Mitchell v. Keith et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
ANDREW J MITCHELL, 	§
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Plaintiff,
V. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-00090
JONATHAN KEITH, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This case has been referred to me for all pretrial purposes. See Dkt. 10.
Before anything else happens in this case, however, I must be assured that this
court has subject matter jurisdiction to preside over this lawsuit.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction
conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). “Federal courts, both trial and
appellate, have a continuing obligation to examine the basis for their jurisdiction.
The issue may be raised by parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time.” MCG,
Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990). The party
asserting federal jurisdiction in a diversity action has the burden to demonstrate
that there is federal jurisdiction. See Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916
(5th Cir. 2001).
Congress granted federal courts jurisdiction over two general types of cases:
(1) cases that arise under federal law (federal-question jurisdiction); and (2) cases
in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and there is complete
diversity of citizenship among the parties (diversity jurisdiction). See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1332(a). Plaintiff Andrew Mitchell contends that this court has diversity
jurisdiction. See Dkt. 1 at 2. For diversity jurisdiction to exist, Mitchell’s citizenship
must be diverse from each defendant’s citizenship, and the amount in controversy
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 31, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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must exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). For
the 	reasons 	explained 	below, 	Mitchell’s 	complaint 	fails 	to 	establish 	that
(1) complete diversity exists as to each defendant, and (2) 	the amount-in-
controversy requirement is satisfied as to each defendant.
MITCHELL HAS NOT ESTABLISHED COMPLETE DIVERISTY
Complete diversity requires that all persons on one side of a controversy be
citizens of different states from all persons on the other side. The citizenship of a
limited liability entity is determined by the citizenship of its members. See Harvey
v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008). When members of
a limited liability entity are themselves entities or associations, citizenship must be
traced through however many layers of members there are until arriving at the
entity that is not a limited liability entity and identifying its citizenship status. See
Mullins v. TestAmerica, Inc., 564 F.3d 386, 397–98 (5th Cir. 2009). A corporation
is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been
incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of
business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Individuals are citizens of the state in which they
are domiciled—that is, the state where the individual resides and intends to
remain. See Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d 793,
798 (5th Cir. 2007).
Mitchell sues 209 defendants, identified in Attachment A to his complaint,
each of whom, he alleges, “is domiciled in Louisiana, North Carolina, or South
Carolina.” Dkt. 1 at 2. This allegation is woefully insufficient to establish complete
diversity. Where jurisdiction is based on diversity, the Fifth Circuit “adhere[s]
strictly 	to 	the 	rule 	that 	citizenship 	of 	the 	parties 	must 	be 	distinctly 	and
affirmatively alleged.” Mullins v. Testamerica Inc., 300 F. App’x 259, 259 (5th Cir.
2008) (quotation omitted).
Among the 209 defendants that Mitchell names are several corporations and
limited liability entities: (1) Reese J. Broussard, Inc.; (2) DJ Airline Investments,
LLC; (3) Swami Bapa Inc.; (4) NOLA Station, LLC; (5) Balls Fried Chicken, LLC;
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(6) Pam Broussard-SideLine Sports & Screening LLC; (7) Yassine Enterprises,
LLC; (8) First Responder Equipment and Uniform Distributors LLC; (9) KMT
Painting and Decorating, LLC; and (10) Greater St. Stephens Ministries, Inc. The
court cannot be assured that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Mitchell’s
claims against these defendants until Mitchell has distinctly and affirmatively
alleged their citizenship. For the incorporated entities, this means that Mitchell
must allege each entity’s state of incorporation and principal place of business. For
the limited liability entities, Mitchell must identify each limited liability entity’s
member(s) 	and 	their 	citizenship—domicile 	for 	individuals 	and 	state 	of
incorporation and state of principal place of business for incorporated entities.
Nor 	can 	the 	court 	be 	assured 	of 	its 	jurisdiction 	over 	any 	individual
defendant. The United States Supreme Court has recognized “the well-established
rule that diversity of citizenship is assessed at the time the action is filed.”
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991). “For
diversity 	purposes, 	citizenship 	means 	domicile.” 	Preston, 	485 	F.3d 	at 	799
(quotation omitted). “The definition of ‘domicile’ has not changed from that set
forth more than a century ago by the Supreme Court: a residence at a particular
place accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of an intention to remain
there for an unlimited time.” Freeman v. Nw. Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553, 555
(5th 	Cir. 	1985) 	(quotation 	omitted). 	“‘Citizenship’ 	and 	‘residence’ 	are 	not
synonymous terms.” Parker v. Overman, 59 U.S. 137, 141 (1855). “Residence
establishes prima facie indication of domicile, but it must be accompanied by an
intent to remain in that state.” Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 463 F. Supp. 2d 583, 592 (E.D. La. 2006), aff’d, 485 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2007).
“[M]ere residence in the State is not sufficient.” Preston, 485 F.3d at 799.
All Mitchell offers this court to establish the citizenship of any individual
defendant is his or her mailing address. That is not enough, particularly in a case
like this one, where the claims concern “insurance losses arising from Hurricane
Laura (2020), Hurricane Delta (2020), Hurricane Ida (2021), or other covered
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perils.” Dkt. 1 at 2. Mitchell does not specify whether the addresses that he provides
were current addresses reflecting the domicile of each individual defendant at the
time that Mitchell filed his complaint, as opposed to their addresses on the date of
the insurance claims at issue. If any defendant was displaced by a hurricane, the
address associated with their insurance may not be the address where they
currently reside or, more importantly, where they resided on the date that Mitchell
filed this lawsuit.
Finally, Mitchell has sued four entities—the Corrine Missionary Baptist
Church, the Gethsemane Church of God in Christ, the Congregation Gates of
Prayer, and Bayak’s Country Store—without identifying the entities’ organization
and corresponding citizenship. Mitchell does not identify what corporate form, if
any, applies to these entities, or the corresponding citizenship test for such form.
If any one of these entities does not have a corporate form and is instead an
unincorporated association, then it “is deemed a citizen of every state in which its
members reside.” Hummel v. Townsend, 883 F.2d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 1989). But
that would require Mitchell to identify each of the members of that unincorporated
association and their citizenship. Should any of these entities be “doing business
as,” then Mitchell must identify the actual party in interest behind the entity and
that party’s citizenship(s). Without this information, this court cannot be assured
that complete diversity exists.
MITCHELL SATISFIES THE AMOUNT-IN-CONTROVERSY
THRESHOLD FOR ONLY TWO DEFENDANTS
Even if the court could be assured that there is complete diversity between
Mitchell and the defendants, it still could not be assured of its subject matter
jurisdiction 	because 	Mitchell 	has 	failed 	to 	establish 	that 	the 	amount-in-
controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, as to each defendant.
Mitchell filed with his complaint a table reflecting the amounts that Mitchell
claims each defendant owes him. See Dkt. 5. These amounts range from $473.22
to 	$143,750.00. 	According 	to 	Mitchell’s 	table 	and 	his 	complaint, 	only 	two
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defendants owe Mitchell more than $75,000: (1) “Corrine Missionary Baptist
Church – 2425 Beachhead (#6112284, $143,750.00)” and (2) “Dexter Fountain –
State Farm (#6112040, $93,138.50).” Id. Despite identifying only two claims that
exceed the amount-in-controversy threshold, Mitchell nevertheless contends that
“[t]he aggregate amount in controversy substantially exceeds $75,000,” and that,
in any event, “this Court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).”
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S.
546, 558–59 (2005)). Both arguments are incorrect.
To start, Mitchell’s reliance on Allapattah is misplaced. In Allapattah, the
Supreme Court held that § 1367 permits the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over
plaintiffs who fail to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement so long as
there is complete diversity and at least one plaintiff satisfies the amount-in-
controversy requirement. Specifically, the Supreme Court held “that § 1367 by its
plain text . . . authorized supplemental jurisdiction over all claims by diverse
parties arising out of the same Article III case or controversy, subject only to
enumerated exceptions not applicable in the cases now before us.” 545 U.S. at
566–67 (emphasis added). Those enumerated exceptions were not before the
Supreme Court in Allapattah, but one of those enumerated exceptions is before
this court now.
The supplemental jurisdiction statute plainly states that “district courts
shall not have supplemental jurisdiction . . . over claims by plaintiffs against
persons 	made 	parties 	under 	Rule 	14, 	19, 	20, 	or 	24 	. . . 	when 	exercising
supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	such 	claims 	would 	be 	inconsistent 	with 	the
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.” 28 U.S.C. 	§ 1367(b) (emphasis
added). In other words, a federal court cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction over
any defendant who has been made a party under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24, unless the
plaintiff demonstrates that every requirement of diversity jurisdiction—complete
diversity 	and 	the 	minimum 	amount-in-controversy—is 	satisfied 	as 	to 	that
defendant.
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Mitchell has joined all 209 defendants under Rule 20. 1 See Dkt. 1 at 3
(“Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2), Plaintiff joins all 209
Defendants.”). Accordingly, this court may exercise jurisdiction over Mitchell’s
claims against each defendant only to the extent that each claim independently
satisfies 	§ 1332’s 	requirement 	of 	complete 	diversity 	and 	the 	amount-in-
controversy threshold. Mitchell cannot aggregate his claims to get around this rule.
The Fifth Circuit recognizes the following “general rule” regarding “the
aggregation of the claims of a plaintiff against two or more defendants”: When a
plaintiff sues several defendants, asserting “separate and distinct” claims against
each of them, “the test of jurisdiction is the amount of each claim, and not their
aggregate.” Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1961)
(cleaned up). “Claims against two or more defendants can be aggregated for the
purpose of attaining the jurisdictional amount, as a general proposition, [only] if
[the defendants] are jointly liable to the plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis added). Mitchell
does not allege that any defendants are jointly liable to him. Mitchell “prays for
judgment against each Defendant, jointly and severally where applicable,” yet
Mitchell 	never 	specifies 	where 	it 	would 	be 	applicable 	to 	hold 	any 	of 	the
defendants—much less all 209 defendants—jointly liable. Dkt. 1 at 8. Without
some reason why the defendants in this case should be jointly liable, Mitchell
cannot aggregate his claims against them to satisfy the amount-in-controversy
requirement for diversity jurisdiction.
1 Rule 20 allows the permissive joinder of defendants where “any right to relief is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and where “any
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
20(a)(2). I will assume, for the sake of argument, that Mitchell may join his claims against
each of the 209 defendants. Even so, that does not cure Mitchell’s failure to identify each
defendant’s citizenship, nor does it help Mitchell satisfy the amount-in-controversy
threshold for diversity jurisdiction.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, Mitchell has failed to establish this court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Clerk shall not issue and the Marshals
shall 	not 	serve 	summonses 	in 	this 	matter 	until 	this 	court’s 	jurisdiction 	is
established.
I will give Mitchell until Thursday, April 30, 2026, to file an amended
complaint that addresses the deficiencies 	noted in this opinion as to each
defendant. Should Mitchell fail to establish this court’s subject matter jurisdiction
again, this action will be dismissed without prejudice.
SIGNED this ___ day of March 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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