Pupo Reina v. Mullin et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
CENIA P.R., 1 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:26-cv-637
§
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al., 	§
in their official capacities, 	§
Respondents. 	§
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DENY PETITIONER’S HABEAS PETITION
Before the Court is Petitioner’s “Petition for Writ of Habeas” (Dkt. No. 1)
(“Petition”). For the following reasons, the Court should deny the Petition.
Petitioner is currently detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the El
Valle Detention Center in Willacy County, Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at 4. Petitioner states that she
both entered the U.S. and was arrested by U.S. Border Patrol on or about November 7, 2025.
Dkt. No. 1 at 4. An Immigration Judge denied Petitioner bond based on lack of jurisdiction
on May 26, 2026. Id. Petitioner asserts the following two claims for relief. First, Petitioner
argues the application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to her detention unlawfully mandates her
continued detention and violates the INA. Dkt. No. 1 at 9. Second, Petitioner argues her
detention without a hearing to determine whether she is a flight risk of danger to others
violates her right to due process. Id.
Petitioner is detainable under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,
166 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2026), and, as pleaded, Petitioner’s constitutional claims are not
viable. Detention “during removal proceedings,” even where such detention is without a
bond hearing, is generally a “constitutionally permissible part of that process.” Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). While the Court has acknowledged the possibility of
1 Due to significant privacy concerns in immigration cases and noting that judicial opinions are not subject to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, any opinion, order, judgment, or other disposition in this case will refer to the petitioner
only by first name and last initial.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 26, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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instances where such detention could strain constitutional limits, see, e.g., id. at 532
(Kennedy, J., concurring), Petitioner has not raised that family of issues in this Petition, see
Dkt. No. 1 at 9-10.
Additionally, 	the 	Supreme 	Court’s 	cases 	“establish 	only 	that 	aliens 	receive
constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and
developed substantial connections with this country.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (emphasis added). If “an alien [] has effected an entry into the
United States,” this changes “the legal circumstances” for aliens regardless of “whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 693 (2001). If the entry fiction applies to a petitioner, that petitioner is “entitled only to
those due process rights as are provided by law,” which is to say “by Congress”—by statute.
Id. at 1442-43. Because the Court finds no purpose to punish Petitioner, Petitioner possesses
no extra-statutory due process rights that have been violated here.
It is therefore recommended that the Court (1) DENY the Petition (Dkt. No. 1) and
(2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to close the case.
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The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections, if any, with the United
States District Judge assigned to the instant case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When filing an
objection, a party must object to specific facts or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation. The District Judge is not required to consider frivolous, conclusive, or
general objections. Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir.
1987).
If any party fails to timely object to any factual or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation, the District Judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of the record
before adopting these findings. If the District Judge chooses to adopt such findings without
conducting a de novo review of the record, the parties may not attack those findings on
appeal, except on the grounds of plain error. Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs., L.L.C.,
875 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed on June 26, 2026.
Karen Betancourt
United States Magistrate Judge
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