Ybarra v. San Patricio County, Texas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
JEANYVA YBARRA,
Plaintiff,
VS.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-00196
SAN PATRICIO COUNTY, TEXAS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
In August 2024, Plaintiff Jeanyva Ybarra filed her initial complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Defendant San Patricio County (“the County”). (D.E. 1). Ybarra’s claims
arise from her time as a pretrial detainee in the San Patricio County Jail, during which time
she alleges that jail staff, acting pursuant to County policies, were deliberately indifferent
to her serious medical needs. (Id.). Currently pending is the County’s motion to dismiss
Ybarra’s claims, to which Ybarra has responded. (D.E. 11, 17).
As discussed further below, it is recommended that the County’s motion to dismiss
(D.E. 11) be DENIED.
I. ALLEGATIONS
Ybarra alleges the following in her complaint. (D.E. 1). In May 2022, she was held
in the San Patricio County Jail (“the Jail”) for approximately three weeks on a
misdemeanor charge. (Id. at 3). On June 3, 2022, during this first period of incarceration,
Ybarra was hospitalized because her hemoglobin count was too low. She had two blood
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 11, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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transfusions and underwent a procedure to have her feeding tube replaced. She was then
released back to the Jail with prescriptions and instructions for care for the feeding tube.
The Jail followed these instructions until Ybarra’s release at the end of June 2022. (Id.).
On July 12, 2022, Ybarra was again arrested and sent to the Jail. (Id.). After two
days, she began having abdominal pain and sought medical treatment, but jail staff did not
provide any treatment. After she passed a kidney stone, she was removed from the holding
tank and a nurse at the Jail conducted a blood test. Ybarra was again sent to the hospital,
where she was told that she had a bad infection and a urinary tract infection. She was given
a shot and then returned to the Jail. While at the Jail, she was not being fed through her
feeding tube as required. She was placed in an isolation tank for observation and again
experienced abdominal pain. The only medical care she received was ibuprofen and a stool
softener. (Id.).
During her second incarceration, Ybarra leaked acid and a substance similar in
appearance to bloody coffee grounds. (Id. at 4). She requested gauze on several occasions
to care for her feeding tube, but jail staff only provided gauze every few days despite
knowing Ybarra’s hygiene needs. After a nurse’s aide saw her, Ybarra was provided gauze
and an antibiotic ointment to put around the feeding tube. Ybarra was subsequently moved
to an eight-person unit with eight other women, where she continued to experience
worsening conditions and medical issues. She made 5-10 sick call requests where she
asked for medical care, to be fed through her feeding tube, to be given gauze, to receive
care for the bleeding she was experiencing, and to receive care for the acid she was leaking
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and the stomach aches she was experiencing. The other inmates also observed her
worsening medical condition. Due to the medical issues, Ybarra was not eating, slept on a
floor mat, and was too feeble to get up. She experienced chills and tried to take warm
showers to alleviate them. The other inmates assisted her during this time. Ybarra
repeatedly sought medical care from the Jail, but rarely received it. In one instance, the
other inmates told an officer that Ybarra was in and out of coherence, was clearly
dehydrated, and could not eat, but the officer responded that there was only so much she
could do. (Id.).
On August 28, 2022, Ybarra reported feeling “very cold” and told an officer she
could not breathe. (Id.). A different sergeant that Ybarra had not seen before was called
in, and this sergeant immediately called emergency medical services. (Id.). Ybarra was
taken back to the hospital and diagnosed with pneumonia, a liver infection, liquid in her
lungs, and dehydration. (Id. at 5).
In count one, Ybarra alleges that the County, through its jail officers and medical
staff, violated her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 6). Ybarra
further alleges that, under the state-created danger doctrine, the jail officers and medical
staff used their authority to create a dangerous environment. They were deliberately
indifferent to her serious medical needs when they accepted her into the Jail despite
knowing her extensive medical needs. (Id.). Moreover, the jail officers and medical staff
recklessly accepted her into the Jail and forced her to endure extraordinary pain and
suffering despite knowing of her extensive medical issues, the care she required, and the
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severe risk of harm during her incarceration. (Id. at 6-7). In count two, Ybarra alleges that
the County is liable for the actions of its employees under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (Id. at 7). Specifically, she alleges that: (1) the
jail staff was deliberately indifferent to her obvious, serious medical needs; (2) the jail staff
acted under the color of law as agents of the County; and (3) the jail staff acted in the scope
of their employment as jail officers or medical staff employed by the County. (Id.). The
County had several policies, customs, or practices that caused the rights violations,
including policies to: (1) accept inmates with major health issues into the Jail; (2) allow
staff to refuse necessary medical equipment or materials to inmates who had serious
medical conditions, such as denying gauze to an inmate with a feeding tube that needed
constant cleaning; and (3) refuse sick call requests to inmates with known serious medical
issues. (Id. at 8). The staff acted in accordance with these policies, which the County was
aware of, and the policies caused the violations of Ybarra’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The County, through its policymaker, knew the policies created a substantial risk of serious
harm and constitutional rights violations, but adopted the policies anyway. (Id. at 8-9).
Ybarra seeks damages and attorney’s fees. (Id. at 9-10).
II. DISCUSSION
a. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of an action for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In determining whether to grant a
motion to dismiss, the court must not go outside the pleadings and must accept all well-
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pleaded facts as true, looking at them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scanlan
v. Texas A&M University, 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003). Although the court must
construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, courts are not required to
“accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal
conclusions.” Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted).
A pleading must include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief and giving the defendant fair notice of what the claim is. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual allegations, but the
plaintiff must nonetheless provide more than merely labels and conclusions, and a
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555. The factual allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true, even if unlikely,
but the allegations must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. A claim has facial plausibility
where the factual allegations allow the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Facts that are
merely consistent with a defendant’s liability are insufficient. Id.
b. State-Created Danger Doctrine
In its motion to dismiss, the County first argues that the Fifth Circuit has never
adopted a state-created-danger theory of liability. (D.E. 11 at 4). Further, the County
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contends that, as recognized by the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court has recently suggested
that courts should be hesitant to expand the reach of substantive due process. (Id. at 4-5).
Finally, the County asserts that, on the merits, Ybarra has not adequately alleged a state-
created-danger claim under the elements previously identified by the Fifth Circuit. (Id. at
5).
Ybarra responds that the state-created-danger doctrine is recognized as clearly
established law by other circuits, and its adoption remains an open debate in the Fifth
Circuit. (D.E. 17 at 4-5). Under the elements of such a claim previously discussed by the
Fifth Circuit, Ybarra argues that, first, she has alleged that the County created a dangerous
environment for her by accepting her into the Jail despite knowing of her extensive medical
needs. (Id. at 5). Under the second element, Ybarra contends that she has adequately
alleged deliberate indifference based on the allegation that the County caused her to endure
extraordinary pain and suffering by recklessly accepting her into the Jail despite knowing
the nature of her medical issues, the medical requirements she had, and the severe risk of
harm she faced. (Id.). She argues that her allegations are sufficient even under the higher
“shocks the conscience” standard applied by the Third Circuit. (Id. at 6). Finally, Ybarra
notes that it is not uncommon for county jails to refuse to book inmates with extensive
medical issues, and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice also has programs to
properly care for such inmates by providing early parole. (Id. at 6-7). In a supplemental
filing, Ybarra argues that the Fifth Circuit has now adopted the state-created-danger theory
and defined the necessary elements of a claim. (D.E. 24 at 1-2).
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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally does not require
the government to protect citizens from the acts of private actors. Fisher v. Moore, 73
F.4th 367, 371 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 309 F.3d 308,
312 (5th Cir. 2002)). At the time of the motion to dismiss, the Fifth Circuit had recognized
one exception to this rule, which applies where a special relationship between the state and
the individual imposes “a constitutional duty to protect that individual from known threats
of harm by private actors.” Id. However, a majority of other circuits had adopted a second
exception to this rule, known as the state-created-danger doctrine. Id. at 371-73. Under
this doctrine, “a state actor who knowingly places a citizen in danger may be accountable
for the foreseeable injuries that result.” Id. at 372.
On November 17, 2025, the Fifth Circuit explicitly adopted the state-created-danger
theory “as a viable theory in our circuit.” Sterling v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, No. 24-
60370, 2025 WL 3205505, at *16 (5th Cir. Nov. 17, 2025). As defined in Sterling, a state-
created-danger claim requires that: (1) “a state actor or state actors affirmatively acted to
create or enhance a danger to the plaintiff[s];” (2) “the act or acts created or enhanced a
danger specific to the plaintiff[s] and distinct from the danger to the general public;”
(3) “the act or acts caused the plaintiff[s’] harm;” and (4) “the state actor’s conduct, when
viewed in total, shocks the conscience.” Id. The “shock the conscience standard is satisfied
where the conduct was intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government
interest, or in some circumstances if it resulted from deliberate indifference.” Rosales-
Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 138 (2018). “To act with deliberate indifference,
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a state actor must know of and disregard an excessive risk to the victim’s health or safety.”
McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 326 n.8 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
Here, following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Sterling, the County’s arguments
regarding the viability of a state-created-danger claim are no longer applicable. Despite
previously refusing to explicitly adopt or reject such a theory for years, the Fifth Circuit
has now explicitly adopted the state-created-danger theory and concluded that it is a viable
claim in this circuit. Sterling, 2025 WL 3205505, at *16. Accordingly, the remaining
question is merely whether Ybarra has adequately stated such a claim under the newly
defined elements in Sterling.
Addressing the elements in order, first, Ybarra’s complaint adequately alleges that
state actors affirmatively acted to create or enhance danger to her by accepting her into the
Jail despite knowing her medical needs and the severe risk of harm she faced as a result of
her incarceration. (D.E. 1 at 6-7); Sterling, 2025 WL 3205505, at *16. Specifically, Ybarra
has alleged that she had earlier been incarcerated at the Jail and, during that time, needed
two blood transfusions and a procedure to replace her feeding tube, so jail officials were
aware of her extensive medical needs. (D.E. 1 at 3). Nonetheless, she was subsequently
sent back to the Jail despite jail officials being unable or unwilling to provide the care they
knew was necessary. (Id. at 3-4). Second, Ybarra has adequately alleged that accepting
her into the Jail created an enhanced danger specific to her because the danger was related
to her specific medical needs. (See id.). Third, Ybarra has adequately alleged that she
suffered harm as a result because the failure or inability to provide her the necessary
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medical care throughout her stay at the Jail led to her being diagnosed with pneumonia, a
liver infection, liquid in her lungs, dehydration, and severe intestinal and liver problems.
(Id. at 5). Finally, Ybarra has adequately alleged that accepting her into the Jail “shocks
the conscience” under the deliberate indifference standard because she alleges that jail
officials knew of her medical problems and the excessive risk to her safety that
incarceration would entail, but they disregarded this risk. (Id. at 3-4).
Accordingly, it is recommended that Respondent’s motion be denied on this claim.
Alternatively, if the Court concludes that Ybarra has not adequately stated a state-created-
danger claim under the standard defined in Sterling, it is recommended that she be granted
leave to amend her claim because the Fifth Circuit adopted this standard after she filed her
complaint and while Respondent’s motion to dismiss was already pending.
c. Monell Liability
The County next argues that Ybarra has not adequately stated a Monell claim
because she has not identified any specific policy that was the moving force behind a
constitutional violation. (D.E. 11 at 4, 6-7). The County asserts that Ybarra has made
merely conclusory allegations of the existence of a policy, but has not asserted factual
allegations to support that these policies exist. (Id. at 7-9). Regardless, the County argues
that none of the three policies that Ybarra identifies can be the moving force behind the
alleged constitutional violation, which is the failure to provide adequate medical care. (Id.
at 4, 7-9). Accordingly, the County contends that, regardless of whether Ybarra raises a
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conditions-of-confinement claim or an episodic-acts-or-omissions claim, she has not
adequately established the required elements of a Monell claim. (Id. at 4).
Ybarra responds that her complaint adequately alleges each element of a Monell
claim, including a policymaker, an official policy promulgated by that policymaker, and
that the policy was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation. (D.E. 17
at 8). Specifically, she argues that: (1) San Patricio County Sheriff Oscar Rivera is the
final policymaker at the Jail; (2) she has adequately alleged three specific policies; and
(3) she has adequately alleged that these polices were the moving force behind acts and
omissions that occurred over the course of three months and caused her injuries. (Id. at 10-
12). Ybarra contends that, although she has not specifically identified the Jail employees
who violated her rights, she has identified that a nurse, nurse’s aide, and at least one jailer
interacted with her and acted under County policy, which is sufficient at this stage. (Id. at
10-11). Alternatively, Ybarra argues that she has adequately stated a conditions-of-
confinement claim. (Id. at 12-15).
In relevant part, § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Municipalities and other local government entities are “persons” within
the meaning of § 1983 and can be held liable for violating a pretrial detainee’s
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constitutional rights, including the right to medical care. Sanchez v. Young Cnty., Texas,
956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020). However, they may not be held liable under a theory
of respondeat superior or vicarious liability for the actions of their employees. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S.
at 689). Instead, to hold a municipality liable, a plaintiff must identify a municipal custom
or policy that caused his injury. Id. This limits a municipality’s liability to only
deprivations arising from its own decisions or from a custom “so widespread as to have the
force of law.” Id. at 403-04. Accordingly, “[t]o support a claim based upon the existence
of an official custom or policy, the Plaintiff must plead facts which show that: 1) a policy
or custom existed; 2) the governmental policy makers actually or constructively knew of
its existence; 3) a constitutional violation occurred; and 4) the custom or policy served as
the moving force behind the violation.” Meadowbriar Home for Child., Inc. v. Gunn, 81
F.3d 521, 532–33 (5th Cir. 1996).
“For section 1983 purposes, an official policy may be either a written policy or a
persistent widespread practice of municipal officials and employees which, although not
an authorized or officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled
as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Morris v. Dallas Cnty.,
960 F. Supp. 2d 665, 683–84 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (citing Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d
257, 263 (5th Cir.2002); Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir.1984)).
“The description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional
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violation … cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.” Spiller v. City of Texas
City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997).
A “plaintiff cannot plead facts “peculiarly within the knowledge of defendants.”
Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995). “[I]n the context of municipal
liability, like that of qualified immunity, it is ‘exceedingly rare that a plaintiff will have
access to (or personal knowledge of) specific details regarding the existence or absence of
internal policies or training procedures prior to discovery.’” Bright v. City of Killeen,
Texas, No. 6:20-CV-431, 2021 WL 1226560, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2021) (citing
Thomas v. City of Galveston, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 842 (S.D. Tex. 2011)). “Accordingly,
only minimal factual allegations should be required at the motion to dismiss stage,” and
“those allegations need not specifically state what the policy is, as the plaintiff will
generally not have access to it, but may be more general.” Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d at
842-43. However, the plaintiff’s allegations must still give fair notice to the defendant and
cannot merely restate the generic elements of municipal liability. Id. at 843. “Allegations
that provide such notice could include, but are not limited to, past incidents of misconduct
to others, multiple harms that occurred to the plaintiff himself, misconduct that occurred in
the open, the involvement of multiple officials in the misconduct, or the specific topic of
the challenged policy or training inadequacy.” Id. at 843-44.
“To survive a motion to dismiss on an unconstitutional custom or practice claim,
Plaintiffs must point to factual allegations sufficient to allow a reasonable inference that
there was a pattern of misconduct involving similar acts.” Robles v. Aransas Cnty. Sheriff’s
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Dep’t, No. 2:15-CV-495, 2016 WL 4159752, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2016). A “custom
consists of actions that occur for so long and with such regularity that the course of conduct
demonstrates the governing body’s knowledge and acceptance of the disputed conduct.”
Morris, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 684 (citing Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161,
169 (5th Cir. 2010)). To show that the custom or policy was the moving force behind the
violation, a plaintiff must further show that the municipality adopted the policy or custom
with deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (stating this rule in the context of a failure to train claim).
The Fifth Circuit characterizes “§ 1983 violations of a pretrial detainee’s rights as
either episodic-acts-or-omissions claims or conditions-of-confinement claims.” Sanchez
II, 956 F.3d at 791. For a conditions-of-confinement claim, the relevant question is
whether general jail conditions “amount to punishment of the detainee.” Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Flores v. Cnty. of Hardeman, Tex., 124 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir.
1997). “To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plead facts that plausibly establish that (1) a
condition (2) that is not reasonably related to a legitimate government objective (3) caused
the constitutional violation.” Rangel v. Wellpath, LLC, No. 5:23-CV-128-H, 2024 WL
1160913, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2024).
In contrast, “if the complained-of harm is a particular act or omission of one or more
officials, the action is characterized as an ‘episodic act or omission’ case.” Flores, 124
F.3d at 738. In such a case, the detainee typically “complains first of a particular act of, or
omission by, [an individual] and then points derivatively to a policy, custom or rule (or
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lack thereof) of the municipality that permitted or caused the act or omission.” Id. The
detainee must show that the individual acted with subjective deliberate indifference to
show a violation of his constitutional rights. Id. “To succeed in holding a municipality
accountable for such a violation, the detainee must show that the municipal employee
(1) violated his clearly established constitutional rights with subjective deliberate
indifference and (2) the violation resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted or
maintained with objective deliberate indifference.” Id. “Deliberate indifference is an
extremely high standard to meet but can be satisfied by a wanton disregard for an inmate’s
serious medical needs.” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 207 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted).
The Monell analysis applies regardless of whether the plaintiff is raising a
conditions-of-confinement claim or an episodic-acts-or-omissions claim. See Sanchez, 956
F.3d at 791 (noting that a plaintiff must show that a municipal policy was the moving force
behind the violation under either theory); Est. of Bonilla by & through Bonilla v. Orange
Cnty., Texas, 982 F.3d 298, 308 (5th Cir. 2020) (stating that the legal standards for a Monell
claim and for a conditions-of-confinement claim have no meaningful difference, and the
failure of a conditions-of-confinement claim is fatal to a Monell claim).
Here, as an initial matter, the County has not raised argument on the policymaker or
constitutional violation elements of a Monell claim, instead challenging only whether
Ybarra has adequately alleged a policy or custom that was the moving force behind the
alleged constitutional violation. (See generally D.E. 11). Further, contrary to Ybarra’s
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arguments, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that the legal standards under Monell and for a
conditions-of-confinement claim have no meaningful difference and that the failure of one
is fatal to the other. Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 308. For both claims, Ybarra must adequately
allege a municipal policy or custom that was the moving force of the constitutional
violation. Sanchez, 956 F.3d at 791. Thus, if Ybarra has not adequately alleged a Monell
claim against the County, she has also failed to state a conditions-of-confinement claim.
At this stage, Ybarra has adequately alleged several policies or customs that are the
moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation. Notably, at this stage, Ybarra
must make only minimal factual allegations and need not state exactly what the County’s
policies are. Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 842-43. So long as Ybarra’s allegations do not
merely restate the general elements of municipal liability, they are sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss. Id. at 843. In her complaint, Ybarra identifies three specific policies or
customs that caused her to be denied adequate medical care, including: (1) accepting
inmates with major health issues into the Jail; (2) rationing or refusing to provide gauze or
other necessary medical equipment to inmates known to have serious medical issues; and
(3) refusing sick calls despite knowing of an inmate’s major medical issue upon acceptance
to the jail. (D.E. 1 at 8). Ybarra has not merely alleged that the County had generic
policies, but rather has named the specific policies that led to her injuries.
Further, Ybarra’s complaint includes sufficient factual background to give the
County notice of what conditions of confinement and acts of its employees the policies or
customs caused. Among other allegations, Ybarra has alleged that: (1) officials at the Jail
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were aware of her medical needs due to an earlier period of incarceration, but accepted her
into the Jail anyway; (2) she was not fed through her feeding tube as required despite
submitting requests; (3) despite leaking acid and a substance appearing like bloody coffee
grounds, she was provided only ibuprofen and a stool softener; (4) she was only provided
gauze to care for her feeding tube every few days despite jail officials knowing her hygienic
needs; and (5) she rarely received medical care despite being unable to eat, unable to get
up, and requiring assistance from other inmates, whose attempts to obtain care for Ybarra
were also refused. (D.E. 1 at 3-4). These factual allegations include misconduct that
occurred in the open by multiple officials, which is sufficient to give notice to the County
of what Ybarra’s claims are. Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 843-44. Although Ybarra has
not specifically named the jail officials, she has alleged that she requested, and was refused,
medical care from both medical staff and jail officers. (D.E. 1 at 3-4). Ybarra’s allegations
of County policy are not merely conclusory or limited to the generic elements of municipal
liability, but rather are as detailed as can be expected prior to discovery given that the
specific details of the County’s policies are peculiarly within the knowledge of the County.
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434; Bright, 2021 WL 1226560 at *4.
It is recommended that the County’s motion be denied regarding Ybarra’s Monell
claim.
III. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the County’s motion to dismiss (D.E. 11) be
DENIED.
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Respectfully submitted on December 11, 2025.
____________________________
Julie K. Hampton
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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