Hedrick v. Commissioner of Social Security Case remanded to Social Security Administration.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
T.H.,1
Plaintiff.
V.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00415
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff T.H. seeks judicial review of an administrative decision denying his
application for disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II and
supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”). T.H. and Defendant Frank Bisignano, the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) have both filed briefs. See Dkts. 11,
15. 	After 	reviewing 	the 	briefing, 	the 	record, 	and 	the 	applicable 	law, 	the
Commissioner’s 	decision 	is 	reversed, 	and 	this 	matter 	is 	remanded 	to 	the
Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
On May 1, 2023, T.H. filed a Title II application for disability and disability
insurance benefits alleging disability beginning August 15, 2022. On January 24,
2024, T.H. filed a Title XVI application for supplemental security income also
alleging disability beginning on August 15, 2022. His application was denied and
denied again upon reconsideration. On February 13, 2025, an Administrative Law
1 On May 1, 2023, the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States issued a memorandum recommending that
courts adopt a local practice of using only the first name and last initial of any non-
government party in Social Security opinions. This court has taken that guidance a step
further in the interest of claimant’s privacy and will use only initials in public opinions.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 16, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing. On April 15, 2025, the ALJ issued an opinion, finding
that T.H. was not disabled. T.H. filed an appeal with the Appeals Council. The
Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision final and ripe for
judicial review.
APPLICABLE LAW
The standard of judicial review for disability appeals is provided in 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). See Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 2002). Courts
reviewing the Commissioner’s denial of social security disability applications limit
their 	analysis 	to 	“(1) whether 	the 	Commissioner 	applied 	the 	proper 	legal
standards; 	and 	(2) whether 	the 	Commissioner’s 	decision 	is 	supported 	by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Est. of Morris v. Shalala, 207 F.3d
744, 745 (5th Cir. 2000). Addressing the evidentiary standard, the Fifth Circuit has
explained:
Substantial evidence is that which is relevant and sufficient for a
reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it
must be more than a scintilla, but it need not be a preponderance. It
is the role of the Commissioner, and not the courts, to resolve conflicts
in the evidence. As a result, [a] court cannot reweigh the evidence, but
may only scrutinize the record to determine whether it contains
substantial 	evidence 	to 	support 	the 	Commissioner’s 	decision. 	A
finding of no substantial evidence is warranted only where there is a
conspicuous absence of credible choices or no contrary medical
evidence.
Ramirez v. Colvin, 606 F. App’x 775, 777 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Judicial
review is limited to the reasons relied on as stated in the ALJ’s decision, and post
hoc rationalizations are not to be considered. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 196 (1947).
Under the Act, “a claimant is disabled only if she is incapable of engaging in
any substantial gainful activity.” Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir.
1992) (quotation omitted). The Commissioner uses a five-step approach to
determine if a claimant is disabled, including:
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(1) whether the claimant is presently performing substantial gainful
activity; 	(2) whether 	the 	claimant 	has 	a 	severe 	impairment;
(3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment;
(4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past
relevant work; and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant
from performing any other substantial gainful activity.
Salmond v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kneeland v.
Berryhill, 850 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 2017)).
The burden of proof lies with the claimant during the first four steps before
shifting to the Commissioner at Step 5. See Salmond, 892 F.3d at 817. Between
Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), which serves as an indicator of the claimant’s maximum capabilities given
the physical and mental limitations detailed in the administrative record. See
Kneeland, 850 F.3d at 754. The RFC also helps the ALJ “determine whether the
claimant is able to do [his] past work or other available work.” Id.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ found at Step 1 that T.H. “has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since August 15, 2022, the alleged onset date.” Dkt. 10-3 at 29.
The ALJ found at Step 2 that T.H. “has the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative joint disease of the
right knee, generalized anxiety disorder with somatic symptom disorder, attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and major depressive disorder.” Id.
At Step 3, the ALJ found that T.H. “does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Id. at 30.
Prior to consideration of Step 4, the ALJ determined T.H.’s RFC as follows:
[T.H.] has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he can only
frequently bend, stoop, and crouch. He can occasionally kneel. He can
never crawl or climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. He can never be
exposed to unprotected heights or dangerous moving machinery. He
can sit or stand at his discretion throughout an eight-hour workday
without leaving the worksite. He can understand, remember, and
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carry out detailed but not complex instructions, make decisions,
attend and concentrate on those decisions for extended periods. He
can respond appropriately to routine changes in the workplace. He
can interact adequately with coworkers and supervisors.
Id. at 34.
At Step 4, the ALJ found that T.H. “is unable to perform any past relevant
work.” Id. at 39.
At Step 5, the ALJ elicited testimony from a vocational expert (“VE”) that
“there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [T.H.]
can 	perform.” 	Id. 	Thus, 	the 	ALJ 	found 	that 	T.H. 	“has 	not 	been 	under 	a
disability . . . from August 15, 2022, through the date of [the ALJ’s] decision.” Id.
at 41.
DISCUSSION
T.H. raises one issue for my review: whether the ALJ erred in his evaluation
of the medical opinions of record. Finding that the ALJ did err, I remand this case
to the Commissioner.
An ALJ is not required to give “any specific evidentiary weight” to medical
opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ considers
the persuasiveness of medical opinions from different medical sources. See id.
§§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 	416.920c(b)(2). 	In 	evaluating 	persuasiveness, 	the 	ALJ
considers 	five 	factors: 	(1) 	supportability; 	(2) consistency; 	(3) 	the 	source’s
relationship with the patient; (4) the source’s specialty; and (5) “other factors that
tend to support or contradict” the opinion. Id. §§ 404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c). The
most 	important 	factors 	in 	evaluating 	persuasiveness 	are 	supportability 	and
consistency. See id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
With respect to “supportability, the strength of a medical opinion increases
as the relevance of the objective medical evidence and explanations presented by
the medical source increase.” Vellone v. Saul, No. 1:20-cv-261, 2021 WL 319354,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)). “As for
consistency, . . . the 	greater 	the 	consistency 	between 	a 	particular 	medical
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source/opinion and the other evidence in the medical record, the stronger that
medical opinion becomes.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)). “Simply put,
consistency is an all-encompassing inquiry focused on how well a medical source
is supported, or not supported, by the entire record.” Id.
At a minimum, an ALJ’s persuasiveness explanation should “enable[] the
court to undertake a meaningful review of whether his finding with regard to the
particular medical opinion was supported by substantial evidence, and does not
require the Court to merely speculate about the reasons behind the ALJ’s
persuasiveness finding or lack thereof.” Cooley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 587 F. Supp.
3d 489, 499 (S.D. Miss. 2021) (cleaned up). “Stated differently, there must be a
discernible logic bridge between the evidence and the ALJ’s persuasiveness
finding.” Pearson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-cv-166, 2021 WL 3708047, at
*5 (quotation omitted).
State agency medical consultants, Dr. Patty Rowley and Dr. Prianka Gerrish,
examined the record and both opined that T.H. could only occasionally climb
ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, or crawl. See Dkt. 10-4 at 18, 39.
Dr. Rowley also opined that T.H. could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. See
id. at 18. Dr. Gerrish opined that T.H. could occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds. See id. at 39. In evaluating these two opinions, the ALJ wrote:
In July 2024, Patty Rowley, M.D., examined the record and opined
[T.H.] could perform work at the sedentary exertional level with
periodic sitting and standing while occasionally performing postural
functions but never climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. The [ALJ]
finds this opinion not persuasive. First, a limitation to work at the
sedentary level is not well supported because while he exhibited some
issues at his internal medicine exam, he retained full five out of five,
motor strength in all extremities. Additionally, while he has continued
to complain of pain, he retained the ability to ambulate without
difficulty. Second, this opinion is not consistent with the overall
record. Specifically, the record shows that even though he has had
issues with his knee and back pain, his medication was effective.
Additionally, [T.H.] did not require an assistive device.
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In July 2024, Prianka Gerrish, M.D., reviewed the evidence and found
[T.H.] could perform work at the light exertional level with periodic
sitting and standing while occasionally performing postural functions.
Overall, the Administrative Law Judge finds this opinion persuasive
as to the exertional level and sit/stand option as it is well supported
with citations to the record of [T.H.]’s presentation at examination.
These limitations are also consistent with the evidence showing
effective 	medication 	management, 	full 	strength, 	and 	generally
normal ability to ambulate. On the other hand, when considering the
entirety of the record, the [ALJ] finds [T.H.] would require different
postural 	and 	environmental 	limitations. 	Specifically, 	because 	of
[T.H.]’s antalgic gait, he has been limited to ground-level work but
frequent bending, stooping, and crouching
Dkt. 10-3 at 38 (cleaned up).
Simply put, there is no logic in the ALJ’s rejection of Drs. Rowley and
Gerrish’s postural limitation recommendations based on T.H.’s ability to ambulate
without difficulty and his antalgic gait. To “ambulate” means “to walk about or
move from place to place.” Ambulate, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.
com/browse/ambulate (last visited July 15, 2026). To state the obvious: being able
to walk without difficulty does not necessarily mean that one can bend, stoop,
crouch, kneel, or crawl without difficulty. Just as a normal gait “is not informative
as to whether [a claimant] could perform light work,” nor is the ability to ambulate
informative as to postural limitations. Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 819 (7th
Cir. 2014), as amended (Aug. 20, 2014). What is especially confusing is that the
ALJ rejected Dr. Rowley’s recommended postural limitations due to T.H.’s ability
“to 	ambulate 	without 	difficulty,” 	but 	the 	ALJ 	then 	rejected 	the 	very 	same
recommended limitations from Dr. Gerrish based on T.H.’s “antalgic gait.” Dkt. 10-
3 at 38. An “antalgic gait” is a gait “marked by or being an unnatural position or
movement assumed by someone to minimize or alleviate pain or discomfort.”
Antalgic, 	Merriam-Webster, 	https://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/
antalgic (last visited July 15, 2026). It makes no sense to say that because someone
walks unnaturally due to pain he can frequently bend, stoop, and crouch. And it is
not my job to make sense where there is none.
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“[T]he line between guessing and creating a post hac rationalization for the
ALJ’s decision is infinitesimally small, if not non-existent. Because I cannot pin
down the ALJ’s reasoning with certainty, I decline to engage in any post hoc
rationalization.” Schwartz v. Kijakazi, No. 4:20-cv-00739, 2021 WL 3620071, at
*3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2021). “‘Procedural perfection in administrative proceedings
is not required’ as long as ‘the substantial rights of a party have not been affected.’”
Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mays v. Bowen, 837
F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988)). Only if a claimant can demonstrate that his
substantial rights were affected—in other words, that the error was not harmless—
is remand required. See Audler, 501 F.3d at 449. Errors are harmless where “[i]t is
inconceivable that the ALJ would have reached a different conclusion.” Frank v.
Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2003). Here, it is entirely conceivable that
the ALJ would reach a different conclusion regarding T.H.’s postural limitations if
he rendered a logical opinion. It is also conceivable that different postural
limitations could result in a finding of disabled. Thus, this matter should be
remanded.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Commissioner’s decision is reversed
and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SIGNED this ____ day of July 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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