Wright v. ASI Lloyds

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
ELIZABETH WRIGHT,
Plaintiff.
V.
ASI LLOYDS,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-cv-00357
AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
All post-judgment matters in this case have been referred to me. See
Dkt. 113. The only outstanding issue for me to address is the amount of costs,
attorneys’ fees, and expenses that Defendant ASI Lloyds is entitled to recover.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Elizabeth Wright brought homeowner insurance claims against
ASI. After the completion of discovery, Judge Jeffrey V. Brown granted ASI’s
motion for summary judgment and denied ASI’s motion for sanctions. On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Wright’s claims for affirmative relief,
vacated the denial of ASI’s motion for sanctions, and remanded the case “for an
explanation of the district court’s reasoning” on ASI’s motion for sanctions. Wright
v. ASI Lloyds, No. 23-40719, 2025 WL 1588832, at *8 (5th Cir. June 5, 2025). The
Fifth Circuit also instructed the district court “to determine whether ASI is entitled
to an award of costs, and if so, the amount of costs it is entitled to recover.” Id.
On remand, Judge Brown revisited ASI’s motion for sanctions in accordance
with the Fifth Circuit’s directive. On August 5, 2025, Judge Brown ordered that
Wright’s counsel, Eric B. Dick and the Dick Law Firm, PLLC (collectively, “Dick”),
be sanctioned under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See Dkt. 94 at 7. Judge Brown
found 	that 	“Dick 	filed 	suit 	based 	on 	unfounded 	factual 	and 	legal 	claims,
intentionally disrupted the discovery process, and filed meritless motions intended
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 11, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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only for delay.” Id. at 3. Judge Brown concluded that ASI “incurred significant cost
defending against these legally and factually baseless claims.” Id. As an appropriate
sanction, Judge Brown ordered “Dick to pay the fees, costs, and expenses
reasonably and necessarily incurred by ASI in defense of this suit.” Id. at 8. Judge
Brown also ordered ASI to “file an amended bill of costs reflecting the court’s order
of sanctions.”1 Id.
On August 19, 2025, ASI submitted an amended bill of costs and attached
invoices evidencing the fees, costs, and expenses claimed. See Dkt. 95. According
to the Amended Bill of Costs, ASI seeks $9,799.55 in taxable costs, $129,001.50 in
attorneys’ fees, and $24,008.46 in expenses. See id. Dick objected to ASI’s
Amended Bill of Costs because, among other things, there was “no testimony either
through affidavit or live witness” to establish the reasonableness of the fees and
costs. Dkt. 96 at 2. ASI addressed this objection by submitting an affidavit from
LaDonna G. Schexnyder, attempting to substantiate the fees, costs, and expenses
ASI seeks. See Dkt. 99-1. Dick then filed an objection and motion to strike
Schexnyder’s affidavit. See Dkt. 102. Dick also challenges ASI’s request for fees and
expenses as “unsupported by competent evidence, grossly excessive, and beyond
what sanctions law allows.” Dkt. 103 at 5.
ANALYSIS
A. 	A WARD OF TAXABLE COSTS
There is generally a strong presumption that the prevailing party will be
awarded costs. See Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 793 (5th Cir. 2006). Indeed,
the Fifth Circuit has said that “the prevailing party is prima facie entitled to
1 I recognize that the standardized AO 133 form for Bill of Costs lists those categories of
costs that are recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and attorneys’ fees are not among them.
It would have undoubtedly been cleaner if Judge Brown had asked ASI to file a fee
application instead of an Amended Bill of Costs. Even so, the import of Judge Brown’s
sanctions order is clear: he is awarding attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses as a sanction
against Dick. The procedural vehicle by which ASI submits the various documentation in
support of its fee request does not really matter. Accordingly, I will construe the
documentation ASI filed in support of its fee request as a fee application and address the
strengths and weaknesses of that evidence on the merits.
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costs.” Schwarz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 131 (5th Cir. 1985) (quotation omitted).
To that end, “[u]nless a federal statute, [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], or a
court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be
allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). The list of recoverable
costs authorized by statute includes:
(1) 	Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) 	Fees 	for 	printed 	or 	electronically 	recorded 	transcripts
necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) 	Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) 	Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in
the case;
(5) 	Docket fees under [28 U.S.C. § 1923]; and
(6) 	Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special
interpretation services under [28 U.S.C. § 1828].
28 U.S.C. § 1920.
The party who seeks to recover costs has the burden of producing evidence
properly 	documenting 	and 	establishing 	the 	costs 	incurred. See Fogleman 	v.
ARAMCO, 920 F.2d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1991). A district court has wide discretion
to 	determine 	whether 	the 	prevailing 	party 	is 	entitled 	to 	an 	award 	of
costs. See Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1049 (5th Cir. 1998). That
said, the denial of costs to a prevailing party is “in the nature of a penalty.” Pacheco,
448 F.3d at 794 (quotation omitted). As a result, a district court “may neither deny
nor reduce a prevailing party’s request for cost[s] without first articulating some
good reason for doing so.” Id. (quotation omitted).
ASI has filed an Amended Bill of Costs as permitted by Rule 54(d)(1),
seeking a total of $9,799.55 in taxable costs. See Dkt. 95. Here is the breakdown of
those costs:
Fees of the Clerk 	$526.50
Fees for service of summons and subpoena 	$1,471.72
Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts
necessarily obtained for use in the case $6,945.78
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Fees for witnesses 	$176.80
Costs as shown on Mandate of Court of Appeals 	$678.75
Total: 	$9,799.55
See id. at 1. Wright does not object to these items. See Dkt. 123 at 4 (Wright’s
counsel conceding at oral argument that there are no objections to the $9,799.55
in costs sought by ASI). As a result, I find that an award of $9,799.55 in taxable
costs is appropriate under § 1920 against Wright as the losing party.
B. 	A TTORNEYS ’ F EES
1. 	Legal Standard
When calculating an attorneys’ fee award, the district court should begin by
calculating the lodestar. See Combs v. City of Huntington, 829 F.3d 388, 392 (5th
Cir. 2016). “The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours an
attorney reasonably spent on the case by an appropriate hourly rate, which is the
market rate in the community for this work.” Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d
492, 502 (5th Cir. 2013). “The court should exclude all time that is excessive,
duplicative, or inadequately documented.” Jimenez v. Wood County, 621 F.3d 372,
379–80 (5th Cir. 2010). “There is a strong presumption of the reasonableness of
the lodestar amount.” Black, 732 F.3d at 502.
“[A]fter calculating the lodestar, a district court may enhance or decrease
the amount of attorney’s fees based on the relative weights of the twelve factors set
forth in” Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1974). Black, 732 F.3d at 502 (quotation omitted). The Johnson factors are: (1) the
time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues in the case;
(3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of
other employment by the attorney(s) due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee charged for those services in the relevant community; (6) whether
the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client(s) or the
circumstances; 	(8) the 	amount 	of 	damages 	involved 	and 	the 	results 	(both
monetary and equitable) obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of
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the attorney(s); (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
professional 	relationship 	with 	the 	client; 	and 	(12) awards 	in 	similar
cases. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19.
“Determining a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter that is committed to the
sound 	discretion 	of 	a 	trial 	judge, 	but 	the 	judge’s 	discretion 	is 	not
unlimited.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 558 (2010) (cleaned
up). The party seeking attorneys’ fees bears the burden of demonstrating the
reasonableness of the fees sought. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437
(1983). A court abuses its discretion when it awards attorneys’ fees without “a
reasonably specific explanation for all aspects of a fee determination,” including
any adjustment to the lodestar. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 558.
2. 	Analysis
Judge Brown has already held that ASI is entitled to recover those attorneys’
fees “reasonably and necessarily incurred by ASI in defense of this suit.” Dkt. 94 at
8. My job is to determine the amount of those reasonable and necessary attorneys’
fees.
In support of its request for attorneys’ fees, ASI has identified each partner,
associate, and paralegal who worked on this matter, their hourly rates, and the
number of billable hours they worked from the commencement of this action
through August 2025. ASI has also submitted the affidavit of Schexnyder, an
attorney representing ASI. Schexnyder attests to the reasonableness and necessity
of the hourly rates, number of billable hours, and fees incurred by ASI in this
matter. See Dkt. 99-1. Finally, ASI has provided its billing records detailing the
legal services provided by its counsel. Schexnyder asserts in her affidavit that the
reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees incurred by ASI in this matter amount to
a total of $131,977.00. 2 See id. at 3.
2 This amount is slightly higher than the $129,001.50 in attorneys’ fees that ASI asked for
in its Amended Bill of Costs. Most of the difference can be attributed to legal fees incurred
in August 2025, which was not reflected in the Amended Bill of Costs. In her declaration,
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When ASI filed its Amended Bill of Costs, it did not present any competent
evidence establishing that the attorneys’ fees it seeks are reasonable and necessary.
Instead, ASI simply attached a stack of invoices—which it now concedes were
inaccurate—to 	the 	Amended 	Bill 	of 	Costs. 	That 	initial 	submission 	was
unquestionably deficient. To remedy the situation, ASI submitted the Schexnyder
affidavit, along with copies of the attorneys’ fee invoices processed by ASI.
See Dkt. 99-1. Exercising my discretion, I will allow this supplemental filing. 3
In evaluating ASI’s request for attorneys’ fees, I must first calculate the
lodestar. To do that, I must assess the proper hourly rates and the reasonableness
of the hours billed by ASI’s counsel. Once the lodestar is established, I will consider
the Johnson factors to determine whether an upward or downward departure from
this amount is warranted.
a. 	Reasonable Hourly Rates
Reasonable hourly rates “are to be calculated according to the prevailing
market rates in the relevant community.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895
(1984). In assessing a reasonable hourly rate, I must consider the market rate
“prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Id. at 895 n.11.
Schexnyder also requests $15,000 for prospective work related to a response to a Motion
for New Trial, and $30,000 in conditional appellate attorneys’ fees.
3 Dick has objected to the Schexnyder affidavit, arguing that “each substantive statement
in the Schexnyder Affidavit (Lines 5-18) fails to meet the evidentiary standards required
by the Federal Rules of Evidence and binding Fifth Circuit precedent.” Dkt. 102 at 5.
Dick’s 	objections 	are 	spurious. 	The 	Schexnyder 	affidavit 	sets 	forth 	Schexnyder’s
qualifications, her opinion regarding reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees incurred in
this action, and the basis for her opinion. This is more than sufficient to support an award
of attorneys’ fees. See Rx.com Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 546, 553
(S.D. Tex. 2006) (denying a motion to strike affidavits regarding fees and expenses
because the affidavits “provide a predicate for the billing records and . . . express opinions
on the reasonableness and necessity of the amounts [the law firm] billed [its client] for
services performed in the underlying litigation”). I thus recommend that Plaintiff’s
Objection and Motion to Strike Affidavit of Ladonna G. Schexnyder (Dkt. 102) be denied.
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Dick argues that there is no evidentiary support for the hourly rates that ASI
proposes. I disagree. In her affidavit, Schexnyder asserts that her firm charged ASI
the following rates at the commencement of this lawsuit: $240 for a shareholder,
$220 for an associate, and $90 for a paralegal. See Dkt. 99-1 at 2. Schexnyder notes
that, effective October 2022, her firm revised the rates that it charged ASI to $270
for a shareholder, $250 for an associate, and $115 for a paralegal. See id.
Schexnyder explains that “[t]he rates my firm charged and currently charges ASI
are well within the range of rates typically charged by insurance lawyers in Texas
and the Houston area, in particular.” Id. This testimony is uncontroverted. Based
on the Schexnyder affidavit, as well as my own familiarity—both as a lawyer and
judge 	for 	the 	past 	30+ 	years—with 	the 	market 	for 	attorneys’ 	fees 	in 	the
Houston/Galveston area, I conclude that the requested rates provided by ASI for
the respective attorneys and paralegals are reasonable.
b. 	Reasonable Hours Expended
The next step in the lodestar analysis is to determine the number of hours
reasonably spent on the case. “The party seeking attorneys’ fees must present
adequately documented time records to the court. Using this time as a benchmark,
the court should exclude all time that is excessive, duplicative, or inadequately
documented. The 	hours 	surviving 	this 	vetting 	process 	are 	those 	reasonably
expended on the litigation.” Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993)
(cleaned up).
Dick argues that I should significantly reduce the number of hours billed by
ASI’s counsel for a litany of reasons, including: (1) some of the time entries are
excessive; (2) some of the time entries are vague or block-billed; (3) time entries
pertaining to clerical work should be reduced; and (4) duplicate time entries
should be reduced. See Dkt. 96. For support, Dick provides a chart in which he
lodges specific objections to virtually every ASI time entry. See Dkt. 96-1. Dick also
insists that an award of prospective attorneys’ fees to ASI for preparing a response
to a motion to alter judgment should be disallowed, and that conditional appellate
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fees are inappropriate. I will tackle these concerns one by one. Before I do that,
however, I must address whether ASI is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees incurred
to date in defending this action at the Fifth Circuit.
Appellate Fees Incurred to Date: As previously noted, Judge Brown
sanctioned Dick under Rule 11 and § 1927, ordering him to pay those “fees, costs,
and expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred by ASI in defense of this suit.”
Dkt. 94 at 8. ASI argues that all its attorneys’ fees incurred—both at the district
court level and on appeal to the Fifth Circuit—were caused by the sanctionable
conduct and are thus recoverable.
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., the United States Supreme Court held
that Rule 11 does not permit district courts to sanction parties for appeals. There,
the high court stated that:
On its face, Rule 11 does not apply to appellate proceedings. Its
provision allowing the court to include “an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including
a reasonable attorney’s fee” must be interpreted in light of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which indicates that the Rules only “govern
the procedure in the United States district courts.” Neither the
language of Rule 11 nor the Advisory Committee Note suggests that
the Rule could require payment for any activities outside the context
of district court proceedings.
496 U.S. 384, 406 (1990). Similarly, a district court lacks the authority to impose
sanctions for appellate work under § 1927. See Matter of Case, 937 F.2d 1014, 1023
(5th Cir. 1991) (“The language of § 1927 limits the court’s sanction power to
attorney’s actions which multiply the proceedings in the case before the court.
Section 1927 does not reach conduct that cannot be construed as part of the
proceedings before the court issuing § 1927 sanctions.”). Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38 gives appellate courts—and only appellate courts—the authority to
impose sanctions for a frivolous appeal. As the Fifth Circuit has recognized: “the
determination of the right to sanctions for conduct during an appeal is reserved to
the appellate court, although it may allow the trial court to fix the amount of the
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fees and costs.” Conner v. Travis County, 209 F.3d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 2000)
(cleaned up).
Dick filed his notice of appeal on December 27, 2023. See Dkt. 75. The Fifth
Circuit issued its mandate on June 27, 2025. See Dkt. 91. Because a district court
does not have the authority to levy sanctions for work performed at the appellate
level, ASI is permitted to recover under Rule 11 and § 1927 only those fees, costs,
and expenses it incurred in the proceedings held before this court. Thus, ASI is not
entitled to recover fees it incurred while the case was on appeal to the Fifth Circuit
from December 28, 2023 to June 27, 2025. I will remove that time from the
lodestar calculation performed below.
I now turn to Dick’s specific complaints about ASI’s billing practices.
Excessiveness: Dick maintains that “ASI billed an inordinate amount of
time on tasks that, by any objective measure, should have taken far less time.”
Dkt. 103 at 17. To evaluate Dick’s claim that ASI has billed for excessive time, I
have reviewed each entry on the billing records. I conclude that a reduction in fees
is appropriate to account for excessive time.
Among the time I find excessive is time ASI’s counsel spent travelling to
depositions and site inspections, which it seeks to recover at 50 percent of the
attorney’s normal billing rate. I addressed this exact issue last year in a different
case:
[T]ravel time should be awarded only if legal work was performed
during the travel. Although I recognize that some courts in the Fifth
Circuit compensate attorney travel time at 50 percent of the attorney’s
billing rate, I am unwilling to do so. I do not believe that a lawyer who
uses travel time to work on an unrelated matter, make personal phone
calls, or watch a movie should expect to be awarded attorneys’ fees
simply because she is en route to a court proceeding. See Gruber ex
rel. Gruber v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 91 Fed. Cl. 773, 791 (Fed.
Cl. 2010) (stating attorneys “should not automatically assume that it
is reasonable to assess any and all travel time to a client-based
destination as billable to that client”).
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Est. of Gentry v. Hamilton-Ryker IT Sols., LLC, No. 3:19-cv-00320, 2025 WL
359793, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2025). ASI’s billing records do not show that its
lawyers performed any work while traveling. This is fatal to ASI’s fee request for
travel time because a “fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement
to an award.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. Without any evidence that ASI’s counsel
performed 	legal 	work 	on 	this 	matter 	while 	in 	transit, 	I 	will 	not 	award
ASI fees for travel time.
Overall, I will reduce ASI’s lodestar for excessiveness by 0.2 hours of
Schexnyder’s 	time 	in 	September 	2022, 	and 	the 	following 	time 	billed 	after
September 2022: 3.1 hours of Diana Beltran’s time, 39.1 hours of Carin L.
Marcussen’s time (27 hours billed as an associate; .1 hours billed as a partner; and
12 hours billed at a travel rate), and 5.2 hours of Schexnyder’s time.
Vague or Block-Billed Entries: Dick next complains that “[n]umerous
descriptions [provided in the time records] lack sufficient detail to assess necessity
or causation, preventing the Court from determining whether the hours claimed
were reasonably expended.” Dkt. 96 at 5. 4 My review of the time records has not
revealed many entries that I consider so vague as to prevent me from assessing the
reasonableness of the time spent on those tasks. To account for the time entries I
do consider vague, I will make a reduction in ASI’s lodestar by 0.4 hours of Lacy
Baccari’s time in September 2022, and the following time billed after September
2022: 0.4 hours of Baccari’s time, 0.4 hours of Beltran’s time, 0.1 hours of Rachel
Hancock’s time, 0.5 hours of Sarah Laurie’s time, 3.4 hours of Marcussen’s time (3
hours billed as an associate; .4 hours billed as a partner), 0.6 hours of Jared
Marks’s time, and 3.8 hours of Schexnyder’s time.
4 Sprinkled throughout Dick’s objections to ASI’s time entries are complaints about “block
billing.” See Dkts. 96 at 5; 103 at 21. “Block billing” refers to the disfavored “time-keeping
method by which each lawyer and legal assistant enters the total daily time spent working
on a case, rather than itemizing the time expended on specific tasks.” Fralick v. Plumbers
& Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund, No. 3:09-cv-0752, 2011 WL 487754, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 11, 2011) (quotation omitted). This does not seem to be an issue in the bills submitted
by ASI, as each time entry is separately itemized.
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Clerical Work: Dick asserts that ASI’s billing improperly includes “clerical
or ministerial tasks, such as scheduling, organizing files, e-filing documents, [and]
preparing cover letters to the clerk.” Dkt. 103 at 24. In response, ASI argues that
the work Dick complains about “is perfectly acceptable to be performed by
paralegals at a lower rate.” Dkt. 99 at 3.
The law is clear: fees for work completed by a paralegal may be recovered if
the work is typically performed by attorneys; “[o]therwise, paralegal expenses are
separately unrecoverable overhead expenses.” Allen v. U.S. Steel Corp., 665 F.2d
689, 697 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). As the Supreme Court has explained:
[P]aralegals are capable of carrying out many tasks, under the
supervision of an attorney, that might otherwise be performed by a
lawyer and billed at a higher rate. Such work might include, for
example, factual investigation, including locating and interviewing
witnesses; assistance with depositions, interrogatories, and document
production; compilation of statistical and financial data; checking
legal citations; and drafting correspondence.
Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989). “Of course, purely
clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of
who performs them.” Id.; see also Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 681 (5th
Cir. 2001) (“Paralegal work can only be recovered as attorney’s fees if the work is
legal rather than clerical.”).
Clerical work, or secretarial tasks, include the “filing of legal documents, the
calendaring 	of 	events, 	and 	communications 	regarding 	scheduling 	issues.”
Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 4:14-cv-00371,
2018 WL 1602460, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2018); see also Lewallen v. City of
Beaumont, 	No. 	1:05-cv-733, 	2009 	WL 	2175637, 	at 	*6 	(E.D. 	Tex. 	July 	20,
2009), aff'd, 394 F. App’x 38 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that basic communications
and case organization are “largely clerical or housekeeping matters and not legal
work” (quotation omitted)). “Preparing, assembling, and redacting documents and
exhibits, including affixing labels, are likewise clerical.” Bowman v. Prida Constr.,
Inc., 568 F. Supp. 3d 779, 787 (S.D. Tex. 2021).
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After reviewing ASI’s time records in this case, certain time entries that
appear clerical in nature. That time should be disallowed. Accordingly, I will
reduce ASI’s lodestar by 0.5 hours of Baccari’s time in September 2022, and the
following time billed after September 2022: 1.2 hours of Baccari’s time, 1.4 hours
of Beltran’s time, 0.3 hours of Hancock’s time, 1.3 hours of Marks’s time, and 0.1
hours of Schexnyder’s time.
Duplicative 	Time 	Entries: 	Dick 	also 	complains 	that 	“[m]ultiple
attorneys billed for identical tasks, inflating costs unnecessarily.” Dkt. 96 at 6. The
thrust of this complaint is that ASI had multiple attorneys working on this matter
when only one was needed.
It is not per se unreasonable for ASI to have employed multiple attorneys to
handle this matter. At the same time, ASI is not entitled to compensation
for duplicative efforts. To determine the amount of reasonable and necessary
attorneys’ fees, a district court is required to determine “whether particular hours
claimed were reasonably expended.” Walker v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 99
F.3d 761, 768 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). “If more than one attorney is
involved, the possibility of duplication of effort along with the proper utilization of
time should be scrutinized. The time of two or three lawyers in a courtroom or
conference when one would do, may obviously be discounted.” Johnson, 488 F.2d
at 717; see also Creecy v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 548 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286
(E.D. La. 2008) (“[W]hen a party chooses two attorneys to represent it in a lawsuit,
the 	opposing 	party 	is 	not 	required 	to 	pay 	for duplicative work 	incurred 	by
the attorneys.”).
After combing through the billing statements, I see that ASI’s attorneys and
paralegals occasionally engaged in and billed duplicative work. For that reason, I
will deduct the duplicative fees incurred by the lowest-billing attorney or paralegal.
This leads to a reduction of the following time billed after September 2022: 0.3
hours of Baccari’s time, and 0.7 hours of Marcussen’s time (all billed as an
associate).
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Prospective Fees: In her September 4, 2025 affidavit, Schexnyder opined
“that ASI will incur an additional $15,000 in costs, fees, and expenses to respond
to the Motion to Alter Judgment filed by” Dick a few days earlier. Dkt. 99-1 at 4.
ASI ultimately filed a 14-page response to the Motion to Alter Judgment. See
Dkt. 108. As already noted, the burden rests with the party seeking an award of
attorneys’ fees to establish and document the appropriate hours expended on a
task. With respect to the time spent responding to the Motion to Alter Judgment,
ASI has failed to meet its burden. I fail to understand how a flat $15,000 figure is
a reasonable fee for filing a 14-page response when no proffer is made concerning
the amount of hours spent preparing the response, and the attorneys who did the
work have not been identified. Accordingly, I recommend that ASI’s request for an
additional $15,000 for preparing a response to the Motion to Alter Judgment be
denied.
Conditional 	Appellate 	Fees: 	ASI 	also 	requests 	an 	award 	of
conditional appellate fees in the amount of $30,000 if Dick unsuccessfully appeals
the sanctions order to the Fifth Circuit. This request for conditional attorneys’ fees
should be denied. As I have already explained, a district court does not have the
power to award attorneys’ fees incurred defending an award of sanctions on
appeal. In the event ASI prevails on appeal, it can seek an award of fees from the
Fifth Circuit for a frivolous appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.
* * *
Based on my findings above, I calculate the lodestar as follows: 6
6 I previously awarded $4,235.16 in sanctions against Dick for his failure to make the
property at issue in this lawsuit available for inspection. See Dkt. 54. In issuing that
sanctions order, I reviewed a number of time entries (from August 22, 2023 to October
24, 2023) and expenses, determining which fees and expenses were necessarily incurred
as a result of the failed inspection. To account for this previous ruling and avoid any
possibility of double recovery, I must adjust the lodestar sought by ASI. Because I
previously considered 11.8 hours of Marcussen’s time (all as an associate) and 1.3 hours
of Schexnyder’s time, see Dkts. 48, 51, and 54, I will deduct these figures from the amount
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Timekeeper Dates
Billed
Hours
Claimed
Hours
Reduced
Hours
Approved
Rate
Approved Total Fee
Baccari
(paralegal)
9/1/22-
9/30/22 3 	0.9 	2.1 	$90 	$189
Baccari
(paralegal)
10/1/22-
8/31/25 8.5 	2.7 	5.8 	$115 	$667
Beltran
(paralegal)
10/1/22-
8/31/25 28.1 	4.9 	23.2 	$115 	$2,668
Elliot
(partner)
10/1/22-
8/31/25 1.7 	1.7 	0 	$270 	$0
Flynt
(associate)
10/1/22-
8/31/25 1.3 	1.3 	0 	$250 	$0
Hancock
(associate)
10/1/22-
8/31/25 10.9 	0.4 	10.5 	$250 	$2,625
Laurie
(associate)
10/1/22-
8/31/25 2.7 	2.3 	.4 	$250 	$100
Leiva
(paralegal)
10/1/22-
8/31/25 5 	0 	5 	$115 	$575
Marcussen
(associate)
9/1/22-
9/30/22 8.6 	0 	8.6 	$220 	$1,892
Marcussen
(associate)
10/1/22-
1/31/24 264.2 	47.8 	216.2 	$250 	$54,050
Marcussen
(associate)
10/1/22-
1/31/24
12
(travel) 12 	0 	$125 	$0
Marcussen
(partner)
2/1/24-
8/31/25 143.5 	131.4 	12.1 	$270 	$3,267
Marks
(paralegal)
10/1/22-
8/31/25 29 	6.5 	22.5 	$115 $2,587.5
0
Schexnyder
(partner)
9/1/22-
9/30/22 1.5 	0.2 	1.3 	$240 	$312
Schexnyder
(partner)
10/1/22-
8/31/25 34 	22.2 	11.8 	$270 	$3,186
presently sought by ASI. As an aside, ASI has represented that it received payment from
Dick for $4,235.16, thus satisfying my previous sanction order. See Dkt. 118 at 1.
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Timekeeper Dates
Billed
Hours
Claimed
Hours
Reduced
Hours
Approved
Rate
Approved Total Fee
Weaver
(paralegal)
10/1/22-
8/31/25 15.4 	0 	15.4 	$115 	$1,771
Lodestar: 	$73,889.50
As reflected in the above chart, the lodestar calculation indicates that ASI is
entitled to reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees from Dick in the amount of
$73,889.50.
c. 	The Johnson Factors
Once the lodestar is determined, a district court may adjust the lodestar
upward or downward depending on the Johnson factors. See Watkins, 7 F.3d at
457. “The lodestar, however, is presumptively reasonable and should be modified
only in exceptional cases.” Id. The party seeking an adjustment of the lodestar
bears a heavy burden. See Perdue, 559 U.S. at 552–53. In this case, neither party
seeks an adjustment of the lodestar. Even so, I have weighed each of the Johnson
factors and find that none of those factors warrant an adjustment to the lodestar
in an upward or downward direction.
C. 	E XPENSES
ASI seeks $24,008.46 in expenses that it contends it incurred in defending
this matter because of Dick’s misconduct. In connection with this request for
expenses, ASI has provided a chart listing each of the claimed expenses as well as
the invoices supporting the claimed expenses. See Dkt. 118 at 4. By far, the biggest
expense 	items 	relate 	to 	ASI’s 	engineering 	expert 	(Lorne 	Epson 	of 	Rimkus
Consulting Group, Inc.) and construction expert (Billy Liles of Texas Quality First
Restoration). The Rimkus bills total $19,540.07; the Texas Quality bills total
$3,709.18.
Dick initially challenged several expenses that ASI sought to recover—
including the Rimkus bills, travel costs, and research charges—because such
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expenses are not expressly permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. This argument is
baseless. When a district court imposes monetary sanctions under Rule 11 or 28
U.S.C. § 1927, as it did here, the court is not limited to awarding the taxable costs
enumerated in § 1920. Rather, a district court sanctioning a party under Rule 11 or
§ 1927 may require the sanctioned party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the improper conduct. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (“If warranted, the
court may award to the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, incurred for the motion.”); Morrison v. Walker, 939 F.3d 633, 635
(5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that the 1980 amendment to § 1927 “broaden[ed]
lawyers’ personal financial exposure to include ‘expenses and attorneys’ fees’”
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1927)). In a more recent filing, Dick abandons this argument,
recognizing that “[a] court can, as a sanction, award reasonable expert fees if they
were caused by sanctionable conduct.” Dkt. 103 at 30.
Dick objects to the Rimkus charges on the ground that “hiring the Rimkus
expert was [not] a necessary result of Dick’s conduct.” Id. This argument does not
move me. As already noted, Judge Brown ordered “Dick to pay the fees, costs, and
expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred by ASI in defense of this suit.”
Dkt. 94 at 8. The expert expenses incurred by ASI are directly attributable to Dick
bringing a frivolous lawsuit. Schexnyder explains in her affidavit that ASI hired
Rimkus to defend against Wright’s claims:
[B]ecause [Dick] alleged the property was damaged by vandalism and
the policy excluded damage from vandalism if the property had been
vacant, ASI retained expert Lorne Epson [of Rimkus] to inspect the
house and opine on whether the utility usage at the property was
consistent with the property being vacant.
Dkt. 99-1 at 3. According to Schexnyder, Rimkus’s charges were “reasonable and
necessary for the . . . defense of this case for ASI.” Id. I concur.
Although I find that ASI is entitled to recover its expert expenses, I must
make an adjustment to ensure that there is no double recovery. As already noted,
I previously sanctioned Dick in this case. See Dkt. 48. As part of that ruling, I
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awarded ASI $2,934.16 in expenses for expert fees and mileage incurred as a direct
result of Dick’s failure to make the property at issue in this litigation available for
inspection at an agreed upon date and time. See id. at 2–3. ASI seeks these same
expenses again as part of its current request for expenses. That is not allowed. As
such, I must reduce ASI’s current expense request by $2,934.16.
Next, Dick questions the validity of travel expenses that ASI seeks to recover
for one lawyer to travel to Dallas to take Wright’s deposition. I have scrutinized
these expenses. They are reasonable, minimal, and proper. I have no hesitation in
finding that these travel expenses should be awarded, especially because Dick
“insisted that [Wright] had to be deposed in Dallas, [and as a result,] ASI incurred
travel costs for [its] counsel to travel” to Dallas. Dkt. 99-1 at 3.
Dick also expresses distrust about the court fees that ASI requests, asking
me to “verify [whether such court fees] were necessary and actually incurred.”
Dkt. 103 at 34. Accepting that challenge, I have reviewed the requested court fees
for certified records and downloaded documents. The actual invoices for the court
fees sought are part of the record and all such fees were reasonably incurred in
defending this lawsuit. Moreover, I have confirmed that none of the court fees
sought as part of the sanction award have already been assessed as taxable costs
under § 1920. There is no double recovery.
Overall, I find that an award of $21,074.30 in expenses is appropriate. This
amount reflects expenses that were reasonably and necessarily incurred by ASI to
defend this action for which ASI has not already recovered.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I recommend that:
1. 	The Court Clerk tax costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 in the
amount of $9,799.55.
2. Dick be ordered to pay ASI $73,889.50 in reasonable and
necessary attorneys’ fees as a sanction under Rule 11 and 28
U.S.C. § 1927.
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3. Dick be ordered to pay ASI $21,074.30 in reasonable and
necessary expenses as a sanction under Rule 11 and 28
U.S.C. § 1927.
I further recommend that Plaintiff’s Objection and Motion to Strike Affidavit of
Ladonna G. Schexnyder (Dkt. 102) be denied.
The 	parties 	have 	14 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of
factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.
SIGNED this 	day of May 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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