Rosas v. Wise et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
GEORGE ROSAS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-00154
BREADEN WISE, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
ON THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In this prisoner civil rights action, Plaintiff George Rosas raises a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Corpus Christi Police Officers Breaden Wise and J. Hasette1
violated his Fourth Amendment Rights to be free of unreasonable search and seizure when
they effected a traffic stop involving him without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Pending are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 49) and Defendants’ Joint
Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 58).
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that summary
judgment be GRANTED in favor of the Defendants because they are entitled to the
protections of qualified immunity.
1 Plaintiff’s briefing and the Court’s docket show the spelling of Hasette’s name as Hassette. However, Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment lists the spelling as Hasette. (D.E. 58, Page 1). Accordingly, the undersigned has used
Defendant’s spelling for Defendant’s last name.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. JURISDICTION.
The Court has federal question jurisdiction over this civil rights action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331.
II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 22, 2022, after midnight, Plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle in Corpus
Christi, Texas. Officers Wise and Hasette were patrolling the area in their capacity as
Corpus Christi Police Officers. The officers executed a traffic stop on Plaintiff for
impeding traffic. Plaintiff was directed to exit the vehicle, and he complied with the
directive. Upon exiting the vehicle, the officers observed a pistol in the waistband of
Plaintiff’s pants. Plaintiff was detained and the officers also reported finding a small bag
of narcotics in Plaintiff’s right front pants pocket. Plaintiff was arrested. On July 26, 2022,
Plaintiff was charged federally by criminal complaint with being a felon in possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). United States v. George Rosas, No. 2:22-cr-
00519 (S.D. Tex. filed July 26, 2022) (N. Ramos presiding). On August 18, 2022, Plaintiff
was indicted. Plaintiff’s attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence in the criminal
case. The United States was opposed and filed a response. An evidentiary hearing was held
on December 8, 2022. Judge Ramos entered an order granting the motion to suppress
finding the Government failed to meet its burden to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the traffic stop was justified at its inception. Judge Ramos found the traffic
stop was a Fourth Amendment violation and ordered the evidence suppressed as the fruit
of the poisonous tree. (No. 2:22-cr-00519, D.E. 62). The United States filed a notice of
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appeal but later dismissed the appeal and the indictment against Plaintiff was dismissed
without prejudice.
Plaintiff filed the instant case against Officers Wise and Hasette on July 3, 2024,
and also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. While Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis was granted,2 the instant case did not immediately proceed
because he was sanctioned $100.00 by this Court on April 3, 2017 in a previous case and
he was required to obtain leave of Court and certify in a sworn affidavit that he had paid
the $100.00 sanction before filing any further pro se actions in the Southern District of
Texas. See In re George Rosas, Case No. 2:17-mc-349 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2017) (preclusion
order).3 Plaintiff later paid the monetary sanction and provided notice thereof on August 8,
2024.
2 Rosas v. Wise et al., No. 2:24-mc-113 (S.D. Tex. July 3, 2024) (order granting ifp application).
3 The Court is familiar with Mr. Rosas as a pro se litigator. While he is no longer in custody, he has previously been
designated as a “three strikes” litigant for filing cases which lacked merit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Some of the cases
lacking merit filed by Mr. Rosas were documented in Rosas v. Nueces Co. No. 2:16-cv-167 (S.D. Tex Oct. 4, 2016)
(Mem. & Rec. to dismiss), a case in which he was sanctioned for having a history of filing vexatious and frivolous
civil actions. (Rosas, No. 2:16-cv-167, D.E. 33). Among the frivolous, vexatious or otherwise meritless cases filed by
Mr. Rosas include: (1) Rosas v. Rodriguez, No. 5:04-cv-172 (N.D. Tex. filed July 27, 2004)(suit against TDCJ
personnel challenging prison disciplinary case dismissed as frivolous); (2) Rosas v. Perez, No. 2:05-cv-102 (S.D. Tex.
filed Feb 25, 2005)(suit against Nueces County Clerk for denial of access to court dismissed for failure to state a
claim); (3) Rosas v. Nueces Cty., No. 2:06-cv-73 (S.D. Tex. filed Feb 13, 2006)(suit against Nueces County for denial
of access to court dismissed for failure to state a claim); (4) Rosas v. Gonzalez, No. 2:15-cv-365 (S.D. Tex. filed Feb
25, 2005)(suit against Nueces County Assistant District Attorney for disclosing Plaintiff as an informant dismissed
for failure to state a claim); (5) Rosas v. Sheriff Kaelin, No. 2:09-cv-310 (S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 13, 2009)(suit against
Nueces County Sheriff for denial of access to court for failing to maintain a law library dismissed for failure to state
a claim and as frivolous); (6) Rosas v. City of Corpus Christi, No. 2:15-cv-133 (S.D. Tex. filed May 15, 2015)(suit
against police officer who arrested Plaintiff dismissed pursuant to the three strikes rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); (7)
Rosas v. Morales, No. 5:15-cv-583 (W.D. Tex. filed July 10, 2015)(suit against regional supervisor of the Texas Board
of Pardon and Paroles dismissed pursuant to the three strikes rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); (8) Rosas v. Bexar Cty., No.
5:14-cv-1082 (W.D. Tex. filed Dec. 8, 2014)(suit against Bexar County for denial of access to court dismissed as
frivolous and failure to state a claim); (9) Rosas v. Reed, No. 5:14-cv-827 (W.D. Tex. filed Sept. 15, 2014)(suit against
district attorney and law enforcement officers dismissed for failure to state a claim and on prosecutorial immunity).
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On August 21, 2024, the undersigned held an evidentiary hearing to allow Plaintiff
to explain his claims. The evidentiary hearing was “in the nature of a motion for more
definite statement.” Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). The Court uses the
evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether the complaint is adequate to permit the Plaintiff
to litigate his claims in accordance with the in forma pauperis statute. Id. at 182. After the
evidentiary hearing, the undersigned entered an order retaining Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claims against the defendants in their individual capacities and granted
Plaintiff’s oral voluntary motion to dismiss the remaining claims without prejudice. (D.E.
14). A scheduling order was entered after the defendants were served. (D.E. 39).
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 22, 2025. (D.E. 49).
Defendants filed a response on October 13, 2025, to which Plaintiff filed a reply. (D.E. 53,
D.E. 57). Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on November 7, 2025, to
which Plaintiff filed a response. (D.E. 58, D.E. 60).
III. THE PARTIES’ CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants move for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, arguing the
actions of Officers Wise and Hasette in executing the traffic stop of Plaintiff and their belief
a traffic violation occurred was objectively reasonable and there was no clearly established
law which prohibited their conduct. They further argue the undisputed evidence establishes
as a matter of law there was no fabricated traffic stop. Finally, they argue the subsequent
federal detention and prosecution arose from an independent action based on Mr. Rosas’
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own admitted conduct, not the actions of the officers, thus there is no causation between
the officers’ conduct and Plaintiff’s injuries. (D.E. 58).
Plaintiff argues there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact that he is entitled
to summary judgment. The evidence establishes he was subjected to a traffic stop by the
defendants that was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion and the law
is well established that such a stop is unconstitutional. Plaintiff further argues the evidence
establishes the defendants falsified their reports and made the traffic stop knowing no
traffic violation had occurred. (D.E. 49).
Defendants’ summary judgment evidence includes:
• Exhibit A: Deposition transcript of George Rosas (July 15, 2025)(D.E. 58-
1);
• Exhibit B: Deposition transcript of Officer Braeden Wise (July 31, 2025)
(D.E. 58-2);
• Exhibit C: Deposition transcript of Officer Jose Hasette (July 31, 2025)
(D.E. 58-3);
• Exhibit D: Corpus Christi Police Department Arrest Report (July 22,
2022) (D.E. 58-4);
• Exhibit E: Affidavit and Criminal Complaint of ATF Special Agent
Richard Miller leading to federal arrest warrant (July 26, 2022) (D.E. 58-5);
• Exhibit F: Order of the Hon. Nelva Gonzales Ramos (February 21, 2023)
granting dismissal of federal indictment (D.E. 58-6);
• Exhibit G: USB containing (1) Dash Camera Video of Officer Braeden
Wise and (1) Body-Worn Camera Video of Officer R. Jones (D.E. 58-7).
Plaintiff attaches the following as exhibits to his Motion:
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• Exhibit A: Judge Ramos’s Order on Motion to Suppress (D.E. 49-1, p. 2);
• Exhibit B: A copy of Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Gonzales, 276 S.W.3d 88 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.)(D.E. 49-1, p. 11); ;
• Exhibit C: Plaintiff’s summaries or excerpts of portions of the depositions
of Defendants (D.E. 49-1, p. 16);
• Exhibit D: A copy of Tex. Trans. Code. § 545.302 Stopping, Standing, or
Parking Prohibited in Certain Places (D.E. 49-1, p. 31); ;
• Exhibit E: Corpus Christi Municipal Code § 53-176 (D.E. 49-1, p. 34);
• Exhibit F: CCPD Investigation Report No. 2207220004 (D.E. 49, p. 36);
• Exhibit G: Arrest Warrant for George Rosas dated July 26, 2022 (D.E. 49-
1-1).
IV. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A genuine
issue exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court
must examine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law.” Id. at 251-52. In making this determination, the Court must consider the record as a
whole by reviewing all pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file, and
drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Caboni v. Gen.
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Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2002). The Court may not weigh the evidence
or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Id. Furthermore, “affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Cormier v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 969 F.2d 1559,
1561 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (refusing to consider affidavits that relied on hearsay
statements); Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam) (stating that courts cannot consider hearsay evidence in affidavits and
depositions). Unauthenticated and unverified documents do not constitute proper summary
judgment evidence. King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party
demonstrates an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case, then the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with specific facts showing that a
genuine issue for trial does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986). To sustain this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on the mere
allegations of the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “After the
nonmovant has been given an opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if no reasonable
juror could find for the nonmovant, summary judgment will be granted.” Caboni, 278 F.3d
at 451. “If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence ... a verdict should
not be directed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51.
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The evidence must be evaluated under the summary judgment standard to determine
whether the moving party has shown the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. “[T]he
substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Id. at 248.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 provides a vehicle for redressing the violation of federal law by those
acting under color of state law. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). To prevail
on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of state law
deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A defendant acts under color of state law
if he misuses or abuses official power and if there is a nexus between the victim, the
improper conduct, and the defendant’s performance of official duties. Townsend v. Moya,
291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The
Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. The reasonableness of a search
depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the search
and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations.” Grady
v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 310 (2015) (emphasis in original). Brief investigatory
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stops are permissible if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). These investigatory stops are limited
in scope and duration and are distinct from arrests, which require probable cause. United
States v. Cooper, 43 F.3d 140, 146 (5th Cir.1995). Traffic stops are considered seizures
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 397
(5th Cir. 2001). In determining the legality of a traffic stop, courts first examine whether
the officer’s action was justified at its inception and then inquire whether the officer’s
subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
stop. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
C. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). The qualified immunity entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is
erroneously permitted to go to trial. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) The
doctrine of qualified immunity affords protection against individual liability for civil
damages to officials “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson 555
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U.S. at 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at818 ). “Qualified immunity balances two
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise
power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably. The protection of qualified immunity
applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is ‘a mistake of law, a mistake
of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” Id. (quoting Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004)).Qualified immunity may protect officials who conduct
unlawful warrantless searches. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644 (1987).
When a defendant invokes the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense. McClendon v. City of
Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). To discharge this burden, the
plaintiff must satisfy a two-prong test.” Atteberry v Nocana Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245,
251-52 (5th Cir. 2005). First the plaintiff must claim the defendants committed a
constitutional violation under current law. Id. (citation omitted). Second, the plaintiff must
claim defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the law that was clearly
established at the time of the actions complained of. Id. A government official’s conduct
violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, “[t]he contours
of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear” that every “reasonable official would [have understood]
that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)
(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The assessment of whether the
law is clearly established does not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent
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must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
V. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ANALYSIS
The basis of the traffic stop in this case has been examined by Judge Ramos in the
related criminal case. While the instant civil case presents issues similar to the criminal
case, the issues before the Court are not identical. Nevertheless, Judge Ramos’ decision on
the motion to suppress provides context to consider the instant summary judgment motions.
In the related criminal case, Officer Wise testified he made the traffic stop because Plaintiff
impeded traffic, but he was not able to identify the law on which he relied to make the
traffic stop. United States v. George Rosas, No. 2:22-cr-00519 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2023)
(D.E. 62, p. 5, order on motion to suppress evidence). Judge Ramos found the relevant
statute at issue is § 545.363 of the Texas Transportation Code. However, the evidence in
the criminal case cast doubt on whether the location of the alleged traffic violation occurred
on a public road or private drive. Id. Judge Ramos found the Government (prosecution)
failed to meet its burden to show by the preponderance of the evidence that the traffic stop
was justified at its inception. Id. p. 7. Judge Ramos found the testimony presented did not
satisfy the Government’s “burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
Rosas had violated any provision of the Texas Transportation Code or even that Officer
Wise reasonably believed that he had. He failed to persuade the Court that he witnessed
Rosas impeding traffic with his stopped vehicle.” Id. p. 5.
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The undersigned agrees with Judge Ramos’ analysis in the criminal case. However,
the Court’s decision on the motion to suppress in the criminal case is not dispositive of the
issues related to qualified immunity in the instant civil case, in part because qualified
immunity was not part of the analysis and because the party bearing the burden of proof is
different. In a criminal case where a challenged search or seizure was conducted without
a warrant, the burden rests on the Government to establish by a preponderance of evidence
that the search was valid. United States v. Waldrop, 404 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2005)
(citing United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 733 n.6 (5th Cir. 1999)). In a civil case, when
a defendant invokes the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense. McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d
314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). It is Plaintiff’s burden to satisfy the two-prong qualified
immunity test. Atteberry, 430 F.3d at 251-52. As discussed below, qualified immunity and
who carries the burden of proof matters in the instant case.
In assessing qualified immunity, the Court may first address the second prong of the
analysis, that is whether Defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the
law that was clearly established. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The
undersigned elects to begin the analysis by addressing whether Plaintiff has carried his
burden to establish Defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the law
that was clearly established.
Plaintiff has the burden of establishing the officers’ execution of a traffic stop was
objectively unreasonable. Section 545.363 of the Texas Transportation Code states: “An
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operator may not drive so slowly as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of
traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with
law.” This statute is not a model of clarity and the scope of the conduct that may constitute
a violation of this statute is, therefore, heavily fact dependent. Judge Ramos’s order on the
motion to suppress in the criminal case sites several Texas State appellate court cases where
courts found certain conduct did not constitute a violation of Section 545.363.4 The cases
cited by Judge Ramos support the position that Plaintiff may not have impeded traffic under
the statute and these cases support the decision that the Government did not meet its burden
in responding to the motion to suppress in the criminal case. However, they do not support
Plaintiff’s effort to overcome qualified immunity because these cases establish the offense
of impeding traffic is fact specific, sometimes requiring interpretation by the state appellate
courts. No case exists sufficiently similar to the facts of the instant case to find that every
reasonable officer would know the traffic stop in the instant case was unlawful. Requiring
the officers to understand such nuances is not required under the qualified immunity
analysis. It simply is not unreasonable for the officers to have executed a traffic stop of
Plaintiff on the facts of this case.
4 United States v. George Rosas, No. 2:22-cr-00519 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2023)( D.E. 62, p. 6, n. 2) (citing Paulea v.
State, 278 S.W.3d 861, 864 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (finding that there was no evidence
that the appellant’s unattended vehicle obstructed or otherwise impeded the normal and reasonable flow of traffic
within the meaning of § 545.363 and the Texas Penal Code, especially in light of the officer’s testimony that he could
“easily” pass appellant’s vehicle); Richardson v. State, 39 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.)
(finding that there was no reasonable suspicion that appellant impeded traffic under § 545.363 where the appellant
was driving 10 miles per hour under the speed limit, there was little or no traffic on the road for appellant to impede,
and what traffic there was had no difficulty passing); and Thomas v. State, No. 12-06-00080-CR, 2007 WL 2460073,
at *3 (Tex. App.−Tyler Aug. 31, 2007, no pet.) (truck driver did not violate § 545.363 by applying brakes and rapidly
slowing from 65 to 50 miles per hour, as there was “no testimony that traffic was backed up or stopped”).
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The summary judgment evidence indicates Officers Wise and Hasette were
patrolling the La Armada and Corban Drive area of Corpus Christi, Texas, on July 22,
2022. Plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle on Corban drive. The officers observed
Plaintiff’s vehicle stop multiple times on Corban drive. (D.E. 58-2, p. 28). Plaintiff does
not dispute he stopped, however, he maintains he was merely slowing down to go over
speed bumps because the vehicle had a low profile. (D.E. 58-1, pp. 75-77). The officers
testified the stop occurred at midnight in a high crime area where there were shootings,
drive-bys, burglaries of motor vehicles, robberies, and heavy drug use and that they
believed Plaintiff was either casing apartments or was going to shoot at some apartments.
(D.E. 58-2, p. 28-29; D.E. 58-3, p. 12). 5 Nevertheless, the officers executed a traffic stop
on Plaintiff for impeding traffic and stopping in a fire lane. (D.E. 58-2, pp. 17, 22, 33; D.E.
58-3, pp. 6, 14). The police report is consistent with the officers’ testimony indicating
Plaintiff was driving suspiciously slow, stopped several times in the middle of the road,
and was pulled over because of the suspicious nature of the vehicle, the time of night,
crimes associated with the area, and for the traffic offense of impeding traffic.
A dash camera from Defendants’ patrol vehicle records one of the officers
immediately explaining to Plaintiff he was pulled over for stopping in the middle of the
road. (D.E. 61). Plaintiff also testified that Officer Wise told him he was pulled over for
impeding traffic. (D.E. 58-1, p. 80). The officer believed this constituted a traffic violation
5 Plaintiff testified he received a call from a friend about 11:30 p.m. The friend wanted .22 caliber shells. Plaintiff
was bringing the ammunition to his friend when he was stopped by defendants. (D.E. 58-1, pp. 58-59, 68-69).
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of impeding traffic. Plaintiff asked Officer Wise why he was stopped and Officer Wise
responded because he had seen Plaintiff stop several times and he was impeding traffic.
(D.E. 58-1, p. 84). Within seconds of traffic stop, Plaintiff was asked for his driver’s
license, and he explained he did not have a driver’s license because it had been suspended.
(D.E. 58-1, pp. 59, 80, 85; D.E. 58-2, p. 29). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was asked to exit
the vehicle. Upon exiting the vehicle, Plaintiff made a motion for the weapon with his hand
whereupon the officers immediately saw a firearm in Plaintiff’s waistband. Plaintiff
testified in the instant case that the firearm was falling from his waistband, and he was
trying to prevent the firearm from falling and discharging. (D.E. 58-1, pp. 86-87).
The fact that the primary basis of the stop was to investigate Plaintiff’s suspicious
activity as opposed to impeding traffic is of no consequence so long as the traffic stop was
objectively justified, even if the officer was mistaken that a traffic violation had occurred.
United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 432 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)). The Court does not evaluate the reasonableness of the
search or seizure based on hindsight that the officers were in fact correct that criminal
activity was afoot. However, it is not lost on the undersigned that Officers Wise and Hasette
were in fact correct in their determination based on a totality of circumstances that there
was criminal activity affot. Based on Plaintiff’s own testimony in this case, he is a former
Texas Syndicate Gang member who, on the night in question, was in fact a felon unlawfully
in possession of a firearm and ammunition. At the moment he was stopped by Officers
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Wise and Hasette, Plaintiff was in the process of delivering ammunition to another person.6
Plaintiff had concealed the ammunition in a cigarette package which was recovered by the
officers. (D.E. 58-1, pp 39, 59, 69-71).7 This observation is only made for the purpose of
evaluating the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct and noting that this is not a case
involving fabricating evidence or other police misconduct.
Plaintiff was driving slowly, in a high crime area, after midnight, and he stopped in
the middle of the street several times. It is not unreasonable for the officers to believe a
traffic stop had been committed or to have a reasonable belief a traffic violation had
occurred and/or to have a reasonable belief criminal activity was underfoot and warranted
further investigation. Plaintiff has not met his burden to establish the conduct of the officers
was wrong to the extent it was beyond debate. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Even if the officers
were mistaken about a traffic violation having been committed, their actions are not of the
type that would forfeit or otherwise terminate the protections of qualified immunity. One
of the purposes of qualified immunity is to give law enforcement officers “breathing room
to make reasonable but mistaken judgments” without fear of civil liability. Messerschmidt
v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012).
In Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 165 (5th Cir. 2009), the Fifth Circuit found
summary judgment was not appropriate where the circumstances were conducive to a well
6 Plaintiff is also prohibited from possessing ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
7 Despite being prosecuted federally, Plaintiff is under the false impression he may currently possess firearms. On
July 15, 2025, Plaintiff testified at his deposition in this case, “I can purchase a firearm, I can’t transport it though.”
(D.E. 58-1, pp 71-72).
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supported suspicion of a defendant’s mendacity, which may serve as a legitimate basis for
the fact finders reasonable inferences concerning the ultimate facts at issue. Id. (citing
Thomas v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 233 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir.2000) (footnote omitted)).
Said another way, if there is good reason to believe the officers are lying about the
circumstances of the traffic stop, a fact issue may arise to defeat the officers’ qualified
immunity claim at the summary judgment stage. However, “a motion for summary
judgment cannot be defeated solely by conclusional allegations that a witness lacks
credibility.” Id. The facts of the instant case are not similar to Deville. In Deville, the officer
at issue had a history of problematic arrests, citizen complaints against him, he had been
asked to resign because of an instance of excessive force, he was further asked to resign
because of a separate instance of filing a false charge against an innocent person, and there
were other reasons to question his veracity about the incident in question. Deville is an
important case in qualified immunity jurisprudence; however, the instant case is not akin
Deville and Officers Wise and Hasette are in no way similar to the officer in that case.
During the entire course of the traffic stop in the present case, as shown by the
videos of the incident (D.E. 61), Officers Wise and Hasette exercised extreme patience and
professionalism when dealing with Plaintiff. The officers were calm and polite. Even when
Plaintiff moved his hand in the direction of a firearm he carried in his waistband, the
officers did not tackle or otherwise use physical force against Plaintiff, or take him to the
ground, or even verbally abuse him. The unrebutted conduct and comportment of the police
officers as recorded on the video is important because it is consistent with the officers
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having acted reasonably from the inception of the traffic stop at issue in the instant case.
Officers Wise and Hasette acted professionally. They may not have fully understood the
statute relating to impeding traffic or that the drive may have been a private drive as a
public street, but there is no evidence or reason to believe they were dishonest in their
explanations for the traffic stop. Plaintiff’s claims that the officers fabricated the reasons
for the traffic stop are conclusory and unsupported by the evidence.
Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends the Court grant Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment based on Plaintiff not satisfying his burden of establishing
that the traffic stop was objectively unreasonable.
Because the undersigned recommends granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment based on qualified immunity, the undersigned does not address the remainder of
Defendants’ arguments nor Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
VI. CONCLUSION.
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that summary
judgment be GRANTED in favor of the Defendants because they are entitled to the
protections of qualified immunity. (D.E. 58). It is further recommended that Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED. (D.E. 49).
Respectfully submitted on April 20, 2026.
_______________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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