Lopez v. O'Malley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
S.L.,1
Plaintiff.
V.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00012
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff S.L. seeks judicial review of an administrative decision denying his
applications for disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II, and for
supplemental security income under Title XVI, of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”). S.L. and Defendant Frank J. Bisignano, the Acting Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”),2 have submitted briefing
addressing the factual and legal issues involved in this matter. See Dkts. 11, 15, and
18. After reviewing the briefing, the record, and the applicable law, I affirm the
Commissioner’s decision.
BACKGROUND
On February 10, 2022, S.L. filed a Title II application for disability and
disability insurance benefits, and a Title XVI application for supplemental security
1 On May 1, 2023, the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States issued a memorandum recommending that
courts adopt a local practice of using only the first name and last initial of any non-
government party in Social Security opinions. This court has taken that guidance a step
further in the interest of claimant’s privacy and will use only initials in public opinions.
2 Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025. Bisignano is
“automatically substituted” as the defendant in this suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); see also 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive
notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social
Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 17, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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income, alleging disability beginning February 1, 2022. His applications were
denied and denied again upon reconsideration. Subsequently, an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written
decision finding that S.L. was not disabled. S.L. filed an appeal with the Appeals
Council. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision final and
ripe for judicial review.
APPLICABLE LAW
The standard of judicial review for disability appeals is provided in 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). See Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 2002). Courts
reviewing the Commissioner’s denial of social security disability applications limit
their 	analysis 	to 	“(1) whether 	the 	Commissioner 	applied 	the 	proper 	legal
standards; 	and 	(2) whether 	the 	Commissioner’s 	decision 	is 	supported 	by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Est. of Morris v. Shalala, 207 F.3d
744, 745 (5th Cir. 2000). Addressing the evidentiary standard, the Fifth Circuit has
explained:
Substantial evidence is that which is relevant and sufficient for a
reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it
must be more than a scintilla, but it need not be a preponderance. It
is the role of the Commissioner, and not the courts, to resolve conflicts
in the evidence. As a result, [a] court cannot reweigh the evidence, but
may only scrutinize the record to determine whether it contains
substantial 	evidence 	to 	support 	the 	Commissioner’s 	decision. 	A
finding of no substantial evidence is warranted only where there is a
conspicuous absence of credible choices or no contrary medical
evidence.
Ramirez v. Colvin, 606 F. App’x 775, 777 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Judicial
review is limited to the reasons relied on as stated in the ALJ’s decision, and post
hoc rationalizations are not to be considered. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 196 (1947).
Under the Act, “a claimant is disabled only if she is incapable of engaging in
any substantial gainful activity.” Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir.
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1992) (quotation omitted). The Commissioner uses a five-step approach to
determine if a claimant is disabled, including:
(1) whether the claimant is presently performing substantial gainful
activity; 	(2) whether 	the 	claimant 	has 	a 	severe 	impairment;
(3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment;
(4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past
relevant work; and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant
from performing any other substantial gainful activity.
Salmond v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kneeland v.
Berryhill, 850 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 2017)).
The burden of proof lies with the claimant during the first four steps before
shifting to the Commissioner at Step 5. See Salmond, 892 F.3d at 817. Between
Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), which serves as an indicator of the claimant’s maximum capabilities given
the physical and mental limitations detailed in the administrative record. See
Kneeland, 850 F.3d at 754. The RFC also helps the ALJ “determine whether the
claimant is able to do her past work or other available work.” Id.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ found at Step 1 that “there has been a continuous 12-month
period(s) during which the claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity.”
Dkt. 8-3 at 18.
The ALJ found at Step 2 that, S.L. “has the following severe impairments:
coronary artery disease (CAD); internal carotid artery (ICA) disease; peripheral
arterial disease (PAD); diabetes (DM); sleep apnea (OSA); obesity; anxiety; and
depression.” Id. The ALJ also found that S.L’s vision issues were non-severe
impairments. See id.
After reviewing the “paragraph B” criteria at Step 3,3 the ALJ found that S.L.
had a moderate limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace
3 “The severity of ‘mental disorders’ is measured using medical criteria (‘paragraph A’),
functional criteria (‘paragraph B’), and an analysis of ‘serious and persistent mental
disorders’ (‘paragraph C’).” Vigil v. Berryhill, No. EP-17-cv-0242, 2018 WL 3233345, at
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(“CPP”), 	and 	mild 	limitations 	in 	understanding 	remembering 	or 	applying
information; interacting with others; and adapting or managing oneself. See id. at
22. The ALJ found that none of S.L.’s impairments met any of the Social Security
Administration’s listed impairments. See id. at 20.
Prior to consideration of Step 4, the ALJ determined S.L.’s RFC as follows:
[S.L.] has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work
as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he cannot
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can occasionally climb ramps
and stairs, and occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl.
He can frequently finger with bilateral upper extremities. He requires
a cane to ambulate. He can understand, remember, and carryout
detailed but not complex instructions.
Id. at 23.
At Step 4, the ALJ found that S.L. “is unable to perform any past relevant
work.” Id. at 32.
At Step 5, however, the ALJ found that S.L. “has acquired work skills from
past relevant work that are transferable to other occupations with jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy.” Id. Specifically, the ALJ found that
S.L. acquired skills from his past relevant skilled work as a restaurant manager that
would transfer to the semi-skilled occupations of customer service clerk, hotel
clerk, and administrative clerk. See id. at 33.
Accordingly, the ALJ found that S.L. “has not been under a disability, as
defined in the Social Security Act, from February 1, 2022, through [June 24,
2024].” Id. at 33.
*2 (W.D. Tex. July 2, 2018) (quoting 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(a)–
(c)). A claimant’s mental disorder satisfies “paragraph B” when it results in one “extreme”
or two “marked” limitations in the following “areas of mental functioning a person uses
in 	a 	work 	setting”: 	(1) understanding, 	remembering, 	or 	applying 	information;
(2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and
(4) adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(b).
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DISCUSSION
This appeal presents two issues for my review: (1) “Whether remand is
required 	because 	the 	[ALJ] 	failed 	to 	account 	for 	[S.L.’s] 	found 	moderate
limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace”; and (2) “Whether remand is
required because the ALJ failed to engage in the legally required analysis of
transferability of skills.” Dkt. 11 at 1. Addressing each of these issues in turn, I find
that remand is not required.
A. 	THE 	ALJ 	A DEQUATELY 	CONSIDERED 	S.L.’S 	M ODERATE 	CPP
L IMITATION
At 	Step 	2, 	the 	ALJ 	found 	that 	S.L.’s 	medically 	determinable 	mental
impairments of anxiety and depression were severe. At Step 3, the ALJ found that
S.L. had a moderate CPP limitation, and mild limitations in the remaining
paragraph B criteria. S.L. does not take issue with the ALJ’s analysis of the
paragraph B criteria or her Step 2 and 3 findings. Rather, S.L. contends that the
ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because “the ALJ’s RFC
finding 	is 	inconsistent 	with 	the 	ALJ’s 	own 	prior 	finding 	of 	severe 	mental
impairments with respect to the moderate limitation in CPP.” Dkt. 11 at 5. I
disagree.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC, and S.L. has not shown
otherwise. At the outset I note that, while the ALJ assessed a moderate limitation
in CPP, the limitation clearly concerns only persisting and maintain pace, not
concentrating. This is because S.L. “testified that chronic pain contributes to
depression, and the conditions limit his ability to move about like he used to
and/or remain active. However, he reported being able to pay attention all day”
and S.L.’s “[e]xaminations showed good attention and concentration.”
Dkt. 8-3 at 22 (emphasis added). Yet, S.L. complains that “there is no limitation
whatsoever in [his] RFC on the ability to understand, carry out and remember
SIMPLE instructions.” Dkt. 11 at 5.
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It is not clear to me why there should be a limitation on S.L.’s ability to
understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions. S.L.’s moderate CPP
limitation derives from the fact that his “chronic pain contributes to depression,
and the conditions limit his ability to move about like he used to and/or remain
active.” Dkt. 8-3 at 22. There is nothing in the record to suggest that S.L. cannot
understand, remember, and carryout detailed but not complex instructions. To the
contrary, there is a medical opinion in the record that supports this determination.
See id. at 31 (“Margaret Meyer, M.D., opined [S.L.] could understand, remember,
and carryout detailed but not complex instructions, make decisions, attend and
concentrate for extended periods, accept instructions, and respond appropriately
to changes in routine work setting.”). This is substantial evidence that supports the
ALJ’s RFC. See Mary C. R. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20-cv-00286, 2021 WL 4476764, at
*6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2021) (collecting “numerous other cases” within the Fifth
Circuit where courts have held that an ALJ’s mental-RFC determination that a
claimant could understand, remember, and carryout detailed but not complex
instructions was not contrary to the ALJ’s finding of a moderate CPP limitation).
Because the ALJ properly considered and accounted for S.L.’s moderate CPP
limitation, remand is not warranted.
B. 	THE ALJ’S PROPERLY A NALYZED THE TRANSFERABILITY OF S.L.’S
S KILLS
At 	the 	administrative 	hearing, 	the 	ALJ 	elicited 	testimony 	from 	the
vocational expert (“VE”) regarding S.L.’s past relevant work. The VE testified that
S.L. had past relevant work as a restaurant manager (skilled, light). The VE also
testified 	that 	a 	person 	who 	performed 	this 	job 	acquires 	the
following skills that transfer to light, semi-skilled occupations: “Communication,
service orientation, coordination, instructing, decision making, recordkeeping,
inventory 	management, 	scheduling, 	monitoring, 	problem 	solving, 	time
management.” Dkt. 8-3 at 65. The VE testified that such a person could, for
example, perform the job of hotel clerk with approximately 415,000 jobs in the
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national economy. See id. The ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony to determine that,
although S.L. could not perform his past relevant skilled work, he gained skills that
would transfer to semi-skilled jobs “with only some adjustments.” Id.
S.L. argues that remand is required because the ALJ failed to engage in the
legally required transferability of skills analysis. In making this argument, S.L.
misinterprets 20 C.F.R § 404.1568(d)(2). S.L. argues that skill transferability is
possible only when the “‘other jobs’: (1) require the same or a lesser degree of skill;
(2) the same or similar tools and machines are used; and (3) the same or similar
raw 	materials, 	products, 	processes, 	or 	services 	are 	involved.” 	Dkt. 	11 	at 	6
(citing § 404.1568(d)(2)). “While [S.L.] quotes the section of the regulation that
potentially supports his argument, he ignores the next subsection, which states
that 	‘a 	complete 	similarity 	of 	all 	three 	factors 	is 	not 	necessary
for transferability.’” Spain v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV 21-2367, 2023 WL 1786722,
at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 18, 2023) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)(3)). “Thus, to the
extent that [S.L.] suggests the job[s] of [customer service clerk, hotel clerk, and
administrative clerk are] not exactly like any of his past relevant work, such
argument is unconvincing and does not undermine the substantial evidence, in the
form of VE testimony, that supports the ALJ’s decision.” Id.
S.L. also argues that the Work Field (“WF”) codes and the Materials,
Productions, Subject Matter, and Services (“MPSMS”) codes for a customer service
clerk, hotel clerk, or administrative clerk differ from those of S.L.’s past relevant
work as a restaurant manager, and the ALJ thus erred when he found that
S.L.’s transferable skills could apply to employment as a customer service clerk,
hotel clerk, or administrative clerk. S.L. “cites no legal authority to support this
argument. To the contrary, the only cases that the Court has identified on this issue
have universally rejected [S.L.]’s argument.” See Spain, 2023 WL 1786722, at *4
(collecting cases). Simply put, there is no error in the ALJ’s transferability of skills
analysis, and the ALJ’s Step 5 findings are supported by substantial evidence.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
A final judgment will issue separately.
SIGNED this ____ day of December 2025.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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