Diez v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice -CID

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
JAMES LOGAN DIEZ,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:23-CV-00269
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE -CID, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY
PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiff James Logan Diez, an inmate proceeding pro se, has filed this prisoner civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motions
for a protective order (D.E.’s 102 & 105), which are construed as motions for preliminary
injunctive relief. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfully recommends
that Plaintiff’s motions be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Criminal
Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID) and is currently housed at the McConnell Unit in
Beeville, Texas. Plaintiff’s allegations in this case arise in connection with his current
housing assignment.
In this action, Plaintiff generally challenges a new Texas Department of Criminal
Justice (TDCJ) digital mail policy that requires nonlegal mail to be sent to a third-party
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 01, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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vendor in Dallas, Texas, to be scanned and later uploaded to the prisoner’s electronic tablet.
(D.E. 1 p. 4; D.E. 1-1 pp. 1-17). The Court previously screened and retained Plaintiff’s
First Amendment free speech claim and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process
claim against TDCJ Executive Director Bryan Collier (“Collier”)1 in his official capacity
for injunctive relief, including the claims related to digitally scanning and storing inmate
mail on servers accessible through the internet. (D.E. 35, p. 6). In his complaint and more
definite statement, Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction of TDCJ’s digital mail scanning
policy as applied to him. (D.E. 1, p. 5; D.E. 1-1, p. 11; D.E. 16, p. 15).
Plaintiff has filed two similar motions for a protective order, requesting that the
Court order Lumpkin to cease and desist taking retaliative action against Plaintiff. (D.E.
102, p. 1; D.E. 105, p. 1). Plaintiff states that, prior to a status conference hearing held in
this case on September 10, 2025, he was housed in General Population. Id. Plaintiff asserts
he was moved to a smaller cell and much more dangerous environment in administrative
segregation housing shortly after the status conference. Id. With regard to the conditions
of his confinement in administrative segregation, Plaintiff states that: (1) his cell is infested
with bugs, pests, and other vermin; (2) his movement and access to various areas and
activities—such as the showers, inmate dining room, mailroom, recreation yard and
library—has been restricted; (3) he cannot get fresh air into his cell; (4) he is not provided
with any form of cleaning supplies to clean and sanitize his cell; and (5) he has difficulty
1 Since the filing of this lawsuit, Bobby Lumpkin (“Lumpkin”) has replaced Collier as TDCJ’s Executive Director. In
a separate order, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the undersigned will direct the Clerk to substitute
Lumpkin in place of Collier with respect to Plaintiff’s claims brought against Collier in his official capacity.
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breathing due to the deployment of chemical agents by security officials that spreads to his
cell. (D.E. 102, pp. 1-2; D.E. 105, pp. 1-2).
Plaintiff claims that he was placed in administrative segregation, which is a more
harmful and dangerous environment, in retaliation for his legal activities. (D.E. 102, p. 2).
He adds that his placement in administrative segregation, or temporary/transient housing,
was unnecessary because he was “not going anywhere or waiting to go anywhere.” (D.E.
105, p. 2).
Plaintiff asks the Court to order Lumpkin to move Plaintiff immediately out of
transient housing in administrative segregation and back into appropriate general housing
population consistent with his classification and medical designation category. (D.E. 102,
p. 4; D.E. 105, pp. 2-3). Alternatively, should he remain in transient housing in
administrative segregation, Plaintiff asks the Court to order Lumpkin to:
● allow Plaintiff the same access to the inmate dining room, recreation yard,
commissary, mailroom, and general population library that are given to other
general population inmates;
● permit Plaintiff hourly in-and-out access to his cell between 0800-2000,
including inclusive access to the showers whenever the G-2 inmate
population are allowed;
● provide Plaintiff with general purpose sanitizing cleaner, mop, broom, and
cleaning rag to clean and sanitize his cell;
● fumigate, spray, or treat Plaintiff’s transient housing cell for pests, such as
ants, cockroaches, and rats; and
● refuse to place another inmate in Plaintiff’s cell until secure lockers with
doors and padlocks are installed in his cell.
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(D.E. 105, p. 3).
Lumpkin responds that Plaintiff’s move to transient housing was part of a temporary
solution to adjust to custody overflow within a custody housing level, such as G2 general
population, at the McConnell Unit. (D.E. 107, p. 3). Next, Lumpkin asserts that Plaintiff’s
requested relief is moot as he is no longer in transient housing after being moved back to
G2-general population housing on November 20, 2025. Id. at 4-5. Third, according to
Lumpkin, Plaintiff’s movement in transient housing in administrative segregation was
restricted due to a lockdown which affected every inmate at the McConnell Unit and was
not targeted to Plaintiff. Id. at 4. Lastly, Lumpkin states that Plaintiff has not used the
grievance system to address his retaliation concerns and that Plaintiff has not provided
specific reasons to support a retaliation claim. Id. at 4-5.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks relief in his motions that are in the nature of preliminary injunctive
relief. See Shafer v. Muro, No. 2:20-CV-167, 2021 WL 2143614, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May
25, 2021) (Libby, M.J.), adopted, 2021 WL 4067258 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 7, 2021) (Morales,
J.). Accordingly, the undersigned construes Plaintiff’s motions as seeking a preliminary
injunction.
A movant is entitled to a preliminary injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(a) if he establishes the following four elements: “(1) a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not
issued, (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that
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will result if the injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not
disserve the public interest.” Robinson v. Hunt Cnty., Texas, 921 F.3d 440, 451 (5th Cir.
2019) (quoting Speaks v. Kruse, 445 F.3d 396, 399-400 (5th Cir. 2006)). The Fifth Circuit
has cautioned that granting a preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy, not to be granted routinely, but only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries
the burden of persuasion.” White v. Carlucci, 862 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also
Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2013); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v.
United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The decision to grant a
preliminary injunction is to be treated as the exception rather than the rule.”).
As an initial matter, the undersigned will consider whether Plaintiff’s requested
relief has been rendered moot. Reanna Arrisola, a “Supervisor III as the Chief of
Classifications with TDCJ, has provided an affidavit in support of Lumpkin’s response.
(D.E. 107-1). She states that, on November 20, 2025, Plaintiff “was moved back to General
Population housing and will remain in general population for the remainder of the year so
long as housing issues do not rise again.” (D.E. 107-1, p. 3).
Because Plaintiff has received the relief he requests in his motions—transfer from
transient housing in administrative segregation back into general housing population—his
motions for preliminary injunctive relief have been rendered moot. See Thomas v. Holmes,
No. 2:23-CV-00190, 2024 WL 5248424, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2024) (Neurock, M.J.),
adopted, 2024 WL 5247155 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2024) (Morales, J.) (denying emergency
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injunctive relief as moot because inmate received the relief requested when he was moved
into a normal-sized cell in an air-conditioned environment); Garcia v. Alfonso, No. 23-cv-
3561, 2023 WL 9050934, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2023) (denying preliminary injunction
motion as moot because plaintiff had received the relief he had requested in that motion);
Bennett v. U.S. Marshal, No. 4:22-CV-00022, 2022 WL 2758542, at *2 (W.D. Ky. July
14, 2022) (same); Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 72 F. Supp. 3d 249, 251 (D.D.C. 2014)
(denying preliminary injunction as moot “because [applicant] has already received his
requested relief”).
Even if Plaintiff’s transfer back into general population did not render his motions
moot, he cannot carry his burden as to any of the four required elements for preliminary
injunctive relief. Plaintiff’s claims in this lawsuit concern Plaintiff’s constitutional
challenges to the TDCJ’s digital mail policy. None of his claims concern his recent
placement in transient housing as alleged retaliation for engaging in this litigation.
Plaintiff, therefore, is attempting to obtain a preliminary injunction based on claims that
are wholly unrelated to his underlying complaint. See, e.g., Morris v. Aliu, No. 6:21cv440,
2023 WL 11821106, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 31, 2023) (rejecting inmate’s motion for a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction based on his placement in restrictive
housing in retaliation for filing lawsuits because such actions were unrelated to the
underlying claims of his lawsuit); Booker v. McDuffie, No. 5:18-CV-208-BQ, 2019 WL
3937225, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 22, 2019) (“Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
has not specifically addressed the issue, district courts within this circuit have found that a
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request for a preliminary injunction must also be based on allegations related to the claims
in the complaint.”).
With regard to his claim of retaliation associated with his placement in transient
housing, Plaintiff essentially seeks “to bring a new civil action masquerading as” motions
seeking preliminary relief in this action. See Schwarzer v. Wainwright, No. 6:18-CV-
00034, 2022 WL 903744, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2022) (Neurock, M.J.), adopted, 2022
WL 902636 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2022) (Tipton, J.). Because there is no relationship
between the injunctive relief requested in these motions and the underlying claims retained
in this lawsuit, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.2 See id.
(“The absence of this connective relationship is fatal to Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive
relief, because “the issues giving rise to [the] injunction will not be addressed, let alone
resolved, at trial.’”) (quoting Zhou v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1008,
1011 (N.D. Iowa 2016)).
Furthermore, as Plaintiff has been moved from transient housing back into general
population, he cannot demonstrate a substantial threat of irreparable harm based on the
alleged dangerous and harmful conditions in his transient housing cell. Lastly, Plaintiff
provides no arguments or evidence to demonstrate that any threatened injury to him
outweighs any damage that the injunction might cause Lumpkin or that the injunction will
not disserve the public interest. See Sepulvado, 729 F.3d at 417.
2 In any event, it does not appear that Plaintiff has attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his
new retaliation claims that are unrelated to the claims retained in this action. Plaintiff is free to try to exhaust his
administrative remedies, if he has not done so, and file a new lawsuit if appropriate.
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motions for a protective order, construed as motions for
preliminary injunctive relief (D.E.’s 102 & 105) should be denied.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s
motions for a protective order, construed as motions for preliminary injunctive relief
(D.E.’s 102 & 105), be DENIED.
Respectfully recommended on December 1, 2025.
____________________________
Julie K. Hampton
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs.
Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc).
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