In re: M/V AET EXCELLENCE and M/V AET INNOVATOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
IN RE M/V AET EXCELLENCE AND
M/V AET INNOVATOR
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-cv-00167
OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before me in this consolidated triple limitation proceeding are two
motions to exclude expert opinions filed by Limitation Petitioner AET.1 AET seeks
to exclude the testimony and opinions of two of Plaintiffs’ experts: Dr. Christopher
R. Sellars, D.O. (Dkt. 96) and Harold A. Asher, CPA (Dkt. 97). Having reviewed the
briefing and the applicable law, I grant both motions.2
BACKGROUND
The court is familiar with the facts of this case. See Dkt. 129 at 2–5.
Claimants Jose Uresti and Gerald Arukwe allege that they sustained injuries while
employed by AET. To support their claims for damages, Claimants retained
Dr. Sellars and Asher to prepare expert reports. Dr. Sellars, a board-certified
physiatrist, prepared life care reports for Claimants. Asher, a forensic economist,
prepared loss of economic capacity reports for Claimants. AET seeks to exclude the
testimony and opinions of both experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. As amended in 2023,
the rule provides that an expert witness may testify if:
1 “AET” includes AET Lightering Services LLC; AET Offshore Services, Inc.; and the M/V
AET Innovator.
2 “District courts in the Fifth Circuit have universally treated motions to strike expert
testimony as non-dispositive matters within the statutory jurisdiction of magistrate
judges.” Lloreda v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00171, 2022 WL 203258, at *1
n.1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2022) (collecting cases).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 17, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not
that:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and
(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles
and methods to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
As a preliminary matter, a district court must determine whether the
proffered witness qualifies as an expert “by virtue of his ‘knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education.’” United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 179 (5th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702). If the expert is qualified, the “overarching
concern” becomes “whether the testimony is relevant and reliable.” Puga v. RCX
Sols., Inc., 922 F.3d 285, 293 (5th Cir. 2019). The party offering the expert opinion
must establish admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. See Sims v. Kia
Motors of Am., Inc., 839 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2016); Fed. R. Evid. 702.
To be reliable, expert testimony must “be grounded in the methods and
procedures of science and be more than unsupported speculation or subjective
belief.” Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452, 459 (5th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).
To 	further 	establish 	reliability, 	an 	expert 	must 	furnish 	“some 	objective,
independent validation of his methodology. The expert’s assurances that he has
utilized generally accepted principles is insufficient.” Brown v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.,
705 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). To be relevant, “the expert’s
reasoning or methodology [must] be properly applied to the facts in issue.”
Arkema, 685 F.3d at 459 (quotation omitted). Expert testimony must also “assist
the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” Weiser–Brown
Operating Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 801 F.3d 512, 529 (5th Cir.
2015) (quotation omitted).
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A district court’s role under Rule 702 “is not to weigh the expert testimony
to the point of supplanting the jury’s fact-finding role—the court’s role is limited to
ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently reliable and relevant to
the issue so that it is appropriate for the jury’s consideration.” Puga, 922 F.3d at
294. Occasionally, “the source upon which an expert’s opinion relies is of such little
weight that the jury should not be permitted to receive that opinion. Expert opinion
testimony falls into this category when that testimony would not actually assist the
jury in arriving at an intelligent and sound verdict.” Fair v. Allen, 669 F.3d 601,
607 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). “Cross-examination at trial, however, is
the proper forum for discrediting testimony, and credibility determinations are, of
course, the province of the jury.” Dearmond v. Wal–Mart La. LLC, 335 F. App’x
442, 444 (5th Cir. 2009). While I have broad discretion in determining whether to
admit or exclude expert testimony, I must exclude testimony where there is
“simply 	too 	great 	an 	analytical 	gap 	between 	the 	data 	and 	the 	opinion
proffered.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
ANALYSIS
A. 	D R . S ELLARS’S L IFE CARE R EPORTS
Dr. Sellars has prepared life care reports for each Claimant. These reports
purport 	to 	estimate 	the 	expenses 	attributable 	to 	Claimants’ 	future 	medical
requirements. See Dkt. 100-8 at 5; Dkt. 100-9 at 5. These medical expenses are
divided into seven categories: (1) Physician Services; (2) Routine Diagnostics; (3)
Medications; (4) Laboratory Studies; (5) Rehabilitation Services; (6) Equipment &
Supplies; and (7) Environmental Modifications & Essential Services. See id.
Dr. Sellars 	estimates 	that 	Uresti’s 	future 	medical 	requirements 	will 	total
$429,423.59 over 36 years. See Dkt. 100-8 at 5. Dr. Sellars estimates that Arukwe’s
future medical requirements will total $258,510.18 over 22 years. See Dkt. 100-9
at 5.
AET moves to exclude both life care reports, arguing that “Dr. Sellars’
methodology [in preparing the reports] is not reliable and his methodology has not
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been reliably applied to the facts of the case. Specifically, none of Dr. Sellars’
opinions are based on evidence that he relied on in forming his opinions.” Dkt. 96
at 14. As such, AET contends that “Dr. Sellars’ opinions thus fail to bridge the
analytical gap between this data and his conclusions about Plaintiffs’ future
medical requirements.” Id. at 17 (cleaned up). Further, AET argues that “[t]o the
extent any of Dr. Sellars’ opinions regarding future medical care include services
that Plaintiffs would have needed before the incidents, his opinions are irrelevant
because they fail to help the trier of fact determine the measure of damages
attributed to the incidents at issue in this case.” Id. at 18.
In response, Claimants assert that “Dr. Sellars is uniquely qualified to
render his opinions as a physician life-care planner, even over other specialties in
medicine.” Dkt. 106 at 14. Claimants also argue that “[t]hrough his scientifically
accepted methodology, Dr. Sellars rendered opinions at issue upon reasonable
degree of medical probability.” Id. at 16 (quotations omitted). Finally, Claimants
argue that “AET has provided this Court with no expert evidence, scientific
authority, and certainly no on-point jurisprudence that would even suggest that
Dr. Sellars’ opinions are somehow unqualified, unsupported, or unreliable.” Id. at
26.
1. 	Dr. Sellars Fails to Explain the Basis for His Opinion
To be admissible at trial, an “expert’s opinion must offer more than a bottom
line.” Wright Asphalt Prods. Co., LLC v. Pelican Refining Co., No. H-09-1145, 2012
WL 1936416, at *11 (S.D. Tex. May 29, 2012) (quotation omitted). “The expert must
explain the methodologies and principles supporting the opinion.” Id. (quotation
omitted). “[U]nexplained conclusions . . . [are] an inadequate basis for th[e] court
to assess reliability.” Id.
In this case, Dr. Sellars fails to explain how he reached his opinions as to
Claimants’ future medical needs. As AET points out: “Dr. Sellars simply offers
recommendations about [Claimants]’ future needs without explaining how he
determined which services were necessary, the data he relied on to reach his
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conclusions, or how he determined the duration of each recommended treatment.”
Dkt. 108 at 8. Because Dr. Sellars does not adequately explain how he arrived at
his opinions, he has failed to provide a reliable foundation for his conclusions. His
testimony must be excluded.
This is not the first time a judge in this district has prohibited Dr. Sellars
from testifying at trial about a life care plan he prepared. See De Alfaro v. Panther
II Transp., Inc., No. CV H-22-2619, 2024 WL 2725047 (S.D. Tex. May 28, 2024).
In De Alfaro, Judge Lee Rosenthal excluded a life care plan from Dr. Sellars
because it “fail[ed] to adequately explain the basis for his recommendations for
life-long therapy, testing, and medication.” Id. There, Dr. Sellars recommended
extensive future care for the plaintiff, including:
physical medicine & rehabilitation/pain management four times
yearly for the first ten years, then three times yearly for the next thirty-
four years, psychiatrist, MRI brain scans five times yearly for thirty-
nine years, X-Rays and MRIs of the cervical spine, shoulder, lumbar
spine, knee, foot/ankle for forty-four years, daily dose of Tylenol,
NSAID, an over the counter topical analgesic, and a prescription
analgesic 	for 	forty-four 	years, 	yearly 	lab 	tests, 	physical 	therapy
evaluations and physical therapy sessions for forty-four years, as well
as various equipment and supplies.
. . .
Additionally, Dr. Sellars opine[d] that [plaintiff] will need to take an
antidepressant for the rest of her life, costing $336,331.68.
Id. (quotation omitted).
In De Alfaro, Dr. Sellars based his recommendation for future medical
requirements on a review of the plaintiff’s medical records and a video interview
with the plaintiff. See id. But because Dr. Sellars did not “bridge the analytical gap
between 	this 	data 	and 	his 	conclusions 	about 	[plaintiff]’s 	future 	medical
requirements,” Judge Rosenthal excluded his report in full. Id.
Here, Dr. Sellars has, likewise, failed to reliably apply his methodologies to
the facts of the case. Although Dr. Sellars did review Claimants’ medical records
and 	interviewed 	Claimants 	virtually, 	his 	life 	care 	plans 	are 	devoid 	of:
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(1) explanation 	or 	analysis 	of 	how 	he 	determined 	that 	the 	future 	medical
treatments recommended for either Claimant are necessary based on his review of
their respective records and interviews; or (2) explanation or analysis of how he
determined that specific medication, testing, or services would be required for
either Claimant for the rest of their lives.
By way of example, Dr. Sellars opines that Uresti will need to take Cymbalta,
an antidepressant, for 36 years at a total cost of $104,392.80. See Dkt. 100-8 at 91.
Dr. Sellars does not, however, “explain how he reached the conclusion that the
specific . . . medication set out in the plan [is] required, much less that [it] will be
required for the remainder of [Uresti]’s life.” De Alfaro, 2024 WL 2725047, at *6.
Dr. Sellars merely concludes, without explanation, that Cymbalta is required. This
is insufficient to satisfy Daubert. See Watkins v. New Palace Casino, LLC, No.
1:13cv224, 2014 WL 10100196, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2014) (excluding expert
opinions in life care plans because they were based on unsupported speculation
and 	subjective 	belief). 	Although 	none 	of 	Uresti’s 	treating 	physicians 	ever
mentioned any cognitive or emotional issues, Dr. Sellars recommends that Uresti
take antidepressants, undergo brain MRI scans, and participate in cognitive
rehabilitation therapy. Dr. Sellars’s recommendations “are unsupported by the
medical records generated by [Uresti]’s treating physicians, and [Dr. Sellars] fails
to explain the basis for his additional treatment recommendations.” Queen v.
W.I.C., Inc., No. 14-cv-519, 2017 WL 3872180, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2017)
(excluding a life care planner’s testimony because the recommendations were not
supported by the plaintiff’s medical records or recommended by treating doctors).3
3 There is a separate and independent reason that Dr. Sellars cannot opine on Uresti’s
future medical needs for antidepressants, brain MRI scans, and cognitive rehabilitation
therapy. “Dr. Sellars has not demonstrated that he is qualified to opine that [Uresti] must
take an antidepressant for the remainder of [his] life, a recommendation that has not been
made 	by 	[Uresti]’s 	treating 	physicians. 	Dr. 	Sellars 	is 	a 	physical 	medicine 	and
rehabilitation specialist, not a psychiatrist.” De Alfaro, 2024 WL 2725047, at *6; see also
Robinson v. Ethicon, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 3d 452, 460 (S.D. Tex. 2022) (holding that an
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This same deficiency applies to the “specific therapies [and] testing” that Dr.
Sellars recommends for both Claimants. De Alfaro, 2024 WL 2725047, at *6.
Dr. Sellars recommends 36 years of spinal MRIs and X-Rays for Uresti, and 22
years of spinal MRIs and X-Rays for Arukwe, but provides no explanation of how
or why he determined that these specific tests are necessary for that duration of
time. See Dkt. 100-8 at 80; Dkt. 100-9 at 73.
In his expert reports, Dr. Sellars insists that Claimants’ future medical needs
will include “Essential Services.” For Uresti, Dr. Sellars estimates “Essential
Services” costing $43,200.00 over 36 years. See Dkt. 100-8 at 130. For Arukwe,
Dr. Sellars estimates “Essential Services” costing $26,400.00 over 22 years. See
Dkt. 100-9 at 109. From my review of Dr. Sellars’s expert reports, I am unable to
decipher what “Essential Services” include. The only description in the life care
plans for “Essential Services” are as an “allowance.” See Dkt. 100-8 at 59; Dkt. 100-
9 at 58. Like a crafty magician, Dr. Sellars apparently pulls these numbers out of
thin air. “[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a
district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by
the ipse dixit of the expert.” Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. Yet ipse dixit is all Dr. Sellars
offers in his life care plans for Claimants. The analytical gaps in Dr. Sellars’s life
care plans are abundant, and prevent me from finding that he reliably applied his
methodologies to the facts of this case.
I am fully aware that Dr. Sellars’s life care plans are quite lengthy—110 pages
for Arukwe and 162 pages for Uresti. But the length of a report does not
automatically mean that an expert has provided a reliable foundation for his
conclusions. I also recognize that Dr. Sellars states that his future medical
recommendations are made with the intent to:
(1) Diminish or eliminate [Claimant]’s physical and psychological
pain and suffering.
expert may not testify that a plaintiff needs treatments that require a medical doctor’s
prescription); Watkins, 2014 WL 10100196, at *8 (same).
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(2) Reach 	and 	maintain 	the 	highest 	level 	of 	function 	given
[Claimant]’s unique circumstances.
(3) Prevent complications to which [Claimant]’s unique physical and
mental conditions predispose him.
(4) Afford [Claimant] the best possible quality of life in light of his
condition.
Dkt. 100-8 at 40; Dkt. 100-9 at 39. These vague statements by Dr. Sellars
concerning his intentions in crafting the life care plans do not explain how he
reached his ultimate conclusions for Claimants’ future medical requirements. Dr.
Sellars’s opinions regarding physical treatments, testing, therapies, and services
have similar analytical gaps.
Claimants argue that AET should have deposed Dr. Sellars to elicit the basis
of his opinions. See Dkt. 106 at 25 (“AET did not care to depose Dr. Sellars and to
ask him for any explanations behind his opinions that they failed to grasp.”). This
argument goes nowhere. The burden rests on the “proponent of the expert
testimony” to establish reliability by a preponderance of the evidence. Sims, 839
F.3d at 400. Dr. Sellars’s has failed to “bridge the analytical gap between this data
and his conclusions.” De Alfaro, 2024 WL 2725047, at *6. For that reason, Dr.
Sellars’s opinions must be excluded.
2. 	Dr. Sellars Fails to Establish That the Medically Necessary
Future Care Was Caused by the Incidents at Issue in This
Lawsuit
AET also argues that “[Dr. Sellar’s] opinions are irrelevant because they fail
to help the trier of fact determine the measure of damages attributed to the
incidents at issue in this case.” Dkt. 96 at 18. Claimants raise no response to this
argument.
Dr. Sellars states that he “consider[s] all future medical requirements in this
Life Care Plan’s Cost Analysis medically necessary, and I consider them specifically
attributable 	to 	the 	medical 	conditions 	which 	resulted 	from 	[Claimant’s]
occupational accident.” Dkt. 100-8 at 9; Dkt. 100-9 at 9. This is nothing more than
a “bottom line or ipse dixit conclusion.” Queen, 2017 WL 3872180, at *3 (quotation
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omitted). I am hard pressed to understand how Dr. Sellars could opine on
causation when he did not review any of Claimants’ medical records prior to the
December 7, 2022 incident involving both Claimants. Because Dr. Sellars has not
demonstrated that “he used a reliable methodology, and reliably applied that
methodology to the facts, to determine causation,” his “conclusory explanation of
the causal link between the accident[s] and [Claimants’] injuries is inadmissible.”
De Alfaro, 2024 WL 2725047, at *7.
B. 	A SHER ’S L OSS OF E ARNING CAPACITY O PINIONS
I now turn to address the expert opinions offered by Asher. Asher has
prepared expert reports for both Claimants, detailing opinions on Claimants’ loss
of earning capacity. Based on the assumption that Claimants are totally and
permanently disabled and that they will not be returning to the workforce, Asher
calculates Uresti’s after-tax loss of economic capacity at $3,309,004, see Dkt. 100-
11 at 4, and Arukwe’s after-tax loss of economic capacity at $1,311,844. See Dkt.
100-12 at 4. AET seeks to exclude Asher’s opinions regarding loss of economic
capacity, on the ground that his “failure to independently validate or assess the
assumption 	that 	Plaintiffs 	are 	permanently 	disabled 	is 	by 	itself 	reason 	for
exclusion.” Dkt. 97 at 14. Recycling many of the same arguments made in the
motion to exclude Dr. Sellars’s testimony and opinions, Claimants respond, in
relevant part, that “experts are allowed to (and, indeed, must) make assumptions
in coming to their conclusions.” Dkt. 105 at 12.
“Rule 702 and Daubert require an expert witness independently to validate
or assess the basis for his or her assumption.” In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prods.
Liab. Litig., 26 F.4th 256, 268 (5th Cir. 2022). While it is true that expert witnesses
“are permitted to rely on assumptions when reaching their opinions[,] . . . those
assumptions must have some factual basis in the record and an underlying
rationale.” Jacked Up, LLC v. Sara Lee Corp., 291 F. Supp. 3d 795, 806–07 (N.D.
Tex. 2018); see also Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 555 F.3d 383, 389
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(5th Cir. 2009) (affirming exclusion of expert opinion that relied on erroneous
information).
Asher’s loss of economic capacity reports presume that each respective
Claimant is permanently and totally disabled. It is undisputed that Asher “did not
rely on any objective evidence that [Claimants are] permanently and totally
disabled.” Harper v. Geico Indem. Co., No. CV 22-4347, 2024 WL 1141167, at * 8
(E.D. La. Mar. 15, 2024). Rather, Asher based his permanent and total disability
assumption solely on Claimants’ counsel’s request “to assume that [Claimants are]
totally and permanently disabled and will not return to the workforce.” Dkt. 100-
11 at 2; Dkt. 100-12 at 3. Courts in this circuit have found such unsupported
assumptions to be a basis for excluding expert’s opinions as unreliable. See, e.g.,
Exume v. United Cargo Logistics, LLC, No. 4:24-CV-205, 2025 WL 1688329, at *6
(E.D. Tex. June 16, 2025) (“The largest gap in Cavazos’s analysis is his glaring
assumption that Plaintiff’s injury, whatever it may be, will remain constant as a
permanent disability for the remainder of her life.”); Harper, 2024 WL 1141167, at
*9 (“Comeaux’s assumption that Richard Harper is permanently disabled must be
excluded because it is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
Tellingly, Claimants cannot point to any evidence in the record to support the
notion that Claimants are permanently disabled and unable to work. Not a single
expert witness or treating physician has opined that Claimants are permanently
disabled and unable to work.
Because Asher’s opinions on loss of earning capacity rely entirely on the
unsupported assumption that Claimants are permanently and totally disabled,
Asher’s testimony and opinions must be excluded in their entirety. See Koele v.
Radue, 260 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Wis. 1978) (trial court properly rejected expert
testimony concerning loss of economic capacity when expert’s “assumption of
permanent 	and 	total 	loss 	of 	earning 	capacity” 	was 	“mere 	. . . 	conjecture”).
Claimants argue that Asher’s reports are merely a “starting point,” which the
jury can adjust and use to calculate the Claimants’ respective loss in light of the
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facts. Dkt. 105 at 15. The reports, however, give no insight on how a jury could
accurately reduce or adjust the lost economic capacity calculation. This will
complicate the jury’s job, not assist it. Accordingly, Asher’s “lack of reliable support
may render [his opinion] more prejudicial than probative, making it inadmissible
under Fed. R. Evid. 403.” Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir.
1987). Asher’s loss of economic capacity opinions are excluded.
CONCLUSION
In sum, I GRANT AET’s motions to exclude Dr. Sellars’s and Asher’s
testimony and opinions. See Dkts. 96, 97.
SIGNED this 	day of December 2025.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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