Polendo v. Corpus Christi Municipal Courts et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
JAKE-SEAN: POLENDO, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
V. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-CV-00140
§
CORPUS CHRISTI MUNICIPAL COURTS, 	§
et al., 	§
§
Defendants.
ORDER
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Mitchel 	Neurock's 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation ("M&R"). (D .E. 35). The M&R recommends that the Court:
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• 	Substitute the City of Corpus Christi as a defendant in place of the Corpus Christi
Municipal Courts;
• 	Dismiss with prejudice all of Plaintiffs official-capacity claims against Judge Chapa,
Judge Reyna, Judge Rivera, Supervisor Rivera, and John Does 1 through 1O;
• 	Grant in part the Defendants' dismissal motion, (D. E. 25), as follows:
o 	Dismiss Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment,
Fourteenth 	Amendment, 	Unlawful 	Exercise 	of 	Admiralty 	or 	Maritime
Jurisdiction, and Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights claims without prejudice
as barred by the Younger abstention doctrine to the extent Plaintiff seeks
injunctive or declaratory relief on those claims;
o 	Stay Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment,
Fourteenth 	Amendment, 	Unlawful 	Exercise 	of 	Admiralty 	or 	Maritime
Jurisdiction, and Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights claims under the Younger
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 03, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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abstention doctrine to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages on those
claims;
o 	Dismiss Plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim without prejudice as premature;
o 	Dismiss 	Plaintiffs 	Conspiracy 	Against 	Rights 	under 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 241 ,
Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law under 18 U.S.C. § 242, and treason
claims with prejudice as premature;
o 	Dismiss 	Plaintiffs 	Conspiracy 	Against 	Rights 	under 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 241 ,
Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law under 18 U.S.C. § 242, and treason
claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted;
• 	Deny Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction, (D .E. 34);
• 	Deny Plaintiffs motion for sanctions, (D.E. 31);
• 	Deny without prejudice Plaintiffs motions for substitute service of process and
extension oftime to effect service, (D .E. 28 ; D.E. 30);
• 	Order Plaintiff to move to reopen this civil lawsuit within 30 days after entry of
judgment or an order of dismissal in his state criminal cases;
• 	Warn Plaintiff that failure to comply with the Court's order to move to reopen this civil
lawsuit will result in dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (b) for failure
to comply with a court order; and
• 	Administratively close this case.
(D.E. 35 , p. 34- 36). Plaintiff filed written objections to the M&R. (D.E. 36). 1
1 The Court also acknowledges that Plaintiff recently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, the Court maintains jurisdiction while Plaintiffs petition ts
pending. See Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc. , 57 F.3d 1406, 1416 (5th Cir. 1995).
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I. Law
When a party objects to the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge , the
district judge " shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. " 28 U .S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). 1
As to any portion for which no objection is filed , a district court reviews for clearly erroneous
factual findings and conclusions of law . United States v. Wilson , 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir.
1989) (per curiam). A party must point out with particularity any alleged errors in the magi strate
judge's analysis. Pelko v. Perales, No. 2:23-CV-00339, 2024 WL 1972896, at *l (S.D. Tex. May 3,
2024) (Ramos, J.). "Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district
court." Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en bane) (overruled on
other grounds by Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass 'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1416 (5th Cir. 1996) (en bane))
(superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)). When a party raises a new argument
in his objections that was not first presented to the magistrate judge, it is not properly before the
Court . Un ited States v. Ar mstrong , 951 F. 2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1992).
1 Under his tenth objection, Plaintiff challenges the standard of review the Court applies to the M&R.
(D.E. 36, p. 13) . "Plaintiff respectfully objects [to the M&R] and demands that the District Court perform
a full , transparent, point-by-point review of Plaintiff s Amended Memorandum in Opposition, addressing
each claim, each cited Supreme Court precedent, and each American Jurisprudence authority, so that ju stice
is not denied by selective omission." Id. at 14. Rule 72(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C) require the Co urt
to conduct a de novo review of any portions of the M&R properly objected to . S ee Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3);
28 U.S .C. § 636(b)(l)(C). "De novo review entails an independent, from-scratch assessment of the
evidence." United States v. Cabello, No. 25-40482, 2025 WL 2738463 , at *l (5th Cir. Sept. 23 , 2025) (per
curiam) (citing United States v. Rueben, 974 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992)). Nor does de novo review
require the Court to engage with each legal authority cited by Plaintiff. S ee Habets v. Waste Mgmt ., Inc. ,
363 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 2004) (declining to find that a district court is required to provide analysis when
it adopts a magistrate' s recommendation for summary judgment). Plaintiff provides no legal support for his
more exacting articulation of the applicable standard of rev iew. S ee (D.E. 36 , p. 13 - 14) . Without legal
support, the Court declines to apply Plaintiffs proffered standard of review to the M&R.
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II. Analysis
Plaintiff raises several objections to the M&R. (D.E. 36). The Court addresses each objection
in tum. 2
A. 	Younger Abstention Doctrine
The M&R recommends the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims
regarding his ongoing state criminal prosecution based on the Younger abstention doctrine.
(D.E. 35 , p. 20). In response, Plaintiff objects to the M&R and raises three arguments as to this
recommendation: (1) the M&R misapplied the Younger abstention doctrine, (2) the bad faith
exception applies, and (3) the extraordinary circumstances exception applies. (D.E. 36, p. 3--4).
The Court finds the Younger abstention doctrine applies to Plaintiff's claims. "The Younger
doctrine establishes a presumption that the federal courts should abstain in cases in which a state
criminal proceeding is pending." DeSpain v. Johnston , 731 F.2d 1171 , 1176 (5th Cir. 1984).
Younger abstention requires federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction when three conditions
are 	satisfied: "(l) 	the 	federal 	proceeding would interfere with an 	' ongoing state judicial
proceeding ' ; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim;
and (3) the plaintiff has 'an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional
challenges. "' Bice v. La. Pub. Defender Bd. , 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Middlesex
Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass 'n , 457 U.S. 423 , 432 (1982)). When a plaintiff fails
to allege facts showing that special circumstances are present or that they are entitled to federal
court intervention, Younger abstention is proper. Driver v. Garcia, No. H-15-0587, 2015 WL
12942418, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 17 , 2015) (Atlas, J.).
2 The Court OVERRRULES any objection not explicitly discussed as lacking sufficient particularity.
Pelko, 2024 WL 1972896, at * 1.
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All three Younger conditions are satisfied here. First, Plaintiff is facing prosecution on one
or more state criminal charges in the Corpus Christi municipal court, (D.E. 21, p. 29- 30), and he
desires that the Court enjoin those state prosecutions, (D.E. 21-1, 18-22). Second, "[t]he state has
a strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws." DeSpain, 731 F.2d at 1176. Third, Plaintiff has
"an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." Middlesex,
457 U.S. at 432.
As to the third requirement, Plaintiff alleges "the state forum has already refused to hear
Plaintiff's constitutional objections[.]" (D.E. 36, p. 3). "[W]hen a litigant has not attempted to
present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal court should assume that
state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the
contrary." Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). Plaintiff does not allege any facts
that the state forum has already refused to hear his constitutional objections. See (D.E. 1) ; (D.E.
4); (D.E. 14); (D .E. 15); (D.E. 16); (D.E. 17) ; (D.E. 21); (D.E. 21 -1); (D .E. 21-2); (D.E. 21-3);
(D.E. 21-4); (D.E. 21 -4 ); (D .E. 28); (D.E. 29); (D.E. 30); (D.E. 31); (D .E. 32); (D .E. 33); (D.E.
34). In the absence of those facts, the Court finds Plaintiff has "an adequate opportunity in the state
proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432. Because all three
conditions are met, the Court finds the Younger abstention doctrine applies.
Next, the Court addresses Plaintiff's argument that an exception to the Younger abstention
doctrine applies. The Court may refuse to abstain under Younger if "(1) the state court proceeding
was brought in bad faith or with the purpose of harassing the federal plaintiff, [or] (2) the state
statute [upon which the prosecution is based] is 'flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and
against whomever an effort might be made to apply it,' or (3) application of the doctrine was
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waived." Frericks v. Rockwall Cnty., No. 3:25-cv-2148, 2025 WL 2858904, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
4, 2025) (Horan, Mag. J.) (citation omitted), adopted, No. 3:25-CV-2148-S-BN, 2025 WL
2856309, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025) (Scholer, J.). Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
an exception applies. See Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 881 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
As to the first exception, Plaintiff must demonstrate his conduct is constitutionally
protected and the State's criminal prosecution is motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to retaliate
or deter that conduct. Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.3 F.2d 1375, 1382- 83 (5th Cir. 1979). Plaintiff
argues "Defendants engaged in a pattern of reissuing warrants, manipulating schedules, and
proceeding without prosecutor involvement." (D.E 36, p. 3). Even liberally construed, Plaintiff has
failed to meet his burden.
Conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish this exception applies. See Malin v. Tex .
Dept of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 4:24 -cv-04434, 2024 WL 5410107, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec.
13, 2024) (Ho., Mag. J.), adopted, No. 4:24-cv-04434, 2025 WL 490482, at * 1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13 ,
2025) (Eskridge, J.). Plaintiff's conclusory allegations, without any factual support, do not
demonstrate Defendants had motivations to retaliate against him for engaging in protected conduct
or to deter his future protected conduct. See (D.E. 1); (D.E. 21); (D.E. 21-1) ; (D.E. 32); (D.E. 36).
Nor does Plaintiff allege facts proving his conduct is protected. See (D.E. 1) ; (D.E. 21); (D.E. 21-
1); (D .E. 32); (D.E. 36). Because Plaintiff fails to provide factual support beyond his conclusory
allegations, the Court declines to find this exception applies. Malin , 2024 WL 5410107, at *4.
In the alternative, Plaintiff objects to the M&R and contends this case "constitutes
extraordinary circumstances that make abstention inappropriate." (D.E. 36, p. 3). 3 Plaintiff argues
3 To the extent Plaintiff argues that the state statutes which form the basis of his prosecution are
unconstitutional, the Court OVERRULES that objection. The M&R correctly found the statutes under
which Plaintiff faces prosecution are not unconstitutional. (D.E. 35 , p. 22-24). Furthermore, nothing in
Plaintiff's objections suggest that the Younger abstention doctrine has been waived. See (D.E. 36, p. 3-4).
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Defendants are "disguis[ing] admiralty or equi ty proceedings as common-law criminal cases,
proceeding without a prosecutor and with unsigned charging instruments. This fraud by silence,
combined with judicial usurpation of jury functions , constitutes extraordinary circumstances that
make abstention inappropriate." Id. 4 In evaluating extraordinary circumstances, Plaintiff must
demonstrate "a clear showing of both great and immediate harm." Wilson v. Gallagher, 4:21-CV-
526-P, 2021 WL 2917238, at *4 (N .D. Tex . July 12 , 2021) (Pittman, J.). Here, Plaintiff fails to
provide sufficient facts for this inquiry. (D.E. 1); (D. E. 21); (D.E. 21-1); (D.E. 32); (D.E. 36). In
the absence of such facts, the Court finds no extraordinary circumstances are present here. Blakely
v. Andrade, F.Supp.3d 453 , 471 (N.D. Tex . 2019) (Boyle, J.) (applying Younger abstention where
a party failed to demonstrate an exception applied).
Finally, Plaintiff objects that "the M&R's conclusion that 'no exception applies' is not
supported by analysis. It simply recites the Younger rule without addressing Plaintiff's factual
allegations or cited authorities." (D.E. 36 , p. 3). First, as discussed above, neither the M&R nor
this Court are required to engage with each of Plaintiff's cited authorities. See, e.g., Habets, 363
F.3d at 381. Second, the M&R's analysis was detailed and, after conducting a de novo review of
the facts and applicable law, the Court agrees with the M&R's analysis. 5
4 Plaintiff repeatedly argues the state courts lack jurisdiction. See (D.E. 36). For example, he contends "the
municipal court proceeded without a valid charging instrument, thereby lacking jurisdiction from
inception." Id. at 5. Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts showing a lack of jurisdiction. (D.E. I); (D.E.
21); (D.E. 21-1); (D.E. 32); (D.E. 36). Plaintiffs proffered 1971 Texas Attorney General opinion, which
he argues demonstrates Defendants lack jurisdiction, is devoid of any reference to municipal courts or their
jurisdiction. (D.E. 35 , p. 26-27 ; D.E. 21-3 , p. 29). And lastly, Plaintiffs arguments as to the state court's
jurisdiction fall well within the Younger abstention doctrine. (D.E. 35 , p. 24- 25). The Court declines to
consider Plaintiffs unsupported jurisdictional arguments in its analysis.
5 Plaintiff relies on Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S . 225 (1972), to argue abstention is the exception, not the
rule. (D.E. 36, p. 4). In Mitchum , the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that "federal injunctive relief
against a state court proceeding can in some circumstances be essential to prevent great, immediate, and
irreparable loss of a person ' s constitutional rights." Id. at 242 (collecting cases). But Mitchum also
reaffirmed a federal court' s ability to decline to intervene in state criminal proceedings pursuant to Younger
abstention. Id. at 229- 31 . Although the Court recognizes abstention is the exception, state court criminal
proceedings represent a kind of exception to the exception- 	under Younger federal courts may only
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Because the Court finds the Younger abstention doctrine applies and the exceptions are
inapplicable, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objection.
B. Failure 	to Address 	Plaintiff's 	Federal 	Constitutional Authorities 	& Ignoring
Established American Jurisprudence Authorities Demonstrates Bias
Next, Plaintiff generally objects to the M&R and argues it failed to address Plaintiff's
federal constitutional authorities and ignored established American jurisprudence. (D.E. 36, p. 4-
5). Within this objection, Plaintiff fails to point with specificity to any alleged error in the M&R's
analysis. Id. 	"Conclusory objections that fail to point out with specificity any error in the
Magistrate Judge 's analysis are not cognizable." Palomo v. Collier, No. 2:23-CV-00037, 2024 WL
180852, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 17 , 2024) (Ramos, J.) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court
OVERRULES this objection.
C. Prosecutor-Signature Defect Disregarded
Absent from the M&R is discussion of a prosecutor-signature defect. 	Plaintiff objects to
the M&R and argues this defect was disregarded and warrants sustaining his objection. (D.E. 36 ,
p. 5-6). This argument is nowhere to be found in any of Plaintiff's filings prior to the M&R. See
(D.E. 1); (D.E. 4); (D.E. 14); (D.E. 15) ; (D.E. 16) ; (D.E. 17); (D.E. 21); (D.E. 21-1); (D.E. 21-2);
(D.E. 21-3); (D.E. 21-4); (D.E. 21-4); (D.E. 28); (D.E. 29); (D.E. 30); (D.E. 31); (D.E. 32); (D.E.
33); (D.E. 34). Because Plaintiff did not raise this issue before the Magistrate Judge, it is not
properly before the Court. Finley v. Johnso n, 243 F.3d 215, 218 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001). The Court
OVERRULES Plaintiff's objection.
intervene in state criminal proceedings in limited circumstances. Because this case implicates no such
circumstances, the Court must apply Younger and abstain.
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D. Improper Judicial Fact-Finding in Violation of the Seventh Amendment & Seventh
Amendment Mandates Jury Determination of Disputed Facts
Next, Plaintiff objects to the M&R, arguing it "improperly engaged in judicial fact-finding
by taking notice of alleged municipal warrants posted on court websites and using them to support
abstention." (D.E. 36, p. 6) ; see also id. at 15-16. The M&R took judicial notice of Plaintiff's six
outstanding warrants in the Corpus Christi Municipal Courts under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.
(D.E. 35 , p. 3 n. l ). Plaintiff contends this judicial notice was procedurally improper. (D. E. 36 , p.
6- 7). The Court disagrees. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to "take judicial notice
on its own." Fed. R. Evid. 201(c). A court "may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding."
Fed. R. Evid. 201(d). The M&R took judicial notice within a stage of Plaintiff's proceeding. (D.E.
35 , p. 3 n.1).
Plaintiff further argues the warrants are not the type of documents that the Court can take
judicial notice of as the "authenticity and validity of these warrants are directly contested." (D .E.
36 , p. 6). Courts are permitted to take judicial notice of public records under Federal Rule of
Evidence 201. Funkv. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011). "Arrest warrants are public
records, and courts routinely take judicial notice of them." Wright v. Moore , No. 3:20-CV-473-
DPJ-FKB, 2021 WL 4190631 , at *7 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 14 , 2021) (Jordan, J.) (collecting cases).
Although Plaintiff may challenge the authenticity of the warrants, a warrant "is self-authenticating
as it bears the seal and the signature of the issuing judge." Id. at *8 (collecting cases). As such, it
was not improper for Judge Neurock to judicially notice Plaintiff's outstanding arrest warrants.
The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objection.
E. Prejudice From "Sovereign Citizen" Label and Selective Treatment of Claims
Plaintiff objects to the M&R on the grounds that it referred to Plaintiff as a "sovereign
citizen," arguing that "this selective framing accepting Defendants' prejudicial characterization
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while ignoring Plaintiff's cited authorities and factual allegations creates an appearance of bias
and undermines confidence in impartial adjudication." (D.E. 36, p. 8). As the M&R expressly
stated, however, "[t]he undersigned has not relied on the defendants' use of [sovereign citizen] in
evaluating the merits of Plaintiff's claims, but has instead applied the law independently of any
such label." (D.E. 35 , p. 34). Based on the M&R's engagement and consideration of Plaintiff's
arguments, 	the 	Court finds 	the 	M&R 	did 	not 	accept Defendants' 	supposedly 	prejudicial
characterization. The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objection.
F. 	Relief Calibration Error
Next, Plaintiff objects to the M&R, contending that the M&R erred in dismissing his claims
and administratively closing the case. (D.E. 36, p. 28). He contends that "when damages claims
cannot be adjudicated due to Younger, they must be stayed, not dismissed." (D.E. 36 , p. 9) (citing
Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 	193, 2022 (1988)). The M&R, however, makes this exact
recommendation. (D.E. 35, p. 35) (recommending the Court stay Plaintiffs claims under the
Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Unlawful
Exercise of Admiralty or Maritime, and Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights pursuant to the Younger
abstention doctrine to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages on those claims). The Court
OVERRULES Plaintiff's objection.
G. Procedural Bias
Next, Plaintiff objects to the M&R on two allegedly procedural grounds: (1) the M&R
deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to file his Amended Memorandum in Opposition, and (2) the
Magistrate Judge did not require Defendants to respond to Plaintiff's opposition. (D.E. 36, p. 10).
As to Plaintiff's first argument, the Court acknowledges Plaintiff complied with the Local
Rules in filing his Amended Memorandum in Opposition. See Local Rule 7.3; Local Rule 7.4.
However, Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum contains the same disjointed factual statements and
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conclusions of law as his original amended memorandum. Compare (D.E. 32), with (D.E. 39).
Further, it reiterates the same arguments contained in Plaintiff's amended complaint and initial
amended memorandum. (D .E. 21); (D .E. 21-1); (D.E. 21-2); (D.E. 21-3); (D.E. 21-4); (D.E. 21-
5); (D.E. 32). Reviewing Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum, the Court does not find arguments or
evidence that would alter the M&R's analysis. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's
objection.
The Court also rejects Plaintiff's second argument. Defendants were not required to
respond 	to 	Plaintiff's Amended 	Memorandum. 	Plaintiff's Amended 	Memorandum 	can 	be
characterized, at best, as a response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, requiring no response from
Defendants. See Local Rule 7.4. Further, absent from the local rules and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is a requirement for a party to respond to an opposing party's non-dispositive
memorandum. Finally, Plaintiff does not explain how consideration of his Amended Memorandum
would alter the M&R's analysis, (D.E. 36, p. 10) , and the Court's own independent review reveals
that it does not do so. The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objection.
H. Structural & Institutional Bias & Cumulative Evidence of Bias and Structural
Conflict
Plaintiff next argues he initially filed his claims in the Southern District of Texas, Victoria
Division, " to avoid the very structural conflicts of interest now evident in this case." (D .E. 36, p.
10). 6 Plaintiff's objection fails to specify which findings of the M&R it is directed toward. Id.
Because Plaintiff's objection fails to object to a specific finding, the Court OVERRULES it.
6 In any event, Plaintiff's choice between the Victoria and Corpus Christi Divisions does not change the
judges who could be assigned to his case: The same federal judges receive all civil cases filed in both
divisions. Therefore, regardless of whether Plaintiff filed in the Victoria Division, hi s case would be
assigned to the same federal judges.
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I. 	Judicial Review of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition is Required
Plaintiff objects to 	the M&R, contending review of his Amended 	Memorandum 	in
Opposition is required. (D.E. 36, p. 13) . Plaintiff filed two separate memorandums in opposition.
(D.E. 32); (D.E. 39). The M&R references and addresses Plaintiff's initial memorandum. (D.E.
35, p. 14, 15 , 18, 23). To the extent Plaintiff's objection is directed at the M&R's use of his original
memorandum, the Court finds the M&Rjudicially reviewed it under the correct legal standard of
review and OVERRULES Plaintiff's objection.
As to Plaintiff's amended memorandum, Plaintiff contends his filing "is not redundant; it
contains expanded authorities, additional factual support, and undeniable precedent demonstrating
the constitutional violations of the municipal courts." (D.E. 36, p. 13). Regardless of whether
review is required, the Court finds Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum is redundant. It does not
contain additional factual support, nor does it contain undeniable precedent demonstrating
constitutional violations by the municipal courts. Further, this memorandum does not alter the
Court's analysis of Plaintiff's claims. The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objection.
J. 	Magistrate's mishandling of service on Defendant Roberto Reyna demonstrates
further bias and advocacy
Plaintiff objects to the M&R, arguing Judge Neurock failed to consider his diligent efforts in
serving Defendant Roberto Reyna. (D .E. 36 , p. 21 - 23). Plaintiffs are responsible for adequately
serving defendants within the required time frame. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(l). Consistent with its
recommendation to stay some of Plaintiff's claims, the M&R permits Plaintiff to reopen his case
upon the completion of his state criminal proceedings and to then seek an extension of time to
serve or request substitute methods of service. (D.E. 35, p. 34). The Court does not find that
requiring Plaintiff to serve Defendants, as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to be
judicial advocacy.
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Plaintiff further argues that Judge Neurock caused Plaintiff to incur costs trying to serve
Defendant Reyna, and then decided to stay the case, resulting in the imposition of a financial
burden on Plaintiff. (D.E. 36, p. 21-22). Plaintiff is permitted to raise these issues, if and when,
the stay in his case is lifted as his motions were denied without prejudice. (D.E. 35 , p. 34-35); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). "A dismissal without prejudice leaves the plaintiff free to re-file the
[motions]." Williams v. Morrison , No. 6:14cv884, 2016 WL4577823 , at *4 n.2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 2,
2016) (Clark, J.) (citing Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296,298 (5th Cir. 1995)).
The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objection.
K. Failure to address Federal Decriminalization of Marijuana (Drug Policy Reform
Act of 2021)
Absent from the M&R is discussion of the Drug Policy Reform Act of 2021. Plaintiff
objects to the M&R and argues the M&R's failure to address this Act warrants sustaining his
objection. (D .E. 36 , p. 17). This argument is nowhere to be found in Plaintiff's filings filed before
the M&R's entry. See (D.E. 1); (D.E. 4); (D.E. 14); (D.E. 15); (D.E. 16); (D.E. 17); (D.E. 21);
(D .E. 21-1); (D .E. 21-2); (D.E. 21-3); (D.E. 21-4); (D.E. 28); (D.E. 29); (D.E. 30); (D.E. 31); (D.E.
32); (D.E. 33); (D.E. 34). Because Plaintiff did not raise this issue before the Magistrate Judge, it
is not properly before the Court. Finley, 243 F.3d at 218 n.3 . The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's
objection.
L. Recusal of Magistrate Judge Mitchel Neu rock for Bias and Appearance of Partiality
Plaintiff objects to the M&R seeking recusal of Magistrate Judge Neurock, and he
subsequently filed a motion for recusal. (D .E. 36, p. 25); (D.E. 38). Recusal is governed by 28
U.S.C. § 455 and 28 U.S.C. § 144 . "The requirements of the two sections are similar, if not
identical." Johnson v. Tipton , No. 6:23-CV-00023, 2023 WL 11857645, at *1 (S .D. Tex. June 21,
2023) (Hampton, Mag. J.) (citation omitted). Section 455(a) states, "Any justice, judge, or
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magistrate judge of the United States shall disquali fy himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U .S .C. § 455(a). Section 144 states in relevant
part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal
bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge
shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 144. To be legally sufficient, a plaintiff must file an affidavit meeting the following
requirements: "(1) the facts must be material and stated with particularity; (2) the facts must be
such that, if true, they would convince a reasonable person that a bias exists; and (3) the facts must
show that the bias is personal, as opposed to judicial, in nature." Johnson , 2023 WL 11857645, at
*l (citingHendersonv. Dep 'tof Pub. Safety& Corr. , 901 F.2d 1288, 1296 (SthCir.1990)).
The district judge has the discretion himself to determine a motion for recusal. Maldonado
v. Ashcroft, 108 F. App ' x 221 , 222 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Doddy v. Oxy USA , Inc.,
101 F.3d 448, 458 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996)). The Court' s opinion that it is unbiased is irrelevant; rather,
the Court must apply an objective test to the facts alleged. Garcia v. City of Laredo, No. CV L-10-
30 , 2011 WL 13248841 , at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 13 , 2011) (Alvare z, J.), aff'd, 702 F.3d 788 (5th
Cir. 2012). In interpreting these statutes, the Fifth Circuit has noted that " [a]dverse judicial rulings
alone[] ... do not support an allegation of bias under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 or 144[.]" Maldonado , 108
F. App 'x at 222; s ee also Waris v. Harris Cnty., No. H-06-1331 , 2007 WL 1791661 , at *1 (S.D.
Tex. June 19 , 2007) (Johnson, Mag. J.) ("[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid
basis for a bias or partiality motion.") (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994))).
Congress requires a judge's recusal in two situations- 	first, if a judge' s "impartiality might
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reasonably be questioned" and second, under several specific factual circumstances set out in the
statute. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)- (b). 7
Here, Plaintiff has not filed an affidavit pursuant to § 144. 8 His motion fails to meet the
threshold affidavit requirement under § 144 as it was not submitted "under penalty of perjury."
See Johnson, 2023 WL 11857645, at * 1. The Court nevertheless will consider the merits of
Plaintiffs motion under both§ 144 and§ 455 , given that "[t]he requirements of the two sections
are similar, if not identical." Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs reason for seeking recusal hinges on his complaints about Judge Neurock 's
M&R, including the M&R 's purported failure 	to address the federal 	decriminalization of
marijuana, as well as Judge Neurock requiring Plaintiff to serve Defendant Robert Reyna.
(D.E. 38 , 3-8). Adverse rulings alone do not constitute grounds for recusal 	under § 455.
Maldonado, l 08 F. App'x at 222. Neither Plaintiffs objections to certain rulings nor his general,
7 Subsection (b) states that a judge shall disqualify himself:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with
whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the
matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it ;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel,
adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the
merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his
household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 455(b).
8 Plaintiff filed a motion following his objections to the M&R. (D.E. 38).
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unsupported claims about the Court's decision-making reasonably call into question Magistrate
Judge Neurock's impartiality. Plaintiff also cites to none of the circumstances listed in§ 455(b) as
applicable in this case. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to identify any fact that would convince a
reasonable person that Magistrate Judge Neurock has a personal bias or prejudice against Plaintiff
in favor of the Defendants in this case. Because Plaintiff has articulated no sufficient basis for
recusal under either§ 144 or§ 455, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs objection and DENIES
his motion for recusal, (D.E. 38).
III. Conclusion
Having reviewed the proposed findings and conclusions of the M&R, the record, the
applicable law, and having made a de novo review of the portions of the M&R to which Plaintiffs
objections are directed, 28 U.S .C. § 636(b)(l)(C), the Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs objections,
(D.E. 36), and ADOPTS the findings and conclusions of the M&R, (D .E. 35). Accordingly, the
Court:
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• 	SUBSTITUTES the City of Corpus Christi as a defendant in place of the Corpus
Christi Municipal Courts;
• 	DISMISSES with prejudice all of Plaintiffs official capacity claims against Judge
Chapa, Judge Reyna, Judge Rivera, Supervisor Rivera, and John Does 1 through 1O;
• 	GRANT in part the Defendants' dismissal motion, (D.E. 25), as follows:
o 	DISMISSES 	Plaintiff s 	Fourth 	Amendment, 	Fifth 	Amendment, 	Sixth
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Unlawful Exercise of Admiralty or
Maritime, and Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights without prejudice as barred
by the Younger abstention doctrine to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive or
declaratory relief on those claims;
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17 I 18
o 	STAYS 	claims 	Plaintiffs 	Fourth 	Amendment, 	Fifth 	Amendment, 	Sixth
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Unlawful Exercise of Admiralty or
Maritime, and Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights under the Younger abstention
doctrine to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages on those claims;
o 	DISMISSES Plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim without prejudice as
premature;
o 	DISMISSES Plaintiffs Conspiracy Against Rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241 ,
Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law under 18 U.S.C. § 242, and treason
claims with prejudice as premature;
o 	DISMISSES Plaintiffs Conspiracy Against Rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241 ,
Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law under 18 U.S.C. § 242, and treason
claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted;
• 	DENIES Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction, (D.E. 34);
• 	DENIES Plaintiffs motion for sanctions, (D .E. 31); .
• 	DENIES without prejudice Plaintiffs motions for substitute service of process and
extension of time to effect service, (D.E. 28 ; D.E. 30);
• 	ORDERS Plaintiff to reopen this civil lawsuit within 30 days after entry of judgment
or an order of dismissal in his state criminal cases;
• 	WARNS Plaintiff that failure to comply with the Court' s order to move to reopen this
civil lawsuit will result in dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (b) for
failure to comply with a court order; and
• 	DIRECTS the Clerk of Court administratively close this case; and,
Case 2:25-cv-00140 Document 65 Filed on 12/03/25 in TXSD Page 17 of 18

• 	DENIES as moot any remaining pending motions.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Corpus Christi, Texas
December l~ 2025
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DA 	S. MORALES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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