismissed.
The events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred on April 25, 2022.
(ECF No. 44 at 5). 	This case was originally filed on August 31, 2023. 	(ECF
No. 1). 	Plaintiffs thereafter filed their First Amended Complaint on October
18, 2024. 	(ECF No. 44). 	Because a two-year statute of limitations period
applies to this case, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims have expired as of April 2024. See
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding
Texas’s two-year personal injury limitations period applies to § 1983 claims).
Additionally, Rule 4(m) required Plaintiffs to serve any defendant within 90
days after the complaint was filed. 	F ED. R. C IV. P. 4(m). 	Although dismissal
under Rule 4(m) ordinarily is without prejudice, sua sponte dismissal with
prejudice is appropriate here because the limitations period has expired and
the decedent raising his gun at an officer, and thus, the officers’ use of deadly force was
reasonable and did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights). 	Without evidence that
Overstreet engaged in the conduct alleged—i.e., firing the fatal shot—Plaintiffs cannot meet
their burden to overcome qualified immunity. 	Accordingly, Overstreet is independently
entitled to qualified immunity.
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any proposed amendment naming previously unknown John Doe defendants
would not relate back to the filing of the original complaint.
While courts may permit amendment to identify previously unknown
defendants, such amendment “either must be made within the applicable
limitations period or must relate back to the date of the original complaint;
otherwise, it will be time-barred.” 	See Taylor v. City of Winnfield, 191 F.R.D.
511, 513–15 (W.D. La. 2000). 	“[A]n amendment to substitute a named party
for a John Doe defendant may not relate back to the filing of the original
complaint under Rule 15(c)(3) in order to prevent prescription” because the
purpose of the rule “is to allow an amendment changing the name of a party to
relate back to the original complaint only if the change is the result of an error.”
Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 320–22
(5th Cir.1998)); see also Canales v. Harris Cnty., No. 4:23-cv-04599, 2025 WL
1287735, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 2, 2025) (“In the Fifth Circuit, the relation-back
doctrine does not apply where a plaintiff originally lacked knowledge of the
identity 	of 	the 	proper 	party. 	Rather, 	it 	applies, 	for 	example, 	when 	a
misidentification or misnomer occurs.” (citing Jacobsen, 133 F.3d at 321)).
Additionally, claims against remaining John Doe defendants may be dismissed
sua sponte based on the statute of limitations if Plaintiffs have pleaded their
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“best case.”9 See Vodicka v. Ermatinger, No. 3:19-cv-0056, 2021 WL 1086979,
at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2021).
Here, Plaintiffs have not identified or served any John Doe defendant
despite the passage of time since the filing of the original complaint. Because
the 	limitations 	period 	has 	expired, 	any 	attempt 	to 	substitute 	named
defendants at this stage would be time-barred and would not relate back under
Rule 15(c). 	See id. (dismissing claims against John Doe defendants with
prejudice 	because 	even 	assuming 	the 	plaintiff 	was 	able 	to 	identify 	the
unnamed defendants, his claims against the John Does were time-barred).
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	recommends 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	against 	the
unidentified John Doe defendant(s) should be dismissed with prejudice.
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 68) be GRANTED. 	The Court further
RECOMMENDS that:
• 	Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant
Cameron Overstreet be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
9 The Court finds Plaintiffs have alleged their “best case,” and have had fair
opportunities to make their case given the multiple motions, as well as the Court giving
Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their Complaint, which they did. See Lozano v. Ocwen
Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007) (“‘[a]t some point a court must decide that
a plaintiff has had fair opportunity to make his case; if, after that time, a cause of action has
not been established, the court should finally dismiss the suit.’” (quoting Jacquez v.
Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1986))).
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• 	Plaintiffs’ § 1983 wrongful death claim against Defendant Cameron
Overstreet be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
• 	Plaintiffs’ claims against the unidentified John Doe defendant(s) be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
As such, if this recommendation is adopted, all remaining claims in this action
will be resolved and the case should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on May 12, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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