Walden-Bing et al v. Horne, LLP et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA ex rel AMY C.
WALDEN-BING,
Plaintiffs,
versus
HORNE, LLP, et al,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:23-cv-01792
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
ORDER ADOPTING
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Amy C. Walden-Bing, as relator, brought this
qui tam suit under the False Claims Act. Though initially
represented by counsel, her counsel withdrew in October of
2025, leaving Plaintiff to proceed pro se. See Dkts 27
(motion to withdraw) & 31 (order granting motion to
withdraw). The United States has moved to intervene and
dismiss this action pursuant to 31 USC §3730(c)(2)(A) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). Dkt 46. It
maintains that dismissal is appropriate because pro se
plaintiffs may not prosecute qui tam actions. Id at 5–8.
The matter was referred for disposition to Magistrate
Judge Yvonne Y. Ho. Dkt 53. She issued a Memorandum
and Recommendation recommending that the motion to
dismiss be granted because (i) Walden-Bing cannot
prosecute FCA claims pro se, and (ii) she lacks standing to
assert common-law claims, having failed to allege any
injury to her own interests. The Magistrate Judge further
found that the Government satisfied the requirements for
dismissal under 31 USC §3730(c)(2)(A) and Rule 41(a)(1).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 31, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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On that basis, she recommended that the complaint be
dismissed without prejudice.
The district court reviews de novo those conclusions of
a magistrate judge to which a party has specifically
objected. See FRCP 72(b)(3) & 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(C); see
also United States v Wilson, 864 F2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir
1989, per curiam). The district court may accept any other
portions to which there’s no objection if satisfied that no
clear error appears on the face of the record. See Guillory v
PPG Industries Inc, 434 F3d 303, 308 (5th Cir 2005), citing
Douglass v United Services Automobile Association, 79 F3d
1415, 1430 (5th Cir 1996, en banc); see also FRCP 72(b)
advisory committee note (1983).
Walden-Bing filed objections. Dkt 59. She claims,
among other things, that the Magistrate Judge applied an
“overbroad pro se bar without considering procedural
alternatives” prior to dismissing her claims. Id at 2. She
further objects to the standing analysis as to her common
law claims. Id at 2–3.
Upon de novo review and determination, Plaintiff’s
objections lack merit.
The first objection fails because under binding Fifth
Circuit precedent, there is a complete bar to pro se
prosecution of qui tam claims. See United State ex rel
Brooks v Ormsby, 869 F3d 356, 357 (5th Cir 2017):
“[R]egardless of the right of anyone to represent
himself pro se, he is not representing himself when he
brings an action solely as relator for another non-
intervening party, including the United States, and
therefore cannot do so pro se.” Walden-Bing has known
since at least July 2025 that she must retain counsel to
pursue these claims, and yet has failed to do so. See Dkt 52
at 2. Because she remains without counsel, dismissal of the
FCA claims is appropriate.
The second objection also fails. The Magistrate Judge
correctly concluded that standing for such claims is lacking
because “[a] relator in a qui tam FCA action does not have
standing to assert common law claims based upon injury
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sustained by the United States.” Voorhees v Kelsey-Seybold
Clinic, PA, 2021 WL 742887, *5 (SD Tex), quoting United
States ex rel Rockefeller v Westinghouse Electric Co, 274 F
Supp 2d 10, 14 (DDC 2003). As such, because Walden-Bing
lacks standing to pursue the claims for payment by
mistake, unjust enrichment, and negligence, dismissal is
appropriate.
The objections fail to otherwise demonstrate legal error
on the part of the Magistrate Judge.
The objections by Plaintiff to the Memorandum and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are OVERRULED.
Dkt 59.
No clear error otherwise appears upon review and
consideration of the Memorandum and Recommendation,
the record, and the applicable law.
The Memorandum and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED as the Memorandum and
Order of this Court. Dkt 53.
The motion by the United States of America to
intervene and to dismiss is GRANTED. Dkt 46.
The complaint by Plaintiff Amy C. Walden-Bing is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Memorandum and Recommendation gave Plaintiff
permission to file a motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint. Plaintiff did so. That motion remains
pending. Dkt 58.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on March 31, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
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