English v. Christus Spohn Health System Corporation

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
CRYSTAL M. ENGLISH,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-00133
CHRISTUS SPOHN HEALTH SYSTEM
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an employment discrimination case brought by Crystal M. English, now
proceeding pro se, against her former employer Christus Spohn Health System Corporation
(“Spohn”).
On January 30, 2026, the undersigned entered a Memorandum and
Recommendation recommending Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be granted
in part as to Plaintiff’s claims for employment discrimination based on race and color and
for retaliation and otherwise denied as to her claim for hostile work environment. (D.E.
75).1 More specifically, the undersigned recommended Plaintiff had not established a
prima facie case of race or color discrimination because she had not presented any
competent summary judgment evidence that she was replaced by someone outside the
1The factual background, summary of argument and statement of facts is contained in the
undersigned’s M & R and need not be repeated here at length. (D.E. 75, Pages 3-19).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 24, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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protected class or that other similarly situation persons were treated more favorably. (D.E.
75, Page 23). The undersigned further recommended that even if Plaintiff had established
a prima facie case, Defendant had established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
employment action taken against Plaintiff, which Plaintiff had not presented any evidence
were pretextual, namely repeated data entry errors, delayed preparation for meetings,
unprofessional tone and persistent attendance problems noting the “evidence before the
Court is simply that Plaintiff was a poor performer who was also difficult to work with and
supervise.” (D.E. 75, Page 25). As to her claims for retaliation, the undersigned
recommended Plaintiff had not established a causal connection between reporting racial
discrimination and/or reporting a doctor having sex with a co-worker and any adverse
action and, further, that “Plaintiff’s employment was terminated for legitimate non-
discriminatory reasons” previously discussed which Plaintiff failed to present any evidence
were pretextual. (D.E. 75, Pages 30-31).
On March 6, 2026, the undersigned’s M & R was adopted. (D.E. 85). Overruling
Plaintiff’s objections related to the dismissal of her claims for retaliation and
discrimination, the Court noted “Defendant demonstrated that Plaintiff was terminated for
a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason, defeating the retaliation claims,” “Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that the persons involved in the decision to terminate her held racially
discriminatory animus toward her” including Catherine Webb, Plaintiff did not challenge
the M & R’s conclusion as to the legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for her termination
specifically “her work performance, tardiness, cell phone use, absenteeism…, escalating
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warnings, reprimands, improvement plans and suspensions,” and Plaintiff failed to identify
any proper comparator. (D.E. 85, Pages 2-4).
Pending is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s March 6, 2026
Order, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).2 (D.E. 87). Upon review,
the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit, as previously
discussed in both the undersigned’s M & R and the Court’s Order Adopting the M & R.
Plaintiff’s Motion simply rehashes her previously submitted arguments in a conclusory
manner that were previously addressed by this Court. Further, she has failed to provide
any sufficient reasons why this Court should reconsider the earlier decision to dismiss her
claims. Additionally, the Court reviewed the evidence submitted by the parties and did not
make credibility determinations, as asserted by Plaintiff. Therefore, the undersigned
RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration be DENIED. (D.E. 87).
ORDERED on March 24, 2026.
_______________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
2Rule 54(b) allows parties to seek reconsideration of interlocutory orders and authorizes the district
court to revise any order or other decision that does not end the action. Austin v. Kroger, 864 F.3d
326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017) (Because the district court was not asked to reconsider a judgment, the
district court’s denial of [the] motion to reconsider its order denying leave to file a surreply should
have been considered under Rule 54(b) [rather than Rule 59].” “Under Rule 54(b), ‘the trial court
is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence
of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law.” Id. (citations
omitted); IIITEC Ltd., Weatherford Tech. Holdings, LLC et al, No. H-19-3386, 2021 WL 2635380,
at *8 (S.D. Tex. June 25, 2021) (“The power to reconsider or modify interlocutory rulings ‘is
committed to the discretion of the district court’” and “every order short of a final decree is
subjected to reopening at the discretion of the district judge.”) (citations omitted).
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(c); Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and Article IV, General
Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendations in a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation within
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs.
Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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